

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


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CAVALRY STUDIES

STRATEGICAL AND
TACTICAL

CAVALRY STUDIES

STRATEGICAL AND TACTICAL

BY

MAJOR-GENERAL DOUGLAS HAIG

C.V.O., C.B.

Late Inspector-General of Cavalry in India

WITH NUMEROUS MAPS AND SKETCHES

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PREFACE

SOME explanation seems due to the reader for the publication of these Cavalry Studies.

The present volume has grown out of the proceedings of Five Staff Rides which took place under my direction when Inspector-General of Cavalry in India (1903-6). These Rides were held under somewhat favourable circumstances. In the first place, India is very suitable for such exercises—every description of country is easily reached from the military cantonments, and no difficulties present themselves in the matter of camping or marching to suit the supposed military situation; in winter the climate is an ideal one for camping and outdoor life; and lastly, ample transport can usually be obtained without expense to those taking part in the exercise. Under such circumstances but little difficulty need be experienced in arranging a practical scheme and in carrying it out under conditions closely resembling those of active service.

But besides the natural advantages of the country it was my good fortune to have, not only on the directing staff, but also among those attending for instruction, a number of officers of the several arms who had not only studied the "deeds of the great masters," but who had also had practical experience of war in various parts of the world.

Thus, as Director of these Rides, I received very valuable assistance on many points; and the problems which daily arose for consideration, were handled, I venture to think, in an especially fresh and practical manner. As a result there was accumulated a mass of material on important Cavalry questions of the day, far beyond the scope of any single English work dealing with Cavalry matters. After each Ride, thanks to the industry of certain of my staff officers, a Report embodying the more important portions of the work was published for the use of those who had been present; and last summer, before I left India, all the Reports were published in one volume under the title of "Five Cavalry Staff Rides." I owe special acknowledgment to Captain Howell of the Guides Cavalry for preparing it for the press.

Copies of the above volume being exhausted, I have been asked by several friends to republish it. These Staff Ride Reports, however, were intended merely as a reminder to those who had taken part in one or other of the Rides. Their form was rather that of a precis of proceedings than a carefully compiled study of certain imaginary Cavalry operations, and so, for the ordinary military reader, they must be difficult to follow, and hence somewhat unintelligible. It was therefore clear to me that if the Reports were to be published they must be remodelled. This would entail much labour, and, as I could not myself at the present moment spare the necessary time to undertake the work, I handed it over to my old friend Colonel Lonsdale Hale, requesting him to deal with the material as he thought fit. The present volume is the result. The first four Rides have been converted into "Studies"; the fifth retains its

original form. The conversion has been utilised to group together views, opinions, and remarks on the same subjects, but which were necessarily scattered over the original records of the three years' work. For the invaluable work which Colonel Lonsdale Hale has performed I desire to express my deep gratitude and obligation ; indeed, without his aid, this volume could never have appeared at all.

I also desire to thank the many friends who have helped me, both in India and at home. Chief among these stand Major Barrow (4th Cavalry), Major Hudson (19th Lancers), Major Macandrew (5th Cavalry), Major Shore (18th Lancers), Major Stewart (R.F.A.), Major Stotherd (30th Lancers), Major Vaughan (10th Hussars). I am also indebted to Colonel H. Gough (16th Lancers), to Major Dallas (General Staff), and to Captain De Prée (General Staff) for some valuable hints and suggestions. It is not practicable to give proper credit in each instance, but the reader will be able to judge, from the large number of technical details included in the volume, how much I am indebted to officers of the Royal Engineers and Army Service Corps for information. For this I desire to express a general acknowledgment here.

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CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

WHERE, as in dealing with the work of a Cavalry Division, so many subjects come up for consideration, it is impossible to specify the exact order of their importance. But the leading idea throughout all these Studies is to bring into prominence the *strategical* employment of Cavalry, the rôle of the *Independent Cavalry Division*, and also the *tactical* employment of Cavalry in co-operation with the other arms.

A thorough study of the strategical situation *as a whole*, and of the probable theatre of operations, is essential in order that Brigadiers may be able to appreciate intelligently the *special rôle* of the Cavalry Division, and also that of their own Brigades. In fact, even the most junior Cavalry officers, whether they be scouts, patrol leaders, troop leaders, or orderly officers, must understand something of strategy in order to be able properly to discharge their duties.

The following extract is taken from some remarks made by Colonel Lonsdale Hale during a discussion at the R. U. S. Institution in London in 1905, on the "Strategical Employment of Cavalry":

" . . . A Cavalry subaltern is sent out in front of an army with three or four troopers, and he is told to find out all about the enemy. If he is lucky, he may come across the enemy and get hold of a certain amount of data, although imperfect. On these data he has to form a conclusion as to what the enemy is doing, and that conclusion he has to send to his Colonel or General behind, and on that the Commanding Officer, perhaps, bases his orders. It requires not merely the

power of close observation. What is the good of officers knowing all these things unless they understand them? The officer must have an understanding of the phenomena which come before his eyes. Let me take a case. Let me take the case of Lieutenant von Busse, of the 6th Cavalry Division. He was sent out in front of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin's Detachment (Armee-Abtheilung) to find out about the French. He was a brave young fellow, and rode forward with ten men, and entered the town of Châteaudun, and found a large body of French of all arms. He made his way out of the town, and, after losing four men, got back to a wood at night, and said to himself, 'I will stop here for the night, and I will send in my report to-morrow after having looked again.' That was the failure. *Had he known the strategical situation he might have said*, 'What on earth is the meaning of this great body of French troops here? Are they all going north to intervene between our Army and the Second Army, or are they going south, or are they stationary?' At all events, if he had had the strategical situation in his mind he would have realised that the mere fact of a large body of all arms being there was of the utmost importance, and that the information should be sent back to his commander as quickly as possible. But he did not do that. He said, 'I will wait until to-morrow morning.' What was the result of this young officer not grasping the situation? The Grand Duke commanding the army behind had heard of a body of troops marching north, and our young lieutenant had hit on the main body due east of his own army. If the lieutenant's report had gone in that night, the Grand Duke might have marched due east the next morning, and perhaps have swept that corps off the ground. As it was, owing to the delay of the young officer and his not realising the importance of the situation, the Grand Duke marched north-east, and the whole of the enemy escaped him."

The duties which fall to the lot of Cavalry in war necessitate that arm being formed into three groups—viz. :

(1) Independent Cavalry, for strategical exploration, under the direct orders of the Chief.

(2) Protective Cavalry, for the provision of the First Line of Security for the Army as a whole.

(3) Divisional Cavalry, for scouting in the close vicinity of the Infantry Divisions, for orderly work in the Division, and for inter-communication between Divisions.

The division of the Cavalry into these three distinct groups is based on the recognition of the fundamental difference that exists between the *Service of Information* (or, to discover) and the *Service of Security* (or, to cover). To the last two groups falls the latter Service; the first group is reserved for the former. These two duties of Cavalry are quite distinct, and must never be confused.

Although, in the first instance, Cavalry should be told off into these groups, the actual distribution must be considered as elastic, and sometimes it may be necessary to reinforce the first group from the second, or *vice versâ*.

The questions are sometimes raised, "Why devote staff rides to the consideration of the work of Cavalry Divisions; why, at Cavalry Manœuvres, work with Cavalry Divisions when our organisation does not acknowledge so large a unit?"* The reply is, that although a Brigade organisation may be deemed the most satisfactory, all things considered, for our requirements in peace, there can be no doubt that in the event of war on any but a small scale, circumstances will cause Cavalry Brigades to be grouped into Divisions, as has happened in most wars. In order to achieve really decisive results, either in strategical reconnaissance or on the battlefield, we ought, indeed, to be prepared to group our Cavalry even still further, and to be ready to form one or more Cavalry Corps.

This, at any rate, was the result of the practical experience for instance, of the Americans, in 1863-5. The Cavalry of

* Since this was written, a portion of the Cavalry of the Field Force (Home Army) has been organized as a Division, but the statement still holds true as regards India.

the Army of the Potomac was first distributed amongst large Infantry units, then concentrated into Divisions, and eventually grouped as a Corps of three Divisions; this Corps comprised a total of some thirty regiments and twelve batteries.

Or again, it is now fully recognised that the German Cavalry in 1870-71, not being suitably organised beforehand, let slip many opportunities of obtaining great results.

The question, however, of grouping our Cavalry into Corps may, perhaps, be disregarded for the moment; but *the necessity for forming Cavalry Divisions* ought to be recognised, their composition arranged for, and sufficient staffs (including a Commanding R.H.A. Officer per Division) allotted. Cavalry Brigades should also from time to time be methodically trained as part of a Division. The want of previous exercises of this nature was most noticeable on the first day of the Rawalpindi manœuvres in December 1905.

It is commonly argued that so far as India is concerned, Cavalry Divisions or even Cavalry Brigades will never be required, and can never be employed on or beyond the North-West Frontier of India, owing to the difficulties of terrain, and of transport and supply. But with our vast and widely scattered Empire, it is impossible to say where our Army may not be required at any moment, and it would be suicidal to confine the higher training of an arm within the limits which appear, rightly or wrongly, to suffice for local requirements, when, without any warning, its services may be peremptorily called for in some theatre of war of a totally different character. To prepare British Cavalry in India for frontier warfare solely, would be nearly as sensible as to restrict the training of the British Cavalry in South Africa to working on the veldt.

It must be borne in mind that the days of small Armies are past, and it is a simple fact that *large Armies entail large numbers of Cavalry*.

"Infantry and Artillery," says Colonel Henderson, "unaccompanied by Cavalry, if opposed by a force complete in

all arms, are practically helpless, always liable to surprise, and, whether attacking or defending, hampered by ignorance of the enemy's movements and bewildered by uncertainty. . . . It is *essential*, then, for decisive success that every force which takes the field against an organised enemy should be composed of the three arms."

Again :

"Moltke, indeed, has laid it down that the junction of two previously separated forces on the field of battle is the highest triumph of generalship. . . . It may be assumed, therefore, that the directors of future campaigns will have always in view the advantages to be derived from hurling a fresh force—whose approach, if possible, has been concealed until it opens fire—against the enemy's flank and rear ; and the sudden onset of Blücher at Waterloo, of Lee at the second Manassas, of Stonewall Jackson at Chancellorsville, of the Crown Prince of Prussia at Königgrätz, will be the ideal of the decisive act of battle. It is to be observed, however, that successful converging movements have been carried out more frequently by a force acting on the offensive than on the defensive. In the first place, an Army which adopts the offensive has usually the superior numbers or the superior *moral*, and it consequently incurs less risk in separation. In the second place, it is usually superior in Cavalry, and is thus able to prevent all knowledge of the separation from reaching the enemy, as well as to conceal the march of the outflanking column. We may conclude, therefore, that it is only when the defender has the more powerful Cavalry, and is at least equal to his adversary in numbers and in *moral*, that he will dare to deliver a converging counter-stroke.

"The army, then, which assumes the strategical offensive has, as a general rule, the best chance of employing this most effective manœuvre ; but *much depends on the quality and handling of the Cavalry*. . . . Cavalry, then, sharing the enormous defensive power conferred by a low trajectory rifle and rapidity of fire, plays a rôle in grand tactics of which the importance can hardly be over-estimated. They make it

possible for a general to adopt the most brilliant of all manœuvres, the converging attack, and to make that attack, as indeed all other attacks, more or less of a surprise.

"But to protect the troops in rear from observation is not the only duty of Cavalry. Reconnaissance of the enemy's position is the foremost of its functions, and the occupation of points of tactical vantage, such as hills, woods, villages, etc., behind which the main Army can deploy in security, or the outflanking columns march unobserved, is not far behind. The pursuit, too, falls upon the mounted arm, the destruction of the enemy's trains, the capture of his guns, the spreading of demoralisation far and wide. But most important, perhaps, of all its functions are the manœuvres which so threaten the enemy's line of retreat that he is compelled to evacuate his position, and those which cut off his last avenue of escape. A Cavalry skilfully handled, as at Appomattox or Paardeberg, may bring about the crowning triumph of grand tactics—viz. the hemming in of a force so closely that it has either to attack at a disadvantage or to surrender."—"The Science of War.")

Now it would be most unwise to assume that our opponent will be so overwhelmed with prospective difficulties of supply, etc., as to enter on a campaign without a due proportion of Cavalry. If then, ignoring the whole teaching of history, and scorning the experiences of others, we propose, unaccompanied by our proper proportion of Cavalry, to meet a force complete in all three arms, our prospects of success will be very small indeed.

Again, with regard even to Indian trans-frontier difficulties of terrain and of transport and supply, those of terrain reduce themselves to either mountains or waterless deserts, and in neither will decisive results ever take place. The trans-frontier area is not *wholly* composed of such features, and we may be certain that large scale operations will surely gravitate towards the cultivated valleys and plains, and away from the mountains and sand.

Difficulties, moreover, of terrain, etc., are *invariably*

exaggerated. "And yet these difficulties," says Marshal Soult, after some twenty-five years of almost continuous active service many years before railways were invented, "were never insurmountable, even when taken as a point in the line of defence. Some issue invariably left ignored, some difficult pass left to be discovered, afforded the means of a passage to obtain another and a still better one. The first point gained left others won or compromised, *and there is no example of an Army which made any serious attempt having failed.*"

The Boers succeeded on more than one occasion in executing tasks pronounced by our military experts to be quite impossible—as, for instance, the mounting of the heavy guns on the hill outside Ladysmith—whilst the Japanese during the recent war constantly carried out the "impossible."

If then it be granted that in a decisive struggle—in a *war*, as opposed to a punitive expedition—large armies will be employed, and that with the large armies will be their due proportion of Cavalry, then the necessity to study and prepare beforehand how best such Cavalry may be employed can need no further demonstration.

In considering the work of Cavalry in the field, we must never lose sight of the fact that the decisive and governing factor on which depend the result and the value of that work is Leadership; the quality and character of the Leading in one and all of the ranks of Command—from the General, the Leader of the Corps of Cavalry, down to the Non-Commissioned Officer, the Leader of a Patrol. In Cavalry work, individuals can make or mar, to an extent almost, if not totally, impossible in the work of the other arms.

The influence of this Leadership is felt as much in the tactical work as in the strategical work, and it is a simple fact that at any moment in a campaign may arise, for a Cavalry Leader of any rank, a situation which, for its satisfactory solution, needs mental power and capacity not often called on in Leaders of similar rank in the other arms. It

is to incapacity to rise to the mental requirements necessary that is due the painfully small proportion of opportunities utilised, to opportunities let slip, so noticeable in all the wars of the past ; and hence the small esteem sometimes displayed towards the arm by soldiers, and the neglect of it in peace time. Moreover, as Colonel Ardant du Picq wrote, about the year 1868 : " The value of Cavalry has been questioned in all periods of history ; the reason for this is that it costs a great deal, and is but little employed, simply because it is such an expensive arm. The question of expense always arises in times of peace."

On the other hand, the far-reaching and valuable results that have been actually derived from successful leading are apt to be overlooked or ignored.

One of the favourite statements employed in depreciation of the Cavalry as an arm, and which, generation after generation, comes to the front, is that, owing to the improvement in Infantry armament, "the day of Cavalry is past." Some views, which we hold to be correct, in opposition to these poor estimates of Cavalry, are now given.

Skobelev published the following order to the Cavalry Division of the 4th Corps on June 15th, 1882: "If Infantry can after suffering tremendous losses succeed in coming hand to hand, why should not Cavalry be able to do the same, seeing that its rapidity of movement is incomparably greater?"

The rôle of Cavalry on the battlefield will always go on increasing, because—

1. The extended nature of the modern battlefield means that there will be a greater choice of cover to favour the concealed approach of Cavalry.
2. The increased range and killing power of modern guns, and the greater length of time during which battles will last, will augment the moral exhaustion, will affect men's nerves more, and produce greater demoralisation amongst the troops. These factors

contribute to provoke panic, and to render troops (short-service soldiers nowadays) ripe for attack by Cavalry.

3. The longer the range and killing power of modern arms, the more important will rapidity of movement become, because it lessens the relative time of exposure to danger in favour of the Cavalry.
4. The introduction of the small-bore rifle, the bullet from which has little stopping power against a horse.

General Maillard, Professor of Infantry Tactics at the École de Guerre in France in 1898, wrote as follows: "To believe that Cavalry can effect nothing against Infantry because the latter is now armed with a long-range repeating-rifle, is to suppose without proper reason that surprises are no longer possible; that leaders will never again make mistakes; that troops will always be in good heart, and ready at any moment for fighting; that they will never be affected by fatigue nor hunger, nor by the results of an unsuccessful fight. Such conclusions are contrary to human nature; and surprises, misunderstandings, mistakes, and failures will constantly recur; and the Cavalry will be at hand to take advantage of them.

"The rôle of Cavalry is far from being over upon the battlefield. In the nature of the country it will find a valuable ally. At any rate, it will be able to take advantage of it just as much as, if not more than, Infantry can, because Cavalry will not hesitate to make a *détour* in order to get the benefit of an undulation to conceal its approach."

From a lecture given before the Berlin Military Society by Lieut.-General von Pelet-Narbonne we take the following extracts:

"General von Moltke in a report to King William I. on July 25th, 1868, writes as follows:

"Where, in the war of 1866, the Prussian Cavalry were successful in action, it always *charged down upon* the enemy.

Some individual squadrons and regiments again and again showed themselves superior to the enemy, and some splendid march operations have been performed. Still, the value of this arm remained, comparatively speaking, small, while a large number of units never came in contact with the enemy at all.' In another place, he says, 'Practically the Cavalry *never* supported the Infantry.' The General quotes only ten instances where regiments, as regiments, and one where brigades, as brigades, have attacked.

"On the other hand, the Cavalry was often not at hand when required, and had to be sent for. At Königgrätz, where the Cavalry of the 1st Army was opportunely in the right place at the right time, but was prevented from moving forward until the Infantry had crossed the Sadowa, it neglected to prepare and to arrange beforehand crossing-places. Only two fords were practicable, and the leading detachments came into action before those in rear were across. When the general pursuit should have begun the action of the Cavalry ceased altogether. Some Brigades remained quite inactive. The reserve Cavalry Division of the 2nd Army was kept so far in rear that it only came up at the end of the battle. *The cause of the indifferent performance of the Cavalry lies not in the material, but in the leading, the formation, and the distribution.* The Cavalry also often shirked coming under shell fire. I shall come back later to this point.

"Moltke then remarks: 'Our Cavalry failed, perhaps, not so much in actual capacity as in self-confidence. But all its initiative had been *destroyed at manœuvres*, where criticism and blame had become almost synonymous, and it therefore shirked independent bold action, and as much as possible kept out of sight far in the rear.' Further on, Moltke complains that 'the reserve Cavalry of the 1st and 2nd Armies, which, in spite of the supply difficulties, was carefully kept in hand until the battle of July 3rd, was then never thrown in front of the advancing columns just when it might have performed important reconnaissance duties.' He concluded with the words: 'The reserve Cavalry of the 1st and 2nd

Armies has been employed very little, or not at all, in the duty of guiding the Army. For long-distance scouting this Cavalry has never been used at all.'

"If one compares the efficiency, as sketched by Moltke, of the Prussian Cavalry of 1866—that of the enemy in self-sacrifice, as shown on July 3rd, was on much the same plane—with the performances of the Cavalry arm in the American Civil War, one must impartially admit, after consideration of the different conditions, that the latter was the *real* article. How helpless and inept were these European horsemen compared with those led by Stuart!

"Most extraordinary of all, to our modern ideas of the employment of Cavalry, seems the meagre use made of the mounted men for reconnaissance. Although Murat's Cavalry Divisions of the French Army had never been sent *far* to the front, with us the Cavalry force—known by the ill-omened name of 'Reserve Cavalry'—was kept in *rear*, while the Divisional Cavalry, composed of advance guard, main body, and reserve, reconnoitred anything but far a-field. Thus, approved methods were altogether forgotten, a heavy indictment against the manner in which military history has been studied during the years which have elapsed since the Napoleonic wars.

"We shall see that the defects recognised by Moltke in 1866 were remedied in 1870-71, in so far as concerns the work of reconnaissance, and so far also as reform was possible in so short a time. Other shortcomings, which had not revealed themselves in the brief campaign and which were unnoticed by Moltke—such as the unsatisfactory fire-arm, and the want of practice in its use—were not remedied. A further evil, which may not have come before the General, was the poor condition of the numerous registered horses in the squadrons. This was, however, noticed, and the Cavalry reorganisation, which had already been put in hand, was continued after the war. In regiments where a fifth squadron had not already existed it was raised, and this was not mobilised as in 1864 and 1866, but was organised as a *dépôt* or reserve squadron,

whereby the intrinsic value of the Cavalry was appreciably increased.

"I now come back to Moltke's remark that *the Cavalry shirked exposure to shell fire*. As an example, in the report of the battle of Königgrätz reference is made to a Cavalry Brigade of the Elbe Army which did nothing, but which, according to its own account, was subjected to a heavy artillery fire in which 'the shells were bursting close in front of the Brigade'—result, one wounded Hussar! Whence this avoidance of casualties so often noticed with the Cavalry? The men on horses are the same brave fellows as their comrades on foot, and when on patrol, they showed themselves cool and daring even to foolhardiness. *The cause must be sought in the training under which the Leaders were formed*. One heard everlastingly repeated the axiom that Cavalry must not run the risk of incurring casualties from fire prior to the charge, it must, therefore, be kept in the rear; this great respect for Infantry fire, which, in itself, was quite justifiable, had developed a timidity for coming to grips at all—we shall find the same when we come to consider the Russo-Turkish War—and all the talk about 'the costly arm more difficult to replace than the others' may also have contributed to this ultra-caution. We should remember the construction which General Carl v. Schmidt gave to this dogma, and which he thus expressed: 'This arm is far *too* costly to have any check placed on its employment.' Principles, correct in themselves, have also done harm through an exaggerated stress being placed on them, particularly at manœuvres—see Moltke's Report—and one should be thankful that our Cavalry is now taught to attack and to come to close quarters with the other arms.

"Another, and perhaps the strongest reason of all for the poor results obtained by the Cavalry on the battlefield, *lies in the characteristics of many Leaders*. An attacking Cavalry is like a shot which has been fired, the effect of which cannot be foreseen, and, which, under certain circumstances, might recoil on the firers. Many a Cavalry officer, per-

sonally brave enough, has shrunk from making up his mind to a course of action, the result of which cannot be determined in advance, and which may demand great, and perhaps fruitless, sacrifice from his men. With the other arms it is possible to break off an action ; not so with the Cavalry charge—fate must run its course. With Cavalry, everything depends exclusively upon the initiative of the Commander, hence the immense importance of the personal element. Without his direct personal influence nothing can be done. On the other hand it may, for instance, be quite conceivable that a division of Infantry in a chance encounter wins the day, entirely through the natural course of events and the energetic action of the subordinate Leaders, without the Divisional General having had anything whatever to do with obtaining the result. The Leaders of bodies of Cavalry attached to other arms, whose Commander is slow to make up his mind, might, in such a case, be less inclined than usual to order an attack to be carried out which they know to be necessary. The Cavalry Commander, free from all responsibility, would, no doubt, accept such an order gladly, and carry it out with skill and energy. The celebrated charge by v. Bredow at Vionville would probably have never been made had a direct order not been received. Sometimes theory, and sometimes practice is the chief factor in achieving great results.

“Cavalry must be educated up to a readiness to act, absolutely regardless of consequences, and to a determination to conquer. We must recognise that there is nothing out of the common in the blood of a mounted man ; this arm must risk casualties, as the Infantry has often done before, without losing its battle-value ; while exaggerated ideas must be avoided, as, for instance, where the charge just mentioned has been dubbed ‘the death ride,’ as though such an action had never previously been heard of ! Such an attack has been made before with the same bravery and equal losses, as also have many deeds of the other arms, without much fuss having been made about them. The faults from which the

German Cavalry suffered during the war of 1870-71 were due, in so far as they have not already been dealt with, to the *personality* of the superior Commanders—a question the importance of which had been frequently emphasised, but not altogether happily solved—more especially in the fact that they avoided every opportunity of manœuvring the Division entrusted to them, so that, in consequence of this fault, many of them would certainly and naturally have been found deficient in self-confidence if they had been suddenly called upon to command twenty-four squadrons combined. This want of confidence, felt and apparent, to perform the duty laid upon them, could be seen from the fact that the Divisions were hardly ever manœuvred as a whole ; they worked with three separate Brigades, each of which had its own orders, and not infrequently the Divisional General rode apart with his staff, taking no part in what was going on. So, for instance, the 5th Cavalry Division, in its operations the day after Metz, and the 4th in the advance from Chartres to Coulmiers on the 9th November. Since one cannot imagine that the senior officers at the head of these Divisions did not know the value of concerted action, the explanation of this phenomenon may be found above, while also the reluctance to launch the whole Division to the attack may have had something to say to it.

“ Another fault was, further, that when the war broke out, *not only were the Divisions improvised*, but to some extent also the Brigades. Commanders did not know their staffs, and had no knowledge of the capabilities of the subordinate Leaders. This had the worst possible results, for in the case of the most important duties, those detailed for them according to seniority were often the least capable of carrying them out. That the unavoidable friction caused by such improvisations has far worse consequences for Cavalry than for the other arms, and that misunderstandings arise which are difficult to smooth will be apparent to all ; clear, full tone can only be got from a well-trained orchestra.”

The following extracts from some interesting articles which

appeared in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* in September 1889 express a commonsense view of the work of Cavalry :

“ Of all the rôles of the Cavalry arm, that of participation in the battlefield is the most discussed. There is no property that has been more systematically denied it, although it has never ceased for a single instant to reassert its claims with ardour. It has been said or written, even to satiety, that the indefinite improvements in firearms, the accumulated progress of ballistics, would condemn large masses of Cavalry to impotence, and would raise an insurmountable barrier to the attack with the sword, the charge.

“ But if we enquire thoroughly into the value of these declarations we shall be astonished to find that they generally rest on arguments of assertion, and rarely on an exact analysis of facts. And, indeed, if we endeavour to deduce from the study of campaigns the causes which at certain epochs have extended or diminished the rôle of Cavalry we find that these causes have no strict relation to the changes of armament, but depend almost exclusively on the principles which have governed the training and employment of the arm—in a word, *on the character of those who have had command.*

“ This lesson shines out clearly from one end of history to the other. If it was otherwise, the Cavalry under Frederic would have played a much more subordinate part than under Charles V., and the squadrons of the First Empire would have gained less brilliant success than those of Louis XIII. or Louis XIV. In fact, the value of the arm appears to be quite unaffected by the considerations habitually brought forward by its detractors. It is not regulated by the power of firearms. Cavalry is in jeopardy when it has no Leaders who understand how to train it ; it recovers itself as soon as at its head it finds chiefs who have a clear perception of its rôle and proper mode of employment. Such were Hannibal, Frederic, and Napoleon. Who ever raised Cavalry higher than did the latter ? And yet muskets carried further and straighter in his time than in the days of Charles XII. or

Gustavus Adolphus. But, anxious to make use of it, having the same faith in it which it had in him, and thinking more of its real use than of how it might be spared, he always placed it where it could intervene with the best chances of success, and put it under the order of Generals who were competent to make vigorous use of it. Thus at Marengo, Aspern, Eylau, and Borodino it decided in an almost regal manner the fate of the day.

“These examples are, however, somewhat distant, but there are more recent ones in 1866 and 1870 which formally disprove the theoretical common-place of the uselessness of Cavalry. Custozza, Königgrätz, Vionville are at any rate three modern battles. As an exception, and too rare a one, it was decided to have resource to the Cavalry, and the results were considerable and such as had not been hoped for. At Custozza, two bodies of Austrian Cavalry, ridiculously out of proportion—viz., fifteen squadrons on one side and only one on the other—threw themselves on the heads of the columns of the 3rd Italian Corps at the moment of their debouching on the field of battle. The moral effect, the shock produced by their impetuous charge, was such that the whole corps which was commanded by Prince Humbert was disorganised and paralysed for the rest of the day (compare page 319). Sixteen squadrons rendered 25,000 immobile, and diverted them from the field of battle. At Königgrätz the Austrian Cavalry divisions, unskilfully massed in rear, were unable to intervene either in the opening scenes or in the course of the battle. But towards the close, when the Austrian Army had been irretrievably beaten, it was decided, all too late, to employ them. Two divisions hurled themselves against the victorious Prussian columns, and by their heroic devotion prevented the retreat being turned into a disorderly rout. At Vionville the charge of the six squadrons of v. Bredow's Brigade cut short the movement of the French 6th Corps, and enabled the Prussian General Staff to bring fresh troops into line. V. Bredow's Brigade was worsted, it is true, but not until it had saved its own Army from imminent

danger, and re-established the equilibrium which had been disturbed.

"Here then are three definite facts which are opposed to the didactic subtleties which people are wont to express so lightly. Here are three modern battlefields on which at three different moments—viz., the commencement, the middle, and the close of the day—the Cavalry intervened with incontestable success. By its audacity it prepares a victory, by its devotion it wards off a disaster. In short, it produces tactical results of the first order."

The securing *tactical results*, the fulfilment of its mission, is the sole criterion of the real value of any arm considered as a fighting instrument. And it is this very truth, although an elementary one, which the majority of those who set themselves up as judges over the Cavalry have not been able or willing to comprehend. Have we not all read, and not without disgust, those strange statements, those wonderful statistics, in which a comparison of the losses caused by bullet and sabre is used as a text for extolling certain particular tactics of the Cavalry? It is fortunate if the conclusion is not positively arrived at that Cavalry is altogether effete and useless. But who can possibly entertain such a narrow and primitive idea of the principles of war as to imagine that the rôle of Cavalry is gauged by the number of losses inflicted by the sabre? The 5,000 Cuirassiers who charged at Aspern, the forty squadrons which hurled themselves on the centre of the Russian Army at Eylau, the floods of allied Cavalry which inundated the plains of Waterloo, v. Bredow's six squadrons which were decimated at Vionville—did they produce really sensible losses by their shock? Certainly not, and it is of very little consequence whether they did, since they produced important tactical results.

In doing this they gathered in a few moments the fruits of long-continued efforts; they saved their Armies from making other sacrifices.

The true conclusion seems to be that even as a battle is only an incident in many months of campaigning, so a charge,

though a very prominent part, is only one part of the function of the Cavalry, and efficiency in the use of the rifle is absolutely essential, as it will be in more frequent use. On the other hand, now as formerly, all great successes can only be gained by a force of Cavalry which is trained to harden its heart and charge home.

The rôle of Cavalry, far from having diminished, has increased in importance. It extends to both strategy and tactics : it alone is of use in the service of exploration, and it is of capital importance in a general action.

Let us sum up in a rapid *résumé* the services which this arm ought to and can render. During the period of concentration it conceals and protects the strategic front of the Armies ; it threatens and disturbs the adversary's base and communications ; it indicates to the Commander-in-Chief the point where he ought to strike, and points out to him the objective. During the march of approach towards the enemy it surrounds the columns with a vigilant network : it clears their path, raises and tears away the veil spread before them. On the field of battle it surprises the hostile Artillery and reduces it to silence : it protects the head and flank of its own Army, covers its deployment, disturbs or retards that of the enemy. A little later it prepares the *événement* and takes part in the assault ; in a few seconds it gathers the fruits of a long contest. Lastly, it completes the victory, or averts disaster : it undertakes the pursuit or covers retreat. In short, it intervenes in the prologue, in the principal act, and in the *dénouement*. It both introduces and consecrates success. But in all cases the combat with its proper rival is its inevitable prelude.

Its field of action is proportionate to the dimensions of the wars of the present. Its objective has increased—the means of attaining it must increase in proportion. It is no longer economy to starve the Cavalry arm. The extent of the objective calls for extended methods of procedure. Numbers, in modern Cavalry, do not constitute merely a material force—they are also an element of moral superiority, an

essential condition of energy and success. Concentration to the highest degree, combined action of the whole, decisive tactics are a necessity. Everything else is vain, uncertain, or harmful. In a single formula we may sum up its rôle and its future. *The war of masses necessitates mass tactics.* And the organisation and training of Cavalry must have this precept as its basis. But as already emphasised, in Cavalry work it is Leadership that tells ; and it is the power of rapidly grasping a situation, of being able quickly to come to a decision and at once issue clear and easily executed orders, that, more than the possession of any other faculty, brings success to a commander in the field.

The development of this faculty ought to be the main objective of the training of combatant officers in peace, and close attention should be paid to all exercises which tend to develop a power of decision and skill in quickly drafting orders.

N.B. | Certainly a knowledge of Military History is all-important for an officer. In studying it we see the "great masters" at work : we learn from their experience, and become acquainted with the difficulties to be encountered in applying principles. But such work contributes little towards developing our power of decision. |

On the other hand, "War Games" and "Staff Rides" should be framed chiefly with the latter object.

In the following pages an attempt is made to put before the reader various situations with the object of accustoming him quickly to make up his mind, and then to interpret his decision into clear orders which can be easily executed.

CHAPTER II.

THE ORGANISATION OF THE CAVALRY DIVISION.

IN these Studies the Cavalry Division is composed of three or more Brigades. The detail of a Cavalry Brigade (Indian) is that given in the Indian Field Service Regulations, corrected to May, 1906, and is shown in the tables on pp. 21 and 22.

In all the Studies the strength of the *enemy's* Cavalry is assumed to be :

Units.	Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers and men.	Guns.
Staff	7	22	...
1 Brigade of 2 Dragoon Regiments .	74	1,840	...
1 „ of 1 Dragoon and 1 Cossack Regiment	63	1,809	...
1 Horse Artillery Division . . .	12	345	12
Total	156	4,016	12

The fighting strength is 3,460 sabres and 12 guns.

Detail of a Cavalry Brigade (Indian).

	BRITISH.		INDIAN.		FOLLOWERS. Public and Private Regiments.	Private servants.	Riding horses and ponies.	Mess Transport animals.	Pack mules.	Draught mules.	Transport followers.	Vehicles.
	Officers.	Warrant Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.	Native Officers and Hospital Assistants.	Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.								
Staff, etc.	4	1	...	4	2	34	25	2	15	6	9	3
Attached to Staff	5	163	...	57	29	13	269	2	39	36	36	17
1 Horse Battery of 6 guns	5											(New Q. F. Equip.)
1 British Cavalry Regiment	28	450	53	60	509	6	159	96	121	43
2 Native Cavalry Regiments	26	...	36	966	214	76	1,042	6	294	180	110	82
1 British Field Hospital	1	6	2	...	50	7	4	...	3	14	14	7
1 Native Field Hospital	2	1	4	8	78	12	8	...	6	24	28	11
Cavalry Brigade Ammunition Column	1	16	...	35	8	4	59	...	3	76	48	36
2 Field Post Offices, 1st class	...	2	...	6	6	2	12	...	4	...
Brigade Supply Column.	...	1	...	4	20	2	1	...	3	140	86	65
Total	72	640	42	1,080	460	210	1,917	16	534	572	456	264

Totals (approximate)—Combatants, 1,341 ; non-combatants, 1,163.

The detail of the Cavalry Division of three Brigades (Indian) is:

Detail of a Cavalry Division of three Brigades (Indian).

	BRITISH.		INDIAN.		FOLLOWERS.			Riding horses and ponies.	Mess Transport animals.	Pack mules.	Draught mules.	Transport followers.	Vehicles.
	Officers.	Warrant Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.	Native Officers and Hospital Assistants.	Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.	Public and Private Regiments.	Private servants.							
Staff, etc.	7	7	1	15	6	30	37	48	...	18	...
Attached to Staff	6												
3 Brigades	216	1,920	126	3,240	1,380	630	5,751	48	48	1,602	1,716	1,368	792
3 Horse Batteries—18 guns .													
GRAND TOTAL	229	1,927	127	3,255	1,386	660	5,788	48		1,650	1,716	1,386	792

Totals (approximate)—Combatants, 4,000; non-combatants, 3,400.

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ORGANISATION OF THE STAFF OF THE DIVISION.

The duties of the *Divisional Staff* are assumed to be divided as follows :

I.

Operations.	}	Chief Staff Officer, or Assistant Adjutant-General.
Intelligence.		
Orders, etc.		
Higher Organisation.		
Field Telegraphs and Signalling.		
Censorship and Press Correspondents.		

II.

Organisation of units.	}	Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General.
Hospital and Sanitary arrangements.		
Casualties.		
Discipline.		

III.

Supplies of all kinds.	}	Assistant Quartermaster-General.
Transport.		
Accommodation and Camps.		
Remounts.		

In practice, it is almost impossible to maintain strictly this division of duties, but some such definition of the respective responsibilities is essential until the staff machine is in good working order, and the various officers have had time to discover by experience the most convenient mutual arrangements. This is, of course, all the more necessary in dealing with a unit which has no permanent peace organisation.

The following additional divisional staff would be required to be found by the Brigades :

S.M.O.

Provost Marshal (only if necessary).

Chief Supply and Transport Officer.

Assistant to Supply and Transport Officer for Supply.

" " " " " " " Transport.

Staff of a *Cavalry Brigade*—

Staff allowed—

Brigade Major.

Orderly Officer.

Native Staff Officer (for Quartermaster-General's duties).

Attached to Staff—

Signalling Officer.

Veterinary Officer.

Attached to Staff when required by the nature of the operations—

Intelligence Officer.

Supply and Transport Officer.

Detailed in Brigade—

S.M.O.

Provost Marshal (under special circumstances).

Brigadiers should get accustomed to working with the first three only, for as casualties occur on service there will always be difficulties about finding sufficient officers to fill the remaining posts.

ORGANISATION OF SERVICES WITH THE DIVISION.

Transport and Supply.—The organisation assumed to be employed is as follows :

First or Fighting Line Transport.

- (a) S.A. ammunition (on mules).
- (b) Signalling equipment (on horses).
- (c) Entrenching tools and explosives (on mules).
- (d) Picketing gear, lanterns, buckets, cooking pots (four horses per squadron or one per troop).
- (e) Medical appliances, saddle crutches, Brigade riding ambulance transport.

N.B.—Attached to the 1st Line Transport when action

imminent—(a) other led horses, *e.g.* officers' second chargers ;
(b) farriers.

A. *2nd Line Pack*.—Field stretchers (until saddle crutches adopted).

Pakhals.—When required by nature of operations (sixteen mules—*i.e.* one per troop).

One blanket and waterproof sheet per man.

Two days' rations (one day tinned meat for British troops).

Two days' grain.

One shoe with nails per horse.

B. *2nd Line Wheel*.—1. Kits.

2. Armourers' tools.

Saddlers' tools.

Horse-shoes and shoeing requisites.

Stationery.

3. Cable carts (until light-cable horses or mules equipped).

Intercommunication.—Besides the mounted man (on horse or bicycle) there are four means of obtaining intercommunication—telegraphic, telephonic, wireless, and visual ; and, assuming that all are available, the selection of one or more for use is dependent not only on the weather, but also on the character of the country. Thus in the Medak district, the theatre of the fourth Study, and where contact squadrons and patrols may be distant from seventeen to twenty-four miles from Brigade headquarters, and cover a frontage of over fifty miles, the country in which the operations commence is unsuitable for visual signalling, and consequently communication between contact squadrons and their Brigade headquarters can be rapidly and successfully carried on by means only of field telegraphs and telephones.

In the fifth—the Attock Ride—the helio plays at the commencement an important part, owing to the existence of high ground—*viz.* the Ziarat Hill near Hasan Abdal, affording a commanding view ; but later on, in the low-lying ground on the banks of the Indus, it must necessarily give way to wire communication.

Despatch riding is always a poor substitute, and entails great waste in horseflesh, whilst in all Cavalry operations time saved is of incalculable and incontestable value.

The present system of field telegraphs in India is as follows: There is one section with each of the three corps of Sappers and Miners; each section consists of:

- 2 British officers.
- 4 British non-commissioned officers.
- 32 native rank and file.

These, however, are for construction and maintenance only. For field service and manœuvre, the signalling staff—*i.e.* British military signallers—are drawn from the Government Telegraph Department. The equipment for each section consists of:

- 20 miles of air line.
- 10 miles of cable.
- 6 offices.

This is its "first-line" equipment, which always accompanies the section on sixty obligatory mules. With the baggage there is another fifty miles of air line, twenty miles of cable, and certain offices from which the "first-line" equipment is replenished daily. A section can furnish two air-line parties and two cable parties, all capable of working simultaneously. Air lines can be erected at one and a half miles per hour per party over good open country, and cable can be laid out at four miles per hour, communication being maintained with a stationary office in rear.

The instruments carried are field-service sounders, vibrators with microphone attachments (so that both telegraph and telephone attachments can be used at will), and two patterns of telephones—one for ordinary use, and one for sending out to tap existing lines. The latter is provided with a signalling key for Morse work if necessary.

For air-line work the bamboo posts are in three pieces, each post weighing 8 lb. The wire is of phosphor bronze, and weighs 5 lb. per mile. The cable used is Siemen's D-35, weighing 77 lb. per mile.

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The main principle is to "fan out" cable lines whilst the air lines are being erected on the main line of advance. When operations cease for the day Morse instruments are put on to the air lines, which have probably reached headquarters, whilst the cables are rolled up and preparations made for carrying on in a similar way the next day.

But important as is rapid intercommunication in the Division itself, of equal importance is it that means for similar communication between the Division and the Army of which it forms a part should be provided.

Mounted Sappers.—It is a vital necessity for Cavalry that they should be accompanied in the field by mounted and mobile detachments of Engineers. The strength of a section of Mounted Sappers is :

Officers	1	Chargers	2
N.O.'s	1	Riding horses	45
British N.-C.O.'s	1	Pack horses	6
Havildars	2	Equipment mules	10
Naicks	4	Riding camels	2
* Sappers	32	Grass mules	15
Syces	15		

* Trades of the Sappers :

Smiths or Fitters	8
Carpenters	8
Saddlers	2
Masons	4
Telegraph Linesmen	4
Telegraph Signallers	2
Engine Drivers	1
Plate-layers	3
	<hr/>
	32
	<hr/>

With each Brigade one section is necessary. Its duty is to carry out work beyond the power of the Regimental Pioneers to undertake. The amount of demolition stores and explosives with Cavalry Regiments on service is sufficient

to effect only very small and easily repairable damage. When a force as large as a Brigade makes a raid on an enemy's line of communications, or penetrates for a short time an enemy's Cavalry screen, it is necessary to carry out some really serious damage, so that the effects of even a mere temporary success may be a serious and lasting inconvenience to the enemy. Owing to the small regimental equipment and the generally slight technical knowledge available in the regiments, no large demolition schemes can be attempted, such as—(1) the lasting injury to large bridges ; (2) the real confusion of a telegraph system, not by destroying wires and instruments, but by mixing them up ; (3) destruction of water supplies and power station ; (4) rendering useless the armaments of works which may have been surprised. All the above require—(1) technical knowledge, both in the officers who decide what to do, and the men who have to carry it out quickly ; and (2) a certain quantity of special stores and tools not carried in the regimental equipments. Rapid bridging and the provision of water supply and making arrangements for the distribution of the water are also part of the work of the section. But in all cases it must be only work that can be rapidly executed, since the mounted sappers cannot carry enough stores for anything more.

As the purpose of the Studies is not merely to illustrate how certain strategical and tactical situations may be dealt with, but to lead readers to think out for themselves, not merely the solutions, but, so far as possible, the details of the work, some remarks will now be made with regard to Orders.

In all military operations, the preparation of proper orders in proper form is of paramount importance. These orders are of three classes : *Operation Orders*, *Routine Orders*, and *Standing Orders*. It is only the Standing Orders that can be regarded as of any permanency during an operation, as the others must be framed to meet the requirements of the day, and in the case of Operation Orders even of the moment. In a Cavalry Division there must be Standing

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Orders for both the Division and the Brigade. A specimen or example of Divisional Standing Orders is now given.

DIVISIONAL STANDING ORDERS BY MAJOR-GENERAL ——— COMMANDING 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION.

1. Parade states will be furnished by Brigades every Monday before noon to the Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, showing—

British Officers, effective.
British Rank and File, effective.
Native Ranks, effective.
Horses.
Transport animals.

On the back of these returns will be noted :

Ammunition.

On man	120	} 700	(a) Amount of ammunition in Regimental Reserve.
Regimental Reserve	180		
Ammunition Column	175		
Field Park	225		

Supplies.

On man and horse—Balance of previous day's ration, emergency return, and 6 lb. grain.
2nd Line A (pack)—Two days man and horse.
„ „ B (wheel) Ditto.
Supply Column—Three days for man, one day for horses.

(b) Number of days' supplies remaining in hand.

(c) Whether any emergency rations have been consumed.

2. Twice a week Commanding Officers will report to Brigadiers the number of men and horses disabled through any cause.

3. Brigadiers are responsible for the sanitary condition of their bivouacs. When two or more Brigades are bivouacked together the Provost Marshal accompanied by the Quartermasters will inspect the bivouacs daily.

4. No natives, except authorised followers, will be allowed within the limits of the bivouacs without a pass signed by one of the following officers :

The Brigade-Major.
The Provost Marshal.

5. No followers will leave the limits of the bivouacs except on duty and under supervision.

6. (a) Brigadiers will make every effort to replace daily, as far as possible, the consumption of supplies by requisition on the inhabitants.

Supplies purchased in the country will be paid for at rates published from time to time in orders.

(b) All foraging parties will be accompanied by an officer.

(c) The scale of rations for men and horses will be in accordance with regulations unless otherwise ordered by the General Officer Commanding the Division, or by General Officers Commanding Brigades when detached.

7. (a) All reconnoitring detachments should keep an itinerary of their route showing the time they passed important places and the action they took, thus :

Place.	Time.	Action taken.	Remarks.

(b) A diary, in the following form, of despatches sent and received, should be kept by Staff Officers to General Officer Commanding the Division and to General Officers Commanding Brigades :

Number of message and hour of despatch.	Hour of receipt and place.	From whom and place.	Contents.	Action taken.

(c) Heads of Departments must early inform the Assistant Quartermaster-General of any special information they may require, in order to avoid more than one patrol being sent in the same direction.

8. In bivouac, Medical Officers will designate the wells allotted to drinking purposes, and a sentry will be placed over each of these wells.

9. The 3rd Brigade will detail a mounted signalling unit to accompany Divisional Headquarters permanently.

10. Commanding Officers will be held responsible that the authorised scales of baggage for each rank and unit are not exceeded.

11. Marauding will be very severely dealt with and men will be cautioned in Regimental Orders against entering the house of an inhabitant on any pretext whatsoever, without proper authority.

12. Time will be reckoned from 0 to 23, 0 being midnight and 12 noon.

13. The day and hour of despatch of mails will be notified in orders.

14. The 4 miles to 1 in. map will be considered the staff map and will be the one referred to in orders and reports, when no other is specially mentioned.

As regards Brigade Standing Orders there is probably considerable divergence of views as to how these orders should be framed. The following notes may be of assistance :

They should be issued with Divisional Standing Orders (C. T., Chap. I. 4). Standing Orders should be as short and concise as possible, and should avoid the repetition of service regulations, etc., unless the latter require modification to meet existing conditions.

The following headings are given by way of example; a selection can be taken from them as may appear necessary, or additions can be made :

1. Special attention should be called to certain Divisional Standing Orders ; any Brigade Orders required with reference to these or in amplification of them.
2. *Brigade duties*.—The roster of units for Brigade duty, which should be automatic. The regiment for duty to come on in succession at a certain hour for 24 hours. This regiment to find all Brigade duties, including inlying piquet, advance guard, flank guard, special patrols, any detached squadrons required from the brigade. It should go on rear guard next day (or march in rear of the Brigade if not required on rear guard).
3. *Hour of march*.—Troops to be ready to march at 1 hour after sunrise in cases where delay has occurred in the issue of Divisional and Brigade Operation Orders (unavoidable delay will frequently occur in the issue of these, when intelligence reports, etc., have to be awaited).
4. *Operation Orders*.—Any particular methods, formations or precautions to which attention should be directed with regard to the character of the enemy, his tactics, nature of the country, etc.
5. *Camps and Bivouacs*.—The standard form of camp (if desired) giving the spaces to be allotted to the various units whenever possible. The perimeter to be made defensible or entrenched ; any special orders with reference to Alarm Posts, strength of inlying piquet, men for duty in horse lines and transport lines, etc. The alarm signal by day and night.

6. *Provost Marshal*.—Provost Marshal's regulations, as required in addition to those in Divisional Standing Orders ; disposal of prisoners, arms and horses captured ; daily search to be made by the Provost Marshal's men for articles left behind in bivouacs after the troop's march, and disposal of the same. If it is necessary to detail a considerable number of men for duty under the Provost Marshal, a particular troop or squadron should be detailed (a squadron was sometimes so detailed in columns in S. Africa).
7. *Discipline*.—Men to be cautioned as to committing offences against inhabitants, etc. (with reference to Divisional Standing Orders) ; Courts-martial : it will perhaps be found convenient to adopt a system under which officers would be detailed in Brigade Orders to form a Court, which would be on duty for a week and which would try all offenders sent for trial during that week : C.O.'s would inform the President if they had a prisoner for trial, and the latter would then order the Court to assemble.
8. *Disposal of spare arms and equipment*—e.g. in the case of men admitted to hospital.
9. *Baggage*.—A small flag to accompany the transport of each brigade facilitates recognition. C.O.'s of units to be held strictly responsible for any excess of authorised scales of baggage. (This is generally necessary, although it is a service regulation.) Any special powers delegated to the Brigade Transport Officer. Strength of guards to be furnished by units.
10. *Signalling*.—A permanent unit to be detailed to Brigade Headquarters, and to camp with them. Telephones, if any, the station to be near Headquarters when not marching. Appointment of a Brigade Signalling Officer, if not already detailed.
11. *Intelligence*.—A Brigade Intelligence Officer to be detailed, if not already appointed ; any special orders *re* personnel and duties.

12. *Orderlies*.—Permanent orderlies required for General Officer Commanding Brigade. These should live with Brigade Headquarters.
13. *Medical*.—Any instructions tending to safeguard the health of the troops. (Particular attention has been directed to this with good results in the Japanese Army.)
14. *Foraging and Supplies*.—System of collecting local supplies. The Brigade Supply Officer should accompany the Brigade party detailed to collect them ; the foraging party should be under a Regimental Officer.
15. *Postal*.—Items of news, intelligence, routine orders, etc., should be posted daily for general information outside the tent of the Brigade-Major, or at some other convenient spot.
16. *Horsemastership*.—Nature of local supplies of grain and fodder obtainable ; any special instructions regarding precautions to be observed in accustoming animals to peculiar forage or change of same ; issue of green fodder ; *bhoosa* should be cleaned, especially when horses are not accustomed to it.
17. *Miscellaneous*.—Unless otherwise ordered, Officers Commanding units should ride near the Brigadier when contact with the enemy is imminent, leaving unit under second in command ; this facilitates immediate action.
18. *Difficult Country*.—Messengers and orderlies despatched to any distance should be sent in pairs ; the rear guard to prevent all lagging.

In following the Studies it is well for the reader to recall to mind the multifarious duties which fall to a Staff Officer in the field. The following among them are brought to notice :

Before an action—

To make sure—(a) that unfit men and horses, a proportion of farriers, etc., are left with the 1st Line Transport at some known point which is communicated to commanding officers of regiments, and to squadron commanders if possible.

- (b) That the reserve ammunition is forthcoming, and that second bandoliers are filled up.
- (c) That special reconnoitring officers are told off.
- (d) That all men are warned that if dismounted, or falling out, or separated during the course of the expected action, they are to rally on the 1st Line Transport.

During the action—

- (a) To assist the G.O.C. in every possible way.
- (b) To keep notes on the course of the action and the general distribution of units.
- (c) To see that a responsible officer is always at the place appointed by the G.O.C. for the receipt of messages.
- (d) To see that a watch is kept in directions where danger may not be expected—*e.g.* in a retreat towards the head (*cf.* Sannahs Post).

After an action—

- (a) The first and most important duty is the issue of further "operation" orders—*i.e.* pursuit, retreat, etc., or outposts; in the event of "halt orders" being necessary, to make arrangements to maintain touch with the enemy.
- (b) The transmitting at once and direct to the Chief Intelligence Officer information likely to be useful to the G.O.C. the army in the rear.
- (c) Getting up the 2nd Line Transport, with food, ammunition, etc., as required to refill 1st Line.
- (d) Collecting from units and preparing immediate reports on—
 - (i) Own casualties, men, horses (killed, wounded, missing).
 - (ii) Requirements to complete—
 - Ammunition, men, horses, equipment, rations.
 - (iii) Captures (usually the Provost Marshal's work)—
 - Prisoners, horses, equipment, baggage, transport.
- (e) Arranging with S.M.O. for care of wounded and for organising search parties.
- (f) Collecting ambulance transport, etc., impressing inhabitants if necessary, and also carts, etc.

- (g) Despatching to nearest base such wounded as are fit to be moved, and arranging necessary escorts.

In connection with the work of a Cavalry Division in India, there are two other matters which it is desirable to mention.

The first is the presence of a native Staff Officer (for Quartermaster-General's duties) on the staff of a Cavalry Brigade. Native officers know little concerning the welfare of any higher unit than a troop, or of the organisation, etc., of the other arms; but it is very remarkable how quickly and readily the more intelligent can be taught.

Native Cavalry regiments should, therefore, carefully select and train a few native officers in the duties which usually fall to the Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General of a Brigade. Such officers would, of course, be brought into constant contact with British troops, and should be encouraged, therefore, to acquire a good colloquial knowledge of English, and, if possible, to write it. An ability to write Urdu in the Roman character simplifies communication with British officers who can speak, but cannot read, the vernacular, though the obligation to learn should in this case be rather on the British than on the native officer.

In certain matters, such as Supply, the native officers are by nature experts. The advantages obtainable from a free use of their knowledge and experience should not, in a Brigade, be confined to native units.

For intelligence duties, under the Brigade Major or Intelligence Officer, Pushtu- and Persian-speaking native officers are likely to be in great request in any trans-frontier campaign, and should receive such regimental instruction from time to time as may better fit them for this class of staff work.

The other matter is the employment of Imperial Service Cavalry with our Cavalry units.

The contingents are furnished from States, and they vary in strength from regiments of four squadrons to detachments of one, two, or three squadrons. The squadron leaders are

natives, and it is improbable that on mobilisation being ordered, more than one, or at the outside, two British officers would be sent with each regiment of four squadrons, or its equivalent. For the above reasons it would appear best to attach a certain number of squadrons to each brigade, brigadiers in turn attaching these squadrons for discipline, etc. to native Cavalry regiments, as far as possible by contingents.

The men composing these troops are, as a rule, good riders and horsemasters, and are well mounted. They are fully equipped in a similar manner to the regular native Cavalry regiments, and their organisation and administration are on similar lines. The men, however, speak a variety of dialects not easily understood by those possessing even a considerable knowledge of Hindustani. For this reason it would be advisable to attach them to, and to employ them, as far as possible, with native troops only. Whenever possible, a British officer should be spared to assist in looking after them tactically. They rarely obtain any training in Brigades, or in conjunction with other troops.

Duties.—They could be most usefully employed on escort duties, orderly work, baggage guard, posts on lines of communication (with a stiffening of regular troops), carrying despatches from post to post, and on remount training duties at advanced dépôts and veterinary hospitals. They are well trained and could be trusted in the fighting line.

Administration.—For purposes of administration they should be immediately under their inspecting officers, though it is doubtful whether on mobilisation the services of the latter could always be spared.

CHAPTER III.

FIRST STUDY (JHELM).

Subject.

AN invasion on a double line of operations across a River Frontier, and up to and including the first decisive battle. The work of the Cavalry Division.

General Idea.

(See *Sketch I.*)

1. The *frontier* between two countries, called respectively the Northern State and the Southern Empire, is represented by the river Chenab, the river Indus (for about 50 miles), the north-east border of Scinde, and the Baluchistan frontier. Kashmir and Jammu form an Independent *Neutral State*.

2. (a) A European Power has recently acquired control over, and has established garrisons in the *Northern State*, making Rawal Pindi its capital and their own immediate base. A railway connects Rawal Pindi with the ultimate base in Europe, but no other railways have as yet been built in the Northern State.

(b) Lahore and Multan, connected by railway with each other and with the bases at Delhi and Karachi, are the frontier towns of the *Southern Empire*.

3. Hostilities have broken out between the European Power and the Southern Empire. The Asiatic inhabitants of the Northern State remain neutral.

4. The strategical deployment of the *Southern Forces* will take place as follows :

- (a) On the left, the Third Army Corps—about Multan.
In the centre, the Second Army Corps—about Jhang.
On the right, the First Army Corps—about Ramnagar.
- (b) A force, independent of the three Army Corps, consisting of the 10th Infantry Division, is at Wazirabad, which is fortified, and is held by its own garrison, and is the terminus of the Southern railway system.

5. The 1st Cavalry Division (3 Brigades) belongs to the Southern right wing, *i.e.* to the First Army Corps, whose concentration it will cover.

6. From information received from various sources, the dispositions of the *Northern Force* appear to be :

- (a) Cavalry : holding the line of the Chenab river, and scouting beyond the frontier.
- (b) The remainder massed in three groups on the Jhelum river :
 - (i) in the neighbourhood of Jhelum and Kharian.
 - (ii) „ „ Pind Dadan Khan.
 - (iii) „ „ Khushab (opposite Shahpur).

Each group is variously estimated at from 25,000 to 40,000, but the total does not exceed 100,000 men.

The general situation, as depicted in this general idea, will now be considered (*see also General Map, No. 1*).

1. In each Army Corps of the Southern Force are three Infantry Divisions. Each Infantry Division numbers 12,000 bayonets and sabres, and 34 guns (*viz.*, 13 Battalions of Infantry, 1 Regiment of Cavalry, 3 Field Batteries, 2 Mountain Batteries, 1 Heavy Battery of 4 guns, 2 Companies of Sappers). The strength therefore of an Army Corps is 36,000 bayonets and sabres, and 102 guns. The total fighting strength of the Southern Force is then approximately :

		Guns.
3 Army Corps . . .	108,000	306
1 Infantry Division (extra) .	12,000	34
1 Cavalry Division . . .	4,000	18
Total	<u>124,000</u>	<u>358</u>

2. The only information of the enemy received from various sources is:

Hostile cavalry holds the right bank of the River Chenab, whilst scouts have crossed to the left bank.

A group concentrated at Jhelum and Kharian, another at Pind Dadan Khan, and a third at Khushab, making a total of, approximately, 100,000. But the respective strength of each group has not been ascertained.

3. The country *north* of a line drawn from Bannu to Pind Dadan Khan and Lala Musa is very rugged, mountainous and much cut up by nullahs. Roads in this zone, with the exception of the Grand Trunk, which runs from Wazirabad through Jhelum to Rawal Pindi (the capital and railway terminus of the Northern State), are mere tracks, and are not suited for wheeled transport. Water and supplies are scarce.

There are good flat roads along the valley of the Indus. But military operations in this area can only be undertaken by small forces, and so must be indecisive in character and prolonged.

The country *south* of the line indicated above is flat and without any marked features.

The only obstacles to the advance of Southern Army in this area are the rivers Chenab and Jhelum. Troops can move across country without difficulty.

Below the point, where the Jhelum joins the Chenab, only one river need be crossed, the two States being contiguous. Grain supplies in this area are plentiful.

For the foregoing reasons the Southern Commander should seek to engage the enemy in the flat open country, and

should cross the Chenab immediately below where it unites with the Jhelum.

4. The *main objective* must always be the destruction of the enemy's Field Force.* The latter is concentrating on the Jhelum river between Khushab and Jhelum—a front of about 100 miles.

By moving towards the enemy's capital, Rawal Pindi, the bulk of the enemy's forces will probably be encountered.

The following are *secondary objectives* as compared with the destruction of the enemy's Field Army, but they are steps leading towards that end :

(a) A point of support on the right bank of the Chenab close below its junction with the Jhelum, to facilitate invasion of the Northern State.

(b) The ridges north and south of Jhelum town, to ensure passage of the Jhelum, and to afford a secure advanced depôt within 50 miles of the enemy's capital, and with a good road from Wazirabad (the southern rail-head) to that capital.

(a) and (b) must form the secondary objectives in the *first phase* of the operations.

The capture of the enemy's capital may be considered the objective of the *second phase*, and the crossings of the Indus about Attock might form the objective for a *third phase*. But the thorough annihilation of the Northern Field Army must be the *main objective* throughout, and must be striven for, when and wherever possible.

5. There seem to be five courses open to the enemy :

(i) To unite against the Southern Right Wing, which is 120 miles from the Centre, and 210 miles from the Left.

(ii) To unite against the Southern Left, which is nearly

* See Napoleon's remarks to Moreau after the campaigns in Italy, 1796-97 : "There are in Europe many good Generals, but they see too many things at once : as for me, I see only one thing, the enemy's main body. I try to crush it, confident that *secondary* matters will then settle themselves."—D.H.

100 miles from the Centre, while containing the remainder of the Southern Army.

- (iii) To break the Centre of the Southern Army by an advance from Khushab and Shahpur viâ Pindi Bhatian upon Lahore.
- (iv) To take up a defensive position to cover the capital.
- (v) To retire without fighting.

Concentration against the Southern *Right*, i.e. the First Army Corps, whilst it is isolated, seems to offer the enemy a good chance of success, but it presupposes that the Northern Army is the first ready for action, and that its Commander has timely information of our dispositions. In this case it would be the duty of the First Army Corps to manœuvre, so as to draw the enemy on, without offering him the chance of a pitched battle, unless in a very favourable position. In the meantime the advance of the Southern Centre and Left would soon make itself felt on his flank and Lines of Communication. Even should he succeed in obtaining a victory over the First Army Corps, it would only be to find superior, or at least equal hostile forces, standing on his flank or Lines of Communication.

If the enemy concentrates against the *Left*, the same arguments as given in the preceding paragraph apply.

The advantages to be derived from adopting the third course, which is known as Strategic Penetration, seem to be—

- (a) One or both wings of the Southern Force become open to flank attack.
- (b) It seems possible to carry the flank attack against the First Army Corps to some point east of Pindi Bhatian so as to interrupt the communications between Wazirabad and Lahore.
- (c) Given sufficient numbers, the Southern Force's detachments about Wazirabad might be completely surrounded.

To prevent the enemy operating in this manner, it is

essential that the Southern Forces be mobilised and concentrated on the frontier and ready for action before those of the North ; otherwise, the initiative with all its advantages is surrendered to the enemy. On the other hand, in the event of the North being the first ready to move, the railways of the Southern State should enable any faulty strategical deployment to be, in some measure, rectified.

This strategical penetration of the Centre seems, then, the most likely plan for the Northern Commander to adopt.

If the Northern Army adopts the fourth course, and takes up a defensive position to cover the capital, it will at the outset of the campaign have to meet our combined forces, which outnumber his, and which, from the directions of their advance, may be brought to bear on him in the most effective way—*i.e.* by converging on him and enveloping him on the battlefield.

Finally, a *retreat* without fighting means the surrender of the territory which it is his business to protect, and probably political trouble, seeing that the Northern State is only held by force of arms.

6. The courses open to the Southern Force will now be considered :

The Southern Commander can advance against the enemy's Field Army in two ways :

(a) on one line ;

(b) on two or more lines.

(a) To advance on *one* line is doubtless the safest, but it is the least decisive. If the whole of the Southern Force were to invade the Northern State from the direction of Lahore, then the enemy, directly imposing himself between us and his capital and covering his Lines of Communication, could check us in a succession of positions in the hilly country south of Rawal Pindi. If, on the other hand, the whole of the Southern Army invades from the direction of Jhang and Multan, the enemy can again interpose with his united forces, and we should leave the important railway centre and town of Lahore open to him. For political reasons we cannot risk an invasio“

of our territory, or even allow the enemy a merely temporary success on our side of the frontier. We also need to deal with the Northern Forces quickly, for they are connected with Europe by railway from Rawal Pindi, and will certainly hurry up reinforcements at the greatest possible speed.

(b) An advance on *two* lines seems to possess the best chances of success in the present case, and it can be carried out without unusual risks, for the following reasons :

We are considerably stronger than the enemy ; inter-communication between the two lines exists, and can soon be established also after crossing the frontier, for there are no physical obstacles capable of barring communication ; the Left and Centre, which will advance on one of the lines, are capable of dealing with the enemy's main forces, from the latter being deducted the troops necessary to guard the Lines of Communication, and those required for the containing force to delay the Southern Right ; and lastly, the Right, on the second line of advance, is strong enough to deal with any force the enemy is likely to be able to detach against it—such, for instance, as the group from Jhelum and Kharian. Although the enemy is operating in his own territory, that territory is his by virtue of force only, and he has therefore to guard his Lines of Communication very carefully ; moreover, in this particular district, his movements will be impeded to a certain extent by the rivers Jhelum and Chenab and the Chenab Canal.

The advantages to be gained by the adoption of this form of advance are very considerable. The Southern Force is able, thereby, to cover its own frontier, the political necessity of doing which has been already alluded to ; and the configuration of this frontier is such, that an advance from the direction of Multan or Jhang will threaten the enemy's communications, and will even afford an opportunity of pushing him back on neutral territory, in which latter case he would be as thoroughly destroyed as if his whole Army were captured. Lastly, questions of Supply are much facilitated by moving the Army in two portions.

7. For the above reasons the Southern Commander should cross the frontier on two lines, as follows :

- (a) The Second and Third Army Corps to unite and cross below the confluence of the Chenab and Jhelum rivers, subsequently advancing up the right bank of the river Jhelum, threatening the enemy's Lines of Communication and pressing him back, if possible, on neutral territory. It is hoped that this movement will have the desired effect of making the enemy deliver battle, and that the threat on his communications will take from him all power of the "initiative." Experience shows that an Army whose communications are threatened will almost invariably devote its whole attention to protecting them.
- (b) The First Army Corps and 1st Cavalry Division to adopt a defensive attitude until the movement of the Left and Centre is developed ; they will then cross the Chenab, north of Lahore, somewhere about Ramnagar (receiving all possible support from the detachment, the 10th Division, at Wazirabad), and will move on to Jhelum.

In thus operating we comply with two fundamental principles of war, namely :

- (1) To lead the bulk of the Army by strategical combinations to the decisive points of the theatre of action, and as much as possible upon the enemy's Lines of Communication, without endangering one's own.
- (2) To manœuvre in such a manner that the bulk of one's own forces act only against detached portions of the hostile Army.

The dislike entertained by Napoleon against acting on double lines of operations is well known. He absolutely repudiated the idea of "operating from widely different directions without intercommunication," on the ground that

it would be impossible for the columns to act in concert. He expressed this opinion on several occasions, and left no doubt about the importance he attached to it. It is the starting-point of his whole strategy of operating with masses, which, as a matter of principle, keeps the main force as closely concentrated as the roads and billeting will permit, and which always has for its object the capability of striking with united forces fractions of the enemy in succession.

Of Napoleon's use of the single line, von Cæmmerer writes as follows :

We must call Napoleon's exploits an almost unbroken chain of successes in the use of the interior line. The need of covering one's own territory against hostile enterprises, which existed at all times and under all circumstances, had caused the military art of the old monarchies to adopt a very broad front as a rule for strategic deployment, and Napoleon's principle, "to advance in mass," as he himself called it, was generally best applied in selecting the centre of the hostile front as the objective. At the same time, when transmission of the intelligence during the operations was still exclusively *dependent on the capacity of a horse*, it was permissible to reckon with certainty upon the impossibility of really proper co-operation of widely separated army portions or corps. The news from one side to the other, the orders hither and thither, could in those days hardly ever arrive in time for acting in harmony with the constantly changing situations in war. Napoleon himself said at the end of his career as a General : "*To operate from widely different directions without intercommunication is a mistake which is usually the cause of another. The detached column has only orders for the first day ; its operations for the next day depend on what has happened with the main column. It therefore either loses time in waiting for orders or trusts to good luck.*" And at another time, "*It is an axiom to keep the columns of an Army always united in such a manner that the enemy cannot push between them.*"

As soon as Napoleon once got between two portions or corps of an Army, their fate was sealed as a rule. He deceived one of his adversaries by a weak but resolutely acting detachment, and fell upon the other with united forces in such a determined manner that the enemy was unable to resist. If this one was beaten, he turned against the enemy whom he had hitherto only held in check.

Napoleon *never* initiated from the outset a *twofold* envelopment or made use of exterior lines, when he could shape things to some extent as he liked, because he, like Jomini, considered the fundamental idea a mistake. When he acted concentrically against Mack in the course of the operations in 1805, he did so because the favourable opportunity permitted him at that moment to aim at the capture of the nearest and very much weaker adversary. And when he occasionally acted similarly, as at Preussisch-Eylau, at Landshut-Eckmühl, and at Bautzen, he merely took advantage of accidental circumstances in a manner which led most rapidly to an effective employment of the forces ; he was, of course, far too much a realist and too little a slave of a definite form to let slip clearly tangible successes for the sake of that form.

But even in the days of Napoleon, some of the most effective combinations of war were by forces acting on double or exterior lines against an enemy moving on a single line of operations. Thus, in 1813 the converging attack by the allies on Napoleon at Leipzig; in the same year Wellington and Graham conduct a similar attack, and with brilliant success, on Joseph at Vittoria; whilst in 1815 Napoleon himself falls a victim to Wellington and Blücher, and his life's work is brought to an end by the use against him of the very operation he had always so persistently denounced.

And, at the present day, the danger of failure in the preconcerted action of widely separated portions of an Army, or of Armies themselves, is reduced almost to a minimum by the modern improvements in intercommunication enumerated in the preceding chapter; for, however completely the enemy may have succeeded in placing himself between our Armies, or portions of an Army, even in such a manner that no trooper can move direct from one to the other, intercommunication can be maintained from one to another along a telegraphic arc of any length far away from any possibility of interference by him. And therefore, when modern forms of outercommunication are available, exterior lines of operation will be employed, because they facilitate greatly the movements of large masses; they render combinations easy; they aid supply; and they place the enemy in a position where its defeat will be little short of destruction.

As regards the strategical deployment of troops on a given frontier, it must be arranged so that the Army may oppose the probable movements of the enemy, and also be able to carry out its own general idea: which factor should predominate, it is impossible to say. If the Army is disposed with reference only to the former, then the initiative is surrendered to one's opponent: if without regard to it, we invite surprise. The decision will depend chiefly on the relative rapidity both of mobilisation and of transport to the common frontier. But a carefully thought-out plan of strategical deployment is the primary necessity in every

general idea for a campaign ; and for the execution of the plan we must arrange beforehand to be able to concentrate our troops ready for action, at any place or places, with the utmost rapidity possible.

In this Study, a certain strategical deployment having been assumed, the strategical offensive has been adopted, because it is the "offensive" which alone can bring a war to a speedy termination ; but this form of strategy is not possible unless every preparation has been made for it in time of peace by perfecting the military machinery. As pointed out by the author of "Representative Government and War," preparation for war must run concurrently with peace strategy : "It is difficult to differentiate between peace strategy and preparation for war ; between the work of the statesman and the work of the soldier. These two are, in fact, so intimately connected, that either one must break down if it lacks the efficient assistance of the other."

Commencement of the Operation.

In accordance with the decision to operate on double lines, the Centre and Left of the Southern Army will unite and cross the River Jhelum close below the confluence of this river with the Chenab. The united force, moving up the right bank of the River Jhelum as a first measure, will then seek the enemy's main Army.

The Right Wing will cross the River Chenab, somewhere near Ramnagar. In order to minimise the risk of operating on two lines, the Right Wing will be at first "refused." But should the Left and Centre fail to bring about an early decision, the First Army Corps must manœuvre against the enemy in order to distract him and to cause him to divide his forces.

Situation on the Right Wing of the Southern Army on the morning of the 10th February :

- (a) A body of hostile cavalry estimated at a strength of about two brigades holds the right bank of the Chenab river, from opposite Wazirabad to Kadirabad. A force of all arms, estimated at 26,000 strong, is occupying the ridges between Jhelum and Kharian.
- (b) The 1st Cavalry Division has just been detrained at Chhinan and is directed to hold the line of the Chenab river from Wazirabad (exclusive) to Vanike (inclusive), about 15 miles south-west of Ramnagar, in order to cover the concentration of the First Army Corps, arriving from the direction of Lahore.

To comply with the directions in (b) the Commander of the Cavalry Division issues the following orders :

No. 1.—Operation Orders.—1st Cavalry Division.

HEADQUARTERS, CHHINAN STATION,
10th February, 1904 (13 hours).

1. (a) Hostile Cavalry (strength estimated at two Brigades) hold right bank of Chenab from Wazirabad to Kadirabad ; and a force of all arms, said to be 26,000 strong, is on ridges between Jhelum and Kharian.

(b) Troops of our First Army Corps to form Right Wing of Southern Army are moving to concentrate between Ramnagar and Wazirabad.

Our 10th Infantry Division is at Wazirabad.

2. The 1st Cavalry Division will be disposed to observe the left bank of the Chenab from Wazirabad (exclusive) to Vanike (inclusive), with the object of covering the concentration of our Right Wing.

3. In the event of the enemy crossing the Chenab in force, the line of the canal will be held from near Runneeke to Futtehpoor as a pivot of manoeuvre; Infantry from Wazirabad will operate as required on railway between this place and the point east of Ramnagar, where the railway crosses the canal.

4. Brigades will be disposed as under :

(a) First Brigade from Wazirabad to Baraduree near Ramnagar (both places exclusive).

(b) Second Brigade from Baraduree to Vanike.

(c) Third Brigade between Chhinan Station and canal as Reserve.

5. Headquarters will be at Chhinan Station.

Dictated to Brigade Majors.

In accordance with the strategical situation the Right Wing was at first held back, awaiting a success on the part of the Centre and Left. The concentration of the First Army Corps proceeded slowly, and the 1st Cavalry Division remained on the left bank of the Chenab river, in touch with the enemy.

However, so early as the 21st February, the Centre and Left of the South gained a decisive victory in the neighbourhood of Khushab; the Left pursued the enemy towards Talagang and Chakwal in the direction of the Northern capital, Rawal Pindi, and the Centre marched towards Jalalpoor.

The Right was therefore ordered to cross the frontier at once, in order to effect a junction with the Centre. It is the intention of Southern Commander-in-Chief to employ the First and Second Army Corps in crushing in detail that portion of the Northern Forces which is believed to be still holding the country to the south and south-east of Jhelum.

Directly information was received of the victory gained by the Left and Centre, the First Army Corps made preparations to cross the River Chenab, and the 1st Cavalry Division received certain definite orders, viz. :

(1) To cover the advance of the First Army Corps towards Khewa.

- (2) To open communication with the Centre Column, which is due at Pind Dadan Khan on the evening of the 24th February.
- (3) To reconnoitre the Jhelum river from Rasul to Malakwal with a view to finding the best crossing-place for the First Army Corps.

In addition to the above specific instructions, it has one other duty for which no instructions are necessary, viz. having once obtained contact with the enemy, never to lose it, and to defeat the main body of the enemy's cavalry, should the latter come within striking distance.

Previous to the advance of the Southern Left and Centre, the 1st Cavalry Division was holding the line of the River Chenab from Wazirabad (exclusive) to Vanike, with the object of covering the concentration and strategic deployment of the Right Wing. The first condition of success for a strategic deployment as well as for a concentration is *security*, and when two frontiers touch one another this is best obtained by the employment of Independent Cavalry Divisions. In the case of one Cavalry Division covering the front of two or more Army Corps, its disposal would rest in the hands of the Army Commander, and it would usually be sent forward early into the enemy's country; but when the Cavalry Division is with one Army Corps only, it would then ordinarily come under the orders of the Army Corps Commander, as in the present instance. When the Second Army Corps (Centre) and First Army Corps (Right) succeed in effecting a junction, then it will probably be found advisable to bring the Cavalry Division under the Commander of the united Corps; otherwise, as experience shows, the Cavalry Division will be employed in the particular interest of the First Army Corps, rather than in that of the whole force.

The following extracts from Bonnal's "Manceuvres de Jena," dealing with the dispositions of a Cavalry Division covering the concentration of an Army, are of interest:

During the period that Napoleon was concentrating his Army for the 1806 campaign against Prussia (Jena) he was "covered" in the direction of the

Franken-Wald by the 1st Corps and two extra Brigades of Light Cavalry under Lasalle and Milhaud.

On the 3rd October Napoleon ordered the Major-General (Berthier) to write the following letter to Murat :

"The Emperor orders your Highness to impress on Generals Lasalle and Milhaud to *keep their Brigades concentrated*, with picquets on the communications to Coburg. I am ordering Marshal Bernadotte (1st Corps) to scout the Leipzig road with his Light Cavalry.

"Generals Lasalle and Milhaud should send their reports of all that passes on the frontier daily in duplicate to Marshal Bernadotte. *They will tire their horses as little as possible, and will keep them ready to start.*"

It seems that the emperor in dictating this letter had foreseen the dissemination of the Light Cavalry Brigades in the mountains around Kronach, and that he wanted to counteract the tendency common to ordinary minds, which consists in putting an equal importance on every dangerous direction, seeking security rather in the strict guard of all the avenues by which the enemy can come, than in the employment of active forces coming to the support of the point threatened or attacked.

We will see if Napoleon was mistaken.

After having reviewed, on the 4th October, the 3rd and 4th Dragoon Divisions, Prince Murat went on the 5th to Kronach, to inspect the Brigades of Lasalle and Milhaud.

At midnight on the 5th October, having again returned to Bamberg, he wrote the emperor, beginning thus :

"I have just returned from Kronach.

"One has been obliged to scatter the Light Cavalry of Generals Lasalle and Milhaud in so many different places that, in spite of the order to concentrate them having been given yesterday evening, this will not be possible until some time during the day to-morrow.

"I have therefore been obliged to come back without seeing them."

The phrase, "*One has been obliged to scatter*," etc., is very cleverly turned so as to avoid responsibility ; but is not the avowal significant ?

And now to return to the operation. The Commander of the Cavalry Division has received certain specific directions, with which he has to comply. He has, of course, already been thinking out and preparing for the various lines of action that may fall to his Division ; and these thoughts, ideas, and conclusions, if put into orderly form and reduced to writing, would appear as what is known as an "Appreciation" ; they would eventually run somewhat as follows :

1. From information received from various sources, the enemy was, at the opening of the campaign, concentrated in three principal groups, viz. at (1) Jhelum and Kharian, (2) Pind Dadan Khan, and (3) Khushab, aggregating

approximately 100,000, but the strength of each individual group is as yet unknown—any one of them may number anything from 25,000 to 40,000.

We know that the Northern Commander concentrated all available forces to oppose our Left and Centre, and has left a mixed force to contain the First Army Corps. The relative strength of these bodies we do not know, but it is almost safe to assume that he faced our advance from the south-west with, at least, two groups, and possibly with a large portion of group 1 also, if he had time to get it up. To be on the safe side, however, we must work on the supposition that the whole of group 1, say, 40,000 men, is in front of us.

The Southern Cavalry Division is stronger than a Northern Cavalry Division by about 500 sabres and 6 guns. Considering the total number of hostile troops in the theatre of war, their distribution, and the fact that most of the troops have been concentrated towards the west, it is not probable that the enemy is opposing us with more than two Divisions of Cavalry, and probably not as much; but we must be prepared to meet this amount.

2. The *mission of the Cavalry Division* is clear—(a) to conceal the advance of the First Army Corps, (b) to open communication with the Second Army Corps and (c) to reconnoitre a portion of the Jhelum and to find a suitable passage across that river.

But before the Cavalry Division can proceed to the execution of these three missions, it must cross the River Chenab; and in doing this, will have to reckon with the Northern Cavalry, either on the Chenab or after the passage.

At present our information regarding the enemy is scanty. A careful scrutiny, however, of the configuration of this part of the area of operations will give a clue to the enemy's probable line of action. Kharian is by nature a strong position; we know that the enemy is holding it; also that his Cavalry faces us on the Chenab, and shows enterprise in scouting across our frontier. From the Chenab as far north as the Kharian-Rasul position, the country is flat and

without any marked features. If the front of the Northern Cavalry on the Chenab is pierced, it seems likely that the hostile Army will operate from the direction of Kharian, using that position as a pivot of manœuvre.

The *first objectives* of the Division must therefore be—

- (a) To probe the enemy's front along the Chenab so as to discover the most suitable places for crossing the river.
- (b) To force the passage.
- (c) To push out "soundings" towards Kharian, and find out what the hostile Cavalry are doing.

The right flank of the Cavalry Division will be protected to a certain extent by the 10th Infantry Division, and it will be necessary to get into communication with the General Officer Commanding this Division and to ascertain his exact intentions.

The most effective way to conceal the advance of the First Army Corps is to defeat the hostile Cavalry, drive it back into the Kharian position, and blockade it therein, or beyond the Jhelum. This method of action also seems necessary before carrying out the other tasks of the Cavalry Division.

Having crossed the Chenab, and before the Division can march to strike the hostile Cavalry, time must elapse while the positions of the latter are being located. During this period the First Army Corps will be crossing the Chenab, and the Division must be disposed to protect it. For this purpose it will have to occupy a line sufficiently long to give space for the assembly of the Army Corps on the right bank, and this line must be far enough advanced to ensure that the passage is not molested by any guns which the enemy may be able to bring into action. It is improbable that he will have to hand anything more powerful than field pieces.

The heavy battery of the First Army Corps will doubtless be able to assist, if necessary, by its fire from the left bank.

This is a good instance of the necessity for an organisation providing for "Protective Cavalry" in addition to the Strategic Cavalry (Cavalry Division). A proportion of the former with

the 1st Army Corps would have freed the Cavalry Division from the duty of covering the Army Corps, and would have enabled it to at once seek out the hostile Cavalry masses.

The Cavalry Division will, then, best carry out its mission in the following manner :

- (1) By crossing the Chenab and taking up a suitable covering position :
- (2) Sending out reconnaissances to discover the enemy's main Cavalry forces, and then marching to defeat them :
- (3) If the enemy scatters his mounted troops, advance in the general direction of the enemy's position on the Kharian Ridge, driving back the enemy's detachments wherever met :
- (4) Special reconnaissances towards Pind Dadan Khan, and of the River Jhelum between Rasul and Malakwal : and, incidentally,
- (5) Arrangements for the rapid transmission of information to the First Army Corps Commander, and for communication with the General Officer Commanding 10th Infantry Division.

FIRST DAY.

Monday, 22nd February.

The concentration of the Cavalry Division preparatory to the passage of the Chenab River : crossing by the Cavalry Division : disposition after crossing.

Situation on right wing of the Southern Army at daybreak, 22nd February :

- (a) Bodies of hostile Cavalry, each 200 to 300 strong, occupy Phalia, Helan, Mughowala, and Kunjah, with patrols along the River Chenab. Estimated strength of enemy on the front Kadirabad-Gujrat is 20 to 24 squadrons and 18 guns.

- (b) 1st Cavalry Division disposed as detailed in Operation Order No. 1 (p. 48).
- (c) Heads of First Army Corps reaching Akalgarh and Chhinan: the 10th Infantry Division marching from Wazirabad towards Runneke.

The arrival of the heads of the First Army Corps at Akalgarh releases the 1st Cavalry Division from its covering duties on the left bank of the Chenab: active and offensive action on the right bank is now required. The following reconnaissance report on the river, viewed from the left bank only, gives an idea of the country :

Verbal orders from General Officer Commanding : " In conformity with general scheme of observation of left bank of Chenab, to reconnoitre the river from Baraduree to Chunnee Jwaluh."

General nature of country on left bank open, flat, sparsely wooded, few villages: soil sandy and very heavy.

Ramnagar—walled village, large, offering good cover from view and excellent *point d'appui*, opposite cart ford to Sahanpal (South). Mounted troops can move anywhere across country to river bank, crossing nullah A. A. A. west of × on sketch at all points. (*N.B.*—Sketch not reproduced.)

Stream—South portion $1\frac{1}{2}$ to $2\frac{1}{2}$ feet deep, sandy bottom; no quicksands where the tracks lead through water. Plenty willing guides available. Cavalry should cross in sections or files. Boats are reported north side of Sahanpal (South): not in use now: only in rains. Actual bed of river heavy sand, difficult but passable for guns.

Right bank reported higher than left and seemed to be marked by line of trees —2 to $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles off from present bank. No Artillery positions of any commanding elevation on left bank, but doubtful if enemy could successfully oppose our troops anywhere as far as seizure of "Bela" island is concerned. His shell fire would be innocuous, ground being sandy: sandy bed is undulating and would give cover to parties crossing.

O. B. S. F. S., Major,
Commanding 4th Hussars.

The main principles to bear in mind in crossing a river are:

First—threaten enemy at various points, to make him uncertain of real point of crossing; *Secondly*—concentrate unobserved; *Thirdly*—get foothold on far bank, and cross to it as quickly as possible; *Fourthly*—close co-operation of guns and Cavalry essential.

It was decided to cross the division between the two

Sahanpals, and in order to mislead the enemy to detach one brigade to threaten down-stream, whilst the 10th Infantry Division from Wazirabad demonstrated up-stream from near Runneeke; the remainder of the Cavalry Division concentrates quietly and unobserved near, but not too near, the selected point. The following preparatory order is therefore issued first:

No. 2.—Operation Orders.—1st Cavalry Division.

HEADQUARTERS, CHHINAN STATION,
22nd February, 1904 (6 hours).

1. (a) Spies report Phalia, Helan, Mughowala, and Kunjah each occupied by about 200 to 300 hostile Cavalry. Enemy's patrols are active on river line. His estimated strength on line Kadirabad-Gujrat is 20 to 24 squadrons and 18 guns.
- (b) General Officer Commanding Southern Left Wing reports decisive victory near Khushab yesterday, 21st instant.
- (c) Our 10th Infantry Division concentrates near Runneeke at 8 hours to-day and advances to threaten Suintpoor.
2. The Cavalry Division will concentrate near Ramnagar preparatory to forcing the passage of the Chenab this afternoon.
3. (a) The General Officer Commanding 3rd Brigade will detail a Regiment to occupy by noon a position near Baraduree, in rear of which the 2nd Line Transport and all vehicles of the Division not required with fighting line will park.

The Officer Commanding this Regiment, and Officers in charge of Brigade Transport to report to Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General at Baraduree at 11 hours for orders.

- (b) The 3rd Brigade (less one regiment and 2nd line Transport) will march so as to reach the vicinity of Chunnee Jwaluh by 12 noon. The Brigadier will then operate towards Mooreed so as to make the enemy expect a crossing at that point.
- (c) 1st and 2nd Brigades (less 2nd Line Transport) will concentrate near Lahore-Wazirabad cross-roads near Ramnagar in readiness to march at 15 hours, and covered by detachments from 2nd Brigade. Horses to be watered.
4. Reports to Baraduree after 9 hours.
Telegraphed to Brigade Headquarters.

The reason for the order to water the horses beforehand will be obvious. If the crossing has to be made under fire, the first consideration will be to get quickly to the other side: and nothing could be more undesirable than to halt to water.

By 14 hours, the effect of the preparatory order is apparent;

the enemy has divided his force to oppose the threatened points, which are respectively 12 and 6 miles from the real crossing, and 18 miles from each other; and the Cavalry Division can now advance with the certainty of being in greatly superior strength to whatever portion of the enemy may still be observing Sahanpal.

About 3,000 yards from the left bank is an island (the "Bela"), which extends for a considerable distance above and below Sahanpal (South), which lies on it: to reach it, heavy undulating sand-waves and one narrow shallow ford have to be crossed. Covered by the guns, if necessary, this island will first be rushed, the tactics employed to do so depending upon the strength and dispositions of the enemy. After making this point it may be necessary to bring on some of the guns before making the next forward spring, though double-horsing would probably be necessary to get these through the sand. The following orders are now issued :

No. 3.—Operation Orders.—1st Cavalry Division.

HEADQUARTERS, BARADUREE,
22nd February, 1904 (14½ hours).

1. (a) General Officer Commanding, 10th Infantry Division, reports by wire at 14 hours that enemy has concentrated between 10 and 12 squadrons, with two batteries near Suntpoor.
(b) About 5 or 6 squadrons with guns are opposing the 3rd Brigade near Mooreed.
(c) Heads of 1st Army Corps are near Akalgarh and Chhinan.
2. The Division will cross the Chenab near the two Sahanpals and then operate so as to cover the crossing of the First Army Corps.
3. (a) The 1st Brigade will then advance on Sahanpal (North) and Boorj without delay, detailing a troop to observe towards Khosur.
(b) The 2nd Brigade will support by operating towards Manga so as to prevent the enemy from Mooreed enfilading the 1st Brigade.
(c) The 3rd Brigade has been diverted on Ramnagar, and will, for the present, be in reserve.
4. Reports to first ferry north of Ramnagar.
Verbally to Brigadiers 1st and 2nd Brigades; by cable to 3rd Brigade.

By 17 hours the Division had reached Boorj, the enemy retiring north-north-west and north, pursued by contact

squadrons. The dispositions for the night are shown in the following order :

No. 4.—Operation Orders.—1st Cavalry Division.

HEADQUARTERS, SAHANPAL (North),
22nd February, 1904 (17 hours).

1. (a) Parts of two Brigades of enemy opposed our passage of the river here to-day, and seem to have retired on Phalia and Helan, respectively, with loss.
- (b) Our advanced patrols are in touch with the enemy on line Chak Mano, Phiree, Dhul. Kadirabad is clear.
- (c) Enemy (strength 1 squadron) marched east from Sadoolluhpoor at 9 hours to-day, and our troops (1 troop from 1st Brigade) now hold that point.
2. Brigades will halt to-night as follows, arranging for their own security :
 - (a) 1st Brigade near Sanehwaluh.
 - (b) 2nd " " Dhuboola.
 - (c) 3rd " at Sahanpal (North) covering passage of transport.
3. Contact squadrons will be sent out as follows :
 - (a) By 1st Brigade towards Helan ;
 - (b) By 2nd Brigade towards Phalia ; for the purpose of keeping touch and discovering enemy's strength at those places.
4. Headquarters at Sahanpal (North).

Sufficient information was not forthcoming by nightfall to enable the Divisional Commander to decide then what would be his plans for the next morning. Brigades were, therefore, merely warned to be ready to march at a certain hour.

No. 5.—Operation Orders.—1st Cavalry Division.

HEADQUARTERS, SAHANPAL,
22nd February, 1904 (20 hours).

1. (a) Prisoners confirm reports that enemy held line Gujrat-Kadirabad with three Brigades (two Dragoon, one mixed).
- (b) First Army Corps will commence crossing from Ramnagar at 6 hours to-morrow.
2. Brigades will be ready to march at 6 hours to-morrow.

During the night, up to 5 hours, the following information arrives from different points :

1. From Contact Squadron—*Phalia* :

"About 6 squadrons enemy with battery marched north-north-east at 3 hours."

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2. From Contact Squadron—*Helan* :

Force of Cossacks and Dragoons with guns still at Helan at 3 hours. Estimated at 300 to 400 men."

3. From Contact Troop, which marched from Sadoolluhpoor to Mughowala, on hearing from Southern troops at Suptpoor that enemy had fallen back northwards at sunset :

"At midnight Mughowala clear of enemy. Latter retired north-west about 21 hours."

SECOND DAY.

Tuesday, 23rd February.

1. Reconnaissance of and advance to meet hostile Cavalry in open country. Cavalry mounted action. Pursuit.

2. Occupying the line of outposts, covered by obstacles, etc., to contain enemy.

Orders are issued as follows :

No. 6.—Operation Orders.—1st Cavalry Division.

HEADQUARTERS, SAHANPAL (North),
23rd February, 1904 (5 hours).

1. Reports received from our reconnoitring detachments during the night show that the enemy has fallen back N.-E. from Phalia : Helan is still held, and a concentration of the enemy's detachments seems to be taking place at some point north of Helan.

2. The Division will advance viâ Helan on Dinga ready to engage the enemy.

3. (a) The 1st Brigade (less 2nd Line Transport) will march at 6 hours to occupy Helan. The Brigadier will push reconnaissances towards Dinga and ascertain where the enemy's column, which passed through Mughowala at 21 hours last night, has gone to. Patrols will be sent out towards Sohawuh to find out whether there are any hostile troops in that district.

(b) The 2nd Brigade (less 2nd Line Transport) will march at 6 hours and follow the 1st Brigade as far as Chak Mano.

(c) The 3rd Brigade (with all 2nd Line Transport) will march viâ Jonake, starting at 6½ hours, and halt at Chak Mano.

4. Reports after 7 hours to be sent to Chak Mano and thence along the road towards Helan and Dinga.

Situation about 8.30 hours, 23rd instant. (See Sketch 2.)

- (a) Divisional headquarters and 1st Brigade have reached Helan. Reports indicate a large concentration of enemy's Cavalry taking place 6 or 7 miles to the front.
- (b) Heads of First Army Corps are commencing to cross the Chenab river.

The question now arises, how shall the Cavalry Division act?

First, what is the general situation? It is now known that the strength of the enemy's Cavalry, holding the line of the Chenab until yesterday, was three Brigades—*i.e.* approximately 5,500 sabres with 12 to 24 guns. He may or may not have been reinforced since. It seems probable that the whole of this force is now concentrating about 6 miles north of Helan and only about 14 miles from the point where our First Army Corps is in the awkward situation of crossing a river—a difficult obstacle in this case, rather on account of the broad expanse of sand than the depth of water. In rear of the enemy's Cavalry there is said to be a force of all arms numbering about 26,000, which had reached the ridges between Jhelum and Kharian at least twelve days ago, and of whose present position practically nothing is known. Between the First Army Corps and the enemy's Cavalry is our 1st Cavalry Division, in strength about equal to the latter, and acting as "independent Cavalry." Now what are the duties of the independent Cavalry?

1. To reconnoitre and report on the country and on routes of advance.
2. To oppose and defeat the enemy's horsemen and to cover the Army so as to prevent the enemy gaining information regarding its movements.
3. To ascertain and report the strength, numbers, and disposition of the hostile forces, interrupt their movements, and undertake enterprises against their communications.

Again :

An enemy awaiting attack in a defensive position may have pushed to the front his Cavalry and Horse Artillery, possibly supported by mounted Infantry, in order to force his adversary to an early deployment, to delay his march, and to gain information. Against these troops the independent Cavalry will *act with vigour*, endeavouring to drive them back behind the outposts which cover the enemy's main body, and to make prisoners. ("C. T." 1905, chap. vi. sect. III, para. 5.)

With these principles in view there can be no question as to how the 1st Cavalry Division should act. Its commander at once decides to engage the enemy's Cavalry. Until the latter are defeated it will be impossible for him to attempt to carry out any of the duties enumerated above ; moreover, the forces being about equal, "he stands a reasonable chance of gaining his object."—"C. T.," chap. vi. sec. 109 (2).

The Divisional Commander having decided to attack, his first thought will be *to concentrate every possible man under his own hand* in order to give himself the best possible chance of being superior in numbers when striking the tactical blow—the ultimate aim of all strategy and tactics. In order to have the whole strength of the Division concentrated under its own leader, directed by one master mind and with one common object, all detachments should, then, be recalled so soon as the fight is imminent. In practice, it is usually difficult actually to *recall* detachments ; it is, therefore, the duty of every Detachment Commander to watch the course of events, and to rejoin *of his own accord* so soon as his special task is finished, and the decisive collision is about to take place—a duty, however, involving insight which will only be gained by proper training in peace. Next, having concentrated, the Divisional Commander advances, and as the situation develops he must form his *plan*. If half the victory depends on determination, the other half depends upon the leader adopting a sound tactical plan.

Now, the only *facts* which the reconnoitring patrols can report with certainty are the approximate number of the hostile squadrons and batteries, and the nature of the intervening ground.

The General Officer Commanding has thus to form a plan based on these three elements—viz. the enemy's squadrons, his artillery, and the ground.

The ground is the mould into which the plan of attack must make the troops fit. The report of the Prussian Cavalry of 1841 (see Kaehler) makes this quite clear. "It is impossible to lay down precise rules for the formation,

deployment, and attack of Cavalry. The physical and moral strength of the enemy and the configuration of the ground will always determine in a different manner how a mass of Cavalry should be handled."

When the moment of combat approaches, reconnaissance with large bodies becomes impossible and, if adopted, must mean defeat in detail. *Combat patrols* should be used to show the exact positions of the enemy, *ground scouts* to prevent squadrons being entrapped in bad ground. Sometimes, as possibly to-day, reconnaissances sent forward must proceed with the greatest caution so as not to disturb the enemy and rouse him to activity. These reconnoitring detachments may consist of an officer, accompanied by a few intelligent despatch riders to bring back information gained ; but, as the distance between the opposing Cavalries becomes less, officers in pairs may be usefully employed, so that *one* may return with a verbal report which time does not admit of being put in writing.

The country must be reconnoitred sufficiently far ahead and in ample time to enable the main body of the force to be directed in accordance with the results of such reconnaissances, and to prevent brigades being launched to the attack over impassable ground. *Ground scouts* are of no use for such purposes, as they are too close to their respective squadrons and are only really useful after the plan of manœuvre has been decided upon.

One, or more, specially trained officers should be entrusted with this duty ; it cannot be entrusted to combat patrols. They already have a sufficiently difficult task to discharge.

Officers with special topographical aptitude should be chosen from the Brigade or Divisional Staff, and they should carry out this work as far to the front as possible.

Possibly the most convenient form for their report is a rough enlargement of the map, executed before setting out, on which obstacles, or favourable ground, can be quickly entered. But nothing elaborate should be attempted ; only the points essential for the General Officer Commanding to know should

be indicated. Sometimes one or more squadrons sent to the front or flanks will ensure a more or less protected zone by driving back hostile patrols and will thus facilitate the work of the patrols under consideration. Squadrons must sometimes also be employed in this way to conceal the march, circumscribing the ground, as it were, by occupying some point or points of tactical importance. In order not to be lost to the division they must, however, rejoin the moment their task has been accomplished, or in any case must always join in the fight by rallying on some neighbouring corps.

Should the enemy appear, contrary to expectation, on the flanks, it is essential that the Commander should have the necessary time in which to alter his dispositions. One or two small patrols should therefore move about $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 2 miles on each flank in order to guard against surprise.

Combat patrols have consequently two distinct characteristics according to their duties, offensive or defensive :—

- (a) Patrols sent in the direction in which one expects to find the enemy.
- (b) Patrols sent to guard against surprises where one does not expect to find the enemy.

In forming the plan the main points to bear in mind are :

- (1) The advance must be concealed, by moving from shelter to shelter as concentrated as is compatible with power of rapid deployment :
- (2) The actual attack must be in the nature of a surprise :
- (3) Rapidity is essential :
- (4) The whole force must be simultaneously hurled at the objective (either in a parallel or converging direction) with one common object—*i.e.* a display of irresistible superiority, at threat of which the enemy will probably decline contact.

In carrying it out :

- (1) Try and foresee the point at which collision will take place. The nature of the ground will possibly admit of small fronts only.

It is sometimes advisable to deploy at a halt, concealed by ground.

(2) Select a pivot for one flank according to the ground ; the enemy can then only threaten the other.

(3) Deceive the enemy as to intentions by—

Intelligent use of artillery :

Misleading action of advance guard or independent squadrons across his front :

Rapid unexpected formation to a flank, in direction of the enemy :

Not permitting words of command or noise, but using instead the "follow-my-leader" system. Therefore be able to deploy by signal ; always take the shortest route ; change the direction of heads rather than wheel.

Bearing in mind these principles, the Divisional Commander commenced to approach the enemy with his Division disposed as follows :

(a) As soon as the enemy was reported to be within striking distance—*i.e.* at about $8\frac{1}{2}$ hours—the Division was ordered to march concentrated ready to deploy for attack.

(b) The bulk of the contact squadrons rejoined their Brigades, leaving combat patrols to continue to gain information and to point out the exact position of the enemy. Reconnaissances with larger units were now impossible, for they would risk defeat in detail.

(c) The system of protection at this time consisted of combat patrols and an advance guard (of one squadron) moving along the road to Dinga in support of the patrols in its front.

(d) The Divisional Commander, with Brigadiers and Officer Commanding R.H.A., rode near the advance guard, advancing from cover to cover, the Division following the latter at a steady trot and conforming to its movements.

(e) Specially trained officers were sent out in front to report on the ground tactically. Ground scouts do not move sufficiently far out for this, nor have they the necessary tactical knowledge.

The Division on its march thus presented the form of a head (the advance guard), a body (the 1st Brigade), and two wings (the 2nd and 3rd Brigades). Each Brigade in mass, with intervals only for air and elasticity. (See Sketch No. 2.)

The Artillery grouped now under Officer Commanding R.H.A. marched on the road until the advance guard was checked ; it then deployed.

1st Line Transport grouped 2 or 3 miles in rear of the Division, moving from shelter to shelter.

2nd Line Transport parked in safety at Chak Mano, about 12 miles from the eventual battlefield ; if allowed to follow at the heels of the Division it would certainly interfere with the latter's freedom of manœuvre when in such close contact with the enemy.

Situation about 10 hours.

1. 1st Cavalry Division (less 2 squadrons and section R.H.A. with 2nd Line Transport at Chak Mano) moving in concentrated formation near and to south of Rusoolpoor.

2. Advance guard (1 squadron) checked south of Sandanwalah by enemy in superior numbers holding that locality.

Lushkuree also held by enemy. Mass of Cavalry near Chuk Shekoo, and a still larger body, probably 14 or 15 squadrons, halted and dismounted near Siveeuh.

About two miles now separate the opponents. With the exception of the villages, which mostly are on raised sites, the country is flat, with trees and scrub impeding the view, so that even at from 1,500 yards to a mile distance, it will be impossible actually to see what the enemy's dispositions are. However, our final dispositions, based upon the reports of the reconnoitring officers, must be decided upon at about this distance.

The only sound plan is to make use of suitable ground as a pivot or *point d'appui* for one flank. Then it becomes clear which flank the enemy can threaten. It is the nature of the

ground which will determine the actual disposition of the Brigades.

The Combat.—The General Officer Commanding having brought forward his Brigades must combine their attacks, in accordance with a general plan, upon some common objective, which should be struck as nearly simultaneously as possible by the whole.

It is the duty of each subordinate, once this objective has been clearly indicated, to lead his command into the fight in the formation most advantageous as regards both the ground and the special military situation.

The encounter should not be broken up into a series of successive episodes, but should be the simultaneous action of all the Brigades (except the Reserve) with one common object, either in parallel or converging directions, each unit fighting on its own account but always keeping in mind the common object in its individual action.

Nor should the combat resolve itself into a *mêlée* which can bring about no decisive result. It should, on the contrary, come about with the violence of a released spring, with the force of moral ascendancy, at the threat of which the enemy saves himself by flight. This known physiological fact, namely, that the physical shock hardly ever takes place, should help to determine the conduct of Cavalry. Only combats unscientifically entered into end in a *mêlée*.

How should the Artillery be employed?—The Artillery is the instrument of preparation for the Cavalry attack. The guns and the Cavalry form one unit; both arms must co-operate in attaining one common objective.

The ideal to realise is to fire the longest time possible, not by beginning *soon*, but by continuing *late*. With this intention it is necessary to give a direction of fire more or less perpendicular to that of the attack, and in order to ensure such fire, the Artillery must not be glued to the Division or Brigade, but must be detached; or perhaps the latter can more easily seize the opportunity to detach itself. The objective of the Artillery is either the hostile Cavalry or

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Artillery, whichever at the moment is producing the tactically greatest effect. The Artillery must be protected either by natural obstacles or by the rifles of dismounted men or machine guns. Inversely, it may sometimes be worth while to launch a detachment to silence the hostile guns. The perfect condition would be to render one's own guns inaccessible, to silence those of the enemy by a charge, and to be able to direct the whole of one's own fire upon the enemy's squadrons until the last moment.

In order, then, not to lose the few precious minutes which are available for the Artillery to produce an effect, it must place itself in a flanking position from which it can fire accurately and for as long a time as possible.

As a general rule the Artillery should direct its fire upon the enemy's leading line, but occasions may arise when by suddenly opening surprise fire upon the enemy's guns the Artillery may, by disabling the hostile batteries, support its own Cavalry more effectually.

The most unsatisfactory method of using the Artillery is to keep it until the last moment at the head of the column of march. Such a disposition induces premature employment of the guns, and straight to the front, *i.e.* in the direction in which the Division or Brigade must eventually deploy. The squadrons then paralyse the action of the Artillery by almost immediately masking its fire.

Necessity for retaining a Reserve.—Once the Division is deployed, the General Officer Commanding is powerless to modify his plan, should he find that the enemy is still manœuvring. To send out gallopers at such a moment would merely cause confusion at a time when success depends upon determination on the part of subordinates, and good order and cohesion in the ranks. Hence the importance for the General Officer Commanding to retain a Reserve to guard against the unforeseen.

To return to the present situation.

The Fight.

1. Between Rusoolpoor and Sandanwalah the rôle of the advance guard changed from one of "protection" to one of "manœuvre"; its Commander now held Jhanda Choochan as a pivot of manœuvre, disposing three troops dismounted, and keeping the 4th troop out as patrols in observation. It is often useful to post the machine guns with the escort to the guns. They can, by their rapid fire, materially aid the escort in beating off any sudden attack on the guns.

Opportunities for intervening effectively in the main action may also present themselves.

2. Under this protection the Divisional Commander was able to complete his plans, in conjunction with his Officer Commanding R.H.A. and Brigadiers, thus ensuring one objective and convergence of attacks.

Concentration should not, however, be allowed to produce a series of narrow, parallel and successive attacks, which would interfere with one another, but rather a convergence of simultaneous efforts, by Brigades, starting from different points towards a common centre.

3. The Artillery was now detached from the Division and moved to a position near the advance guard, but with strict orders not to open fire prematurely. In war, and especially in advance-guard operations, "silence is often golden." Compare Colonel Henderson's remarks on the action of Stuart's Cavalry at the Evelington Heights, 3rd July, 1862; also Weissembourg, Vionville, and Gravelotte, all of which began with a useless surprise.

As pointed out above, by all means get in as many shells as possible, but do not fire until the enemy has deployed and is fully committed to an attack in a certain direction. Fire which is opened too soon, and before the enemy has deployed, enables him either to refuse combat, or to manœuvre in such a way as to avoid, or cause the opponent to mask, the guns at the really critical moment, *i.e.* just before the actual contact.

Much practice is necessary to ensure true co-operation between the two arms in situations such as this.

4. Using Jhanda Choochan (held by the massed guns and 1 squadron) as a pivot of support, the Division obtained the initiative and manœuvred north-eastwards towards Lushkuree, thus drawing the enemy across our guns and causing him to mask his own, which had taken up a position near Shekhoo, and had already displayed their position by firing prematurely on our column at a range of about 6,000 yards, so soon as the latter appeared to the east of Rusoolpoor.

The Southern Cavalry Division was entirely successful in the fight which ensued ; and the enemy's Cavalry broke, and fled in great confusion northwards, being pursued by the 1st Brigade, whilst the other two Brigades rallied in rear.

As regards pursuit, Warnery has written: "Only a squadron in disorder can gallop as fast as another in disorder!" So the squadrons most engaged should pursue at top speed. There can be no middle course—either pursue at top speed, or rally at the halt. Squadrons pursuing in this manner, however, are lost should some fresh hostile squadrons come upon the scene: a reserve is consequently indispensable during a pursuit.

Situation on evening of 23rd February. (See Sketch 3.)

1. Enemy's Cavalry was decisively beaten near Sandanwalah about noon.

2. 1st Brigade, picking up many prisoners, pursued northwards past Dinga towards Khoree; the latter point was found to be held by Northern Infantry entrenched.

The pursuit was checked by enemy holding line of piquets from Khoree W. to Khokra, and Rasul, on river Jhelum, and N.-E. towards Kharian.

Headquarters 1st Brigade bivouacs at Noor Jemal.

3. During the afternoon 2nd Brigade was ordered to occupy Cheeleewanwala and Moong, with the object of driving back enemy's patrols into the Kharian position, and to push up into touch with enemy's outposts.

Patrols confirm the report that enemy's right is at Rasul.

The right of 2nd Brigade outposts is opposite Thay, and in communication with left of 1st Brigade.


4. 3rd Brigade and Divisional Headquarters at Dinga.

5. 2nd Line Transport reaches Dinga between 18 and 20 hours and halts.

In view of the new situation, how should the Cavalry Division act? The enemy's Cavalry having been defeated, the initiative now lies with our Cavalry Commander, who, however, must constantly bear in mind the main strategical plan. Now the intention of the Southern Commander-in-Chief is to effect a junction between the First and Second Army Corps with a view to crushing in detail that portion of the enemy's forces operating near Jhelum; and in accordance with this intention the original instructions to the Cavalry Commander were—(a) to cover the advance of the First Army Corps towards Khewa; (b) to open up communication with the centre column, due to reach Pind Dadan Khan on the 24th February; and (c) to reconnoitre the Jhelum river from Rasul to Malakwal, with a view to finding the best crossing-place for the First Army Corps. It was only the appearance of a large hostile body of Cavalry which temporarily interfered with the direct execution of these orders. As one of the results of success, the situation clears at once: and it is now definitely known that the enemy's force of all arms, of whose movements so much doubt existed previously, is at present occupying a position along the Kharian ridge. Conversely from the enemy's point of view, the situation is suddenly lost in obscurity. The whole of their system for the collection of information must have been thrown out of gear, and it is improbable that anything is definitely known as to the actual subsequent movements of the First Army Corps, which, in the morning, was presumably reported to be crossing the Chenab river from near Ramnagar. The General Officer Commanding 1st Cavalry Division decides, therefore, to conceal the advance of our Infantry columns by occupying a line of outposts, covered by obstacles, etc., so as

**Blockade of S.W. portion of
KHARIAN RIDGE
operations during night
of 24th February**

SKETCH 3.



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to seal up the enemy within his own outpost line and to force him to remain in his defensive position.

The following results will thus be obtained :

- (a) The advance of the First Army Corps will be concealed.
- (b) Communication with the Second Army Corps can be opened and maintained without difficulty.
- (c) The banks of the Jhelum can be reconnoitred for a suitable crossing-place.

The following orders are accordingly issued (see sketch 3) :

No. 7.—*Operation Orders.—1st Cavalry Division.*

HEADQUARTERS, DINGA,
23rd February, 1904 (20 hours).

1. (a) The enemy lost 12 guns and many killed and wounded in the action to-day. The remains of his Cavalry are now enclosed in the Rasul-Kharian position by our outposts.
- (b) The leading troops of the First Army Corps are to march to Jonake-Suleman this afternoon, and at daylight to-morrow will march to Sohawuh. The 10th Infantry Division has reached Mughowala.
2. The 1st Cavalry Division will continue to blockade the south-western flank of the Rasul-Kharian position, and at the same time will prepare to cross the Jhelum.
3. (a) The 3rd Brigade, together with the 2nd Line Transport, will march at midnight to Cheeleewanwala.
- (b) The detachment of the 2nd Brigade now at Cheeleewanwala will, as soon as relieved by the 3rd Brigade, march to Moong.
These moves must be completed before daylight.
4. The General Officer Commanding 2nd Brigade will have the Jhelum reconnoitred from near Rasul to a point opposite Syadpoor, with a view to the passage of the river by the Cavalry Division and First Army Corps. As many boats as possible to be secretly collected, and all necessary arrangements made for crossing.
5. Headquarters march at midnight to Cheeleewanwala.

Note.—With a view to opening up communication with the Second Army Corps a special detachment capable of division into two patrols after crossing the river, consisting of 1 officer, 1 N.C.O., 4 men, and 6 horses, carrying musselsacks and rope for making a raft, was sent off from headquarters at Dinga after dark on 23rd instant with orders to cross the river Jhelum near Haranpur.

THIRD AND FOURTH DAYS.

*Wednesday, 24th, and Thursday, 25th February.***Passage of River Jhelum: Dispositions after Crossing.**

(See Sketch 4.)

The situation on the morning of the 24th is most interesting. The leading troops of the First Army Corps will reach Sohawuh in the evening, and should be able to reach the left bank of the Jhelum river and be ready to commence crossing by midday the following day. The leading troops of the Second Army Corps are one march west of Haranpur. But everything depends upon the successful handling of the Cavalry. If the enemy discover the move towards Khewa, he may either recross the Jhelum river and occupy the hills covering the crossing at Khewa, or he may attack our Infantry whilst on the line of march, or engaged in crossing the river; in both cases threatening their line of communications. The rôle of the Southern Cavalry Division is then a double one:

- (a) To deceive the enemy as long as possible into expecting an attack from the direction of Dinga, simultaneously concealing the march of our Infantry towards Khewa;
- (b) To cross the Jhelum river and seize a covering position on the right bank, so as to insure a safe and rapid crossing for the Infantry columns in rear.

The Brigadier Commanding the 2nd Brigade has the whole of the 24th in which to reconnoitre the river and to make preparations for crossing, but in order to prevent any delay to the Infantry columns in rear it is most important that the hills north of and covering the Khewa-Jalalpoor crossing should be occupied before the morning of the 25th.

It is decided that the 2nd Brigade shall cross during the night 24th-25th to a point near Syadpoor, and the following orders are therefore issued:

No. 8.—Operation Orders—1st Cavalry Division.

HEADQUARTERS, CHEELEENWALA,
24th February, 1904 (12 hours).

1. (a) Enemy still holds the Rasul-Kharian position in force, and seems to expect to be attacked there.
- (b) The leading division of First Army Corps, with pontoon section Royal Engineers, will reach Sohawuh to-night. The 10th Infantry Division will reach Dinga.
2. The blockade of the enemy's position will be maintained by one brigade of the Cavalry Division, while the rest of the division crosses the river Jhelum to-night opposite Syadpoor.
3. (a) The General Officer Commanding 1st Brigade, strengthened by the Divisional Cavalry of the 10th Division, will take over all the outposts at 17 hours, and at daylight to-morrow will keep up a brisk fire along the whole line and bombard the enemy's position at some point north of Khoree throughout the day.
- (b) The 2nd Brigade will leave Moong about 19 hours (after dark), taking all appliances which have been prepared there for crossing the river, and proceed to point chosen opposite Syadpoor.
The river will be crossed without delay, and the hill north of Jalalpoor must be occupied as soon as possible.
Scouts should be sent towards Jhelum and also towards Domeli to ascertain what forces the enemy has in those directions.
- (c) The 3rd Brigade and all 2nd Line Transport will march from Cheeleenwala at 19 hours to Khewa, where the 2nd Line Transport will be parked under escort of the 11th Hussars (Corps Cavalry) which will arrive there at nightfall.
The 3rd Brigade will then follow the 2nd Brigade across the Jhelum.
4. Reports to be sent to Moong until dark, then to Khewa where a connecting post and signal station will be established by the 2nd Brigade.
Copies sent by orderly to 1st and 2nd Brigades at 12 hours; verbally to General Officer Commanding, 3rd Brigade.

Now, the crossing the river has to be considered.

The main stream of the Jhelum varies from 150 to 300 yards in width, unfordable, and flowing about 2 miles an hour: sandy bottom: banks generally steep and about 10 feet high. The spot selected for the crossing is shown in sketch 4. The Cavalry Division has no pontoons, but, according to reports from patrols, the following material might be collected during the afternoon of the 24th instant :—

- (a) Rafts ("tällë") of 400–500 sleepers carry a weight of 100 maunds—approximately 3·5 tons.

- (b) "Sarnai" rafts—large goat-skins filled with air lashed under ordinary charpoys or any suitable wooden frame, such as tent-poles lashed together. Two to three men to each charpoy. There were plenty of goats about, and native troops would be expert in skinning them rapidly.
- (c) "Ghurrah" rafts—made of empty ghurrahs lashed mouth downwards under ordinary country charpoys, guided over by two swimmers. Seven to eight ghurrahs should support two men.
- (d) Kerosene oil tin or "pēēpē" rafts. Similar to above. Seven to eight tins with mouths sealed up should carry four to five men.
- (e) Goat-skins stuffed with straw. Similar to (b) above, but buoyancy increased.
- (f) Buffaloes, herds of which graze regularly on the "Bela" or islands amid stream, could be collected under their native herdsmen. Each buffalo could swim with one man on his back, or holding on to his tail.
- (g) Guides for tracks to fords and ferries available in every village; necessary on account of quicksands.
- (h) Swimmers owning their own "sarnais": always one or two experts in each village. One swimmer with bundle straw, "charrie," etc., under his chest can always take one man over on his back.
- (k) Supplies of country rope always procurable in a few hours from villages, *e.g.* from off the wheels of Persian wells.
- (l) Country boats can be worked by three men for continuous work. Five rowers required. Should carry 200 maunds safely: say 100 armed men and saddlery, or 1 gun, 1 limber, or 8 horses.
- (m) Lastly doors and lintels from houses, wooden parts of wells, roofing timbers, rough native tools, country carts, etc., could be requisitioned and applied to purposes required.

Reports of reconnaissances of the river for crossing should show at a glance—

Points where boats
ferries } exist,
fords }

where horses and transport can be swum across.

No river should be considered as impassable to Cavalry, and if they cannot find fords or ferries they must swim and get across somehow. Much assistance can often be derived from the local riverain population, but too much reliance should not be placed on native statements. Reconnoitring officers before reporting should themselves actually test all likely fords and crossing-places.

Once the crossing-place has been decided on, what are the duties of the staff? At least three officers will be required to be specially detailed :

No. 1 officer to be in charge of the working parties on the near bank, (*a*) for collecting materials, (*b*) impressing inhabitants, (*c*) control and direction of the actual work, (*d*) clear marking out of the fords by means of stakes, brushwood, lines of rushes, etc., or by posting natives in the water, (*e*) clear marking out of points of entry to, and egress from, the water.

No. 2 officer on the near bank—to control the approaches and the order of the units crossing.

No. 3 officer on the far bank—to point out the covering position to the first party over, to control the despatch of units as soon as collected, and to prevent confusion and unnecessary loitering about.

These last two officers should be in constant signalling communication with each other.

It is desirable to post boats down-stream when available for the rescue of men and horses in trouble. At night, arrangements should generally be made for lighting the crossing-places. These lights should be as few as possible, and should be arranged so as to be invisible to the enemy.

The actual detail of the dispositions decided on, in the case under consideration, is best shown in the sketch, but the following points should be noted :

(1) Since the crossing is to be carried out by moonlight, the difficulty of giving orders to units at the point of crossing should be thought of. Units must be kept together, and Regimental Commanders must be told *before* the Brigade marches from Moong exactly what the task of each one will be on reaching the point of crossing: and what appliances will be provided, and where: boatmen, guides, etc., should also be told off beforehand, and a careful watch should be kept over them to prevent them slipping away or getting lost in the darkness.

(2) The first objective must be to get a covering party of *dismounted* men across to the farther bank. For this a whole regiment might be told off, the commanding officer with three squadrons dismounted men to embark at once in boats: the remaining squadron to remain with the whole of the horses of the regiment, the latter being linked in charge of one or two men per troop.

Having obtained a foothold on the far bank, a complete regiment should next be crossed *with horses*. The first objective, after gaining a foothold on the right bank, should be to seize and entrench a position on the Jalalpoor ridge to cover the point selected for throwing the bridge from Khewa. For this purpose, as soon as the first mounted squadron is safely across, it would be sent off as an advance guard, preceded by patrols, to gain the ridge above Jalalpoor. The remaining regiment and guns to follow with the Brigadier.

Lastly the horses and fourth squadron of the covering regiment to cross, and also the 1st Line Transport.

The 2nd and 3rd Brigades having safely crossed, the next difficulty is again to concentrate, *i.e.* to withdraw the 1st Brigade towards the point of passage, whilst continuing still to show a front towards the Rasul-Kharian position, and to "mystify and mislead" the enemy there as long as possible.

The following order is, accordingly, despatched :

To General Officer Commanding 1st Brigade, Noor Jemal.

HEADQUARTERS, SYADPOOR,

Thursday, 25th February, 1904 (7 hours).

1. (a) Our 2nd Brigade holds hills north of Jalalpoor. The 3rd Brigade is now crossing.
- (b) Engineers begin to throw bridge across Jhelum near Khewa at daylight and hope to complete work by 14 hours.
2. Continue to harass enemy until dark, then withdraw to Khewa and cross river about midnight. The bridge will be reserved for you to cross at that hour.
3. Divisional 2nd Line Transport now at Khewa will follow you to Jalalpoor.
4. Report progress of your march to General Officer Commanding First Army Corps, at Khewa, as well as to me at Jalalpoor, where Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division, are to-day.

Situation at sunset on Thursday, 25th February.

1. 2nd Brigade began crossing near Syadpoor at 22 hours last night (Wednesday) : finished at 4 hours (Thursday) to-day.

Opposed by about 250 Cavalry covering a line Jalalpoor-Haranpur. Enemy fell back north-east and north-west.

Brigade now holds : Pass to Asnot on left ; centre holds pass on road to Vang ; right holds road to Chackri.

Reinforced at 8 hours by battery of mountain Artillery which crossed on raft at Khewa.

Hostile patrols met on Boonhar river.

2. 3rd Brigade crossed at Syadpoor, beginning at 4 hours on 25th ; finished at 10 hours, and was joined by another mountain battery.

Advanced squadrons at Kotera. Headquarters—Meriala.

Connects with right of 2nd Brigade and left of 1st.

3. 1st Brigade finding enemy withdrawing from Khoree about 14 hours, presses him, but is checked by works in pass on road to Pooran.

Brigade then concentrates on Moong, ready to cross to-night (Thursday) with 2nd Line Transport.

4. Divisional Headquarters at Jalalpoor.

5. Leading Division of First Army Corps guarding bridge about Khewa and Jalalpoor, and still crossing, rear of First Army Corps at Mangut.

6. Centre of Southern Army—*i.e.* Second Army Corps, approaching Haranpur.

7. General Officer Commanding enemy's troops around Jhelum heard at noon, when on Kharian ridge, of Infantry crossing near Jalalpoor.

Southern patrols on right bank of Jhelum are in touch with his (enemy's) mounted scouts on Boonhar river.

FIFTH DAY.

Friday, 26th February.

Cavalry operating in Hilly Country to delay Enemy's Advance.

The vigorous action of the Cavalry Division on Wednesday afternoon and that of the 1st Brigade yesterday (Thursday) succeeded in its object, and it was not until noon yesterday that the General in command of the enemy's forces realised that his position had been turned, and that he must fall back at once behind the Jhelum. The report from the detachment of Cavalry watching the line Jalalpoor-Haranpur, who were driven back by the 2nd Brigade in the early morning yesterday, must have reached hostile headquarters by about eight hours ; but it was only the news of the arrival of the Infantry columns at Khewa, and of the construction of a bridge there, which finally removed the expectation of any serious attack being made on the Rasul-Kharian position. A portion of this hostile Cavalry detachment was reported to have retired north-west ; it is at present not quite clear why this direction was taken, but the point must be borne in mind.

The hills to the north of the Jhelum river, although only from 2,000 to 3,000 feet in height at their highest points, form a difficult obstacle. The slopes are mostly very steep and irregular, and the valleys between the hills are broken up by deep and often impassable nullahs. Only three roads lead

CROS

SKETCH 4.

Syad



Island.

- A. B. Boat ferry for men, gun, saddlery etc.
- E. F. Corduroy road over heavy sand.
- F. G. Point for swimming horses and mules.
- C. Copses to be seized by covering party.

Order for Crossing:

- 4th Mrs. 3 Squadrons covering parties, dismounted.
- 5th Lrs. 4 Squadrons mounted, 2 guns R.M.A.
- 6th " Brigadier, 4 Squadrons mounted, 4 guns R.M.A.
- 4th Mrs. 1 Squadron, horses of 3 Squadrons.
- 1st Line Transport.

N.B.- Not to scale.

2nd Bde

through or round the spur running down between Boonhar and Jhelum rivers, viz.:

- (a) Via Asnot to Domeli ;
- (b) From Jalalpoor, the main road, via Chackri to Jhelum ;
- (c) Via Meriala and Darapoor, along the right bank of the river to Jhelum—

all practicable for wheeled Artillery. There is also a difficult path via Kookar to Asnot.

By the evening of the 25th instant the Cavalry Division have occupied these defiles, and received instructions to hold them until relieved by the Infantry of the First Army Corps still crossing at Khewa. The latter are not expected to reach the northern exits of the defiles until the afternoon of the next day, the 26th instant. On the evening of the 25th the following orders are issued :

No. 9.—Operation Orders.—1st Cavalry Division.

HEADQUARTERS, JALALPOOR,
25th February, 1904 (22 hours).

1. (a) Our scouts report large columns of enemy moving from the Kharian ridge this afternoon towards floating bridge at Sangoi. Their Cavalry is in touch with our outposts near Darapoor and on Chackri-Jalalpoor road.
 - (b) Our First Army Corps is still on left bank of Jhelum, except one brigade covering bridge head. Our Second Army Corps is at Haranpur to-night.
 2. The Division will be disposed to hold the northern exits of the defiles on the roads from Jalalpoor to the Boonhar river until our Infantry can come up.
 3. (a) The 2nd Brigade will concentrate and be disposed so as to secure the north exit of the main defile about three or four miles south-west of Chackri.
 - (b) The 3rd Brigade will hold a position near Darapoor and connect with the 2nd Brigade.
 - (c) The General Officer Commanding 1st Brigade will detail one squadron, to hold the head of the pass on the Jalalpoor-Asnot road, and, with the remainder of his brigade, will take up a position of readiness near the road to Chackri from which he can support the three positions as required.
 4. The 2nd Line Transport remains with 1st Infantry Brigade near Jalalpoor.
 5. Signalling communication to be opened by the headquarters of brigades with the station on Mangaldeo point on hill north-west of Jalalpoor.
- A connecting post is at Dāk Bungalow, Jalalpoor.

*Situation, Friday, 26th.**(16 hours.)*

1. Advance of Northern troops checked by the Southern Cavalry Division holding line Darapoor—Joomeki Dhok, but strong columns can be seen moving up in support from the direction of Sangoi.
2. (a) Leading troops of First Army Corps—just arriving at the positions held by the Cavalry, and taking over outposts.
(b) Leading troops of Second Army Corps—reach Jalalpoor at sunset.
3. Cavalry Division—halts in the hollows between Noorpoor and the main ridge, getting water in the stream which runs from Vang past north end of main ridge opposite Pind Serika.

By Friday evening the Cavalry Division is badly in need of rest. Operations have been continuous during the last five days: two rivers have been crossed, an action fought followed by a pursuit, and a great deal of country has been covered both by night and by day in reconnaissance and protective duties. Moreover, judging from the situation, hard fighting may certainly be expected to take place the next day. As early as possible, therefore, on the Friday afternoon—*i.e.* as soon as the Infantry have taken over the position and outposts—the Divisional Commander concentrates his Brigades in a safe position behind the Infantry outposts, the latter now in touch with the enemy for the first time. In selecting this position he is, however, careful to bear in mind the tactical situation, and to anticipate as far as possible where the Division will be most favourably situated for co-operation in the battle expected to commence next morning.

The question may here be considered, *Should Infantry ever be attached to a Cavalry Division?* This point was raised

after the war of 1870-71, when a great deal of military literature was published on the subject, some writers saying that there ought to be Infantry with the Cavalry, and others that there ought not. In the year 1889 it was considered desirable to sum up the discussion, and a long article appeared in the *Militär-Wochenblatt*, in which the writer, who dealt with the 4th, 5th, and 6th Cavalry Divisions in the second period of the war, came to the conclusion that there ought *not* to be Infantry, except under very exceptional circumstances; that, if there are Infantry, there must be a great number of them to be of any use, and then the result is that mobility diminishes. But he did not go into a later period of the war after the battle of Le Mans. In January, after that battle, a large force with the 4th Cavalry Division went towards Alençon. The 4th Cavalry Division was on the exposed flank. They got into close country, and the Division did not know whether it was likely to be attacked from the west, the north, or the east. The men were employed all day long in reconnaissance in this difficult country. At night they had to put out strong outposts, and the consequence was they were working by night as well as by day, with the result that the men, *not the horses*, were knocked up. The General sent back for a battalion of Infantry (the 44th Regiment), and when these came up the outpost night work of the Cavalry ceased. The Infantry were employed simply and solely for outpost piquet duty at night.

Infantry, not Mounted Infantry, be it noted. They were very short of forage in that country, and wanted only men—not 600 additional horses also. The Infantry were, on this occasion, brought up in waggons, four horses to twelve men, or in carts with two horses to six men. In certain situations, then, the desirability of attaching an Infantry battalion to the Cavalry Division should certainly be borne in mind.

SIXTH DAY.

*Saturday, 27th February.***Cavalry co-operating in the great Counterstroke :
the Pursuit.***Situation at 11 hours.*

1. The Northern Commander has taken the offensive towards Jalalpoor in the hopes of defeating the First Army Corps before the Second Army Corps can arrive to assist it.

At daylight he succeeded in capturing the line of villages from Naka on his right to Badiala and Darapoor on his left.

His main effort is being made against the Darapoor ridge supported by guns of position from Rasul.

2. The First Army Corps has been driven back across the Darapoor nullah, but still occupies a line from about Joome-ki Dhok to Kotera.

3. The Second Army Corps is coming up on the left of the First Army Corps, and the Southern Commander decides to make a great counterstroke with over half his strength, *i.e.* with the whole of the Second Army Corps and the Cavalry Division, pivoting on Joome-ki Dhok as the right. Divisions in succession move down the Chackri nullah and form to their right, so that a line of Infantry and guns is quickly formed from Chackri to Joome-ki Dhok.

4. The Cavalry Division is ordered to support the movement on the outer flank from near Haripoor.

At dawn the division was still in its position of readiness behind the Noorpoor ridge, and until the moment for the general assault arrives, it would probably remain there, careful not to scatter in detachments, nor to wear out horses with unnecessary galloping. This state of semi-repose does not imply a lack of "activity," but is only the necessary preparation for action. A body of Cavalry which rushes

hither and thither without any definite objective, and without any tactical idea, knocking up against positions strongly defended, and wearing out its strength to no advantage, is not "active" in the true tactical sense of the word. Activity must be *effective*, depending first on the tactical plan, and then on determination to carry through that plan.

Whilst waiting in the position of readiness, helio or other communication must be maintained with the General Officer Commanding the Southern Force. Protection patrols would be on the look-out, one squadron probably being sent across to the far side of the Boonhar river for this purpose: presumably, reconnaissance of the ground was completed yesterday. In addition, three or more specially trained officers would occupy points of vantage whence carefully to observe and report on the course of the main fight—a most important duty, for on their information the Divisional Commander may often have to act on his own initiative, seizing an opportunity to co-operate, or support, and without necessarily waiting for orders.

So soon as the great counterstroke commences, as stated in the situation above, the 1st Cavalry Division moves out towards Chackri. At this period two points should be borne in mind—(a) whilst the counterstroke develops, care must be taken to prevent the hostile Cavalry from attacking our troops on the exposed left flank or in rear: from the nature of the situation the enemy's Cavalry are more likely to be operating on their own right, *i.e.* against our left, than elsewhere, and this danger must be foreseen and guarded against; (b) as many squadrons as the ground can accommodate, and no more, should be detailed to co-operate with the Infantry in the stroke itself: the remainder acting as reserve or flank guard: excess in the attacking line will merely cause crowding and disorder.

Accordingly, the 3rd Brigade is detailed to push on to the attack in close co-operation with the left of the Infantry.

But close co-operation does not imply the adoption of Infantry tactics, *e.g.* a line of dismounted skirmishers pro-

longing the Infantry firing line and crawling with it from cover to cover. The direction of the advance is from west to east, *i.e.* at right angles to a series of knolls and spurs running south and north down from the main ridge to the Boonhar river. The general disposition of the Brigade is, then, in several lines behind the series of folds in the ground. Mounted and dismounted action are combined: sometimes, a few men may advance on foot to gain a point; at other times, detachments will be able to gallop forward and to seize successive positions, holding them until the Infantry can get forward in relief. The other two Brigades, stealing from cover to cover, are on the left rear of the 3rd, and as far as possible concealed, but ready to deal with the enemy's Cavalry should they appear, and also to take part in a final attack so soon as the Infantry counterstroke shall have produced its effect.

As to formation and pace, the Division started in mass, but mass is only suitable as a formation of assembly, or of approach outside the zone of fire. Over 1,500 yards range, squadron column, or open column of squadrons can be used, preferably in echelon. Under 1,500 yards, single rank should be employed, squadrons being extended to the extent compatible with the maintenance of effective command. To cross ground swept by fire, Cavalry must spread out and the pace must then be the fastest possible; but the horses must be spared by halting in folds of the ground whenever opportunity offers.

Situation at midday, Saturday.

The Cavalry after supporting the movement on the outer flank from Haripoor complete the victory by charging towards Bijwala and Naki.

The enemy retreat towards Sangoi.

The Cavalry Division operates by brigades in succession on the enemy's western flank to interrupt his retreat.

Infantry press the enemy directly in rear.

The Cavalry attack itself comprises three acts—the approach, the charge, the rally : these must be governed by the following principles :

The *attack* by Cavalry is, in its effect, more moral than bloody ; and this moral effect depends largely on surprise. “ Surprise transfixes troops to the ground, and turns the most modern of rifles into harmless pitchforks.”

Now facility of surprise depends on the state of demoralisation into which troops may have been thrown by fire of all kinds. Infantry which has been many hours under severe shell fire is ripe for surprise, and it is not necessary for Cavalry to start so very close to the enemy in order to achieve success. On the other hand, a body of Infantry, which is unshaken, must actually be surprised in the narrowest sense, for the moral effect of a surprise on troops which have not been demoralised by a preliminary bombardment is very fleeting, and it is then of vital importance that the attacking Cavalry should reach the Infantry before the psychological moment has passed.

Infantry can usually fire straight only to its front. Towards the flank or rear, there is always the risk of shooting one's own friends. The enemy's flank or rear should therefore be attacked, but preferably the flank, because if the rear is attacked the attacking squadrons will quickly traverse the leading lines, and will then run the risk of being shot in the back by them. The ground must decide which flank should preferably be attacked.

The *rally* after the attack. The attacking Cavalry should rally towards the front, because by falling back to rally, the losses in retreat are very great. Often it may be best for the Cavalry to scatter after the charge, and then to seek refuge round the flanks for some spot in which to rally—but such action requires careful explanation beforehand, and a very close understanding between leaders and led. As a rule, it is less costly to ride straight through and away, than to attempt to rally under fire.

The successful charge must be followed by a vigorous pursuit.

How should this pursuit be carried out?—Hemmed in between the river and the hills, the enemy naturally retreat in the direction of Sangoi and Jhelum.

The reserves of the Northern Army would presumably be somewhere between Bijwala and the Jhelum river, with probably some troops near Pambar. These for a time are likely to delay pursuit.

Rather than suffer delay by engaging the enemy's troops in this part, where moreover they presumably would be the freshest, it would seem to be more effective for the Cavalry Division to move upon the enemy's north-west flank—by the Chackri road if open; if not, via Chak and Hoon and the base of the hills—so as to anticipate the enemy reaching Natoala, Sangoi or Naoaran, and then to attack from the flank, either mounted or dismounted, according as the ground permits. Possibly the difficulties of ground near Hoon might prevent whole Brigades being employed in masses. Their Commanders must then indicate the points to be reached, and leave to regiments and squadrons a free hand in the matter of following up the enemy.

Meanwhile the Infantry and Artillery press the enemy directly in the rear. But this immediate pursuit cannot produce decisive results; it must be completed by the employment of every available man of the troops which took part in the battle, and before such a pursuit by the bulk of the Infantry and Artillery can be organised, some time will probably elapse. Units will, in many cases, have to be reformed: ammunition filled up: rations and forage drawn from the rear, etc. The Cavalry are, however, responsible that touch is maintained, and if the whole of the Cavalry Division is to be withdrawn in indirect pursuit, some system for the maintenance of direct pursuit must at once be organised by making use of the squadrons of Divisional Cavalry. In certain cases several pursuing columns might be necessary, according to the number of objectives. In every case, however, must be remembered the vast importance of information of the situation being regularly sent back

to headquarters, so that the General-in-Chief may direct the march of his main columns in the most effective direction.

If doubt exists as to the road taken by the enemy's main forces (this was the case after Ligny, Königgrätz, Wörth, etc.), the freshest horses must be sent on patrol at once, and reconnoitring be carried on widely along every possible road by which the enemy can have retreated, or some railway junction or other important centre on his line of communications must be aimed at. It is better to delay a little, rather than to risk launching the Cavalry in a wrong direction, because it may only have to retrace its steps, and would then probably fail altogether in catching up the enemy.

The pursuit must be pressed without rest by the whole of the Cavalry, and without regard to sparing the horses or men. It would probably be sunset before Sangoi could be reached. The pursuit must, however, be kept, up with the same vigour by night, in spite of tired horses.

After a victory, an Army can dispense with its Cavalry, provided the fruits of victory have been reaped.

To quote from Count von Wartenburg ("Napoleon as a General") :

It is indeed a characteristic noticeable in the strategy of all the greatest Generals that they knew how to utilise their Cavalry to the best advantage. For it is this arm, designed for a wide field and rapidity of movement, which requires superior officers of exceptionally large grasp and quick resolution, who, keeping only the great aims of a war in view, are able to set aside objects of secondary importance and to put up with heavy losses also; for Cavalry employed over a large area must often get into situations from which it cannot withdraw without suffering them.

Napoleon himself said :

"The use of Cavalry demands boldness and ability; above all it should not be handled with any miserly desire to preserve it intact."

And again :

"I do not wish the horses to be spared *if they can catch men*. . . . Take no heed of the complaints of the Cavalry, for if such great objects may be attained as the destruction of a whole hostile Army, the State can afford to lose a few hundred horses from exhaustion."

This was Gneisenau's conviction, and as to what was effected by the Cavalry of Lee's army, we need only mention the name of Stuart.

As an instance of the errors (in this case, fatal) that may ensue if the main Cavalry force is launched in pursuit in the wrong direction, and before steps have been taken to clear up the true direction of the enemy's retreat, the following notes taken from Hyde Kelly's "Battle of Wavre" may be of interest (see Sketch 5) :

During the night following their defeat at Ligny (16th June, 1815), the Prussians withdrew their right and centre corps due north towards Wavre, via the Tilly and Gentinnes roads, leaving Thielemann's corps (III.) at Sombreffe to cover the retreat.

Thielemann retreated via Gembloux (where he halted and rested for 10 hours !), his rearguard moving from Sombreffe about 4 a.m. This corps then turned north also towards Wavre.

Grouchy (commanding the detached force detailed to pursue the Prussians) received orders about 11 p.m. on the 16th to send the 2nd Cavalry Corps of Pajol and Excelmans at daybreak in pursuit of the Prussians. *He was not told in what direction to pursue, or whether to pursue Thielemann only.*

Accordingly, when Pajol started at 4 a.m., there were no signs to show in what direction Thielemann had retired (no signs having been sought for). Taking Soult's Division of Light Cavalry, Pajol started off from Balâtre and made his way across to the Namur road *under the impression* that this was the true line of retreat. He sent in a despatch from Balâtre, stating that he was "pursuing the enemy, who were in full retreat towards Liège and Namur," and that he had already made many prisoners. Shortly after striking the Namur road he came across a Prussian Horse Battery, which had somehow failed to fall in with the Prussian columns.

This battery Pajol captured, and it tended to increase his belief that the Prussians were making for Namur. But advancing some three miles beyond Le Mazy without coming across further traces of the enemy, Pajol began at last to suspect that he was leading a wild-geese chase.


Accordingly he halted at Le Bouquet, and *sent out reconnoitring parties*. At midday (17th), while Thielemann was resting at Gembloux, he started for St. Denis, with the object of taking the Louvain road. . . .

Meanwhile Excelmans fared little better. Berton's Brigade of Dragoons started off to follow Thielemann's rearguard. But Berton followed down the Namur road behind Pajol. What good could he do here? It is hard to suppose that it was not known which way Pajol had taken.

Berton, on reaching Le Mazy, was told by peasants that the Prussians had retreated by Gembloux. He therefore halted and *waited for orders*. Orders arrived, and Berton was sent on to Gembloux.

Here, at 9 a.m., he found the Prussian outposts, and descried on the far side of the village the whole of Thielemann's corps resting. Excelmans arrived soon with

SKETCH 5.



the rest of his Cavalry Corps, but neglected to send back word to Grouchy at once. Although he had 3,000 Cavalry and 12 guns, he made no attempt to harass the Prussians.

So slack and unenterprising were Excelmans' moves that it was not till nearly 10 p.m. that he knew with comparative certainty that the Prussians were retiring on Wavre. And even then Grouchy writing to Napoleon failed to convey the idea that the *whole* Prussian army had gone in that direction.

CHAPTER IV.

SECOND STUDY (DELHI).

Subject.

THE employment of Independent Cavalry Divisions, to follow up a defeated hostile Army, to ascertain its intentions and its movements, and to prevent its escape.

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The system of the Cavalry organisation in each of the three German Armies was identical, but with that of the Second Army only, need we concern ourselves here.

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Four regiments forming the Cavalry Division of the Saxon (12th) Corps ;

Nine regiments forming the 5th Cavalry Division (un-attached) ;

Five regiments forming the 6th Cavalry Division (un-attached).

The mobilisation of the German Armies commenced on the 16th July. The Divisional Cavalry regiments were already with their Divisions, the Hesse Brigade and the Guard and Saxon Divisions were with their Corps ; but the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions had to be formed from scattered units which had first to be collected ; and the assignment of the various so-formed unattached bodies to the three Armies was not made until the 25th July. The transport to the frontier did not commence until the 24th, and for some days the mass of the Cavalry was well away in rear of the line of strategical deployment. But by the 29th, the 5th and 6th Divisions are to the front, and on this day we find a trace of "Independent Cavalry" properly so-called, that is to say, an organised body operating under the orders of the Supreme Commander for Strategic Reconnaissance in the interests of the whole field force (see Sketch 6).

On this day the Royal Headquarters directed the Commander of the Second Army to send forward these two Divisions, under the command of General v. Rheinbaben, the Commander of the 5th Division. "This body of Cavalry was to establish itself at a short day's march on this [the German] side of the frontier, and from thence to carry out constant enterprises against the enemy with squadrons and regiments, to keep an unflagging watch on the frontier, and to find, and keep the touch of the enemy." A Division of Infantry from

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Four regiments forming the Cavalry Division of the Saxon (12th) Corps ;

Nine regiments forming the 5th Cavalry Division (un-attached) ;

Five regiments forming the 6th Cavalry Division (un-attached).

The mobilisation of the German Armies commenced on the 16th July. The Divisional Cavalry regiments were already with their Divisions, the Hesse Brigade and the Guard and Saxon Divisions were with their Corps ; but the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions had to be formed from scattered units which had first to be collected ; and the assignment of the various so-formed unattached bodies to the three Armies was not made until the 25th July. The transport to the frontier did not commence until the 24th, and for some days the mass of the Cavalry was well away in rear of the line of strategical deployment. But by the 29th, the 5th and 6th Divisions are to the front, and on this day we find a trace of "Independent Cavalry" properly so-called, that is to say, an organised body operating under the orders of the Supreme Commander for Strategic Reconnaissance in the interests of the whole field force (see Sketch 6).

On this day the Royal Headquarters directed the Commander of the Second Army to send forward these two Divisions, under the command of General v. Rheinbaben, the Commander of the 5th Division. "This body of Cavalry was to establish itself at a short day's march on this [the German] side of the frontier, and from thence to carry out constant enterprises against the enemy with squadrons and regiments, to keep an unflagging watch on the frontier, and to find, and keep the touch of the enemy." A Division of Infantry from

CHAPTER IV.

SECOND STUDY (DELHI).

Subject.

THE employment of Independent Cavalry Divisions, to follow up a defeated hostile Army, to ascertain its intentions and its movements, and to prevent its escape.

In the previous Study the Independent Cavalry Division was practically, until the last, the sixth day of the operations, acting, not under the orders of the Supreme Commander of the whole Army, but under those of the Commander of one of the three Corps composing it. Only on the last day, when a second Corps of the Army came on the scene, the Division passed under the control of the Supreme Commander.

So desirable does it seem to be to emphasise the importance of a right organisation for the Cavalry with an Army, in order to utilise the arm to the greatest advantage, that as a preliminary to proceeding with the Study, a brief account will now be given of the organisation and actual employment from the 8th to the 18th August, 1870, of the large mass of Cavalry with the First and Second German Armies, and of the meagre results obtained from its work. The remarkable similarity in the ground and country in the vicinity of Metz and the Moselle, to that in the vicinity of Delhi and the Jumna, the scene of the Study, adds force to the contrast in the procedures adopted.

The system of the Cavalry organisation in each of the three German Armies was identical, but with that of the Second Army only, need we concern ourselves here.

With this Army were 37 regiments, distributed as follows :

Eleven regiments to eleven Infantry Divisions ;

Two regiments as a Brigade to the Grand Ducal Hesse Infantry Division ;

Six regiments forming the Cavalry Division of the Guard Corps ;

Four regiments forming the Cavalry Division of the Saxon (12th) Corps ;

Nine regiments forming the 5th Cavalry Division (un-attached) ;

Five regiments forming the 6th Cavalry Division (un-attached).

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each of two Corps was to follow as support. This force went forward, and the Commander of the Second Army, in accordance with recommendations from the Royal Headquarters, had intended to throw forward on the 6th August a large body of Cavalry from these Divisions for a raid on the Saargemünd-Bitsch Railway.

But the battles of the 6th, practically initiated by individual officers in the First and Third Armies, were not in the scheme of the general plan of operations, and, although they were victories for the Germans, they completely disarranged the original plan, for which a new plan had to be substituted. And as regards the part to be played by the Cavalry Divisions henceforth, this was left, almost without exception, entirely in the hands of the Army Commanders, the Supreme Commander mainly restricting his action to giving them general recommendations of a most elementary character, apparently not always unnecessary.

The new plan now to be adopted was a general wheel of the whole force to the right, the First Army about Forbach acting as the pivot, and the Second Army being in the centre of the line.

The Commander of the Second Army had at his disposal four Cavalry Divisions and one Brigade. Two of the Divisions and the Brigade he left with their own Infantry units ; the 6th Cavalry Division he attached to the Third Army Corps, one Brigade of the 5th Division he attached to the Fourth Corps, the two others to the Tenth Corps, these Corps being the first line of the Army ; so now, just as the advance was commencing, and when strategic information obtainable only by masses of Cavalry was all-important, there remained no "instrument of exploration" in the hand of the Army Commander, still less in that of the Supreme Commander. There was merely an enormous Divisional Cavalry, and a still more numerous Army Corps Cavalry.

There was no real pursuit after the battle of Spicheren, and on the 8th August the Second Army was taking up its positions for the new advance.

On the 8th August the front of the line of the Second Army extended from Forbach (Third Corps), by Saargemünd (Tenth Corps) to Rohrbach (Fourth Corps).

The 6th Cavalry Division is at Morsbach, 3 miles in front of Forbach. The 5th Cavalry Division was from 4 miles on the right, to 8 miles on the left, in front of their Army Corps. On the 9th there was practically no material change in the positions of the Cavalry Divisions or of the Army Corps in rear. Reconnaissances have been carried on to the front. The reports received formed the basis for the following Royal Headquarters' order of the 9th :—

SAARBRUCKEN,

9th August, 8 p.m.

Reports received lead to the supposition that the enemy has withdrawn behind the Moselle or Seille.

All three armies will follow this movement. The Third Army takes the road Saarunion-Dieuze and those south ; the Second Army the road St. Avold-Nomeny and those south ; the First Army the road Saarlouis-Boulay-Les Etangs and those south.

In order to cover the march the Cavalry is to be sent forward to a considerable distance, and is to be supported by advance guards thrown out well to the front so that, should the necessity arise, each Army may have time to close up.

Any deviations from these lines of march will be ordered by His Majesty as the position or movement of the enemy may demand.

The 10th August may be employed by the First and Second Armies in giving the troops rest, or in placing them on the roads designated for them.

As the left wing cannot reach the Saar until the 12th, the corps of the right wing will have comparatively short marches (*vide* p. 262 of German Official History, English translation).

It should be noted that this order only assigns to the Cavalry a rôle of protection : its action was to be defensive and passive ! This rôle is in keeping with its distribution by detachments to the several Army Corps, but it is certainly a surprising one in view of the lack of definite information at Royal Headquarters as to the enemy's doings at this time.

From the 7th to 10th August the Cavalry marched 25 miles, or an average of $6\frac{1}{4}$ miles a day. In the First Army the 1st and 3rd Cavalry Divisions were still in rear of the Infantry. Indeed, the Commander of the 3rd Cavalry Division considered it imprudent to risk his command in front of the

Infantry, his reason being that the country in front was mountainous and wooded (an incorrect estimate of the country). Hence complete ignorance prevailed in the First Army regarding the movements and intentions of the enemy. This was confirmed by the following extract from the official account of the war (p. 283):

As the Cavalry Divisions of the First Army were not in first line, the immediate contact with the enemy on this side had almost entirely ceased. From the advance guard of the Seventh Army Corps was the report from Captain v. Schutz, 8th Hussars, alone received in the afternoon, to the effect that hostile corps were to the west of Fouligny.

On the 10th August the main bodies of the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions march $12\frac{1}{2}$ miles. Their reconnoitring detachments ascertain that the French had halted behind the French Nied; they had been halted there since the 9th.

This information reached Army Headquarters on the 11th August, and, as a consequence, the following orders were issued to the Commanders of the First and Second Armies (p. 286):

ST. AVOLD,

7 p.m., 11th August, 1870.

It is not improbable that there is a considerable hostile force in front of Metz, on the left bank of the French Nied. A closer concentration of the First and Second Army is therefore necessary. His Majesty the King orders as follows:

The Third Army Corps at Faulquemont will form the *point d'appui* for this concentration.

The First Army will move two corps early to-morrow into the line Boulay-Marange, and one to Boucheporn.

The Second Army will advance the Ninth Army Corps to Longeville west of St. Avold: the Second Army Corps will, in so far as it may be available, close up to the latter place. The Tenth Corps will follow after the Third.

The Guard, Fourth and Twelfth Corps are to be brought forward towards the left wing of the indicated position, so that they may either close up to it or continue their march in the direction of Nancy, as occasion may demand.

(Signed) v. MOLTKE.

These orders indicate that considerable doubt and uncertainty existed at the Royal Headquarters about the movements of the French, and they affect most closely the rôle which the Cavalry ought to have been playing with a view to

clearing up the situation. Yet no mention is made of that arm.

In the night between the 11th and 12th August the French resume their retreat upon Metz. News of these movements reaches the German Headquarters on the 12th, and the following orders (p. 293) are at once issued :

ST. AVOLD,

4.30 p.m., 12th August.

So far as our intelligence enables us to perceive, the enemy's main forces are in the act of retiring through Metz over the Moselle. His Majesty commands :

The First Army to advance to-morrow, the 13th, towards the French Nied ; main body on the line Les Etangs-Pange and to hold the railway station at Courcelles ; Cavalry to reconnoitre in the direction of Metz and to cross the Moselle below it. The First Army will thus cover the right flank of the Second.

The latter to march on the line Buchy-Château Salins, push its outposts to the Seille, and endeavour if possible to secure the passages of the river Moselle at Pont-à-Mousson, Dieulouard, Marbach, etc. *Cavalry to reconnoitre beyond that river.*

The Third Army to continue its advance towards the line Nancy-Luneville.

(Signed) v. MOLTKE.

The idea apparent in the order of the 11th that the French might fight on the east of Metz has been given up, and the forward movement is now to be continued under the protection of the First Army, which is brought to a halt as a flank guard opposite Metz. The Cavalry of the Second Army is to "reconnoitre beyond the Moselle" merely as a protection to the columns which are marching upon the bridges over that river south of Metz.

On the 11th the French halt in and on the east of Metz. News of this reaches the Royal Headquarters on the 13th at HERNY, and the following orders (p. 299) for the 14th are then issued :

HERNY,

9 p.m., 13th August, 1870.

From intelligence received considerable hostile forces are this morning still halting at Servigny and Borny, this side of Metz.

His Majesty orders that the First Army will remain to-morrow, the 14th, in its position on the French Nied, and will observe, by pushing forward advance guards, whether the enemy retires or advances to the attack. To meet the latter eventuality the Second Army to-morrow will advance the Third Corps at first

only abreast of Pagny, the Ninth Corps to Buchy, where, at a distance of 5 miles, they will be prepared by a well-timed march to take part in a serious action before Metz. On the other hand, the First Army will be in a position to prevent the advance of the enemy southwards by a flank attack.

The remaining corps of the Second Army will continue their advance towards that part of the Moselle between Pont-à-Mousson and Marbach. The Tenth Corps will take up a position in advance of Pont-à-Mousson.

The Cavalry of *both* armies to push forward *as far as possible*, and to molest any retreat of the enemy along the road from Metz to Verdun.

(Signed) v. MOLTKE.

Here at last is the order for the Cavalry to "advance as far as possible." It will be noticed how, as each day more definite information became necessary in order to enable the General-in-Chief to direct the Armies, so each day a little larger demand is made upon the Cavalry. Indeed, owing to want of precise and timely news of the enemy, the Commander-in-Chief found his freedom of operation restricted, and he was forced to direct the Armies from day to day just as if he was dealing merely with small tactical bodies.

Again, the want of a properly constituted flank-guard to ensure to the Army its liberty of action towards its right flank, led to the fight at Borny on the 14th, and caused three Army Corps (the Seventh, First, and Eighth) to be thrown into a state of alarm: and, if the attack had not taken place so late in the evening, this alarm must also have necessitated the deployment of the Third Corps.

The Army Order of the 14th (for the operations of the 15th) had been issued before news of the battle of Borny had been received. By these orders the First Army and three corps of the Second (viz., the Third, Ninth, and Twelfth) were still retained before Metz.

The situation, however, was modified by the battle of Borny, and it was decided on the 15th to push forward four corps to the Moselle, and three to the Seille, and to leave only the three corps of the First Army facing Metz, with the 1st, 3rd, and 6th Cavalry Divisions disposed as a screen for observation purposes.

The Army Order of the 14th August issued at Herny

at 6 p.m. prescribed the following movements for the next day (p. 339):

On the right wing of the Second Army, the Third, Ninth, and Twelfth Army Corps were merely to close up their columns and to cook betimes; the Second Corps was to continue its forward movement. The first line of the First Army, the First and Seventh Army Corps, was also to retain its present position; the Eighth Corps, however, was to draw forward to Bazoncourt, as a prelude to the projected movement of this Army to the left, and to a closer connection with the right flank of the neighbouring Army. With a view to shedding light upon the adversary's movements, instructions were given to the Second Army *to send forward the entire force of Cavalry available on the left bank of the Moselle against the enemy's communications between Metz and Verdun*, supporting it in the directions of Gorze and Thiaucourt by those corps which should first pass the river. For this purpose the Third Corps was also to make preparations on the 15th for throwing a bridge below Pont-à-Mousson.

The foregoing Army Order, the fifth in five days, indicates the real objective which ought in the orders of the 9th August, 8 p.m., to have been assigned to an "independent" force of Cavalry, namely, to move "against the enemy's communications between Metz and Verdun," to clear up the situation, and, having gained touch with his columns, to operate so as to impede their march should they be retreating.

This mission, so tardily expressed on the 14th, had already been outlined by Prince Frederick Charles on the 12th of August.

The following very remarkable order was addressed by him to the Officer Commanding the Tenth Corps:

The enemy having evacuated his position behind the Nied, your Excellency is requested to send forward this very day General Rheinbaben with his two Cavalry Brigades to Pont-à-Mousson and Dieulouard on the Moselle. Bredow's Cavalry Brigade will also be sent to join him as soon as possible. General Rheinbaben will cross the Moselle, advance on to the plateau between the Moselle and the Meuse, and push forward in a north-westerly direction towards the road Metz-Verdun in order to ascertain without delay whether the enemy is leaving Metz by that road.

If, as we have reason to believe, the Cavalry Division of the First Army is operating in the same manner below Metz, the communications of the French Army at Metz with France will be cut in three or four days.

Your Excellency is requested to be good enough to impress upon General Rheinbaben the great importance of the operation with which he is now entrusted.

A division of Infantry should be sent forward as early as possible to-morrow morning to Pont-à-Mousson, preceded as quickly as possible by an advance

guard, with the object of occupying that important point so as to ensure communication with General Rheinbaben.—("Regimental History of the 11th Hussars.")

Unfortunately this order had to pass through the intermediary of the Tenth Army Corps, so that it was the 15th August before the 5th Cavalry Division began to execute it. If, on the other hand, this Cavalry had been directly under the orders of Prince Frederick Charles, Commanding the Second Army, it would certainly have been able to scout sufficiently far ahead to gain such definite news of the enemy's movements as would have ensured to the Armies their entire liberty of action with a view to intercepting the French retreat.

Instead of carrying out this great strategical mission, we find this 5th Cavalry Division crawling painfully along at the head of the Tenth Corps—the sole Cavalry Division which preceded the Armies until the 16th August.

In five days, from the 11th to the 15th, this Division covered 56 miles, or about 11 miles a day—the pace of indifferent Infantry.

On the 15th August the reconnaissances made by the 5th Cavalry Division only reported, to the south of Rezonville, a camp of about 20,000 men. In reality the whole French Army was in the vicinity 110,000 strong (ten Divisions of Infantry with four Cavalry Divisions).

Indeed, the information sent in by the 5th Cavalry Division was so meagre and inaccurate that at noon next day (the 16th), when the battle of Mars-la-Tour was at its height, Prince Frederick Charles issued orders for the march of his army towards the Meuse!

Yet this Division, as evidenced by its deeds at Mars-la-Tour, lacked neither dash nor bravery. But its wings were clipped. Instead of operating under the direct orders of the Commander-in-Chief, the only officer whose interest it was to employ it independently, the Division marched along at the head of the Tenth Corps, to which it was tied as it were by a string.

On the morning of the 16th August, the 5th Cavalry Division was sent by the Commander of the Tenth Corps to reconnoitre from Vionville to Rezonville, a distance of $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles! Then, shortly afterwards, the 6th Cavalry Division debouched from the Gorze defile at the head of the Third Corps. The details of the surprise of the French camps by the German Cavalry are well known. It has been well likened to the overturning of a bee-hive by some thoughtless schoolboy. The sound of the guns roused the French Army, which stood to arms: and the German Army ran the greatest risk of a disaster to two of its Corps, from which it was only saved by the incapacity of the higher leaders of the French forces to take advantage of their good luck.

Under the circumstances, a cannonade, which brought a force of 135,000 Frenchmen against the heads of the scattered German columns, must be considered a grave mistake.

Mars-la-Tour was indeed a repetition of the strategical error of Spicheren. If the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions had been organised as Independent Cavalry in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief, and entrusted with the mission to reconnoitre the French Army, such a mistake could scarcely have occurred. Their imprudence was due to the fact that they were acting as mere advance guards; the Divisions were, in fact, isolated in front of two different Army Corps, and were acting under the orders of the leaders of these Corps, who were so badly informed of the general situation, so full of peril, of the two opposing Armies, that they believed that there was only a hostile rear-guard in their front.

Having gained touch with the enemy about Rezonville, the two Cavalry Divisions should have sought to discover where his main body was, by moving *viâ* Doncourt upon Auboué, and sending reconnaissances as quietly as possible eastwards to ascertain the extent of the enemy's position.

But it seems only natural that the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions should, on this occasion, have behaved like ordinary

Divisional Cavalry, since they were acting as parts of different Army Corps, and only in the zones of action assigned to these Army Corps. No matter how numerous a body of Cavalry be attached to an Infantry Division, or to an Army Corps, it is only human for the Commander of that unit to employ the Cavalry under his orders solely within the narrow limits of his own sphere of operations, for the furtherance of his own personal aims, and not for the general benefit of the whole Army.

Only the Commander-in-Chief who can view the Divisions, Army Corps, or Armies as a whole, and can consider in proper perspective the probable development of the *main* operations as regards "space" and "time," is in a position to indicate to the independent Cavalry what should be its mission.

The truth of these principles is to be found demonstrated in the operations of Napoleon. During the long years of peace which followed they lay forgotten, until the neglect of them in 1870 caused their re-discovery.

On the 17th, the German Army concentrates. Seven Army Corps bivouac on the south of the Metz-Mars-la-Tour road. Contact with the French outposts, however, is only kept up in front of Gravelotte.

The 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions are withdrawn to the rear of the Infantry, and only the Divisional Cavalry regiments remain in the front line, but without displaying any great activity.

The withdrawal of the 5th and 6th Divisions seems only natural after the fatigues and losses of the 16th. But there were three other Cavalry Divisions available on the left bank of the Moselle, namely the Guard, the Saxon, and the 1st Cavalry Divisions.

At this time information as to what had become of the French Army seems of the very greatest importance to the Commander-in-Chief of the German Armies. His enemy had every opportunity open to him for escaping towards the north by Briey and Audun-le-Roman. Would the

French take advantage of it and march, or did they intend to stand fast where they were?

Von Moltke found next day, on the 18th (Battle of Gravelotte), the disadvantage of not having had these questions answered earlier. At 10.30 a.m. on that day he was still unaware how far north the French right extended. Yet, had the six Cavalry Divisions been grouped as Independent Cavalry, this want of information could scarcely have existed. For, setting aside the two Divisions already stated to be unfit for work on the 17th, and the 3rd Division which remained as a screen on the south-east of Metz, there were still three Divisions available for this task, and had they been grouped as suggested, the dispositions of the French Army would assuredly have been ascertained by noon on the 17th.

An examination of the operations of the German Cavalry at this period leads to the conclusion that the reason why it furnished so little information of real use to the Commander-in-Chief, lay in the fact that it was broken up and distributed amongst the several Army Corps. The Commander-in-Chief had no body of Cavalry, suitably organised, for carrying out the *strategical* duties of the Army.

Spicheren and Rezonville were two surprises, due to want of information: the result of the want of a body of Cavalry, organised as an "instrument for gaining information." For the same reason, during the days under consideration, Moltke lacked both strategical and tactical "liberty of action," though the inactivity of the French rendered the want of "time" and "space" for manœuvring the German forces less noticeable than would have been the case had the Germans been opposed by a vigorous Commander-in-Chief at the head of a well-organised Army.

The organisation adopted by the Germans for their Cavalry in 1870 is directly opposed to the principles upon which Napoleon organised his Cavalry. In order to get full use of it as a strategical instrument Napoleon organised his Cavalry into large units. Each Corps d'Armée had a Brigade

or Division attached to it for purposes of protection and advance-guard duties; that is to say, the rôle of this body was mainly a *defensive* one. At the same time he retained under his own command a "Cavalry Reserve," which included a mass of Light Cavalry. This latter was employed as "Independent Cavalry" for extended reconnaissance; its rôle was thus essentially *offensive*.

Many important problems were offered for solution by the Cavalry in 1870 and they demand close study, because problems of a like nature, though under different circumstances, will certainly be met with again. The success which everywhere followed the Germans in that campaign has blinded many soldiers to the errors which were often committed and passed unpunished. Hence military professors have, as a general rule, held up the doings of the Prussian Cavalry as examples worthy of our closest attention. They forget that the French Cavalry was *morally* absent, and that, in reality, the German Cavalry Divisions were unopposed, so that what was suitable and successful in 1870 might well spell disaster if attempted in the presence of a determined Cavalry skilfully led. It matters little how greatly troops are scattered for reconnaissance, if their rival is absent and is unable to take advantage of such dissemination.

The foregoing account contains statements of fact taken from the Official History. A few commentaries have been added, collected from various sources, but chiefly from an "Essai sur l'Emploi de la Cavalerie," by Colonel Cherfils, published in Paris in 1899. These criticisms are based on actual *facts*, so far as it is possible to arrive at facts in war histories, although they are said to be somewhat harsh and improper, in view of the successes which resulted. However, we must derive our principles from the experiences of the past, and to this end it is essential to ascertain the whole circumstances of the Cavalry in 1870, so that our conclusions may be sound. It will not, therefore, be out of place to quote from a German writer of undoubted authority (Hœnig), in order to make clear the real state of organisation, training,

and leading at the beginning of the 1870 campaign. To quote from his pamphlet, "Tactical Guides for the Cavalry Division":

Twenty-four or thirty-six squadrons were placed under the command of one man: but was it right? Had they been trained up to it? Not at all. These masses of Cavalry were in no way tactical, but only numerical bodies. Their commanders, too, were no tacticians, but merely "drills."

By glancing at the past on this subject I shall best illustrate the reason why wrong conclusions, unjust verdicts, and false principles about the fighting action of Cavalry have frequently been formed. I will not mention any names. When the war in 1870 broke out, new commanders were suddenly appointed to the higher units (except Cavalry); the rapidity with which this important step was effected, and the admirable composition of the higher staffs, both for carrying out the command and also as regards the mutual personal relations between the general and his chief of the staff, show clearly with what care the various important requirements had been considered: and what was done in this way was far from being the smallest factor in the secret of our grand successes.


From this it is quite evident that the question of the generals and the composition of the staffs had been long previously considered, that an exact estimate had been formed as to the value of the individual, and that by disregarding questions of seniority the right men were put in the right places. This was the triumph of great over petty interests. The services done by the supreme direction of the Army have not been properly appreciated in this respect.

But what was the course taken in making the appointments to the commands of the Cavalry Divisions? Here seniority was strictly adhered to, and thus an instrument, about which there prevailed no consensus of opinion, nor ideas as regards its composition, the part it had to play and its general task, was put into the hands of "persons."

The tactical body was a new one, and the units composing it continued to be quite independent of one another. It had not been possible for a *tactical* blending to take place, because the necessary conditions for this had not been practised in peace. But even if these conditions had been fulfilled, it would still never have been possible to place any great hopes on the fighting action of the instrument, because we could not, and dared not, ask or expect much from those who were then the leaders. However learnedly this man or that man might discourse about war and warfare, it is, at all events, certain that in the important Cavalry posts there were wanting the men of action, of decision, and of tactical ability. In addition to this, even the staffs in the new formations were quite strange to one another. The Commanding General and the Staff Officer of the Cavalry Division very frequently differed in their views: their time was spent in holding councils, in pondering and in deliberating, and they seldom came to any action, or when they did, it was then, as a rule, too late. It was one perpetual weighing of *pros* and *cons*. The state of unreadiness of the arm and of the organisation; vagueness as to the part it had to play; uncertainty as to what should be required of the Cavalry by reason of its power of execution and speed; deficient tactical training and narrow tactical methods; faint-heartedness

in the upper, and impetuosity in the lower ranks ; an absence of unanimity in the principles ; and the instrument itself without tactical instruction or any cohesion in its organisation—such were the conditions under which the arm was handed over to its fate.

Much has recently been done by Lord Kitchener to improve the organisation of the Cavalry in India : but a great deal still remains to be done, and Cavalry officers must assist by systematically thinking out for themselves what are the requirements of a Cavalry force in the field besides officers, men, and horses : such things for instance as transport, supply, means for communication, and Royal Engineer services generally. Again, to lead and rightly to employ Cavalry it is indispensable that there should be a clear understanding as to the part it has to play. Now the best and only way to arrive at a more or less unanimous opinion as to the *principles* of our action is for officers to study the past and then try to apply their conclusions to actual situations of to-day. The opportunity afforded to so many Cavalry officers from different stations in India to meet together to consider such matters is one of the greatest uses of the Cavalry staff rides. Having decided on our principles of action it is possible then to determine the most suitable tactical formations and to perfect our instruction, as leaders at camps of exercise, and in the field.



SKETCH TO ILLUSTRATE
OPERATIONS OF THE
GERMAN CAVALRY,
AUGUST, 1870.

Approximate Scale $\frac{1}{425000}$

4 3 2 1 0 5 10 15 Miles

General Idea.

(See Sketch 7, and General Map No. 2.)

1. The Ganges represents the frontier between two hostile States called "East" and "West." Bareilly is the capital of the Eastern State. Ajmere and Bhiwani (70 miles west of Delhi) are the bases of the Western State. The country roads and railways, etc., are to be considered exactly as they exist.

Delhi is an entrenched camp with limits roughly as follows :

Wuzirabad on the north—thence westwards to Azadpur—thence south to near Chankri—thence south-eastwards through the positions west of Nurhula to Nurhula, and on to the Jumna, the latter from this point northwards to Wuzirabad forming the eastern boundary.

Perimeter—about 25 miles.

2. The Eastern forces have crossed the Ganges and gained a decisive victory over the Western troops near Garhmuktesar. The latter have retired on Delhi.

3. On Sunday, February 26, Ghaziabad is occupied by Eastern mounted troops. The Western rear-guard holds the right bank of the Hindan river about Arthala.

NOTE.—The Eastern Army consists of three Army Corps, each comprising three Infantry Divisions and a Brigade of Corps Cavalry as below :

First Army Corps	{	1st Infantry Division.
		2nd " "
		3rd " "
		Corps Cavalry Brigade "A."
Second Army Corps	{	4th Infantry Division.
		5th " "
		6th " "
		Corps Cavalry Brigade "B."
Third Army Corps	{	7th Infantry Division.
		8th " "
		9th " "
		Corps Cavalry Brigade "C."

In addition, the Eastern Commander-in-Chief has under his own orders a Force of Independent Cavalry of two divisions, viz. :

1st Cavalry Division (5 Brigades)	{	1st Brigade.
		2nd "
		3rd "
		4th "
		5th "
2nd Cavalry Division (3 Brigades)	{	6th "
		7th "
		8th "

Each Brigade has with it a Battery R.H.A.

The Brigades of Corps Cavalry are formed, as was similarly done in South Africa, by concentrating into Brigades the Divisional Cavalry Regiments, which detach to each Infantry Division one Troop for Orderly duty and the service of more immediate security.

Special Idea.

(See Sketch 8.)

(1) On Sunday afternoon, February 26, the heads of the Eastern Infantry columns reached the Fatehpur Branch of the Ganges Canal, and the Army Corps are disposed generally as follows :

First Corps—On north of Hapur—Garhmuktesar Road.

Second Corps (less pontoon train)—On south of that road.

Third Corps (less pontoon train)—About Garhmuktesar.

1st Cavalry Division :

1st Brigade—Ghaziabad.

2nd Brigade—Dehra.

3rd Brigade—Dadri.

4th Brigade—Sikandarabad.


5th with Divisional Headquarters, Dasna ; also pontoon train of 2nd and 3rd Corps.

The 2nd Cavalry Division is about Muradnagar.

Army headquarters—Garhmuktesar.

(2) About 13 hours on February 26 the General Officer Commanding 1st Cavalry Division received the following "Army Operation Orders" for February 27 :

SKETCH 7.



Operation Orders.**HEADQUARTERS, EASTERN ARMY, GARHMUKTESAR,***26th February, 1905 (10 hours).*

1. Reports received lead to the supposition that the enemy has withdrawn behind the river Jumna.
2. The Army will follow the enemy and cross the river Jumna on the south of Delhi near its junction with the Hindan river.
3. The General Officer Commanding First Army Corps will cover the right flank of this movement. For this purpose he will send forward as early as possible to-morrow one Division with the bulk of his Corps Cavalry to act as a flank guard and to hold the line of the Kaila-Chilla canal ; the remainder of the corps will be disposed near Ghaziabad to mask the fortress of Delhi.
4. The General Officer Commanding Second Army Corps will also send forward one Division with his Corps Cavalry as early as possible to act as an advance guard and seize the crossings over the Jumna from near Raipur on the north to the vicinity of Amipur on the south, and prepare for the passage of the Army. The remainder of the corps will move on Nagla on the Hindan.
5. The Third Army Corps will march on Dadri.
6. (a) The General Officer Commanding 1st Cavalry Division will cross the Jumna as close as possible to Delhi, taking due precautions for the protection of his flank in the direction of that fortress, and will operate so as to discover as quickly as possible the line of march or the positions of the Western Forces. If the enemy is retreating he will operate so as to hamper his march ; if the Western Army is still about the fortress, he will prevent its escape.
The communication of the Division will be by Nagla-Dadri-Hapur.
- (b) The 2nd Cavalry Division will operate on the north side of Delhi with the object of cutting the enemy's communications in that direction. As soon as the General Officer Commanding has reached the right bank of the river he will try and join hands with the 1st Cavalry Division and act in combination.

During the first period of this operation the 2nd Cavalry Division will connect with the Corps Cavalry of the First Army Corps ("A" Brigade) and will communicate with Army Headquarters by that means.

Notes on the Situation.

The Army Order of February 26 directs the Eastern Forces to cross the Jumna south of Delhi. With this in view, it is necessary—

- (a) That a large body of Cavalry (1st Cavalry Division) should precede the Army and discover the whereabouts of the Western Forces.
- (b) That another body of Cavalry (2nd Cavalry Division) should mask the fortress of Delhi ; and, turning it on

the north, unite with the 1st Cavalry Division in the event of the enemy allowing himself to be shut up in the entrenched camp.

The enemy has retired behind the river Jumna, perhaps intends going further west. The 1st Cavalry Division must search out and get touch with the enemy wherever he may be.

Meanwhile, while the Army marches towards the Jumna to the south of Delhi it may be attacked from two directions—in front, or on the right flank. It is necessary, therefore, to provide two instruments to ensure to it liberty of action, as follows :

1. In the direction of Delhi (on its right flank) a flank guard consisting of Corps Cavalry Brigade "A" and one Infantry Division First Corps.
2. Toward the front, an advance guard consisting of Corps Cavalry Brigade "B" and one Infantry Division of the Second Corps.


The Army Order of 26th reached the headquarters of the 1st Cavalry Division at Dasna at 13 hours on the same day. The Cavalry Brigades had already marched certain distances, so that the Division, as a whole, cannot move forward again till next morning—27th. But in view of the necessity for gaining early information, some reconnoitring force must be sent forward without delay.

This reconnoitring body will, in the course of its operations, be at least a long day's march in front of the rest of the Division, and in view of its independent rôle, and the "unforeseen" which characterises its mission, it should have a "central mass" of some strength. This mass must be able, according to circumstances, to send out several sets of reconnaissances in different directions, and either to support them directly, or to send detachments of sufficient strength to their support.

For these reasons a Brigade charged with the full responsibility of clearing up the situation—the 4th is the

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most conveniently placed—may well be sent forward to the Jumna (near Dankaur) on the 26th.

Sikandarabad to Dankaur is about 12 miles.

Based on the above considerations, 1st Cavalry Division Order No. 1 was issued; and, as time is of importance, a telegram (No. 1) was sent to the General Officer Commanding 4th Brigade, at Sikandarabad.

No. 1.—Operation Orders.—1st Cavalry Division.

HEADQUARTERS, DASNA,

26th February, 1905 (14 hours).

1. (a) The enemy has retired behind the Jumna. Spies report that he intends retreating further westwards.
- (b) The 4th Cavalry Brigade has been ordered to reconnoitre as soon as possible the routes leading from Delhi towards Ajmere and Bhiwani.
- (c) The Army will move to cross the river Jumna on the south of Delhi, near its junction with the Hindan river.
2. The objective of the 1st Cavalry Division is to gain a position of readiness on the south-west of Delhi with a view to prevent the enemy's escape.
3. (a) The 1st Brigade will march at daylight and take up a line of outposts from Ghaziabad to Okhla (on the Jumna) along the line of the Kaila-Chilla canal, with the object of resisting any movement from Delhi against the flank of the Division. Okhla will be held with the object of covering the passage over the Jumna there, and of regulating the flow of water in the Hindan and Jumna rivers by means of the sluices.
- (b) The remaining Brigades will march in accordance with the itinerary attached and will make a long halt in the vicinity of the Hindan river, each fronting towards Delhi. When probability of an attack from Delhi is past, further orders will be issued for the continuation of the march.
4. The General Officer Commanding will march with the 1st Brigade.

ITINERARY OF MARCH FOR 27TH INSTANT (FIRST PART).

	1st Brigade.	5th Brigade, and 2nd Corps Pontoons.	2nd Brigade.	3rd Brigade, and 3rd Corps Pontoons.	Notes affecting all Brigades.
Line of march	Ghaziabad, Ghajera, Makanpur, Gharauli.	Dasna, Ghaziabad and follow in rear of 1st Brigade to Saadatpur.	Dehra Chapraula, Pathwari, Salarpur, Sarai Sadar.	Dadri, Surajpur, Nagla.	Each Brigade is responsible for its own protection.
Hour of march	Cross Hindan river 6 hours.	Harsaun Bridge, 5 hours.	5 hours.	5 hours.	
Long halt	..	Saadatput . .	Sarai Sadar .	Nagla . .	Length of halt uncertain.
2nd Line Transport	Pack to Ghajera, Wheels to Kakrala.	Via Chapraula to Kakrala.	Dadri, Nagla .	Surajpur .	Will park and wait for orders.

X. S. TELEGRAM, NO. 1.

From—The Assistant Adjutant-General, 1st Cavalry Division, Dasna.

To—The General Officer Commanding, 4th Cavalry Brigade, Sikandarabad.

Time—14 hours. Date—February 26, 1905.

No. 1. Enemy believed to have retired to right bank of Jumna. Our army will follow enemy and cross Jumna south of Delhi near its junction with Hindan river. Objective of 1st Cavalry Division is to gain position of readiness near Mahrauli with view to prevent enemy's escape. To enable these operations to be carried out, early information of what is taking place west of Delhi is most necessary. In order to clear up situation you will march at once on Dankaur and push reconnaissances across river at once so as to ascertain what movements of enemy are taking place between Delhi and Ajmere and Bhiwani and interrupt his communications with those places. Divisional Headquarters march towards Raipur to-morrow, but until further orders you should communicate with me through Dadri, to which place you should send your unfit men and horses.

FIRST DAY.

Monday, February 27.

**Commencement of the Strategical Reconnaissance by
the Cavalry Divisions.**

The Brigades—except the 4th—marched as directed in the foregoing order, and reached the stations prescribed for the long halt as under—

	Hours.
1st Brigade at	9
5th „ „	9—10
2nd „ „	10—11
3rd „ „	8—9

All Brigades on halting fronted towards Delhi. During this halt, information was received from the 5th Brigade that the fords of the Jumna below Okhla were impassable owing to flood. As the Hindan had turned out to be fordable anywhere, the pontoons were pushed on rapidly towards the Jumna. Constant reports came in from the 1st Brigade showing that the enemy's forces were still filing into Delhi over the railway bridge, that the rear-guard at Shahdara was stationary, and that no indications of a hostile movement southwards were discernible. At 14½ hours the General

Officer Commanding 1st Cavalry Division, judging that the enemy had no intention of moving against his right, gave orders for pontoon bridges to be thrown over the Jumna at Raipur and Karauli and for the march to be continued at 15 hours in accordance with Divisional Order No. 2 below :

No. 2.—Operation Orders.—1st Cavalry Division.

HEADQUARTERS, GHARULI,

27th February, 1905 (14½ hours).

1. The 1st Brigade holds the line of the Kaila-Chilla canal with detachments guarding the canal works at Okhla.

2. With reference to paragraph 3 (b) of the Divisional Order No. 1, dated 26th February, 1905, the Division will at 15 hours continue its march in accordance with the attached itinerary.

—	1st Brigade.	5th Brigade.	2nd Brigade.	3rd Brigade.	Notes affecting all Brigades.
Line of march	..	Chalera, Madanpur.	Raipur, Tughlakabad.	Mangrauli, Karauli, Amadpur.	Brigades arrange for their own protection.
Bivouac	..	Madanpur ..	Tughlakabad station.	Amadpur.	
Outposts	To be maintained in position all night between Okhla and Hindan river.	Brigades arrange for their own protection.
and Line Transport	Pack to Saadatpur, <i>Wheel</i> to Raipur.	Pack to Madanpur, <i>Wheel</i> to Raipur.	Pack to Tughlakabad station, <i>Wheel</i> to Raipur.	Mangrauli, Karauli, Amadpur.	

Divisional Headquarters at Raipur. Communication by lamp. Telegraph line to be opened along Agra canal for communication between Brigades.

The crossing of the Jumna was effected without interruption, and nothing was seen of the enemy beyond a few patrols, amounting in all to about one squadron, which retired westwards over the Tughlakabad ridges. During the afternoon the "A" Corps Cavalry Brigade commenced to arrive and to take over a portion of the outpost line of the 1st Cavalry Brigade. The Commander of the latter pushed forward two squadrons on to the ridges 2 miles west of

Okhla in order to secure his passage of the river on the morrow. The following order was issued at 19 hours :

No. 3.—Operation Orders.—*1st Cavalry Division.*

HEADQUARTERS, RAIPUR,
27th February, 1905 (19 hours).

1. (a) The crossing of the 1st Cavalry Division was unopposed, except by a few hostile patrols, amounting in all to about a squadron : they retired westwards over the Tughlakabad ridges.

(b) Outposts of Eastern Cavalry on general line Okhla station, Tughlakabad, and ridge running southwards.

(c) Brigades bivouac as follows :

1st—holding line of the Kaila-Chilla canal, with its headquarters and 2nd line A (pack) at Okhla.

5th—at Mandanpur, with 2nd line A.

2nd—at Tughlakabad station with 2nd line A.

3rd—at Amadpur, transport complete.

2nd line B (wheel) of 1st, 2nd, and 5th Brigades is at Raipur.

2. Brigades to be ready to march at 5 hours to-morrow.

3. Pontoons at Raipur to be left under escort from 2nd Brigade ; those at Karauli to be protected by detachment 3rd Brigade, till Corps Cavalry comes up to-morrow.

4. Divisional Headquarters at Raipur.

Remarks on the First Day's Operations.

The objective of the march was to reach the Jumna, but the Division had to move towards the passages over the river at a safe distance from the enemy's forces which hold Delhi. It was necessary therefore to detail a Brigade to flank the march of the Division in order to secure tactical liberty of action in the event of having to co-operate against any attempt of the enemy from Delhi.

This Brigade was posted along the line of the Kaila-Chilla canal, in order to close the plain to the enemy until the 28th instant, when the "A" Corps Cavalry Brigade might reasonably be expected to relieve it.

The first stage of the march of the Division under these conditions terminated at the Jumna : beyond that river the country is rocky, and the road viâ Tughlakabad to the Rajputana Railway constitutes a defile. Until the 28th instant, however, all danger and interest centred towards

Delhi. If the flank guard were threatened by a sortie of hostile Cavalry from Delhi, the Division would have operated so as to support it, because if this enemy's Cavalry were successful they would be able, not only to jeopardise the safety of the 4th Cavalry Brigade near Dankaur, but also to attack and delay the heads of columns of the Infantry Divisions further to the rear. The task of the flank guard was to prevent any such success being possible.

On the 28th instant the 1st Brigade (acting as flank guard), when relieved by Corps Cavalry Brigade "A," will rejoin its division.

The 1st Cavalry Division then finally abandons all idea of action on the left bank of the Jumna, and advances to gain the ridges beyond that river.

Thus the special character of the march of the Division on the 27th instant was based on the disposition of the flank guard to cover it towards Delhi.

Now for the detail of the execution of the march. The 1st Brigade held on its right the passages over the Hindan River about the East Indian Railway bridge, and those over the Kaila-Chilla canal to a point beyond the Jumna near Okhla. The latter point, with its sluices and the bund over the Jumna and the main road to the south, were seized and strongly held as a bridge-head as soon as possible. The main body of the Brigade remained in a position of readiness near Gharauli.

The march of the three other Brigades was as follows :

5th Brigade, Dasna to Saadatpur, arriving between 9 and 10 hours.

2nd Brigade, Dehra to Sarai Sadar, arriving between 10 and 11 hours.

3rd Brigade, Dadri to Nagla, arriving about 8 hours.

There are usually several fords over the Jumna between Raipur and Karauli, but owing to a heavy fall of rain the river became unfordable, so the pontoons, which are available, were required.

During the whole of the 27th instant, whilst the danger was on the side of Delhi, the Division could on no account settle down to bivouac on the river, until reports from the flank guard made it clear that no offensive movement was contemplated by the enemy moving south-east from Delhi.

The Division therefore remained in a position of readiness during most of the day, so that Brigades could operate northwards if required, and the transport could be closed up.

During this halt of Brigades in positions of readiness, the General Officer Commanding the Division was with the flank guard. In principle, the General Officer Commanding marches wherever the tactical interest lies; and usually, therefore, with the advance guard. In this case he will be best able to judge of the situation if he is with the flank guard.

Only when all probability of an offensive movement from the direction of Delhi was past—say about 15 hours—and when the western movement of the enemy over the railway bridge appeared to be continuing unabated, could the Cavalry Division move on towards the Jumna.

The interest of the march now changed from the flank to the head, and the advance guards assumed an important tactical rôle. How far ahead should they march?

They should march sufficiently far ahead to give us possession of the exits of the defiles across the Jumna. That is to say, the advance guards should be in possession of the canal and ridges west of the river, before the main bodies of the Brigades begin to cross.

Brigades halted on evening of 27th instant as follows :

2nd Brigade near Tughlakabad station.

5th " " Madanpur.

3rd " " Amadpur.

1st " on the line of the Kaila-Chilla canal with
its left at Okhla.

4th " on reconnaissance.

And now to return to the 4th Brigade (see Sketch 9).

This Brigade was ordered forward on Sunday afternoon,

26th instant, to Dankaur, 12 miles from Sikandarabad, thence 4 miles to Atta, on the Jumna, charged with the full responsibility of clearing up the situation on the west of Delhi.

On Sunday night, certain reconnoitring detachments were pushed across the Jumna to scout over the roads and railways leading west and south-west from Delhi, and to examine tactical points where traces of the enemy are likely to be found.

What localities in the district in question should be reconnoitred? Two reconnoitring detachments might be sent out, one towards Nangloi station, the other in the direction of Gurgaon to scout to Bahadurgarh.

These parties will then cut all the routes of importance. They would be provided with signalling equipment for day and night, telephone or carrier pigeons if possible, and with means for tapping telegraph wires.

Transmission of Reports.—No telegraph lines run direct. But a branch line of wire might have been run out at once from Sikandarabad to the Jumna at Atta, and even led across the river. Sufficient wire might even be available south of Sikandarabad station on East Indian Railway to run an air line to Dankaur and Atta. Probably, however, helio, lamp, telephone or cable, pigeons (from some frontier post), native runners, or motor-bicycles would have to be used. Early information is of first importance to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, because the great operations depend upon his decisions, and his decisions depend upon his information.

It may sometimes be convenient to send messengers along roads in carts or ekkas; three or four horses per troop should, therefore, be trained for harness.

Sometimes, again, it is possible in civilised warfare to support the patrols with one or two detachments, or relay posts, whose presence midway lessens danger and distance for patrols and despatch-riders.

What should the *strength* of these two reconnoitring detachments be?

Their rôle is not to fight, so they should be as weak as possible, commensurate with the requisite number for scouting, for examination of the country, for demolition work and despatch-riding.

- (a) Take the first case, that of the patrol towards Nangloi station—for actual scouting say one officer and four to six trained “regimental scouts.” Reports will probably be sent back from the following places : (1) Faridabad—whether signs of enemy have been found on the Agra road and railway. (2) Somewhere near Tughlakabad or the Kutab—reporting if ridges are held or not, and whether there are any signs of enemy on the main Delhi-Gurgaon road which passes the Kutab. (3) Palam station—stating what is going on upon the Rajputana-Malwa Railway and the Delhi-Gurgaon old road which passes Philadpur. (4) Nangloi, on the Southern Punjab Railway and road to Bahadurgarh.

Total as above eight messengers 8

Signallers with helio, lamp, and appliances for tapping telegraph lines 4

Pioneers with demolition material 2

Spare 6

Say 1 officer and 20 men with 26 horses (that is to say, a troop with its weaker elements withdrawn).

But to facilitate the transmission of reports to Brigade Headquarters and to act as a feeder for patrols, some larger body should be provided on the Tughlakabad line, especially as this patrol will be working nearer to where the enemy is known to be (Delhi) ; so a whole “contact squadron” should be charged with the mission towards Nangloi.

As regards the use of the contact squadron for supplying more patrols when the situation demands, it should be noted that once definite traces of the enemy’s whereabouts have been found, the reconnaissance enters on a second phase. The numbers of scouts and patrols must then be considerably increased so as to develop and augment the information. A

true picture of the enemy's disposition can only be obtained by probing his front at numerous points, and collating the several threads of information thus gathered.

(b) As regards the strength of the patrol towards Gurgaon, allow an officer and 6 scouts for actual reconnaissance work ; and for despatch-riding from—

- (1) Ballabgarh, on Agra road and railway ;
- (2) Ridges beyond Pali, where the road passes through the hills ;
- (3) Near Gurgaon, on main direct road and rail to Ajmere ;
- (4) Najafgarh or Bahadurgarh ;

that is four messages—*i.e.* 8 despatch-riders.

Signallers and pioneers, as for No. 1 patrol, make a total of 1 officer and 20 men with 26 horses. Say a "contact troop," as calculated for the actual reconnoitring detachment of the first reconnaissance.

But in this case it seems unnecessary to increase the detachment to the strength of a squadron because—

(1) The Brigade will move *viâ* Pali to Gurgaon—*i.e.* in rear of this patrol—and will itself act as a haven of refuge for messengers and as patrol "reservoir."

(2) It is necessary to avoid, until the last possible moment, attracting attention to the direction in which the Brigade proposes to march. A contact troop is less likely to attract observation than a whole squadron.

(3) Rapidity is essential ; one troop marches faster than four troops.

The detachments detailed for these two reconnaissances should be pushed across the River Jumna with as little delay as possible.

But it seems unnecessary to send them forward at once from Sikandarabad. Some advantage will be gained by keeping them in rear of the advance guard of the Brigade until the Jumna is reached ; for their horses will thus be spared a certain amount of reconnaissance work, whilst but little time will be lost. The detachments would, however, march at the

head of the main body, and the bridging appliances in rear of the guns, so that there should be as little delay as possible in getting them across the Jumna. Some reconnoitring patrols will already be out near the Jumna, as the Brigade would have been halting at Sikandarabad in the ordinary course of events.

The characteristic of the reconnaissance is *rapidity*. How is rapidity to be combined with the numbers required in the central mass?

The unfits of each unit sent forward must be left to come on at a slower pace with the main body, or be sent back to the nearest dépôt on the communications. It seems better to select units in this manner than to select fit men and horses, and then to organise a special body on the spur of the moment, as has been done upon occasions.

As regards tapping the telegraph wires, the object is to take the place of the Delhi signallers and to receive messages from Ajmere, Bhiwani, Rewari, etc., etc., before the enemy is aware of what is being done.

What should be the nature of the *instructions* given to the contact squadron and to the reconnoitring troops sent forward from the 4th Brigade at Atta?

Their objective is to examine the roads and railways which lead from Delhi towards Ajmere and Bhiwani, the bases of the Western State, so as to discover whether the hostile Army has left Delhi, or has been joined by reinforcements from either base.

Avoid laying down an itinerary for such reconnaissances or prescribing the exploration of a particular zone of country. To examine a specified zone of country, the scouting party must move by zig-zags; thus more than double the work is thrown needlessly on the horses.

The answer to a reconnoitring problem will often be found only by making use of indications discovered as one goes along, and by acting as the circumstances of the case demand. Thus the point made for by a patrol may frequently change during its day's march. The axis of one reconnaissance will

in this case be Tughlakabad-Nangloi stations. The axis of the other reconnaissance will be Ballabgarh-Gurgaon-Bahadurgarh.

In the former there seem to be six important knots of communications on to which "soundings" should be dropped, namely :

1. Cross-roads, north-west of Tajpul.
2. " " Mahrauli.
3. " " north-east of Philadpur.
4. Palum railway station.
5. Nangloi station and high road.
6. Badli " " " "

In the second case there are three, namely :

1. About Gurgaon.
2. " Najafgarh.
3. " Bahadurgarh.

The officer in charge of each reconnaissance will go from one point to another as he judges best. If on the way he gets any important information of the enemy, he will split up his patrol. He will himself follow the enemy, and send on detachments, so as to cut all roads up to the last one. An important point: remember that every detachment must be informed as to the march of the Brigade, in order to be able to send back despatch-riders direct with reports.

The reconnoitring orders issued to the Brigade at Sikan-darabad might, then, read somewhat as follows :

No. 39.—*Operation Orders.—4th Cavalry Brigade.*

HEADQUARTERS, SIKANDARABAD :

26th February, 1905 (14½ hours).

1. (a) The enemy is believed to have retired to the right bank of the Jumna river.
- (b) Our Army is following him up.
2. The objective of the 4th Cavalry Brigade is to clear up the situation on the west of Delhi and to interrupt the enemy's communications from Delhi to his bases at Ajmere and Bhiwani.

3. The march will be continued to-day viâ Dhankaur to Atta at 15 hours, at which hour the head of the main body will cross the Dadri-Khurja high road :—

Advance Guard.—1 Squadron, 7th Hussars.

Main body.—7th Hussars (less 1 squadron).

“D” Battery, Royal Horse Artillery.

Bridging detachment.

12th Cavalry.

10th Lancers (less 1 troop).

1st Line Transport in order of units.

2nd Line Transport.

Rear Guard.—One troop, 10th Lancers.

4. The Officer Commanding 7th Hussars will detail the following units for special reconnaissance duty. The officers detailed will report at Brigade Headquarters for orders without delay. Three days’ supplies on pack mules to be taken—

(a) One squadron.

(b) One troop with signalling party and squadron materials for demolition. Six regimental scouts to be attached.

5. All unfit men and horses will march from camp at 15½ hours under orders of Captain X., 10th Lancers, to Dadri, where he will report to Officer Commanding Detachment, 3rd Cavalry Brigade, for instructions.
6. Reports to be sent to main guard of advance guard.

Note.—The squadron ordered in 4 (a) includes signallers and pioneers with material sufficient to damage the railways and wires. The instrument and telegraphist for tapping wires must be attached from Brigade Headquarters or from telegraph company Royal Engineers.

Unless some boats or pontoons had been available, the passage of the *main body* of the Brigade over the Jumna would present considerable difficulties, as the river was unexpectedly found to be unfordable.

As regards the direction of march to be taken by the main body of the Brigade, the Tughlakabad pass is only some ten or eleven miles from the Delhi forts, so the Brigade should take a more southerly route, say, by the north side of Ballabgarh to Pali. The latter place is sixteen miles from Atta, and should be reached by noon on Monday, 27th instant.

The pass about six miles east of Gurgaon and south-west of Ghutorni village, and over which the main Delhi road to Rewari and the south-west runs, is some twelve miles farther on. The Brigade should be able to occupy this pass, and the hills to the north of it by Monday evening, February 27.

These hills afford a very strong position towards north-west and east.

Supply of 4th Brigade.—Only pack transport, on account of the difficulty of getting carts over the Jumna near Atta, and also on account of the nature of the country from Pali northwards.

As wheel vehicles became emptied they should be sent to fill up, and to remain with the Divisional Supply Column, which is on its march towards Raipur, until an opportunity for rejoining arises (see p. 135).

The reconnoitring Brigade thus leaves Atta on Monday morning with three days' supplies (1 on man, 2 on pack), *i.e.*, it is rationed till Wednesday night, March 1.

For any special operation of this sort it seems essential that the transport of a Cavalry Division be so organised that it is possible to allot an extra allowance of pack animals as circumstances require to any particular Brigade.*

The Brigade will now have learnt from the reconnoitring parties that there are no movements on the roads from Delhi, and that the enemy is still at Delhi. Should the patrols already sent out be now ordered to move upon Delhi? Or should we send out fresh ones?

Send out fresh ones, because—

- (a) Time would be lost in recalling the first lot : and
- (b) They are already fatigued.

We now enter on a fresh phase of the reconnaissances. The objectives of the first reconnaissance were to find traces of the enemy and to locate his whereabouts. Now, however, that we have located his positions approximately, our *next objective* is to ascertain, without delay, the roads by which the enemy proposes to leave Delhi; to signal his approach along them, and immediately to launch as strong a force as possible upon his columns.

Therefore as many reconnaissances must be sent out as there are roads available for the enemy.

* It is believed that the S. and T. Officer at Divisional Headquarters had this power now of transferring transport.

There are four roads, not counting those leading directly south, which the 1st Brigade detachment on ridge west of Okhla guards, viz. :

- 1 to Gurgaon.
- 2 „ Najafgarh.
- 3 „ Bahadurgarh.
- 4 „ Sonapat.

The 2nd Cavalry Division will by Tuesday night or Wednesday be in occupation of this last road. So it seems sufficient to hold the three remaining ; three patrols will suffice in this case. The presence of British officers with all these patrols is not so important, except upon the first two roads, because simple *observation*, not tactical deduction, is now required. Each of these reconnaissances will advance to some suitable position of observation from which scouts will be sent further forward to gain touch. So the strength of these patrols should be at least 6, viz. 4 to hold the post of observation and 2 scouts out in front.

Touch must be continuous, and the posts must not be allowed to be brushed aside by any counter-move of the enemy. The patrol must consequently be closely supported. For this purpose squadrons must be sent forward in their rear, either to hold tactical points or to act offensively against any hostile reconnoitring parties.

On Wednesday, March 1, the 1st Division will have come up to its reconnoitring Brigade, and all will be concentrated in a position of readiness near Najafgarh.

The supporting squadrons and patrols sent out on the 27th must be relieved on the 28th, to save horses and men excessive fatigue.

Communication by telegraph, or otherwise, should be established between the several parts of the Division, and towards the crossings on the Jumna.

SECOND DAY.

*Tuesday, February 28.***Cavalry prevent Escape of Enemy's Main Army.**

At 20 hours last night, February 27, information was received from the 4th Brigade that they had cut the Delhi-Agra railway line near Ballabgarh and had opened up telegraphic communication between that place and Tughlakabad station via the railway telegraph line. The following orders were then issued :

No. 4.—Operation Orders.—1st Cavalry Division.**HEADQUARTERS, TUGHLAKABAD STATION :***28th February, 1905 (3 hours).*

1. (a) Our scouts report that the enemy is still in the entrenched camp of Delhi.
- (b) The 4th Brigade halted near Gurgaon last evening with detachments reconnoitring all routes from Delhi leading towards west and south-west. It marches at daylight on Bahadurgarh.
2. The Division will march at daylight, via Mahrauli on Najafgarh to support the 4th Brigade in preventing the enemy from moving westwards.
3. Brigades will march in the following order to the Rajputana-Malwa railway, and will halt in that vicinity until the transport has come up to the line—
 - (a) The 2nd Brigade (less 2nd Line Transport) will leave Tughlakabad at 6 hours and take up positions between the Kutab and Amadapur with the object of opposing any hostile movement from Delhi against the right flank of the Division.
 - (b) The 5th Brigade (less 2nd Line Transport) will follow the 2nd Brigade as far as Mahrauli, whence it will march on Shahabad with the object of covering the head of the Division from the west and south.
 - (c) The 3rd Brigade (less 2nd Line Transport) will march next as far as Masudpur, where it will concentrate in a position of readiness.
 - (d) The 2nd Line Transport of Brigades will march at times stated on attached table via Mahrauli and Sukhrali to the vicinity of Alawirdi (3 miles north of Gurgaon), where it will halt and outspan.
 - (e) The General Officer Commanding, 1st Brigade, will detail one regiment with a section Royal Horse Artillery, to reach Tughlakabad by 7 hours and hold a position in that vicinity to cover the passage of the transport. This detachment will then follow as rear guard. The remainder of the Brigade, after being relieved by Corps Cavalry Brigade "A," will concentrate at Okhla and march via Mahrauli to Alawirdi.
4. Reports will be sent to Mahrauli.

Itinerary for Tuesday, 28th.



	and Brigade.	5th Brigade.	3rd Brigade.	1st Brigade.	Notes affecting all Brigades.
Line of march	Tughlakabad-Mahrauli.	Madanpur : Tughlakabad Mahrauli . Masudpur . Shahabad .	Amadpur . Tughlakahad Masudpur .	Okhla. Tughlakabad. Mahrauli. Thence across country to Alawirdi.	Orders will be issued when the further march is to be continued.
Hour of starting	6 hours	6 hours	5 hours	As soon as the Brigade is concentrated.	
Long halt	Online Kutab to Amadalpur.	Shahabad .	Masudpur .	1 regiment and section Royal Horse Artillery to Tughlakabad, then follow transport as rear guard.	
2nd Line Transport.	Pack at Tughlakabad by 5.45 hours, then follow in rear of 3rd Brigade to Mahrauli, thence via Sukhrali to Alawirdi.	Concentrate by 7 hours at Tughlakabad station, thence at 7.30 via Mahrauli to Alawirdi	March at 7 hours to Tughlakabad station, thence by same route and in rear of 1st Brigade transport.	Concentrate at Tughlakabad station by 7.30 and follow 5th Brigade transport.	

The 2nd Brigade was in position on the line Kutab-Amadalpur by 9 hours, the 5th Brigade was posted near Shahabad watching the left flank of the Division, by 12 noon. The 3rd Brigade at same hour was in a position of readiness about Masudpur. The relief of the 1st Brigade by the "A" Corps Cavalry Brigade was completed by 6 hours ; 1st Brigade left Okhla at 8 hours and reached the Kutab by 12 noon. The flank guard, referred to in Divisional Order No. 4, paragraph 3 (e) above, remained in position south of Okhla station till 14 hours. The rear of the column of transport left Tughlakabad station at 11 hours and reached the Kutab at 14 hours. Reports that hostile Cavalry had crossed the Jumna near Raipur yesterday seem to have reached

4th Cav. Brigade from Sikandarabad

routes of No. 1 and 2 reconnaissances,
on left bank of Jumna near Atta.

supported by a Contact Sq.
" by 4th Bde. itself.



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Delhi, as the Western Commander sent out a force of about one Cavalry division, apparently with the object of clearing up the situation towards the Kutab and Tughlakabad. An engagement took place on the front Kutab-Okhla between this reconnoitring force and the Eastern Cavalry. The latter dismounted, held the ridges, and made a counter-stroke, driving the Western Cavalry detachment back upon Delhi. During the afternoon, information was received that the 4th Brigade was at Najafgarh with reconnoitring patrols, supported by squadrons, on the routes which leave Delhi on the west, namely, to Najafgarh and Bahadurgarh, both inclusive. On this the following order was issued at 17 hours :

No. 5.—Operation Orders.—1st Cavalry Division.

HEADQUARTERS, MAHRAULI :

28th February, 1905 (17 hours).

1. (a) The enemy's army is about Delhi. About four of his regiments of Cavalry with guns which advanced southwards to-day were driven back into Delhi with severe loss by our 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Brigades.
- (b) The 4th Brigade is near Najafgarh with a detachment near Nangloi station.
- (c) The "A" Corps Cavalry Brigade has occupied a position on the ridge about one mile west of Okhla.
2. The Division will bivouac as under and will be ready to oppose any attempt of the enemy to break out of Delhi—

5th Brigade	near	Palum station.
2nd ,,	Philadpur.	
3rd ,,	Rajokhri with a detached troop near Mahrauli to connect with the "A" Corps Brigade.	
1st ,,	Gurgaon Station.	
3. Divisional Headquarters will be at Gurgaon Station.

Late in the day our scouts reported that a large body of the enemy's Cavalry had at about 14 hours to-day settled down in bivouac near Chankri—strength about 20 to 30 squadrons with guns. The following order was issued at 19 hours :

No. 6.—Operation Orders.—1st Cavalry Division.

HEADQUARTERS, GURGAON RAILWAY STATION :

28th February, 1905 (19 hours).

1. The situation is unchanged except that scouts report that a large body of Western Cavalry settled down in bivouac at about 14 hours to-day near Chankri on the west of Delhi. Strength some 20 to 30 squadrons with guns.
2. Brigades will be ready to march at 5 hours on 1st March.

THIRD DAY.

*Wednesday, March 1.***The Cavalry Combat.****No. 7.—Operation Orders.—1st Cavalry Division.**

HEADQUARTERS, GURGAON STATION :

1st March, 1905 (3 hours).

1. (a) The enemy's Cavalry, reported near Chankri last evening, is estimated at 3 divisions. A new Infantry bivouac is reported near Nurhaulta.
- (b) Our 2nd Cavalry Division was on the line Mandaula-Loni yesterday morning.
2. The 1st Cavalry Division will concentrate with the object of attacking the hostile Cavalry should it attempt to leave the fortress. The roads from Delhi towards the west and south-west will be observed by detached posts.
3. (a) The independent rôle of the 4th Brigade is over. The Brigadier will send forward a squadron towards Chankri to get touch with the enemy's Cavalry and report his movements. The roads from Delhi towards Bahadurgarh will be observed. The rest of the Brigade will concentrate near Najafgarh at 6 hours.
- (b) The General Officer Commanding 5th Brigade will observe the country from the Rajputana-Malwa railway on the east to Mataula on the west (both inclusive). The Brigade (less detachments) will concentrate near Palum village at 6 hours.
- (c) The 1st and 2nd Brigades and 3rd Brigade (less one squadron) will march at 6 hours to a position of readiness near Amberhai.
- (d) The General Officer Commanding 3rd Brigade will detail one squadron to protect the Kutab "Minar" (where a signalling station is established) and will observe the road from Delhi via Philadpur towards Gurgaon.
4. Second Line Transport will concentrate at Gurgaon Station.
5. Reports after 7 hours, to be sent to Amberhai.

Narrative.

The above movements were carried out as directed. At about 10 hours information was received that about 3 Divisions (36 squadrons) of the enemy's Cavalry, with guns, were advancing from Chankri in the direction of Najafgarh along the south bank of the Najafgarh canal. Three officers were sent out to make a rapid sketch of the country between Mataula and the R.-M. railway. As the result of this reconnaissance the 4th Brigade was ordered to occupy Mataula, the Artillery was posted on the ridge to the south and south-

east of that place and the remainder of the division moved towards the village of Palum to a place affording better cover (see Sketch 10). The enemy posted his guns on some commanding sandhills east of Hashtal, and pivoting on them continued his advance toward the south-west. Our Cavalry then moved east of Mataula, and forming for attack compelled the enemy to change his direction towards the south-east and thus to mask the fire of his guns whilst ours were enabled to enfilade him up to the last moment. The enemy gave way and retreated towards Delhi in disorder, abandoning most of his guns. After the action the following orders were issued :

No. 8.—Operation Orders.—1st Cavalry Division.

HEADQUARTERS, PALUM STATION :

1st March, 1905 (13 hours).

1. (a) The enemy's losses in the Cavalry action this forenoon include 20 guns.
- (b) The hill close to Nuriāna is now strongly held by the enemy, otherwise the situation on the south-west front of Delhi is unchanged.
- (c) Our 6th Cavalry Brigade (2nd Cavalry Division) occupied a position near Badli station this morning. Mahrauli is held by the "B" Corps Cavalry Brigade and the ridge north of Tughlakabad by the 4th Infantry Division of the Second Army Corps and "A" Corps Cavalry Brigade.
2. The Division will occupy positions on the main roads from Delhi with the object of preventing the enemy from moving towards Bahadurgarh, Najafgarh, or Gurgaon.
3. Brigades will hold positions as under—
 - 5th Brigade near Mundka.
 - 1st " " Najafgarh.
 - 2nd " " Philadpur. This Brigade will also guard the Rajputana-Malwa railway.
 - 3rd " " Rujokhri, in readiness to support the "B" Corps Cavalry Brigade and to prevent any movement from Mahrauli on Gurgaon.
- The 4th Brigade will be in Reserve near Bijwasun.
4. Divisional Headquarters will be at Bijwasun.

Remarks on Third Day's Operations.

With reference to the situation on the evening of March 1, the Western Cavalry having been defeated, the next objective is to gain touch with the Western Army.

The independent Cavalry must be directly under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief and be manœuvred in accordance

with the strategical plan. Does he intend to blockade the Western Army in Delhi, or to allow it to leave the place in order to engage in a decisive battle near Delhi?

In the first case, masses of Cavalry must be pushed forward as close as possible to Delhi, in order to command the main exits with guns; in other words, to invest the place as closely as possible until the Eastern Infantry can come up.

In the second case, the Western columns must be allowed to emerge from the intrenched camp of Delhi. The general plan should be to have a Brigade ready to oppose the advance of the Western columns on each of the roads by which they can march westwards, say on the line Mundka-Najafgarh-Philadpur-Mahrauli. In case of attack these Brigades will gradually fall back to a position fixed upon beforehand and rendered impregnable against a simple direct attack. This front should allow room for the Western forces to deploy for battle. At the same time sufficient depth must be secured for the columns of march of the Eastern Army to form up for battle and to ensure to them perfect freedom of manœuvre. This was the plan adopted for March 2.

Care, however, must always be taken that the dispersion of the Cavalry is justified by gaining *first a victory* over the hostile mounted troops! In the case under consideration a scattered disposition at this period is justified, and seems the best way of adapting the means to the immediate end in view, viz. to prevent the enemy from escaping before the Eastern main columns can engage him in battle.

FOURTH DAY.

Thursday, March 2.

Observing the Enemy's Movements.

The hostile force, observed the previous evening, March 1, in occupation of Nuriana, advanced during the night and at daylight was in possession of the ridges east and north-east of Philadpur. The 2nd Brigade fell back to a position near Mulukpur. During the day it was ascertained, both by

reports received and by observations from the summit of the Kutub "Minar," that the enemy was concentrating large bodies of troops on the south of Delhi with the evident intention of attempting to break out to the west or the south-west on the following day. The following was the situation on Thursday evening, March 2 (see Sketch 11):

The enemy took the offensive to-day on the south of Delhi, and by nightfall holds the following general line with outposts about a mile farther south:

Mangul Ria (near Rajputana-Malwa railway).

Philadpur.

Mujahadpur.

Humayun's Tomb.

2. The Eastern Forces are disposed as under—

First Army Corps (less 1 division)	} On line Okhla-Yea-
Second „	
Third „	

Sultanpur-Shikandarpur, with detachments watching the approaches from Ajmere.

Cavalry.—1st Cavalry Division (less 1 Brigade) near Dundahera (on the Gurgaon-Philadpur road).

5th Brigade Amberhai.

2nd Cavalry Division.—Mundka.

The following orders were issued by the Commander-in-Chief:

No. 50.—Operation Orders.—*Eastern Army.*

HEADQUARTERS, RUJOKHRI:

2nd March, 1905 (17 hours).

1. Large hostile bivouacs are visible from the Kutub on the line Humayun's Tomb, Philadpur. The enemy's right seems to be near Mangul Ria.

2. The intention of the General Officer Commanding is to hold the enemy on the line Tughlakabad-Rujokhri, and to take the offensive against the enemy's right, with the object of driving him eastwards towards the Jumna and preventing his return into Delhi fortress.

3. (a) The General Officer Commanding First Army Corps will strongly entrench a position near Tughlakabad, which must be held at all costs as a pivot of manœuvre for the rest of the Army, and to cover the bridges at Raipur.

(b) The General Officer Commanding Second Army Corps will entrench and strongly occupy the high ground which lies between the villages of Mulukpur-Sikandarpur-Ghutorni with the object of preventing the

enemy from marching towards Gurgaon. The positions now occupied on the line Yeakutpur-Mulukpur will be held as a false front as long as possible.

- (c) The Third Army Corps will halt to-night on the line Amberhai-Simalka, and at daylight to-morrow will advance towards Philadpur and Malcha with the object of occupying the ridge between those villages.
 - (d) The 2nd Cavalry Division will co-operate on the left of the Third Army Corps by engaging the enemy on the front Chankri-Nuriana as soon as it is daylight.
 - (e) The 1st Cavalry Division will remain at the disposal of the General-in-Chief in a position of readiness near Rujokhri.
4. Reports to be sent to Rujokhri.

FIFTH DAY.

Friday, March 3.

Cavalry in the General Action.

The general engagement is in progress on the morning of the 3rd instant. The enemy advancing in strength from the line Munirka-Majahadpur have driven back the Second Army Corps from their false front on the Rujokhri ridge, and the enemy now occupy the hills north-west of Mahraul. At about 11 hours large masses of the enemy, covered by the troops holding this latter position, are pushed southwards from Kutab in an attempt to escape towards Rewari by passing to the east of Gurgaon. The 1st Cavalry Division is ordered to leave its position of readiness near Rujokhri and to delay this movement.

How should the Cavalry Division act?—The Divisional Commander, being himself in a good "look-out" position and in constant communication with his own selected staff officers, specially deputed to watch the course of the action, is not surprised at receiving this order. He has possibly already detected the enemy's attempt to break out, and has decided in his own mind on some plan of action to meet it. To delay the enemy can only mean to attack him: and so at least to force his column to deploy. From a study of the ground on the spot, it seemed possible for the Cavalry Division to advance concealed in a column of brigade masses over the neck across which the road from Gurgaon to Ghutorni village passes, to a

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point within 500 yards of the latter village ; but one or two small nullahs would have thrown brigades into disorder had they come upon them unawares at a fast pace. In order to take measures to ensure the smooth passage of the Division over them it was essential for the General Officer Commanding to have known beforehand that they were there. The ground being soft, easy soil, a sufficient number of passages could quickly have been made, probably with half an hour's work, to ensure the rapid deployment of the Division in the required direction.

On reaching the edge of the plain west of Ghutorni village, the 3rd, 4th and 5th Brigades were ordered to deploy and to attack respectively in the direction of the villages of Sultanpur, Satbari, and Chandan.

The remaining two Brigades were at first retained in hand in case the opposing Cavalry should appear. It seemed natural to expect that some hostile squadrons would have been reorganised out of the 72 which took part in the Cavalry action on the 1st instant, two whole days ago, and these would doubtless closely support the enemy's bid for freedom.

The ground seemed very favourable for the attack of the Eastern Cavalry Division ; and, given foresight in previously reconnoitring the ground and determination in the execution of the attack, important tactical results may be expected from Cavalry operating in this manner at the right moment.

This attack checked the efforts of the Western Army to break out southward. A general attack by the First and Second Army Corps, supported by the Third Army Corps and the 2nd Cavalry Division, was at once ordered. The Western Army, attacked in front, and threatened in flank, retreated in disorder on Delhi, pursued by the two Cavalry Divisions.

General Remarks.

Into this Study have been introduced Brigades of Corps Cavalry. These, sometimes called " Advance-Guard Cavalry," or, as on p. 3, " Protective Cavalry," are for the provision of the

First Line of Security for the Army as a whole. Hitherto, the units of which the Brigades consist have been regiments, one of which has been attached to every Infantry Division, and denominated Divisional Cavalry. But to detail a whole Cavalry Regiment to an Infantry Division seems a waste of power, when two or more Infantry Divisions are grouped in the field.

Moreover, the disadvantages of having Cavalry marching amongst the Infantry columns are obvious: this, however, must occur when Infantry Divisions are grouped into corps, unless at the same time their Divisional Cavalry regiments are grouped into Brigades. In the field the latter practice has usually been followed: thus we find Marshal Soult issuing the following orders on this head on September 25, 1805, regarding some three or four Light Cavalry regiments which formed part of his Corps. They had been organised into a body called the Light Cavalry Division, though in reality in strength it was only equal to one of our Indian Brigades. The order begins as follows:—

The Division will always be concentrated and will receive orders direct from Corps Headquarters. The regiments of which it is composed will only be detached as a temporary measure (and then only by virtue of a special order from Corps Headquarters) for duty under the orders of one of the General Officers Commanding an Infantry Division. The General Officer Commanding the Light Cavalry Division will detail a party of ten Hussars or "Chasseurs" under a senior Non-Commissioned Officer for duty as despatch-riders with the Headquarters of each Infantry Division. These detachments are to be relieved every eight days.

In this Study this practice has been adopted, and the regiments usually allotted to Infantry Divisions have been grouped into one Cavalry Brigade, per Army Corps of three Infantry Divisions. A detachment, however, of one troop per Infantry Division is detailed weekly from the Corps Cavalry Brigade and attached to the Headquarters of Infantry Divisions for orderly and despatch-riding duties.

The Corps Cavalry Brigade thus formed is, however, without Horse Artillery.

The following extract from an essay on the "Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign" by Colonel Davis, United States Army, shows how the force of circumstances in the field compelled also the Americans to group their Cavalry into large corps instead of retaining it "fractioned amongst Infantry units":

"I will say a word in closing as to the lessons taught by this campaign. In the first place, what may be called the 'science of outposts' was developed as it had not been before in the history of war. Up to this time the practice had been to maintain a chain of Infantry outposts along the front and flanks of an Army in the vicinity of the enemy. Cavalry had been neither freely nor boldly used, and outpost duty had, as a rule, been timidly and inefficiently performed. Within the lines all was believed safe; beyond the outposts, not only was it 'enemy's territory,' but the country was presumed and believed to be actually filled with the troops of the enemy. In the two great wars just preceding our own, in the Crimea and in Italy, this state of the case was true to a remarkable degree. This was largely due to the fact that the Cavalry had been *fractioned up and distributed* among the larger units of Infantry. The same thing was attempted in the Army of the Potomac, but after a year's experience, the attempt was abandoned; the Cavalry was withdrawn from the Infantry corps and concentrated, first in a *division*, then in a *corps of three divisions*, acting under the orders of the Commanding General.

"In this campaign we have the first example of the outpost work of an Army being done 'by wholesale' by the arm best fitted for the task. The Cavalry of one Army was employed to locate the main body of the enemy, and incidentally to examine the country between the contending Armies. The Cavalry of the other Army endeavoured to prevent this information from being obtained by interposing itself as a screen between its own main body and that of the enemy. In the performance of these duties we have seen that there were frequent collisions. If the tactical details of these encounters

be carefully and thoroughly studied, I think the fact will appear that, while there was much fighting on foot, it was not so generally successful as has been supposed. I think the fact will also appear that the command was most frequently and uniformly successful which was most skilfully handled as a *mounted* force, dismounting only to accomplish a temporary purpose, or, as in Buford's case at Gettysburg, when it was necessary to oppose Infantry, or to hold a point of great strategic importance until the Infantry could arrive."

Looking at the rôle of the Corps Cavalry during the operations, the task of the First Army Corps in the first phase was to mask the entrenched camp of Delhi during the flank march of the Eastern Army. For this a flank guard consisting of 1st Infantry Division and Corps Cavalry Brigade "A" was detailed. This surrounded the eastern side of Delhi as with a veil, while the remainder of the First Army Corps acted as the centre of resistance near Ghaziabad, thus protecting the right of the main Army.

The Second Army Corps was next ordered to send forward one Division beyond the Jumna with its "B" Cavalry Brigade to act as an advance guard covering the front of the Army in its march across the Jumna.

This General Advance Guard consisting of the Division and one Brigade of Cavalry acted as a moving *tête de pont* to cover, in the first instance, the passage of the Jumna. Next, it shaped itself to fit the heads of the enemy's columns, so that behind this screen the Army could be manœuvred with something akin to certainty for battle.

One special officer commanded this Advance Guard, and another the Flank Guard.

With reference to the battle dispositions, given in Eastern Army Operation Orders No. 50, the First Corps has to co-operate in a passive defence of a position near Tughlakabad: the Second Corps to assist in the withdrawal from a false front to a defensive position in rear: the Third Corps takes part in an offensive movement. In addition to these special duties, there is, in each case, the important one of

keeping up inter-communication during the battle between neighbouring corps and divisions, and also scouting ; but it seems a waste of power to employ highly trained and well-mounted Cavalry soldiers on work which can easily be done by others.

In view of the difficulty experienced in mounting Cavalry at all, it is a matter for consideration whether it would not be an economy to organise a special corps of orderlies and despatch-riders, mounted on country ponies, for work within or in the immediate vicinity of Infantry Divisions. With reference to this point Lieutenant-General Sir O'M. Creagh writes :

I advocate that the scouts of Infantry battalions be mounted ; in these days of long-range rifle fire, it is impossible for dismounted men to explore the country efficiently when a battalion is acting alone. Should this suggestion be worthy of adoption, I would suggest that fifty men per battalion be mounted. This would give an Infantry Division sufficient mounted troops for its own immediate protection, as well as for all the duties at present carried out by Divisional Cavalry. Thus nine Cavalry regiments would be released for their legitimate duties under the General Officer Commanding that arm. These "mounted scouts" should be drawn from the present Mounted Infantry. Their training should fit them for all the duties that Divisional Cavalry now perform ; and they should be so organised that they could be formed into battalions if required. They should be mounted on country-bred ponies, so as not to compete with the horsing of Cavalry regiments.

Notes on Supply.

With regard to the method of supplying the 1st Cavalry Division during the last four or five days (see Sketch 12).

1. Assuming that two days' rations and two days' grain are carried both in the 2nd line A (pack) and 2nd line B (wheel), then each *unit* had with it on the morning of the 27th instant four days on pack and draught for men and animals. In addition each *brigade* had in its supply column—three days for men, and one day for animals. (*Vide* table of "state" on p. 139.)

2. On arrival at the Raipur crossing the supplies in *unit* charge were pushed over the pontoon bridge on the night

of the 27th, and the *brigade supply columns* were parked at Raipur for the night.

3. On arrival in its camp on the 27th each unit would use one day's supply, and would send its empty wheeled transport on the morning of February 28 to Madanpur to replenish from the supply columns.

The 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th Brigades would, therefore, have had on hand on the morning of the 28th their full supplies of four days.

4. The following would have been the itinerary of the supply columns at Raipur :

(a) Crossing at Raipur on the morning of the 28th at 5 hours, they would arrive at Madanpur two miles away at, say, 6 hours. There would be a halt there of one hour to enable brigades to replenish.

(b) Leaving Madanpur at 7 hours viâ Faridabad, on the banks of the Agra Canal, and Ballabgarh, the column would reach Bangur at 15 hours that afternoon—distance 20 miles.

(c) Leaving Bangur at 5 hours on March 1 it could arrive at Gurgaon at 15 hours on that day—distance 25 miles.

5. Our state of supplies shows that the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th Brigades have two days for men and animals in hand on the morning of the second instant, and the 4th Brigade one day only.

6. Under the orders of General Officers Commanding, Brigade supply transport (*i.e.* 2nd line) as emptied would be despatched to Gurgaon, which is the depôt for supply, that is to say, there would be in Gurgaon on the 1st, or morning of March 2, two days' wheel transport of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th Brigades, and two days' wheel and one day's pack of the 4th Brigade.

7. The supply column transport arrives at Gurgaon on the afternoon of March 1, and the unit transport would take over supplies that evening and rejoin their units on the morning of the 2nd.

8. Each brigade would therefore have on the morning of March 2 *four* days for its *personnel* and *two* days for its animals.

9. A convoy consisting of 2,056 carts would be required to bring up ten days' supplies for men and animals of the five brigades, and would cover a road length of 13,000 yards, or practically 8 miles. This would be too cumbersome, and it would therefore be run out in two lots, starting on consecutive days.

Assuming that the convoy left Dadri on the morning of the 27th at 8 hours, and that it consisted of *bullock* carts (though as a rule bullocks should travel at night when possible), it would arrive at Amipur on the Jumna at 18 o'clock, and would park there for the night—distance, 15 miles.

Starting at 5 o'clock on the morning of the 28th, it would march viâ Ballabgarh to Bangur, arriving there at 18 hours that evening—distance, 18 miles.

Starting again on March 1 at 5 hours, it would reach Bhundsi at 15 hours that evening—distance, 15 miles.

Leaving Bhundsi at 5 hours on March 2, the convoy would arrive in Gurgaon, its destination, at midday—distance, 10 miles.

10. There would, therefore, be on the afternoon of March 2 with the division—

In unit charge four days for men and animals.

In brigade supply column three days for men and one day for animals.

In depôt at Gurgaon two days for men and one day for animals.

Total: 9 for men; 6 for animals.

11. Calculations have been based on a uniform speed of 3 miles an hour for mule transport, $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles for bullock.

12. There is an alternative route from Sikandarabad to Gurgaon viâ Tigaon and Ballabgarh, but it is longer (56 miles).

Dadri viâ Pali to Gurgaon is shorter (43 miles), but has

the disadvantage of being over very broken ground, and also of bringing the supply columns very close to the fighting line, as no roads are shown across the bad ground except the track to Philadpur.

Pali would be unsuitable as a depôt, as it would be too far from the line in front, being—

14	miles	from	Philadpur.
12	"	"	Rujokhri.
16	"	"	Bijwasun.
23	"	"	Najafgarh.
28	"	"	Mundka.

NOTE.—A point to notice is that the Brigade Supply Column is the unit, and although Brigade Supply Columns would often undoubtedly be collected into one group under Cavalry Divisional Orders to suit the military situation of the moment, the Brigade Supply Column must be recognised as a component part of the Brigade and arranged for.

*Points that would have to be put in Divisional Orders
on February 26.*


1. That the Brigade Supply Column of each brigade would move on Raipur on the morning of February 27, 1905, where it would remain parked till further orders, under the senior Brigade Supply and Transport Officer.

*Points that would have to be put in Divisional Orders
on February 27, 1905.*

2. Brigade Supply Column will move to Madanpur tomorrow, the 28th, and will halt there to enable the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 5th Brigades to replenish their brigade transport. They will then march under the orders of the senior Brigade Supply and Transport Officer via Faridabad, Bangur, and Bhundsi to Gurgaon, moving as rapidly as possible.

3. General Officers Commanding Brigades will send all transport, as supplies are used daily, to Gurgaon to await

SKETCH 12.



the arrival there of the supply column due on March 1, with orders to replenish there, and then to rejoin their units as quickly as possible. Till further orders Gurgaon will be the depôt for supplies for the 1st Division.

The Divisional Supply and Transport Officer would issue similar orders to his Brigade Supply and Transport Officers, and would further inform them that a convoy carrying five days' supplies would arrive in Gurgaon on the 2nd instant, and another with five days on the 3rd.

STATE OF SUPPLIES

DATE.	MEN.					ANIMALS.					Brigades.
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	
26th February, 1905	7	7	7	7	7	5	5	5	5	5	Days.
Expended 27th February, 1905	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Supply columns detached ...	3	3	3	3	3	1	1	1	1	1	
Balance in hand	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
28th February, 1905 :											
Replenished at Madanpur...	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	
Expended	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Balance	3	3	3	2	3	3	3	3	2	3	
1st March, 1905											
Balance	3	3	3	2	3	3	3	3	2	3	
Expended	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
2nd March, 1905											
Balance	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	
Taken from supply columns	2	2	2	3	2	1	...	
Balance	4	4	4	4	4	2	2	2	2	2	

CHAPTER V.

THIRD STUDY (AURANGABAD).

Subject.

A “DECISIVE battle” the real objective in war. Strategical Preparation. Selection of a Primary and a Secondary Theatre of War, and Use of Entrenched Depôts illustrated by 1809. Measures to be taken with regard to a “Buffer State.” Employment of the Cavalry Division and of the Army Cavalry up to the “decisive battle.”

General Idea.

1. The Central Provinces south of the Narbudda and the Nizam's Dominions on the north side of the Bombay-Madras railway represent an Asiatic State called “the Buffer State,” between two European powers called respectively “North” and “South.” (See Sketch 13.)

2. The population of the Buffer State consists of a number of mixed races which are traditionally antagonistic, but under the strong hand of the Nizam local disturbances have been suppressed, and a force of semi-regular troops, numbering about 50,000, has been raised and armed.

The residence and seat of Government of the Nizam is at Aurangabad. Hyderabad and Raipore are the next most important cities in the State.

A treaty of alliance exists between the Government of the South State and the Nizam by which the integrity of the latter's dominions is guaranteed. Owing, however, to certain

regulations enforced by the Nizam, the military geography of the Buffer State is more or less unknown: nor has any scheme for co-operation between the respective Armies ever been evolved.

3. Madras and Bangalore are the bases of the South State, and are connected by railway with Poona and Wadi, garrison towns on the frontier.

4. The southern frontier of the North State is the river Narbudda. Bhopal is the advanced base and is connected by railway viâ Jhansi, Delhi, and Lahore to its ultimate base in Europe.

5. The North State having recently built the railway Bina-Katni suddenly extends it by Bilaspur to Raipore, and overruns the country of the Buffer State southwards towards the Godavery. Upon this the Nizam calls upon the South State to fulfil its pledges, but, for political reasons, and inasmuch as the capital (Aurangabad) is not immediately threatened, the operations of the South are at first limited to a military occupation of the country about Hyderabad and Warangal, as a preliminary operation to expelling the enemy from the Raipore province. The South employs for this purpose an army of about 100,000 men, and extends the railway from Wadi to Hyderabad. At the same time a force of one Cavalry Division of three Brigades, with three Batteries of Horse Artillery, and two Infantry Divisions are concentrated at Poona ready to move upon Aurangabad, should the situation require it.

6. Two Squadrons of Imperial Service Cavalry are with each Cavalry Brigade.

Note.—No railways or railway bridges other than those stated above will be supposed to exist, but in all other respects the country is to be considered exactly as it is.

The "situation" depicted in the foregoing "General Idea" is closely analogous to the "situation" in Germany and Italy in 1809. It will therefore be instructive, before considering this Study, to turn to the records of that campaign for lessons of guidance from Napoleon himself.

NOTES ON MEASURES TO BE ADOPTED PREPARATORY TO THE STRATEGICAL DEPLOYMENT.

1. *The real objective in war is a decisive battle.*—In order to prevent ourselves adopting wrong strategical principles, it is essential to bear carefully in mind this, the ultimate aim of war. Clausewitz describes Napoleon's conception of war somewhat as follows :

War has only one objective—namely, to annihilate the enemy. Now the annihilation of the enemy really means thoroughly to demoralise him, to break his will-power ; because the will, much more than the use of any implements, is the real obstacle to be overcome before the final end of a war can be attained. Thorough demoralisation, both in the theatre of operations and on the battlefield—*i.e.* strategical and tactical demoralisation—is the objective.

The means whereby Napoleon sought to produce this general state of collapse in his enemy was a battle. But that battle had to be a decisive one ; so decisive, that not only were the troops which were actually present morally affected by it, but also many others, including possible allies.

The battle was rendered decisive by a concentration of numbers and of effort, and by the suddenness of the blow upon the centre of gravity of the enemy's forces ; and the latter, once broken, were pressed without rest until completely overthrown and demoralised.

There is no doubt then about the principles which guided Napoleon ; and he tells us that the great Captains have "all acted on the same principles."

War must be waged on the same principles as a siege : fire must be concentrated upon a single point. Once a breach is made, the equilibrium is broken, the other defences become valueless and the place is taken. Attacks must not be scattered, but concentrated. ("Rapport sur la position politique et militaire des armées de Piémont, 19th July, 1794," by General Bonaparte to Robespierre.)

A decisive battle must then be our real objective. But there are great difficulties which prevent the massing of large numbers of troops at the required point.

A consideration of the Campaign of 1809 shows what steps Napoleon took to overcome such difficulties.

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2. *Strategical preparation necessary to overcome difficulties of operating in masses as illustrated by Napoleon's Campaign in 1809.* (See Sketch 14.)

In the same way as in the case under consideration, Napoleon's enemy, the Austrians, had the initiative, and just as the Commander-in-Chief of the South State has to protect the territory of the Buffer State from invasion, so too Napoleon was bound by treaty to protect the country of his allies, namely Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Italy.

The position of Napoleon's troops in January, 1809, was as follows :

Held fast in Spain	300,000
A single concentrated unit under Davout in Germany	60,000

From Stettin to Cherbourg and l'île d'Aix, from Hamburg to Naples there were only scattered detachments.

Germany was in a ferment. Austria was preparing for war.

On January 14 Napoleon dictates at Valladolid (in Spain) (No. 14,707) some notes to Eugène on the defence of Italy (see p. 184). At the same time he sends instructions to his Ambassadors in Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Saxony, and to the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine, telling them to get their troops ready to march. He also instructs the Bavarians to arrange a line of defence on the Inn and Salza rivers, with entrenchments at Passau and Burghausen. His note to Eugène directs the latter to defend Venice and Northern Italy with 45,000 men by a "war of positions."

Here we see Napoleon dividing the whole Theatre of War into a "Primary" and "Secondary Theatre": this is his first step towards economising troops in one direction with a view to obtaining a mass for the "decisive battle" elsewhere. In the present case the valley of the Danube is made the primary theatre.

His instructions to Bavaria further show his forethought regarding the "principal theatre." A covering force is to be

organised to give him time to concentrate his masses at the required point. Napoleon is always careful never to attempt to fight a decisive battle until he has first concentrated every man possible.

Having made these preliminary arrangements more than three months before the decisive battle is fought, Napoleon proceeds to Paris with all speed to supervise the organising and equipping of his Army. And, being obliged for diplomatic as well as for military reasons to await the enemy's aggression, he arranges a "zone of manœuvre" in the primary theatre with the object of enabling him to take the offensive at the first possible moment.

He makes use of two rivers (the Danube and the Lech) as defensive barriers against the enemy, but not against his own forces, by forming bridge-heads at Ratisbon and Ingolstadt on the Danube, and at Rain, Augsburg, and Landsberg on the Lech.

The following other measures are taken—


- (a) Three fortified supply depôts are organised, viz. at Donauworth, Augsburg and Ingolstadt. (For the amount of supplies, etc., in each, see the sketch.)
- (b) Passau is formed into a place of arms "for offensive purposes," and is organised to hold out for three or four months against the enemy.
- (c) Supply depôts in rear at Ulm and Strasburg.

3. *Napoleon's use of entrenched depôts.*

Napoleon's use of entrenched depôts should be particularly noticed. Railways have to a great extent replaced them in modern war in Europe, for which reason Continental strategists seldom refer to their advantages. But should it be necessary to wage war in a country in which there are no railways, the employment of large masses will be impossible without them. Napoleon's letter, dated September 3, 1806, to General Dejean, deals with this question :

Last century it was questioned whether fortifications were any good. Some crowned heads thought them useless, and consequently dismantled their fortified

SKETCH 14.



Order date purposes." A work made for 400 men
 700,000 at for three or four months (Letter No.
 1,000,000 dated Valladolid, 14th January) 500,000
 2,000,000 0 rations of biscuit; several thousand
 3,700,000 of flour. A million cartridges near
 So that if enemy takes Passau, these
 Probably will be safe. (No.14,827, dated 1st March)
 10 days for
 10 "
 Owens for

places. As for me, I would reverse the question and ask whether it is possible to carry on war on a large scale without entrenched dépôts ; and I declare that it is not possible. Without fortified supply dépôts, no good plan of campaign can be arranged, and without "places" which I call "de campagne," that is to say which are capable of resisting Hussars and partisans, offensive war is impossible. (Compare pages 187-190.)

Again, "many such dépôts, of which only the half may come in useful, will have to be organised for an army ; but they are necessary to enable us to contend with possible circumstances" (letter dated 8th December, 1806, to the Intendant General Petiet).

Another great advantage derived from these "entrenched dépôts," and from Napoleon's plan of having a fortified post every 5th or 6th march on his communications, was the economy effected in the troops for convoy work. In the case of the campaign under consideration the writer of "*La Guerre des Masses*," page 170, estimates that Napoleon's arrangements of entrenched dépôts as compared with the Archduke Charles's system of convoys and escorts, made a difference of 160,000 men in favour of Napoleon in the decisive battle. But with reference to these entrenched dépôts it should be noted that Napoleon never deals in an abstract manner with the problem of strengthening a place. He always considers the rôle which he expects it to play, and the maximum length of resistance required of it, and then organises it accordingly.

His constant pre-occupation, as must be that of every commander in the field, was how to reduce the number of troops employed on matters of secondary importance, in order to increase the numbers available for the decisive battle. Many military professors pay insufficient attention to details of this nature, which are really the groundwork of success in war.

The "manœuvring zone" thus organised by Napoleon possessed the following advantages :—

- (a) It covered his lines of supply and retreat.
- (b) It was as close as possible to the enemy.

- (c) It facilitated certain strategical movements with the object of causing the enemy to divide, so that Napoleon was able, while remaining concentrated, to defeat the enemy's armies in succession ; and
- (d) It enabled Napoleon to manœuvre in the primary theatre, without any difficulties as regards supply, concentrated masses totalling over 200,000 men.

The following table showing the grouping of Napoleon's forces on the 18th April, three days before Eckmühl, gives some idea both of the large numbers which he succeeded in bringing together for the "decisive battle," and also of the large area in which he was simultaneously conducting operations at this period :

I. In the primary theatre, in the "zone of manœuvre," 170,000 and 245 guns called the "Army of Germany."

The following reserves not yet arrived—

Guard . . .	22,000 men, joined at Vienna.
In Hanover . . .	14,000 men joined 20th April at Donauworth.
In Saxony . . .	18,000 men joined after Ratisbon (Bernadotte).
In Poland . . .	18,000 men threaten Galicia.
Guarding Germany	20,000 men Westphalians and Dutch under Jerome.

In Holland watching

English landing. 20,000 men under King of Holland.

112,000

- II. In Italy (secondary theatre), 45,000 under Prince Eugène.
- III. In Dalmatia „ „ 12,000 under Marmont.
- IV. In Spain, 300,000 French, Italians, and Germans.
- V. In France, camps of National Guards and Conscripts for coast defence. A total of about 650,000 men under arms.

4. *Measures taken with the object of causing the enemy to detach, and so to reduce his strength at the decisive point.*

In order to retain forces of the enemy in the secondary theatre far from the decisive point, and also to cause the employment of considerable forces on secondary objectives in the principal theatre, Napoleon made use of diplomacy as long as possible. Sometimes he caused the enemy to fear that he would violate the frontiers of a neutral state, or, on the other hand, he would profess profound respect for the neutral country so as to induce the enemy to uncover his frontier in that direction. Thus, for instance, in 1806 Bernadotte reached the Danube without difficulty by violating Anspach.

Another method adopted was to spread rumours regarding the assembly of troops eccentrically—*e.g.* in 1800 of an army of Reserve at Dijon, and again in 1806 of the Corps of Observation at Wesel. The newspapers said of the latter that 80,000 were there; at the outside the numbers were actually under 40,000.

The press is the great agent in this kind of work and ought to be properly organised in peace with a view to assisting the Empire when wanted.

Now to return to the "Study."

The following lessons may be deduced from a study of the 1809 Campaign to serve as guides in the situation under consideration:

(1) Divide the whole theatre into a "primary" and a "secondary theatre," and organise a containing force to hold the latter. (See Sketches 13 and 15.)

Thus the Hyderabad District becomes the secondary theatre, whilst the primary theatre will consist of the zone of country from the Narbudda to Aurangabad.

As a containing force in the Hyderabad District, some 20,000 troops supporting 30,000 of the best of the semi-regular troops of the Nizam should suffice to carry on a "war of positions" between the Godavery and Hyderabad. This arrangement will set free 80,000 Southern troops for use in the primary theatre.

(2) Provide supplies for 100,000 men during the time required for the approach to, and the concentration of the various columns in, the primary theatre, and for the probable period of fighting.

(3) Organise a manœuvring zone in the primary theatre :

(a) If time admits, organise the Tapti and Poorna* rivers, with the neighbouring mountain ridges, as barriers against the enemy, and provide passages for our own use.

(b) Provide an entrenched dépôt with double bridge-heads capable of holding out for four months, and containing 500,000 rations at the junction of the Poorna river with the Tapti (near Edalabad) (*cf.* Passau in 1809).

(c) Organise a fortified supply dépôt at Aurangabad with twenty days' supplies for 100,000 men, and prepare two double bridge-heads on the Pain Gunga river, capable of resisting capture by *coup de main*, at Kunnairgaon and at Deotannah. Five days' supplies for 80,000 men to be collected in each.

(d) Improve the main roads, and provide entrenching tools.

(4) Arrange with the Buffer State to organise a covering force near Edalabad on the Poorna river in order to give time for the Southern Allied Army to concentrate. Guides and interpreters must also be provided.

(5) To cause the enemy to detach a Corps of Observation on south-west of Bhopal, spread rumours of intention to pass through the neutral zone.

(6) Delay concentration as long as possible in order to economise supplies.

(7) Reconnoitre widely ; and as soon as the direction of the enemy's march is pronounced, concentrate in a single mass and march as rapidly as possible against the centre of gravity of the enemy's forces with the object of fighting a decisive battle.

* This river must be distinguished from the Purna river to the south, which will be mentioned later.

“Mon plan de campagne, c'est une bataille ; et toute ma politique, c'est le succès.”

The question arises, how best to employ the allied forces of the Nizam ?

His troops may be assumed to be divided into two classes :

- (A) Regular, or rather semi-regular, that is to say, the forces of the State, more or less organised, equipped, and drilled. In the present case these may be supposed to consist of Cavalry, Artillery, and Infantry, with armament more or less up-to-date and with an organisation based on, and to a certain extent assimilating with, our own. They would wear uniform and be fairly well disciplined, but be ignorant of all military training other than, possibly, elementary drill on a barrack square. It is doubtful whether their departmental organisation, *i.e.* transport, medical, etc., would stand the strain of mobilisation.
- (B) Irregular tribal levies, both mounted and foot, armed with inferior weapons, with little or no discipline, and organised on a feudal system under which each chieftain would be bound to provide a fixed number for the defence of the kingdom. In addition to these there would be a number of petty chiefs, each with a small following, poorly armed, professing allegiance to the ruling power, but practically independent, and therefore a somewhat doubtful asset. This class would be entirely without organisation, and as they would not wear uniform, they would be liable to be treated as spies if captured armed.

The first step to be taken would be to arrange with the Buffer State that certain political and military officers of the Southern State should be placed on the staffs of the Generals in Command of the Regulars (class A), to whom they would act as advisers. Orders should also be issued by the Buffer State placing all troops under the command of a *commandant*

de place, or some other such person, who would detail such troops as the General Officer Commanding the British Cavalry Division had need of, whilst to assist the latter a strong staff of civil and military officers in the employ of the Buffer State should be detailed. This staff would from time to time, and place to place, issue such proclamations in the name of the Buffer State as might be necessary, and would also assist in enforcing the collection of supplies, and in organising a local intelligence system to assist the Southern Headquarter Intelligence Staff.

Class A (the Regulars) could be usefully employed to keep open the lines of communication as the Cavalry Division advances. (See General Map No. 3.) For instance, they could hold the Chowka-Poolmurree defile pending the arrival of our Infantry, the crossing of the several rivers, *e.g.* the Girja and Purnah, and the hills to the north-east of the road between these two rivers: follow up the Cavalry Division and assist in holding all commanding positions taken by the latter: garrison and hold certain strategic points, guarding the approach to the capital, such as Roza, Dowlatabad, Dhabaddy, etc. As a portion of their Artillery will probably be mountain, they could be usefully employed in co-operation with the Cavalry in the hills and about Adjunta.

Care should, however, be taken that the numbers sent to any one district should be in accordance with the wishes of the Southern military authorities, in order that useless mouths may not have to be maintained in a country where supplies are difficult to procure.

Another means of utilising a semi-regular local Army has been well illustrated in our own history. In the Peninsular War the Portuguese Army, after it had learnt its own inferiority to the enemy, was to a certain extent taken in hand by the British, who reorganised, equipped, and even paid it. It thereby became a valuable fighting asset, and Wellington's example should never be forgotten. Similarly, the Army of our ally Shah Shuja, in the Afghan War of 1838, was trained and led by British officers.

Class B (Irregulars).—These could be given a free hand to operate against the enemy's line of communications and generally to harass the enemy, being assured that they would receive good rewards for services rendered. Certain of them could be employed by the Intelligence Department as spies and for the collection of intelligence. When in their own districts they could, if thought trustworthy, be used to piquet heights.

Steps should also be taken to form a corps of Guides with individuals attached to Southern Cavalry squadrons, regiments and brigades ; in view of the fact that the maps are known to be unreliable (see General Idea) the services of such guides would be invaluable.

If organised and treated with tact, it should be possible gradually to create amongst them a feeling of *esprit de corps* which would certainly tend to strengthen their loyalty.

A large number of interpreters would also be required : every Southern patrol and every detachment would at least be the better for having some one able to question the inhabitants. Without interpreters questioning is often quite useless. According to the "General Idea" the population consists of a number of mixed races, from which it may be inferred that a variety of dialects will be met with. There will, however, probably be a *lingua franca* prevalent in the towns, and more or less common to all, and which would often have also to be the means of communication between the interpreter and the troops of the Southern Army for whom he is interpreting. Assume, for instance, the case of Afghanistan. The interpreter should there be able to converse with a variety of tribes, each with a peculiar dialect, such as Usbaks, Tajiks, Kafirs, Hazaras, etc. : the *lingua franca* of the type of men from whom interpreters would be drawn would probably be Persian—not Hindustani nor even Pushtu—so that to make use of such interpreters we should require in our ranks a full supply of Persian speakers.

Military history teaches us that the whole question of co-operation with an ally is fraught with difficulties and danger.

When the theatre of operation lies in the country of the ally, and when the organisation of the latter's forces is imperfect, these difficulties increase, for war can rarely benefit the inhabitants on the spot, and ill-feeling is certain to arise. Wellington's constant trouble with the Spaniards is a case in point. These difficulties increase again, in an Oriental country, where the further element of religious fanaticism creeps in.

On the whole, it is probably wiser to openly recognise the danger and to risk hurting feelings rather than to misplace confidence. The so-called "political" considerations have often spelt disaster.

Special Idea.

(See General Map No. 3, and Sketches 13 and 15.)

1. During September it becomes apparent that the North is meditating an advance from Bhopal. The Nizam is therefore addressed by the Southern authorities with a view to opposing that advance, and the following preparations are made :

- (a) An entrenchment near Aurangabad, capable of holding out for two or three months with supplies collected for twenty days for 100,000 men, some supplies being put there from Poona and other Southern magazines.
- (b) Double bridge-heads capable of resisting a *coup de main* over the Pain Gunga river at Kunnairgaon (18 miles north of Hingoli), and at Deotannah (25 miles north-east of Jafferabad) with five days' supplies for 80,000 men at each. Supplies are also collected for that number of troops along the roads from Hyderabad to Hingoli.
- (c) Bridge-heads and entrenchments, capable of holding out for three or four months, are also made at the junction of the Poorna river with the Tapti (near Edalabad) and 500,000 rations stored.

This with a view to offensive operations.

(d) Roads are also prepared between the places named above.

2. The plan of the Southern Commander-in-Chief is to leave 20,000 of his troops to support about 30,000 of the Nizam's levies in the Hyderabad District, and to concentrate the remainder with the Poona Force in the direction of Aurangabad, with a view to a decisive battle.

3. During November, Northern Forces, estimated at anything between 100,000 to 150,000, crossed the Narbudda and occupied Burhanpur. But little resistance is encountered, as the best of the Nizam's levies are in the Hyderabad District, and some 5,000 are holding the entrenched depôts.

Some of our mounted levies are on the Poorna river near Edalabad.

4. The Poona Field Force has marched with the intention of opposing the enemy from Burhanpur until the army from Secunderabad can co-operate, and at all costs to prevent the capital, Aurangabad, from being captured.

5. On Wednesday evening, December 14, the situation is as follows :

(a) Divisional Headquarters, with the leading brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division, Southern Force, reached Aurangabad this afternoon after a long march from beyond the Godavery; the remainder of the Division halts at Valooz (9 miles south of Aurangabad).

The two Southern Infantry Divisions from Poona, with a Cavalry Brigade, are to reach the Godavery to-morrow night, Thursday, 15th December.

(b) Five Cavalry Brigades with some Infantry, detached from the Southern Field Force operating in the secondary theatre near Hyderabad, were expected to reach the line Basim-Mangrul last night, Tuesday (about 100 miles east-south-east of Adjunta).

Their march is directed on the Adjunta Ghaut.

- (c) The General Commanding the 1st Cavalry Division has been sent forward with orders to assist the Nizam's troops in holding the passes through the Ghauts near Adjunta until the Infantry from Poona can relieve the Cavalry: to clear up the situation towards Burhanpur, and to open communication with the force from Hyderabad.

Reports sent from Adjunta at 4 hours to-day show that the levies have fallen back from Edalabad and are holding the passes through the Ghauts, but that they were confronted by a numerous body of the enemy's horsemen, mostly irregulars, who are harassing their advanced posts. The enemy has detached a force to mask the Tapti entrenchment, and is crossing the Poorna a few miles above Edalabad with his main columns.

Buldana reports hostile mounted troops coming southwards from Melkapur last evening.

Commencement of the Operations.

The following orders were issued by the G.O.C. the Cavalry Division.

No. 1.—Operation Orders.—1st Cavalry Division.

HEADQUARTERS, AURANGABAD:

14th December, 1904 (23 hours).

1. *Situation*.—(a) The enemy's main columns are on the Poorna river near Edalabad; his mounted troops (strength uncertain) are in close touch with our native levies who are holding the Adjunta Ghaut.

The levies at Buldana report hostile mounted troops moving southwards from Melkapur yesterday afternoon.

(b) The Poona Field Force should reach the Godavery to-morrow; a force from Secunderabad was expected to reach the line Basim-Mangrul last night.

2. *Objective*.—The task of the 1st Cavalry Division is to clear up the situation towards Burhanpur: to hold the Adjunta Ghaut in co-operation with the native levies until the Poona Force arrives: and to open communication with the field force from Hyderabad.

3. *Task of Brigades*.—(a) The General Officer Commanding, 1st Brigade, will operate so as to ascertain the composition and strength of the enemy's troops in the neighbourhood of Adjunta and Buldana, and will send forward detachments to clear up the situation towards Burhanpur, and especially to find out what forces

of the enemy have come south of the (northern) Poorna river and in what direction they are marching.

(b) *The 2nd and 3rd Brigades*, which are at Valooz to-night, will, on reaching Aurangabad, halt on the Cavalry parade ground.

After filling up supplies the march will be resumed in the following order: the head of the column will pass the Delhi Gate of Aurangabad City at 14 o'clock.

Advance Guard, 1 regiment, 2nd Brigade.

Main Body, 2nd Brigade (less 1 regiment and 2nd Line Transport).

„ 3rd Brigade (less 1 troop and 2nd Line Transport).

„ 2nd Line Transport 2nd Brigade.

„ „ „ 3rd „

Rear Guard, 1 troop, 3rd Brigade.

4. *Communications*.—Reports to be sent to the main body of the Advance Guard.

The general object of strategic exploration may be summed up as the judicious selection of two or three principal objectives. In the case under consideration the main objective is Burhanpur, with Adjunta and Buldana lying on the way to that place. A force of Cavalry which is employed on strategical reconnaissance will not have to extend as a dense and continuous screen across the whole front of an army (or armies), as has too frequently been maintained. Such dispersion, without giving it penetrative power and strength at any one point, would leave it morally and materially weak everywhere, and incapable of making any useful effort. On the contrary, the independent or strategic Cavalry must be divided into as many groups as there may be objectives chosen by the General-in-Chief, and each of these groups must be well concentrated, for it is obvious that the opposing Cavalry will be charged with a similar but opposite mission. Presuming that the enemy's Cavalry have also taken the field, then strategic exploration must culminate in a tactical collision. Thus we conclude that Cavalry in this rôle will work in two elementary forms: (a) a collection of isolated groups for scouting; and (b) a compact and concentrated mass for fighting.

To apply these principles to the present situation. Burhanpur, where the enemy's main army is believed to be, is the real objective of the Cavalry Division, for from that

place sufficient news of the enemy's forces is likely to be gained to enable the General-in-Chief to form his plan of operations. But, approaching the Adjunta Ghaut, between that objective and the Division is a hostile force of Cavalry, which may or may not have to be reckoned with. Some reconnoitring detachments should therefore be directed upon this hostile Cavalry, while others must endeavour to avoid the enemy's Cavalry, and by working well round to the flanks find out what he covers. Jalgaon and Buldana seem to be suitable places to which such contact squadrons might be despatched, and from whence they could send out "soundings"—*i.e.* patrols, to clear up the situation. In deciding the strength of a patrol, the number of days it will be absent, and the work it will have to do, must be taken into consideration. In this case it would not be advisable to send less than a squadron, as the calls on men and horses, including the transmission of intelligence, will be heavy ; it may, too, often be necessary to use force to obtain information by driving back patrols of the enemy. Orders to the patrol leader should invariably be given at a personal interview with the Brigadier or his staff officer, who should explain clearly what information is required, and should then give the commander of the reconnaissance a free hand both to carry out his mission and to transmit the information he may have acquired.

FIRST DAY.

Thursday, 15th December.

Strategical Reconnaissance by a Cavalry Brigade.

The 1st Brigade marched at 6.30 hours, sending out at 5 hours three contact squadrons, viz. one to Jalgaon, one along the Bhusawal road, and one towards Burhanpur. The 2nd and 3rd Brigades arrived at Aurangabad from Valooz at midday, the 3rd Brigade being ordered at 12.5 hours to send one troop of Imperial Service Cavalry to Loonar in order to keep communication with the detachment from Hyderabad.

Information received about 10 hours (Thursday).

1. The enemy's horsemen, marching by several tracks, were able yesterday (Wednesday) to turn the positions held by the Nizam's levies about Adjunta. The levies consequently had to fall back, and last night halted on the (southern) Purna river; a camp of the enemy's mounted troops was at Podwuth.

2. Scouts from 1st Brigade reach the Girja river about 10 hours, and find the native levies retreating in great disorder. They learn from some of the fugitives that the enemy had surprised them in the morning. The levies from the district north of the Ghauts are suspected of treachery, as many of them joined the enemy during the night.

The enemy is in close pursuit: his force consists of both regular and irregular Cavalry with guns.

Situation in afternoon (Thursday).

1. The main body of the 1st Cavalry Division reaches Chowka about 16 hours. The General Officer Commanding decides to halt in that neighbourhood for the night. The 1st Brigade halts near Poolmurree, south of the Girja river, with outposts along that river in touch with enemy.

2. Spies report large bodies of the enemy of all arms were crossing the Poorna river near Edalabad yesterday (Wednesday), and that Bodwad was occupied by a force of all arms yesterday afternoon.

No. 2.—Operation Orders.—1st Cavalry Division.**HEADQUARTERS, CHOWKA :****15th December, 1904 (16 hours).**

1. (a) The enemy's advanced Cavalry is on the Girja river in touch with our 1st Brigade, which is halting near Poolmurree to-night.
(b) Spies report that large bodies of the enemy of all arms were crossing the Poorna river near Edalabad yesterday (Wednesday), and that Bodwad was occupied by a force of all arms yesterday afternoon.
2. The 2nd and 3rd Brigades will halt for the night in the vicinity of Chowka.
3. In the event of attack, the high ground north of Chowka will be held by 2nd Brigade, 3rd Brigade being in support.
4. 2nd Brigade will provide the outposts.

5. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade will water from the streams to the north of Chowka, the 3rd Brigade and transport animals from the Chowka tank.

6. Headquarters will be at the village of Chowka.

It will be noticed that nothing is said in these orders as to what will be done the next morning.

It seldom, however, happens that orders for the morning's march can be issued until late at night. Information comes in late from patrols which have been pushed out far to the front, and it must then be collated and sifted before the Commander can make his plans and issue his orders. It is not, however, necessary to keep troops or subordinate staffs awake until these orders can be issued. It will, as a rule, suffice to issue an order that units will be ready to march at a certain hour on the following morning—for instance, to-day, brigades are merely warned to be ready to march at 6 hours to-morrow.

It is sound to accustom all ranks to prepare each night to march next morning, even if no such warning orders are issued. And the headquarter staff should sleep in the afternoons, when possible, so as to be ready to work at night.

SECOND DAY.

Friday, 16th December.

The Tactical Collision with the Enemy's Cavalry.

Situation at daybreak, 16th instant.

Just before dawn the General Officer Commanding, 1st Brigade, sends one regiment across to the north (left) bank of the Girja river and captures the high ground about Kinnola. Patrols report during the night that a large force of hostile mounted troops bivouacked last night at Boygaon and Allund.

In view of the report of the presence of a large force of hostile mounted troops within striking distance—less than 10 miles from Poolmurree—the Divisional Commander

decides to concentrate at once by moving forward to join the 1st Brigade. The following orders are accordingly issued :

No. 3.—**Operation Orders.**—*1st Cavalry Division.*

HEADQUARTERS, POOLMURREE :

16th December, 1904 (5 hours).

1. (a) Our patrols have discovered during the night that enemy's bivouacs of mounted troops are near Allund and Boygaon.
(b) Spies report large bodies of the enemy of all arms were crossing the Poorna river near Edalabad on Wednesday, and that Bodwad was occupied by a force of all arms on the afternoon of that day.
2. The 2nd and 3rd Brigades will march in the following order :
The head will pass over the high ground north of Chowka at 6.45.
Advance Guard, one squadron 3rd Brigade.
3rd Brigade, less one squadron.
The outpost line will close in on the column after it has passed through it.
3. The 2nd Line Transport of 2nd and 3rd Brigades will halt, in conjunction with that of 1st Brigade, at Poolmurree and await orders.
4. The General Officer Commanding, 3rd Brigade, will detail his Imperial Service Cavalry (less one troop) and two guns to form an escort to the transport.
5. Reports to Patree.

The first point to be considered is the advance of the Division when within striking distance of the hostile Cavalry.

According to reports, the enemy is from 8 to 10 miles distant. The advance, therefore, would be in a concentrated formation across country in readiness to deploy and attack. A mass formation, with intervals to allow of air, would be suitable, the formation varying in width to suit the country and its passages.

It will be noticed that only one squadron is detailed as an advance guard. Apart from the fact that the 1st Brigade is on ahead, a reason for this is, that being in open country and close to the enemy, the Division is moving in mass ready for action. A body of Cavalry, on the other hand, when in column of route (as, for instance, yesterday) has need of an advance guard of some strength to give it time to deploy for action. Now, however, we are already, practically speaking, "in action," so we merely protect our front and flanks by means of combat patrols.

Since the march orders were issued the situation has somewhat changed, by the fact that the 1st Brigade, finding that the enemy in front of it was in weak strength (perhaps only a contact squadron), was able to send a detachment across the river and so to establish a sort of *tête du pont*, and advance guard to the Division. Subordinate leaders must always be encouraged to act on their own initiative and without orders in cases of this sort.

Occasions will arise when a strong advance guard can be employed with advantage. It will then have a manœuvring rôle, and will operate so as to deceive the enemy, cause him to make a mistake and draw him in one direction while the mass of our Cavalry attacks unexpectedly from another. *But* an advance guard of this nature must be fairly close to the rest of the Division to enable it to profit by the enemy's mistake. This is, more or less, the situation to-day, when the news arrives that the 1st Brigade has established itself north of the Girja river.

If a road happens to be running in the direction taken by the Division, place the Artillery on it. If there be no road, then mass the guns on a flank, level with the leading brigade.

The Division loses its liberty of evolution the moment it is deployed, hence the necessity to delay deployment as late as possible. When in brigade mass, instead of deploying into squadron column to the front, brigades can deploy by taking ground to a flank in column of troops or open column of squadrons and then wheeling to a flank, thus economising space and gaining time for deployment. By advancing obliquely at the end of an approach march, space is also economised and we are enabled to deploy later.

The advance to-day shows that the manœuvring of Cavalry does not consist solely of correct and rapid movements: the situation will often require brigades and divisions to wind cautiously through difficult ground, and climb up steep places, such as the Girja river banks to-day, and then to deploy for attack with cohesion and perfect order in the ranks. Only

the very simplest formations are required, but the greatest accuracy and discipline in the ranks are essential to success. The process of making any Cavalry efficient in preserving a continuance and uniformity in its pace is tedious: but there can be no prospect of making the best fighting use of the Division unless these two requisites are fully satisfied.

The enemy, about 20 to 24 squadrons strong, with guns, attacked the Division near Noygaon after it had crossed the Girja river, and were defeated. The defeated enemy, pursued by the 3rd Brigade, fled to the hills north of Shellode, where the pursuit was checked by fire from the hills north of Shellode village.

The 2nd Brigade rallied and then followed, and on reaching Boygaon was ordered to move forward toward B. Mooda via Wanjola. The 1st Brigade and three batteries Royal Horse Artillery followed to Chintshaida.

No. 4.—Operation Orders.—1st Cavalry Division.

HEADQUARTERS, CHINTSHAIDA:

16th December, 1904 (16 hours).

1. The enemy have been pursued by the 3rd Brigade past the Purna river. The Brigade was stopped by the enemy, who are in position on the ridge north of Shellode, and it is now in touch with the enemy's outposts.

The 2nd Brigade has been ordered to move towards Wanjola, sending the 3rd Brigade battery to rejoin its Brigade.

2. The 1st Brigade will halt at Chintshaida.

3. The 2nd Line Transport has been ordered to move forward to Chintshaida and should arrive by 12 midnight.

4. Reports to Chintshaida.

Note.—The 1st Brigade is in reserve after being on outpost duty the night before. The guns of the 3rd and 2nd Brigades are unable to remain up with the pursuers, so they join the nearest formed body and follow as best they can—in this case the 1st Brigade.

THIRD DAY.

Saturday, 17th December.

Cavalry Division operating in Hills.

Yesterday the Division effectually performed one of its duties, by putting an end to the attempts of the enemy to discover what was going on in the direction of Aurangabad.

This morning's reconnaissances tended to show that the troops which checked the pursuit yesterday evening were the Cavalry attached to the enemy's advance guard, and that they numbered probably a brigade of mounted troops, holding a front from on the ridge south of Mungrool to Dygaon.

2. The 3rd Brigade contained them north of Shellode, at the same time working round their left flank. The 2nd Brigade threatened the enemy's right flank by a turning movement. The 1st Brigade supported the attack of the 3rd.

3. The enemy retired from all his positions to the hills northward of Oondengaon.

4. The Division bivouacked for the evening in the following positions :—

1st Brigade, Sarola.

2nd Brigade, Mandaa.

3rd Brigade and Divisional Headquarters, Podwuth.

No. 5.—Operation Orders.—*1st Cavalry Division.*

HEADQUARTERS, PODWUTH :

17th December, 1904 (18 hours).

1. Helio from the contact squadrons indicates that the enemy is advancing in force both towards Adjunta and Buldana.

2. The Division will occupy the ridges south of Oondengaon, the right on the Juah river and the left on the ridge south-west of Kollode, with the object of preventing the enemy from moving southwards.

3. The 2nd Brigade will hold from and including the Adjunta road to the west.

The 1st Brigade the east section.

The 3rd Brigade in reserve near Podwuth.

4. Special patrols, strength 1 officer, 18 men (including signallers), 24 horses, will be detailed by 3rd and 1st Brigades and be ready to march at 20 hours. The officers detailed to command them will report to the Assistant Adjutant-General at 19 hours.

5. All empty supply waggons will leave Podwuth at 9 hours to-morrow, with an escort of one squadron Imperial Service Troops detailed from 3rd Brigade to fill up at Aurangabad.

6. Headquarters at Podwuth.

According to our reports we have in front of us on the morning of the 18th instant, only the advance-guard Cavalry of the enemy, together with the remains of his independent

Cavalry defeated on the Girja on the 16th. The object of this advance guard, consisting, as it does, of mounted troops alone, is, doubtless, to gain time for the army in rear. By stopping to attack them in their position between Mungrool and Dygaon we should have only been playing their game. We should preferably manœuvre round their flanks, and so compel them to retire. Our object is to find out where the enemy's main forces are ; and as our object has been placed within our grasp by the fact that we have defeated the enemy's strategical or independent Cavalry, we should only be wasting time and lives by entering into a fire action with this small party of Cavalry.

The case might, however, occur of a brigade having to attack Cavalry holding a similar position, so some remarks on this matter.

In making such attacks it must be remembered that whilst a purely frontal attack can rarely expect to succeed, a flank attack, unless combined with a containing, or, in other words, a frontal, attack, can hardly ever be successful. The enemy, especially if, as in the present case, he happens to be mounted, will merely withdraw his troops from the portions of his position which are not threatened, and so be enabled, assisted by his mobility, to meet the flank attack. Flank movements, therefore, should not take place within full view of the enemy, but should be commenced at some distance back, so that, when developed, they may come in the nature of a surprise ; whilst the containing attack must be in sufficient force to admit of its being pushed home should the enemy give an opportunity by unduly attenuating his line to meet the flank attack.

As regards higher training for dismounted action the main points seem to be :

- (a) The necessity for all Cavalry leaders to cultivate an *eye for country* with respect to its possibilities for fire effect and cover.
- (b) Constant practice by squadrons and higher units in moving rapidly, as concealed as possible, to positions

offering tactical advantages. How to advance over a fire-swept zone, the formation to employ, the use to make of the ground, etc., need thought and practice. All preparations for shooting must be made under cover, so that a hot fire can be opened *by surprise*. Squadron commanders, for instance, must keep their squadrons hidden behind the fire position about to be occupied until they have indicated the objective and approximate range to their troop leaders.

- (c) In normal conditions the number of rifles available will not be great, but inferiority in this respect should be compensated for by *judicious leading* and *mobility*. To gain the full advantage of mobility is for mounted troops a consideration of equal importance to fire effect. Whereas the ruling maxim for the employment of fire by Infantry may be said to be that fire should only be opened when it is considered likely to be effective, in the case of Cavalry the importance of securing the highest results by fire has to be considered in connection with the retention of the power to break off the action whenever it may be advisable to do so. Moreover, a prolonged fire combat will be the exception for Cavalry. Its action must be swift and decisive, and the object will usually best be attained by means of accurate and highly concentrated rapid fire.
- (d) In order to enable a commander to break off the action at any moment and reopen it in a more favourable situation, a *rigid fire control* is essential. With this object *inter-communication* must be kept up between the several parts of the force—by helio, flag, orderlies, etc. To this end also, and with a view to regulating the expenditure of ammunition, the delivery of *sudden bursts of fire* on the tactically most important target will be found most effective. In the intervals between these bursts, when not

actually advancing, it is often injudicious to maintain a "pit-pat" fire. Better to lie still when, even if incompletely concealed, your presence will perhaps be forgotten: or pretend to mount, and then steal back again. Special patrols should always be out to protect the flanks.

- (e) Necessity for mutual co-operation between adjacent units (*i.e.* troops in a squadron, squadrons in a regiment, regiments in a brigade, brigades in a division) both in an advance and a retirement, and also during an engagement.
- (f) Led horses should be kept as close as possible, but should not follow the movements of dismounted men unless definitely ordered to do so by the commander—lances must be left on the led horses.

The strength of the *Mounted Reserve* must depend on whether there is a hostile Cavalry force within striking distance, and the likelihood of its interfering mounted during the fire-fight.

During December 18, 19, and 20, the Cavalry Division remained on the ridges south of Oondongaon, endeavouring by wide and extensive patrolling to ascertain the positions of the enemy, and thus carry out another of its duties.

Meantime, the main body of the Southern Army has been moving up from the direction of Hyderabad.

The situation on Tuesday evening, December 20, is as follows :

1. Northern Force (the enemy)—

- (a) Reconnaissances of the Southern Cavalry show that the left wing of the Northern Army (estimated at about 30,000) is about Buldana and Deulghat.
- (b) The Northern right wing, estimated at about the same strength, is on the hills about Adjunta, from Wussai to near Wolsingi.

2. Southern Force—

- (a) The Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Force, finding that his enemy is moving by the two roads, viz. Bodwad to Adjunta, and Malkapur to Buldana, concentrates the main portion of his Army (50,000) on the Kaylna river from Podwuth to Jafferabad, with the object of falling upon the enemy's right wing near Adjunta.
- (b) A force of 15,000 with three Cavalry Brigades is detached to operate on the upper Pain Gunga river, and, pivoting on the entrenched dépôt at Deotannah, to contain the enemy's left wing (Sketch 15).
- (c) Advance and flank guards of the Southern Main Army are in touch with the enemy on the line Oondengaon-Dhar. The strength of this detachment is two Infantry Divisions (20,000) and two Cavalry Brigades.
- (d) The 1st Cavalry Division is on the left flank of the Army, with its headquarters near Wuddallee.

SEVENTH DAY.

Wednesday, 21st December.

March to the Battle-field. Employment of the Army Cavalry (Sketch 16).

On Wednesday morning, the 21st, the Southern Commander sends forward three columns (each of a division of 15,000) upon Dhaora, Shivani, and Oondengaon to engage the enemy. The remainder (40,000) close up towards Podwuth with the object of enveloping and vigorously assaulting the enemy's right.

The Southern Army is now based on Aurangabad.

No. 100.—Operation Orders.—Southern Force.

HEADQUARTERS, PODWUTH :

21st December, 1904 (3 hours).

1. (a) Reconnaissances show that the enemy's right column is holding the following positions on our front :

His left is near Wolsingi (three miles south-east of Dhaora) ; the hill between Wolsingi and Badoth is held in considerable strength. The plateau south-west of Shivani appears to be entrenched : thence the position runs along the hills north of the villages of Dotra, Ch. Golagaon and Oondengaon to Jalkee, where the right seems to rest.

- (b) The enemy is said to have large reserves near Adjunta.
- 2. The General Officer Commanding intends to engage the enemy along his front to-day, and to mass troops near Podwuth with a view to pressing the attack against the enemy's right to-morrow.
- 3. (a) The General Officer Commanding 1st Infantry Division will engage the enemy about Wolsingi and Badoth, and will entrench the hills about Julgaon and Peeplegaon to protect our right flank.
- (b) The General Officer Commanding 2nd Infantry Division will try to capture the plateau between Shivani and Dotra.
The 5th Infantry Division will move to a position of readiness near Wakadee in rear of the 2nd Division.
- (c) The General Officer Commanding 3rd Infantry Division will engage the enemy on the ridges north of Oondengaon, but will not press the attack home.
The 4th Infantry Division will remain near Podwuth in readiness to support the 3rd Division.
- (d) The 6th Infantry Division will march on Podwuth at 6 a.m.
- 4. General Officers Commanding Divisions will march so as to commence the action about 8 hours.
- 5. The General Officer Commanding 1st Cavalry Division will cover the left flank of the 3rd Division, and will especially reconnoitre the country towards Uldah and Jalkee, with the object of discovering where the enemy's right flank rests.
- 6. Reports to be sent to Podwuth.

The march of any main Army to the battle-field deserves careful consideration. Von Caemmerer's remarks on the subject are worthy of close attention.

"The Army of Frederic the Great performed its march to the battle-field, often for miles, in one compact body, the various parts of which had always to execute simultaneously the same movements, and to start, halt, wheel, deploy, or attack by the immediate word of command of the Supreme Commander, repeated by the lower ranks and transmitted by them to the lowest. Napoleon freed himself from such formalism ; and the proper utilisation of the roads of a country had become one of the most important parts of the science of a General Staff. Every one then realised that this procedure not only ensures the greatest celerity when march-

ing for some considerable time, but also spares the troops most, in spite of unavoidably circuitous routes. When, however, a battle was imminent, when it became a question of throwing overwhelming masses on the one point where victory was to be ensured, then the habit of former times was remembered, and the troops were brought forward to the battle-field not only on roads, but also on rapidly improvised tracks. On the roads, where Artillery and wagons had precedence, the columns marched on as broad a front as possible, and off the roads quarter-column of sections was the formation chiefly adopted for marching. Considerable friction and difficulties must have frequently arisen, when water-courses, valleys, and other obstacles were met with, and doubtless many movements must have completely failed owing to these reasons. The troops, too, must have suffered enormous fatigue when this mode was adopted ; and in spite of the well-recognised marching power of the French Infantry, must consequently also have suffered loss. But when, while studying military history of Napoleon's time, we admire the astonishing rapidity with which the Emperor hurled large masses of troops from one point to the other, we find the key to such phenomena in the procedure above described. And when Jomini in his last work, while discussing retreats, calculates only two hours for a corps of 30,000 to clear one road before another corps can follow it from the same camp, moving to the same object, he is not mistaken, as perhaps some tactical scholars in our time may think ; for Jomini has in his mind arrangements for marching above described. He also quite distinctly says that it would be sufficient to calculate the hours of starting for different corps according to the time it will take the Artillery to move off. Until we have grasped these peculiar technics of Napoleonic Army movements when in the neighbourhood of the enemy, we shall never understand his operation orders.

“But there was also a limit, after all, to these severe exactions and hardly conceivable performances. In the autumn campaign of 1813 operations on the inner line no

longer succeeded in preventing united action of several hostile Armies, and the principle of delivering alternate blows in different directions completely broke down. The cause was not disparity in numbers, nor was it the influence of unusual and unaccountable accidents.

“The reason why the operations on the inner line failed in the autumn campaign of 1813 will be found in *the growth of the Army, and in the unwieldiness of the masses* which were meant to be hurled about with the greatest rapidity, and which, in spite of all the artifices of Imperial march technics, could not be got to where they were wanted, or were exhausted by the terrible exertions exacted from them.

“As the roads developed and improved, the march technics which Napoleon employed during decisive operations gradually disappeared. When there are useful and ample roads, nobody nowadays would think of ordering the bulk of the army (Infantry and Cavalry) off the roads, and telling them to march for miles across country in quarter-column of sections. We now continue to march on the roads in column of route until close to the battle-field. In this way the individual divisions, with their three arms properly combined and distributed, always remain under the immediate command of their leaders, and one of those reasons ceases to exist which, with Napoleon's mode of procedure, made a special deployment for battle absolutely necessary. While Jomini calculated time and space for large bodies of troops (of course, only when concentrated for decisive battle) exclusively by the time it took the Artillery to get clear of the camp, and thus allowed for the deployment of an Army Corps of 30,000 men only two hours, we are now obliged to base our estimates for marching and deploying on quite different conclusions. During the staff rides of the Prussian General Staff, the staff duties in the field (which Jomini calls Logistics) are constantly tested, and their principles revised and kept up to date. The length of columns and the time for deployment of large units, which are now much more richly provided with Artillery, are carefully determined ; and the result of all those calculations is that

the Army Corps of roughly 30,000 men is found to be the natural strategic unit, because it is that body of troops which in one column of route would occupy the normal length of a day's march. *Thirty thousand men occupy about fourteen miles and fourteen miles is about the usual day's performance* of one Army Corps, for which the average endurance of the heavily packed pedestrian forms the standard. Such an Army Corps, therefore, can start every morning from a position of assembly, and can be again concentrated in the afternoon in a similar position fourteen miles ahead ; it can at the same time also be kept in touch with its baggage, its columns and trains, which bring up ammunition and supplies, and which at the present day are composed of at least four to five times more vehicles than at the beginning of the last century, owing to the increased demand for ammunition and the greater weight of the Artillery projectiles, as well as owing to the more ample provision for food and for the care of sick and wounded.

"If greater exertions are urgently needed, we could start the corps earlier, so as to be assembled at the required point at noon. The number of trains and columns which would otherwise immediately follow could be limited to what is absolutely necessary ; and, instead of the bulk of the impedimenta of this First Corps, a Second Army Corps could then use the same road in the afternoon. This is the exception in our days, and, compared with the normal movement of an Army, is on a par with an example in Jomini's Logistics which closely investigate into a movement of $2 \times 60,000$ or 120,000 men in one day and on one road, or rather, *alongside one road*."—(Von Caemmerer.)

On the same subject von Moltke writes as follows :—

"Very large concentrations of troops are in themselves a calamity. The army which is concentrated at one point is difficult to supply and can never be billeted ; it cannot march, it cannot operate, it cannot exist for any length of time : it can only fight.

"To keep all the forces concentrated without a distinct

object or otherwise than for a decisive battle is, therefore, a mistake. For that decisive battle we can certainly never be too strong, and therefore it is absolutely necessary to summon even the last battalion to the battle-field. But any one who wishes to close with his enemy must not intend to advance in one body on one or few roads.

"To remain separated as long as possible while operating, and to be concentrated in good time for the decisive battle, that is the task of the leader of large masses of troops.

"No calculations of time and space will guarantee success where accidents, errors, and deceptions form part of their factors. Uncertainty and danger of failure accompany every step towards the aim, and it will only be attained if the fates are not altogether unkind ; but in war everything is uncertain, nothing without danger, and we will scarcely attain great results in any other way.

"If we realise that a Prussian Army Corps, with all its trains formed into *one* column, occupies a depth of about 18 miles, that this normal length very quickly increases when on the march, and easily grows to double that length on bad roads in bad weather, or owing to partial checks, that the head of the column will already have arrived in the new bivouac before the rear has quitted the old one, we find that at the most only one Army Corps can be moved on one road in one day.

"Of course we would leave behind all the trains that can be spared when an action is imminent, yet the actual fighting portion of the corps formed in one column still occupies a depth of twelve miles, the extent of an ordinary day's march, and the head of the column could not be supported by its tail before some hours have passed.

"It is therefore an error to think that we are concentrated if everybody is, or many are, marching on one road. We lose more in depth than we gain in breadth ; for two divisions marching abreast of each other at an interval of four and a half to seven miles will more easily and better support each other than if they followed behind each other. It is thus

self-evident how important it is for large bodies of troops to march if possible in more than one column. The troops are thereby spared much fatigue, and their housing and supplying are considerably facilitated.

"This mode of procedure naturally finds its limit in the number of available roads and in the necessity of mutual support. Not everywhere will there be found many roads, converging approximately towards the same object; nor must the columns be completely prevented by obstacles from co-operating, if co-operation is likely to become necessary.

"Of course the number of parallel roads decreases in the same ratio as the space from which the start is to be made contracts. An Army concentrated at one point can no longer be moved otherwise than across country; in order to be able to march it must again separate either in breadth or depth, which is equally dangerous in face of the enemy. If, therefore, we wish to operate, we must continue to march in separate bodies.

"It will be gathered from what has been stated that little success can be expected from a mere frontal attack, but very likely a great deal of loss. We must, therefore, turn towards the flanks of the enemy's position.

"If this is to be done with undivided force, a small change in the direction of march would already suffice for small bodies; because a Division, for instance, can, even under favourable conditions of ground, scarcely occupy more than a mile of front. Armies of more than 100,000 men, on the other hand, occupy more than *four and a half miles* of space. To turn their front would mean a day's march; this would remove the decision by arms to the next day, give the adversary time to evade it, and as a rule endanger our own communications by our intention of threatening those of the enemy.

"Another means consists in containing the enemy in front with part of our forces and enveloping his flank with another portion. It is then, however, necessary that we remain

strong enough in front so as not to be overpowered before the flank attack becomes effective. We must also be active enough in front in order to prevent the enemy from throwing himself with superior forces upon our flank attack. At any rate, we are obliged to divide our forces in these cases.

"The normal effect of a flank attack by its fire alone will be greater upon small bodies than upon Armies. These latter, however, cannot so easily escape the consequences of a successful flank attack on account of the greater difficulty of their movements.

"If the Army has approached the enemy in one body before the battle, every new separation with the object of enveloping or turning the enemy will necessitate a flank march within his striking distance.

"If we do not wish to enter upon such tactics, which will always remain risky, there is nothing else left but to reinforce that wing which is to overpower the opposite hostile one, and this would after all be again only a frontal attack. It may succeed, however, if part of the reserves of the centre and of the other wing could be spared for that purpose.

"Incomparably more favourable will things shape themselves if on the day of battle all the forces can be concentrated from different points towards the field of battle itself; in other words, if the operations have been conducted in such a manner that a final short march from different points leads all available forces simultaneously upon the front and flanks of the adversary. In that case strategy has done the best it can ever hope to attain, and great results must be the consequence."—(Von Moltke's "Tactical and Strategical Essays," pp. 172, 173.)

And now, on the very eve of the "decisive battle," it may be well to consider somewhat fully the action of the Cavalry not only as an arm, but as one of the "three arms," as to a certain extent exemplified in this brief campaign.

Cavalry must not be considered merely as an independent force searching for and engaging only the enemy's Cavalry.

Its value has always depended on the use made of it and on the skill of the leader in co-operation with the other arms. Acting in close co-operation with Infantry, it is an inseparable part of a fighting machine composed of the three arms.

The two main principles governing the employment of Cavalry in modern warfare are to give the Commander of the Army (*a*) strategical, (*b*) tactical liberty of action.

Before the battle, the preliminary success of the Cavalry is of the highest importance, because its success or failure must greatly influence the nature of the dispositions of both parties; one will operate more on the offensive, while the other will be thrown on the defensive. On the one hand, with a victorious Cavalry, we will have all the information required, and full liberty of manœuvre and choice of ground; on the other hand, with a beaten Cavalry thrust back on its own Infantry, the General Officer Commanding is more or less in the dark, uncertain and hesitating in his movements; advancing, if he does so at all, under cover of an Infantry advance guard, with the hostile Cavalry harassing his flanks and communications. The operations of the first few days in this Study have shown us that, to admit of strategical manœuvre, early information is absolutely essential, *e.g.* the information gained by our Independent Cavalry influenced the direction of march of the columns from Hyderabad.

What should be the first objective once our Cavalry has defeated the hostile Cavalry, when it will have become master of the theatre of war? As was emphasised in the First Study (Jhelum), to discover the front covered by the enemy and the position of the flanks. Its next task will be, not exactly to attack the hostile columns, but to harass and delay their march, to lay traps and ambushes. For these duties comparatively small bodies acting with Horse Artillery will suffice. The enemy will be forced to halt, to make premature deployments, and as a result to delay his advance. Thus, too, his *moral* will be affected and his physical strength impaired before the main action has really commenced.

Success in battle depends mainly on *moral*, and a

determination to conquer. "Without the determination to win, Marengo would have been a defeat ; with the determination to win, Mars la Tour would have been a victory" (Colonel Millet). Moral force is the result of training, and of daily efforts having as their objective the inculcation of the sense of duty, of the value of discipline, and of the spirit of sacrifice. Mutual confidence depends on *moral*. The successes of Napoleon, Alexander, Hannibal, and Cæsar were based on these facts.

As regards reconnaissance of an enemy who has determined to take up a defensive position, there is no doubt great difficulty owing to the introduction of smokeless powder and the deceptive properties of the repeating rifle. But it must always be recollected that the enemy, in order to reach a selected position, must march to it ; and actual movements are difficult to conceal. During their marches the Cavalry ought to be able to ascertain all necessary information as regards the numbers and composition of the forces concerned.

During the fight it is the duty of the independent Cavalry to arrange for the safety of the flanks. It will therefore operate in one or more bodies on one wing, or if strong enough on both wings. It seems almost certain that with two bodies of Cavalry directly opposed to one another and with contrary objectives a Cavalry engagement must ensue. This fight is, however, not a necessity ; it is only a means to an end, and should the enemy's Cavalry be absent, it seems a mistake to push Cavalry on to seek a fight. For success depends now on close co-operation, and on the Cavalry protecting the flank of the manœuvring advance guard. But such a situation seems unlikely to occur if our adversary possesses any Cavalry at all, and we must therefore expect a Cavalry engagement on a large scale.

And now as regards the other principle governing the employment of Cavalry, namely, obtaining for the Commander (*b*) tactical liberty of action.

In the forward movement of the main Army, the Army or Protective Cavalry plays an important part.

Let us examine Napoleon's operations on the 9th October, 1806, before Jena. His front covered, on this day, about 25 miles. The Army moved on three roads about 12 or 13 miles apart. Two corps were on each road at an interval of a day's march, thus requiring one day to concentrate on the centre. To admit of this being done it was necessary that the Army should be covered for one day's march in advance. Accordingly we find an advance guard of one Army Corps with six regiments of Light Cavalry, under Murat, marching a day ahead, with patrols pushed out still farther in advance. This force formed a sort of strategical advance guard for the Army, and gave Napoleon freedom of manœuvre. Out of this method of procedure the strategical employment of Cavalry seems to have grown.

There are obviously grave objections, when several Infantry Divisions are marching together as a unit under one commander, to having squadrons intermingled with Infantry in the columns of march ; moreover, there is not enough work for so many squadrons with an Infantry Division. It is far better, both for tactical reasons and for the comfort of the troops, to group these Divisional Cavalry regiments into brigades and to employ them as Army Cavalry or Protective Cavalry. This, indeed, has as a rule been done in most armies in the field. But the main columns of the Army must be provided with some mounted men for orderly work, despatch-riding, etc. ; one squadron should either be detached for this work from the Advance-guard Cavalry Brigade or special squadrons of Cavalry should be trained in peace and mobilised for this purpose.

Here we are combining the six regiments attached to the six Infantry Divisions into two brigades ; the principles governing their employment may be conveniently considered under four heads, corresponding to the phases in a battle.

There are four phases in a battle :

The introduction, when manœuvring and preparation take place.

The engagement, when Artillery and rifles come into play to hold the enemy and prevent his manœuvring.

The *événement* of Napoleon, *i.e.* the supreme effort, and the assault of the position.

The taking advantage of victory by pursuing the enemy to the uttermost limits, or the covering of our own retirement.

During the introduction this Cavalry will have the rôle of outposts to discharge, and in addition to this and to clearing hostile troops from the front, it must throw itself upon the *points d'appui* of the enemy in order to facilitate the progress of its own Infantry and Artillery. It will constantly harass the enemy's Infantry, and by taking up positions on its flanks and pouring in thence long-range fire compel it to deploy. Opportunities of surprising hostile guns or columns of Infantry moving up into positions without having taken adequate measures for protection *en route*, or of charging Infantry detachments which advance too far without scouts, should never be let slip.

And of supreme importance during this phase is the last reconnaissance of the battle-field, for on the information gained by the Cavalry the General Officer Commanding will base his plan of attack.

Besides finding out, and informing the Commander-in-Chief of the first general formations of the enemy, the Cavalry must also report accurately regarding the conformation of the ground, the cover afforded, and the difficulties and advantages of the ground. This is certainly the work of Staff officers, though there are never enough officers trained for such kind of work. To enable these individual officers, whether of the Staff or Cavalry, to see, they must be supported up to a certain point. Even if the main body of the hostile Cavalry has been defeated, there will always remain two or three squadrons fit for "police" duty in the space between the two Armies. It therefore seems indispensable that such reconnaissances be supported by two or three squadrons for a short distance. These can throw themselves on any hostile detachment, drive it back, and so open a road for our officers and scouts.

In the reconnoitring period of the independent Cavalry, the value of a patrol depended rather on its composition than on its strength, and it was necessary to retain the fighting mass as strong as possible. Now this principle is not so important. The retention in hand of a fighting mass of Cavalry is no longer so important, while on the other hand the necessity for our scouts to reach their objective becomes overwhelming ; moreover, they have to see as quickly as possible. Time is short, and the General Officer Commanding is probably waiting for their reports.

The backbone of the reconnaissance of the battle-field is the officer ; but his success depends in a great measure on the squadrons which support him—without their support he will often effect nothing.

To get the information to the General Officer Commanding use—

- (a) Despatch-riders at the gallop, and
- (b) Helio from the supporting squadron.

As the General Officer Commanding may be moving about, there must be a regular system of helio-stations, so that the results of the reconnaissances may be known at once, and further orders sent if necessary.

It may be that by taking advantage of the ground, detachments of Cavalry can surprise some of the enemy's guns while, or before, they are getting into position. In any case our squadrons should move about in front as a temptation for the enemy to open fire and disclose his positions.

Having discovered where the enemy's advance-guard batteries are, we can decide upon placing our own with greater advantage.

Possibly the latter are still far in rear, and the enemy threatens to occupy points which are essential to our success. The Cavalry must quickly dismount to hold whatever is necessary. This will be easy, as the best Artillery positions are on ridges with room in rear for led horses, etc. In such positions, or in front of them, there will often be rocks and boulders, or a wood, house, or point of sorts which will offer

0 100 miles.



Shewing the
both "Primary" DERABAD

THIRD STUDY (AURANGABAD)

N.B. — The aqua
contained in the

protection, and be capable of defence. Thither a few dismounted men must be sent at once.

The General Officer Commanding makes his plan of engagement behind this scattered veil of squadrons which are disposed on the front covered by the advance guard ; some scouting, or rather supporting the scouts ; others offering a target to induce the enemy to open fire with his guns ; others holding dismounted certain positions likely to be of value to the main body.

During the second phase, the engagement, the groups of Cavalry can no longer remain in the front line ; each one, according to its rôle and field of action, will either drop in rear or slip through towards the enemy, looking out for opportunities of action : *e.g.* batteries dismounted by our shell fire, and moving to some shelter for repair, or Infantry resting, perhaps with piled arms, or moving in column of route carelessly protected.

During the *événement*, and in the pursuit or retreat, it will probably be the independent Cavalry that will take the principal part ; but owing to the very great frontage of a defensive position to-day, it is probable that the combat will resolve itself into a line of almost separate encounters, and in each of these the advance-guard Cavalry must be ready to take up analogous rôles at any moment.

SEVENTH AND EIGHTH DAYS.

Wednesday, 21st, and Thursday, 22nd.

Cavalry in the General Counter-Stroke.

Situation at 5 hours on the morning of the 22nd instant. (See Sketch 16.)

1. Hard fighting took place during all the 21st instant on the eastern half of the battle front.

The Northern Commander was able to hold all his positions, but was obliged to move some of his reserves towards Shivani.

2. The Southern 1st Infantry Division holds the entrenchments on the Peeplegaon ridge with outposts on line Anwah-Julgaon-Saylood.

Dhar is held by a detachment of Cavalry with patrols to north-east and east looking out for northern left wing between Dheulgat and Gondankhera.

The Southern detachment which was left on the Pain Gunga river vigorously engaged the latter force and impeded its march towards Dhaora.

3. The Southern 2nd and 3rd Infantry Divisions hold the ridges from Anwah westwards to Kollode, which have in places been strengthened with entrenchments.

4. The 4th Infantry Division moved from Podwuth on the afternoon of the 21st instant in rear of the 3rd Infantry Division, and is now about Nanagaon-Pangree-Virgaon.

The 6th Infantry Division near Boargaon and Huttee.

The 5th Infantry Division near Chichpoor and Podwuth.

All ready to advance.

5. The 1st Cavalry Division is near Umbai. Patrols have ascertained that enemy has no troops west of Jalkee.


At 5 hours on the 22nd instant the 6th Infantry Division is ordered to engage the enemy on the hills between Kollode and Jalkee, while the 4th Infantry Division advances by Ghaut Ambree to attack Jalkee from the west and north-west. The 5th Infantry Division to march to Huttee in reserve.

The 1st Cavalry Division to move to a position of readiness near Ghaut Ambree and to co-operate in the attack.

On the 22nd we return to the independent Cavalry Division, which was left guarding the left flank of our advance, and preventing the enemy from finding out what was going on in rear of our Infantry attack. Thus the movement of our 4th Infantry Division from in rear of Podwuth towards Nanagaon was probably unobserved by the enemy. To-day the Cavalry Division must be prepared for its participation in the "decisive battle." Before the break of day the 4th Division will have commenced its march up the side of the

ber.

Adjunta Pass





Ghaut Ambree ridge, and by daylight will be in a position to attack towards Jalkee, the enemy's attention having, probably, already been diverted by the attack of the 3rd Infantry Division. As soon as there is sufficient daylight, the Cavalry Division would cross the Ghaut Ambree ridge in rear (*i.e.* to the westward) of the 4th Division, and, moving down the northern slopes towards Uldah, take up a position of readiness. This position of readiness is well concealed by ground and trees. Should the enemy's right wing attempt to fall back on Baythulwaddy, we should here be astride their line of retreat. There is water close by Uldah, and there is an excellent position for guns and rifles along the ridge which runs east and west, some 1,000 yards north of the village. (See Sketch 17.)

Here the Cavalry would rest, with its patrols out until the moment for the general assault arrives. The fewest possible detachments must be made, and there must be no unnecessary galloping. Patrols are required to guard against surprise, and special officers, pushed as close as possible to the actual battle-ground, must watch the course of action. The General Officer himself also must be out in front watching, and in communication, by signal, telegraph, telephone, or orderly, with the General in Chief Command, and with commanders of neighbouring Infantry Divisions. Such is a *position of readiness*.

While the general counter-stroke is in preparation, care must be taken to prevent the hostile Cavalry taking our troops in flank or rear. To this end the hostile Cavalry will have to be beaten or driven back if it threatens to interfere. This duty is secondary to taking part in the counter-stroke, but still it is of vast importance. In the case under consideration, the 4th Brigade, Poona Divisional Cavalry, was detailed for this work, leaving three brigades for the counter-stroke. The sketch shows the disposition of the division when making the counter-stroke. The ground must always decide the best method of execution and the most suitable dispositions to be adopted. When the two

brigades moving furthest round the enemy's flank have made their presence felt, then the first brigade is launched to the attack. But these attacks will not be launched until the "*preparation*" is over. Moreover, each one will be made upon separate points, and beyond the zone of assault of the Infantry columns. Each brigade must retain a reserve. The attack of all these masses of Cavalry upon the enemy's flank and rear, in combination with the assault of the Infantry, will assuredly shake the enemy's nerve and resolution; to such an extent, possibly, that the mere sight of the advancing Infantry will cause him to evacuate his position and to retire in confusion.

The general attack was successful.

Then followed—

The pursuit: as many squadrons and guns as possible were thrown upon the enemy's demoralised columns so as to harass their retirement. The 4th Brigade seems the most likely to be available first, since its rôle was to guard the flank. Only a limited number of squadrons would, however, be sent in direct pursuit. The bulk of the squadrons and guns marched rapidly viâ Baythulwaddy to seize a position on the enemy's line of retreat, whence to attack him both by mounted and dismounted action. This should complete the enemy's rout, and give decisive results.

AKING PART NTER STROKE.




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CHAPTER VI.

FOURTH STUDY (MEDAK).

Subject.

THE "General Idea" is the same as in the last Study, but the operations followed are those of a Containing Force in the "Secondary" Theatre of War, *i.e.* north of Hyderabad.

The "Idea" is similar to the situation in Italy in 1809, where the Theatre of War was "Secondary" to that in Bavaria, the "Primary" Theatre as described on pp. 143 *et seq.*

Some of Napoleon's views on the utilisation of the "Secondary Theatres" will, therefore, now be given as an historical example of the methods which should, or should not, be employed under similar circumstances.

NOTES ON EUGÈNE'S CAMPAIGN IN ITALY— 1809. (See General Map No. 4, page 202.)

(A) USES MADE BY NAPOLEON OF LINES OF DEFENCE IN A SECONDARY THEATRE, OR FOR A SECONDARY OBJECTIVE IN THE PRINCIPAL THEATRE.

In Napoleon's Correspondence there are numerous passages in which he explains how to utilise lines of defence to contain an enemy by means of inferior forces in a secondary theatre, or for a secondary objective in the principal theatre. In the following despatch (No. 14,707), dated Valladolid, 14th January, 1809, he explains very clearly to Prince Eugène how his principles should be applied to the defence of Italy. In the first part he deals with an *active defence*, using Osoppo and Palmanova as pivots of manœuvre.

In the second part he supposes that the French Army of Italy has been forced to retire upon the Adige, and he considers the defence of that river. In the course of the second part he defines clearly cases in which similar lines of defence may be suitably employed.

No. 14,707. *Note on the defence of Italy.*

Palmanova has an offensive as well as a defensive rôle.

In the event of the French army wishing to advance on Laybach in the Carniola, Palmanova would be the advanced dépôt and end of its line of communications; the supply parks, hospitals, and magazines could be concentrated there, and in case of a check the Army could then be reorganised.

After threatening the enemy in the Carniola and on the Isonzo, should it be desirable to march towards the left on Klagenfurth and unite with the Army of Germany (which might meantime have marched on Salzburg), then Palmanova is equally important. The troops detailed as its garrison will now form a curtain to conceal our movements for two days from the enemy. Transport, sick, and other details can be concentrated in the place.

Osoppo will also play a similar rôle to Palmanova. Should we wish to advance on Klagenfurth, it will serve as advanced dépôt to our line of communications. If, on the other hand, after misleading the enemy by threatening to march towards Klagenfurth, the army were to attack the enemy on the Isonzo, all the troops left on the side of Tarvis to mask this movement will retire to Osoppo and form its garrison.

In this way the two places are useful for offensive operations. Again, if circumstances compelled us to leave Palmanova to itself, 1,500 good Infantry, 1,000 Sappers, and dépôt details would be more than sufficient to hold it. 400 to 500 would suffice for Osoppo. Thus, with 3,000 to 4,000 troops, these important points would be made quite safe.

On the other hand, if we are compelled to fall back from these places, where should we halt? My first idea was the river Piave; this caused me to issue the *Mémoire* on this point six months ago. But the river Piave is fordable for three-quarters of the year. Now, if the enemy turned the Piave, the French General might be forced to make a false manœuvre; besides, the Piave is a long distance from Mantua and Peschiera, which form the centre of the defence of Italy. The French General would of necessity become less bold through the fear that, if the line of the Piave were turned on the left, he could not arrive in front of these places, which require large garrisons, in time to oppose the enemy's advance.

What caused me to fix upon the river Piave in the first case was because that river covers Venice, and before abandoning that large town with its large arsenal a battle ought to be lost; moreover, it seems most unsatisfactory to make a detachment of several thousand men from the field Army in order to leave a garrison in Venice.

These advantages are of capital importance. But would it not be possible to give to the line of the Adige the same qualities?

Defence of Italy on the line of the Adige.

The line of the Adige can never possess the quality of covering Venice, because it is not sufficiently far forward ; but water can be taken from the Brenta, from the Adige, and the various torrents which run into one or other of these rivers, and be collected in such a way as to make the country between the Adige and the Brenta so impracticable that it will be impossible for the enemy to cut off Venice from the Adige, consequently he will be obliged to cross the Adige in order to invest Venice. . . . This, then, must be the first work to be undertaken, viz. the country between the Brenta and the Adige, which is already marshy, must be made more so, and to such an extent that it will be absolutely impossible for the enemy to penetrate until he shall have first occupied the post defended by the water, and which itself is very difficult of capture.

Once this has been arranged the French Army has every advantage : a large and very rapid stream ; bunds on right bank which render its defence easy ; close proximity to Mantua and Peschiera ; a central place of arms already of considerable strength, viz. Legnago.

On this line, Mantua, Peschiera, and Legnago, which luck has placed where they are, will mutually support one another, and combine as a single unit in the defence of Italy.

Under the circumstances presumed, the Adige must be fortified ; the position at Legnago already exists.

Suppose that the enemy, after forcing the Tagliamento and the Piave, advances on Padua and Vicenza ; he might wish to move on Verona, but for that operation only one road is available—he must pass by Villanova. Now it is only about four miles from Villanova to Arcole. By erecting a fortified work in the form of a *tête-du-pont*, at Arcole, which will enable the French to cross at any time at Ronco and debouch towards Villanova in an hour's time, the enemy will never dare to advance on Verona ; only light Cavalry, hussars, and despatch-riders will risk it.

Besides the advantage of preventing the enemy from advancing upon Verona, the work at Arcole will also prevent the enemy from occupying the Caldiero position, which he has twice occupied successfully already.

This will tend greatly towards the tranquillity of the larger town of Verona ; because, even if the enemy did show himself there, he would be checked in front of Peschiera, and, since that line of communications of the French Army runs through Mantua, the fear of having the enemy at Verona could not seriously shake the determination of the French General.

After Arcole and Legnago, one or two other “ places ” seem likely to be useful between Legnago and Venice : one roughly in the direction of the main road from Padua to Ferrara, near Anghiara ; and perhaps a post at Castelbalda ; but this place, or these two places, must derive their chief strength from the inundations, and must be field works (*places de campagne*), possessing the power of retaining the enemy on the left bank if necessary, or of being defended by their own garrison of 400 to 500 men under another set of circumstances.

The Army having four passages over the Adige, with its right at Malghera (a fort at the mouth of the Brenta), suitably strengthened, its left at Arcole, and its front covered by the inundation between the Brenta and the Adige, what can the enemy do ?

(a) If he advances on Verona, our Army debouches by Arcole and catches him in the very act ; (b) if he masks each of the crossings, we unexpectedly deploy by one of them, and defeat his several corps in detail ; (c) finally, if he marches up the Brenta in order to reach Trent, and move on Montebaldo and Verona, with his line of communications passing to the Tyrol, he makes a detachment which will be absent for 8 to 10 days : he weakens himself to this extent. If the detachment is small, it is of no consequence : a few troops at Rivoli will hold and rout it. If the detachment is large, then the main Army is weakened to that extent.

Next suppose the enemy establishes his headquarters at Padua and tries to cross the Adige between Legnago and Arcole.

Leaving then a small garrison in Arcole and the other places, the Army can debouch by the bridge of Anghiara, or even enter Venice, and then deploy by Brandolo or by Malghera against whatever is investing the place, cut the enemy's communications in all directions, and place his Army in the most hazardous position.

Whatever the enemy does, the terrain is so disposed that with half the number of troops but equal skill, everything is simple for the French General, everything presages victory for him and points the way to it : on the other hand everything is most difficult and risky for the enemy.

This is the one advantage which fortifications can offer in war. Field works are like guns ; they cannot obtain their objects single-handed : they must be properly used and well handled.

In these operations, the importance is apparent of carefully organising the means of communication from Ronco by the right bank of the Adige to Anghiara and Venice : the roads must be carefully reconnoitred and kept in good order, so that it is possible to move the Army to either extremity of the line by night and in two or three marches.

No general of experience and common sense would risk anything in front of this great fortified re-entrant from Ronco to Malghera, where the French Army covered by inundations can manœuvre unobserved, and by means of which all spying and other means of scouting are rendered impossible. Any morning he might find his enemy three marches in his rear or on one of his flanks, with all the enemy's forces concentrated against his own still scattered. If it be argued : " But the enemy will take Arcole " ; Arcole surrounded by water is not easily captured. Or, again, " The enemy will take Legnago," which is supposed to be still more important to him. Then the highest possible praise is bestowed upon the proposed line of defence : because if it is only possible to attack it after capturing a fortified place, it has attained its object.

We can only hope for the following advantages from a line of defence : to make the position of the enemy so difficult that he become involved in faulty operations and be beaten by inferior numbers ; or, if the hostile general is prudent and has some engineering skill, to force him to cross methodically the obstacles which we at our leisure have constructed, and so to gain time. On the other hand, viewed from the side of the French Army, to assist the weakness of the French General by making his position so clear and easy that he cannot commit any great mistake, and, lastly, to allow him time to await support. In the art of war as in mechanics, time is the important element between mass and power.

In discussing the line of the Adige, it may be argued that the enemy will come

by Insbruck on Trente. In this case the enemy weakens himself in the face of our other forces, and, secondly, the positions of Montebaldo and Rivoli leave nothing to be desired. If we are master of Rivoli, the enemy cannot advance on Verona. If we hold Montebaldo, he cannot reach Rivoli.

On that side nature has done everything, and nothing further is wanted.

Undoubtedly the best has been done if the enemy occupies Verona and has crossed the Adige, but the French Army has not been turned, because, to suppose the most exaggerated case, if *the enemy* has his centre at Verona, his right at Peschiera, and his left at Treviso, the French Army would have its right at Venice, its left at Mantua, its centre at Legnago. It must be recognised that, in this case, the advantage would be on the side of the French Army which has both flanks resting upon fortified places and can manœuvre at will between them against hostile forces, the left, right, and centre of which are equally in the air and equally open to attack.

The more we think over this position, the more we come to the conclusion that with 30,000 men there is nothing to be feared from an Army of 60,000 troops of the same value, or that at least we shall be able to gain several months' time.

Thus, according to Napoleon, in a struggle in a secondary theatre, an *offensive* attitude must still be adopted at the outset; we must try and impose upon our enemy by continual threats, force him to scatter his troops, so that we can fall upon one of his isolated corps with a real superiority in numbers.

In this game of obstacles which is being played with the enemy we must make up for our smaller numbers by increased *rapidity*. But this superior mobility can only be derived from certain entrenched places which will relieve us of our impedimenta, convoys, sick, wounded, etc.

To sum up, act vigorously to retain the enemy as far as possible from the defensive barrier. But once he has got close to it, there is nothing else to do but attack him while he is crossing it, and in most cases the dispositions which he has made to ensure success will then be badly disarranged and time will be gained.

Regarding "places de campagne."

The following letter, dated 17th June, 1806 (No. 10,419), was sent by Napoleon to General Dejean, his Minister of War, and explains more fully Napoleon's views on the use of fortified posts and towns.

Here are a few notes, Monsieur Dejean, on the Peschiera project. Even supposing the works V X and S R are completely finished and armed, Peschiera is not capable of offering such a resistance as to justify its garrison of 3,000 men. If 3,000 good troops are placed in Peschiera, it merely means that 3,000 men will be handed over to the enemy after a month's resistance.

It is most essential to be quite sure in our minds as to the usefulness of fortified places. Some fortifications defend a pass : this of itself gives them a special character. There are also "fortified bases" which, being strongly garrisoned, are able to hold out for a long time ; they thus permit of a weaker Army being reinforced or reorganised, so that it can try its luck again in the field.

In the first case a fort or small entrenchment is all that is required ; in the second case we want a large place of arms on which neither money nor trouble ought to be spared.

Besides these two cases, there is a third one, namely, the defence of a frontier by fortifications. Thus the frontier from Dunkirk to Maubeuge, etc., etc.

Let us consider into which of these cases Peschiera comes :—(a) It is not and cannot be made into a "*fortified base*," commanded as it is on every side and being also restricted in size. Moreover, it is close to Mantua, which performs this rôle. One fortified base *depôt* is sufficient upon one frontier. It would be better then, for this reason, to locate the artillery services, supplies, and the garrison at Mantua, and to spend on that place whatever the fortifications of Peschiera would cost.

Peschiera, however, might, on account of its size, be regarded as having a special objective, namely, that of covering a crossing over the Mincio ; but the Mincio is such a small river that this consideration does not merit attention.

As a frontier the line of the Adige is not fortified. Unless it were suggested to construct fortifications at Peschiera, Valeggio, Goito, Governolo, and that the Adige be treated in like manner ; and that as third line, Lonato, Montechiaro, Castiglione, Solferino be entrenched so as to have in Italy a similar frontier to that of Flanders, where, even if the enemy were four times the strength of the defenders, he would not be able to advance until he had taken two or three entrenchments. But in the present case, however, the enemy would merely have to leave a body of troops opposite Peschiera, another detachment in front of Mantua ; and pass at Valeggio and Goito or at any other point, and would continue his operations on the Mincio and Adda, presuming always that he possesses a decided superiority in numbers.

By masking these places he would reduce his numbers very slightly, perhaps by 14,000 men ; this figure, considering the very superior number which we have supposed him to possess, would affect his strength much less proportionately than the garrisons of Mantua and Peschiera would reduce the strength of the French Army ; presuming, say, 3,000 men in Peschiera and 7,000 men in Mantua, or a total of 10,000. It must be admitted that the enemy need not detach more than 14,000 men ; while, if a battle were imminent near Castiglione or in the plains of Montechiaro, the enemy, if at all skilful, would be able to arrange to withdraw 8,000 men from the corps of observation at the critical moment. The garrisons, however, would only be able to make sorties against the opposing light troops which would withdraw before them. We have seen a similar state of circumstances during the last wars in Germany, in the case of the large garrisons which Austria left in Phillipsburg, Mayence, and Mannheim ; it was never necessary to

observe these places with even a number of troops equal to the strength of the garrisons.

However, suppose the enemy does besiege Peschiera, he will take it after 12 to 15 days' work: we shall lose many guns, supplies, 3,000 men, and the money expended in fortifying the place. But is Peschiera for these reasons of no value whatever? Is it unnecessary to have fortifications at all at Peschiera? In the circumstances already considered any fortifications would be superfluous. But there is another aspect of the question which I shall now examine.

(b) Peschiera as a *place de campagne*. If it were possible to suggest putting Peschiera at Saint Georges, or in any other position in the Mantua zone of operations—that is to say, in such a position that its communications with Mantua could not be cut—then it would be of the greatest value, and I would not hesitate a moment in deciding what to do. It would give additional strength to the Artillery and to the garrison of that great fortified base *dépôt*, which would give time to an Army to fall back to reorganise and resume the initiative.

But Peschiera exists where it is, and will be of the greatest use from an offensive point of view; its works render secure from hostile raids the *dépôts*, hospital, warlike supplies, and the transport boats which convey to Torbole and all points on the lake, troops and supplies, and assist enormously an Army near Trente. Peschiera also blocks the direct road from Verona to Brescia, acts as a pivot of manœuvre to an Army defending Montebaldo and the upper Adige; it supports the left of an Army operating on the Mincio, and enables it to concentrate its full strength about Mantua or for any other operation by affording a safe refuge to such troops as might be left behind the Mincio for two or three full days to mislead the enemy. Although Peschiera is protected by permanent fortifications, it is still what I call a *place de campagne* (a temporary field-work). A skilful General will be able to derive immense value from it, but it would not be of the slightest use to an incompetent one.

During the Castiglione operations, Peschiera had a garrison of only 500 men, the greater number of whom were cripples, and for seven or eight days it was left to its own resources. It proved of the greatest advantage to the French Army, because, instead of 500 men, the enemy came to the conclusion that there were 1,500 in it, and left 4,000 before the place. The movements of the Army were thus concealed, and when a French Division returned to Peschiera after Castiglione, the enemy was unable to delay its passage of the Mincio even for one hour, but was afraid for its own retreat, and failed effectually in cutting it off.

The French General left 500 men there: a nervous one would have left 1,000; but a skilful one would only have left a garrison so long as the enemy had *not* gained a decided superiority, and provided that fighting was still going on and there was every chance of the Army subsequently returning.

But let us suppose that in the case in which Peschiera played so important a rôle, the French General had come to the decision to concentrate all his troops at Rivoli and fight a decisive battle; that he had already lost a portion of his Army in killed and prisoners; and that he had no hope of reinforcements, as there were none beyond the Alps, do you think he would leave the garrison locked up in the forts? Not at all; he would blow up two or three of the bastions at Peschiera, or at any rate evacuate the place if it were impossible to blow it up; but he would not reduce his field Army by a single man.

If you ask me what is meant by a *place de campagne* with permanent fortifica-

tions, just cast your eye over the events which took place last Vendémiaire (September 21 to October 21); see how valuable that wretched old Château of Verona was: its influence on events was possibly incalculable. That poor Château made us master of the Adige: this fact at once altered the whole complexion of affairs in the campaign. That insignificant fortress, Legnago, too, is only a *place de campagne*.

If, instead of acting as he did, the Grand Duke Charles had crossed the Adige at Ronco or at any other point, and beaten the French Army, more or less as Scherer was beaten in the year VII, the Château of Verona and Legnago would at once have fallen.

Moreover, during all the time that an Army is manœuvring, while it withdraws from one flank to concentrate upon the other, or makes a march or two towards the rear to combine with some support or reinforcement which has remained on the Ticino or Adda, or which is coming forward from Alexandria, or perhaps from Bologna; during all these manœuvres the enemy has neither the time nor the means to carry on a siege: he masks all fortified places, fires a few shells and salvos from his Field Artillery at them—that is exactly the degree of strength which a *place de campagne* should possess.

Peschiera ought to be a *place de campagne* and possess the degree of resistance required; but it has not the qualities for a place of this kind. In this case the qualifications required are to be able to afford protection to a Division retreating from Verona pursued by the enemy: the heights would have to be evacuated because the fire from the works does not command them.

Another reason why Peschiera cannot be used as a *place de campagne* is because it does not possess sufficient power of resistance to give a commandant of ordinary courage a feeling of security! C bastion is quite commanded by the heights and is easily breached, so that there is some fear that an enterprising enemy, who has a few 18 or 24 pounders, might carry the place in the 12 or 15 days during which the Army is manœuvring.

Such are the qualities and amount of resisting power which Peschiera should possess: there must be no, or very little, increase of garrison, because a *place de campagne* must be capable of being held by the smallest possible numbers.

(B) NAPOLEON'S INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DEFENCE OF ITALY.

I.—Arms and Ammunition.

No. 12,173. *From the Emperor Napoleon to Prince Eugène,
Viceroy of Italy.*

OSTERODE,
25th March, 1807.

Italy may be divided into three zones: the country from the Isonzo to the Adige; the country between the Adige and the Adda; and the country between the Adda and Piedmont.

If a battle is lost and the enemy happens to be in superior force, you might be driven back behind the Adige. In this case the 17,000 rifles which you have at Venice and the 7,000 at Palmanova would be of no use to you. Those at Palmanova can be used by the Army, but 17,000 is too large a number at Venice ; so remove 7,000 of them.

You have 3,000,000 cartridges at Palmanova, and 3,000,000 at Venice. Take away 1,000,000 from each of these depôts, and place them behind the Adige. These 2,000,000 rounds would be of considerable value to the enemy. If there are 2,000,000 lb. of powder at Palmanova, remove half of it without delay.

After this, presume that the enemy has crossed the Adige and drives you back on to the Adda. You will then want arms, cartridges, and powder at Pavia and Plasencia.

Finally we come to Piedmont, but this does not concern you.

Piedmont, however, will be divided into two : Alexandria and Turin, Fines-trella and Genoa.

Thus all the ammunition supplies in Italy will be divided into five parts, in order that, if communication should be interrupted with the first four, we still have the means of arming and supplying the last part.

Think over these ideas ; act in accordance with them, but make your dispositions gradually and without haste.

2.—Food and Forage.

No. 14,909. *To Eugène Napoleon, Viceroy of Italy, at Milan.*

PARIS,

16th March, 1809.

My son, you must think over the question of supply : the plan of feeding troops by markets becomes impossible when large concentrations take place. You must then have recourse to requisitions, and at the same time bring in large supplies from the neighbouring territories ; fix the prices, and see that the requisitioning is legally carried out : that is the best plan.

Padua, Venice, Bassano, and Verona are rich countries. Supplies should be easily conveyed from the Po and Adige to Palmanova. Under the circumstances you must help the Treasury by making the requisitions at a moderate price : this is the universal custom in every country in the world. . . .

No. 14,698.

VALLADOLID,

13th January, 1809.

My son, I have received your letter telling me that you have heard that the Austrians are collecting large supplies at Goritz. It seems to me extraordinary that they should collect supplies so close to us.

I suppose that Palmanova is fully supplied ; that is the principal point. I presume also that you have collected at Palmanova sufficient amount of biscuit to supply the whole Army on an emergency.

3.—*Communications of the Army.*

No. 14,926.

PARIS,

18th March, 1809.

Give orders for the road Mantua-Legnago-Padua-Treviso to be put in the best state of repair ; this in future will be the main line of communication, instead of by Brescia and Verona. (*N.B.*—Note Napoleon's care to change his line of communications, so as to render any hostile attempt against them more difficult.)

I have ordered the telegraph to be put in working order by the 1st April between Paris and Milan.

(C) NAPOLEON'S INSTRUCTIONS TO EUGÈNE BEFORE THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN.

Situation of the French and Austrians when Hostilities commenced.

Napoleon was anxious to delay the outbreak of hostilities until he was ready, and in order to avoid giving the Austrians any pretext for a rupture, he on several occasions warned Eugène against making any conspicuous movement with a view to concentrate his Army.

On March 14 he wrote :

After the 20th March you are at liberty to occupy camps at Udine, Saint Daniel, and Montechiaro ; but I am anxious that these moves be carried out leisurely, and the health of the troops considered.

And on March 16 :

You will then have on the 1st April 60,000 Infantry, 10,000 Cavalry, and 708 guns on the left of the Adige, forming the nucleus of an Army of 80,000 men.

Not wishing to give Napoleon any cause for complaint, Eugène delayed his concentration as much as he could.

On the other hand, on the 1st April (ten days before the outbreak of hostilities), the Austrian Army was concentrated on the Italian frontier under the Archduke John.

Headquarters at Goritz.

8th Corps between Tarvis and Villach.

9th Corps between Laybach and the Isonzo. Total, 48,000 men.

Tyrol Corps (Chasteler), 12,000 men.

Dalmatia Corps, 8,000 men.

Reserve, 20,000 Landwehr troops.

The whole Army numbered about 100,000 men.

The Franco-Italian Army was commanded by Prince Eugène, with General Charpentier as Chief of Staff. The latter had acted in the same capacity to Massena in the same theatre of war in 1805.

The Army consisted of:

In First Line.

Seras' Division between Udine and Palmanova.

Broussier's Division between Udine and Saint Daniel and Osoppo.

Sahue's (Light Cavalry) on the Tagliamento.

In Second Line.

Grenier's Division at Sacile, Conegliano, Pordenone.

Barbou's Division from Bassano to Legnago.

Severoli's Division at Padua and Este.

Grouchy's Division of Dragoons between Mantua and Verona.

In Rear.

Lamarque's Division marching on Verona.

Fontanellis' Division in camp at Montechiaro looking towards the Tyrol.

The Royal Guards between Milan and Padua.

Pulley's Division of Dragoons at Ferrare and Rovigo.

Total about 63,000 men and 6,000 horses.

The 11th Corps (Marmont), 10,500 men in Dalmatia.

Finally some troops were moving up from Naples to join the Army.

Napoleon was fully persuaded that the Austrians would remain on the defensive in Italy, and would march the bulk of their troops by the Tyrol into the principal theatre of war in Bavaria. His instructions to Eugène, put briefly, were to

try and detain the enemy by threatening him in the direction of Tarvis, but on no account to compromise the safety of his Army.

No. 14,909. *To Eugène Napoleon.*

PARIS,
16th March, 1809.

My son, I told you in my letter of this morning that I thought it would be necessary at the beginning of April to locate the Divisions of Seras and Broussier with two regiments of Light Cavalry in the Frioul; Grenier's Division at Conegliano, Sacile, and Pordenone; Barbou at Treviso and extending as far as Bassano, the Italian Divisions at Padua and Vicenza; Lamarque's troops at Verona, except the 112th, which is still required in Tuscany. You should also move the Cavalry closer up; but at the same time you must not produce a scarcity of forage. My intention is not to make any movement at all during April, and everything leads me to think that the Austrians for their part will reflect upon the abyss which is ready to swallow them up: the Russians are marching against them. However, we must be in perfect readiness for anything, and talk big. It is not beyond the bounds of possibility (but this is for you alone) that I might come and spend a week in Frioul during April, see all the troops, who must be in fine condition, and get back at once to Paris. . . .

No. 14,943.

Napoleon orders a reconnaissance of the theatre of war.

No. 15,050. *To Eugène Napoleon, Viceroy of Italy, at Udine.*

PARIS,
10th April, 1809, 11 a.m.

My son, everything leads me to the conclusion that the Austrians began hostilities yesterday or will do so to-day or to-morrow. If they attack before the 15th, I have ordered my Army of Germany to retire on Augsburg and to the Lech, in order to be able myself to be present to direct the first blows.

Move your headquarters without delay to Pordenone. Put Broussier's Division between Pontebba and Chiusa; Grenier's Division between Chiusa and Venzone; Lamarque at Osoppo; Barbou at Udine; one Italian Division near Udine, the other near Codroipo. Concentrate your whole Army, for hostilities are imminent. Give the Venice command to General Vial, and order that place and Porto-Legnago to be armed and supplied.

Barbou's Division, with an Italian Division and a few Cavalry Regiments, under the orders of General Baraguay d'Hilliers, ought to be sufficient to hold whatever forces the enemy may have in the direction of Goritz and on the road to Trieste. At the same time you should be ready to debouch and attack Tarvis with the Divisions of Grenier, Seras, Broussier, Lamarque, the Italian Guards, one Italian Division, and even Barbou's Division as well, if you find that the enemy is not in

force on the left of the Isonzo. But you must avoid the enemy's entrenchments, and don't break your head against his redoubts.

(NOTE.—This letter did not reach Eugène till the 18th. He was defeated at Sacile on the 16th April.)

No. 15,061. *To Eugène Napoleon, Viceroy of Italy,
at Valvasone.*

PARIS,

12th April, 1809, 11 p.m.

My son, I suppose that you had scarcely arrived at Verona or Trente when you heard that the Austrians had begun hostilities, and you have gone to your headquarters in Frioul. I have heard by the telegraph only that the Austrians have passed the Inn and so declared war. I think I have already told you that my orders were that if the Austrians attacked before the 15th, my troops were to retire behind the Lech, where I shall be myself on the 15th. I am anxiously waiting to hear what they have done in Italy; but all my information leads me to think that they mean to remain on the defensive there.

You will have concentrated your Army in the Frioul and placed a Division in the Pontebba defile, so as to threaten a movement on Tarvis at any moment. I presume that you have taken precautions to prevent any encumbrances remaining at Udine, and have placed all the Cavalry dépôts, as well as the hospitals, on the other side of the Piave.

Palmanova and Osoppo should contain your final requirements.

In this way you will be free from all impediments, and can act according to the enemy's movements. As far as I can calculate, the enemy's main forces should be at Tarvis. If that is so, he will not advance on Goritz, but will concentrate at Laybach.

Post some Cavalry and about 12,000 men on the Isonzo, and march with all your Army towards Tarvis. Leave nothing to chance, but avoid the entrenchments which the enemy has made, so that you may not smash your head against his redoubts. I expect the road to the Tyrol will be difficult; write me in duplicate by the St. Gothard and by ordinary courier. Keep your Army well concentrated.

Tell Marmont of the hostilities. I have already advised you to place the 14th provisional half Brigade at Verona, and to bring up the Division consisting of the 62nd, 23rd, and 22nd by forced marches by Bologna and Ferrare to Treviso, in order to act as a reserve. Leave Miollis at Rome. Issue orders again to ensure that Venice is well armed and provisioned. Don't be in any hurry, but see what the enemy does: his dispositions must serve as your guide.

No. 15,068.

STRASBURG,

15th April, 1809.

My son, I am now at Strasburg. I wrote to you from Paris. Threaten much, but be in no hurry, and march with every precaution.

No. 15072.

STUTTGART,

16th April, 1809, 1 a.m.

I suppose that they have attempted nothing on your side. Keep your troops well concentrated. March deliberately. (*Marches posément.*)

On the 10th April the Austrians crossed the Italian frontier, and surprised the French Army, which was not yet concentrated, in the same way as they had forestalled them in Bavaria.

The Archduke John moved the bulk of his Army (the 8th and 9th Corps) along the central route by Cividale and Udine, and only sent two advance guards on the roads through the Carinthia and Carniola.

Thus surprised, what ought the Viceroy of Italy to do? Retire, but delay the enemy's advance as much as possible in order to gain time for his Army to concentrate. With this end in view, every line of defence must be employed to advantage. A halt should be made on each line, and steps taken to make the enemy believe that a most vigorous opposition is to be expected. If deceived by these measures, the enemy will deploy and make dispositions to force the line, and await the arrival of his supporting troops before attacking. By operating this way the French Army might gain valuable time. A further retreat, however, must be begun sufficiently soon to allow the same procedure to be carried out at the next line of defence.

By such methods Eugène might have gained sufficient time to organise a strong defensive position on the river Piave, without ever fighting a decisive battle. In accordance with Napoleon's strategical plan he was weaker than the enemy, so he should have avoided a pitched battle. His rôle was to contain 100,000 Austrians in the secondary theatre while preventing them both from rendering any assistance to the main Austrian Army, and, as far as lay in his power, from laying waste the rich country of Northern Italy. Napoleon would be able in the meanwhile to deal with

the Austrian main forces in Bavaria. Moreover, supposing these 100,000 Austrian troops were stupid enough to delay too long in Italy, that country might become their grave.

Such, then, were the possibilities of the situation. But Eugène lacked the power of calmly appreciating it: he merely acted with the courage of despair. He seems afraid that Napoleon will blame him because the Austrians have invaded Italy. And so he gives battle to the Archduke Charles, in open country, near Sacile in front of the Livenza, and without the following troops: Lamarque's Division, Pully's Division of Dragoons, the Royal Guards, part of Fontanelli's Division, and the troops coming up from Naples.

His Army is routed, and he retires in disorder at one stride to the Adige, without even trying to defend the line of the Piave.

(D) LETTERS FROM EUGÈNE TO NAPOLEON SHOWING THE DECISIONS AT WHICH HE ARRIVED AT AND WHY.

Eugène to Napoleon.

UDINE,
10th April, 1809.

SIRE,

I hasten to inform Your Majesty that the letter, of which I send you a copy, was delivered to our outposts near Pontebba at 5 a.m. to-day. It has this moment reached me, and I have ordered General Broussier to advance at once beyond Osoppo and defend with energy the position of Ospitaletto (N.B.—a few miles north-east of Osoppo).

I have directed the following—the Divisions of Grenier, Barbou, and Severoli, with Grouchy's Division of Dragoons, to march to the Tagliamento. General Seras has been told to throw any one who attempts to cross the Isonzo into the river. I have arranged to collect five Infantry and two Cavalry Divisions on the Tagliamento, and I shall dispose them as circumstances develop. I have left two Infantry and one Cavalry Division on the Adige, which will join me, however, should no movement be reported in the Tyrol. Should the enemy be moving in that district, I shall send General Baraguay d'Hilliers to take command of these Divisions.

Note the various dispositions made by the Viceroy. To leave one Cavalry and two Infantry Divisions on the Adige is to operate in direct opposition to the principle of the con-

centration of force at the decisive point (see Napoleon's letters of April 15 and 25).

Eugène to Napoleon.

VALVASONE,
12th April, 1809.

The enemy's advance was well developed on the 11th along the whole front. According to numerous reports which have reached me, General Chasteler is in the valley of the Fella with 18,000 men, Prince John has arrived with 17,000 men, and General Giulay has crossed the Isonzo with 27,000. As I have only Broussier's Division available to withstand such large hostile forces I have decided that I ought not to tackle the enemy, and have ordered a retrograde movement towards my reinforcements, and with the object of concentrating my Divisions behind the Tagliamento. This movement appeared the more necessary since Prince John, having reached Cividale, threatened to turn General Broussier's right. General Seras was accordingly ordered last night to take up a position near Campoformio, and to cross the Tagliamento to-day, leaving one regiment to hold the bridge-head, while the 8th Chasseurs and 6th Hussars scouted further to his front.

This movement has been carried out. General Grenier, who arrived at the bridge when General Seras was crossing, took position at Valvasone. General Broussier was to fall back last night after dark and cross the Tagliamento at Dignogma. These movements have been carried out in quietness and with precision, and without affecting the *moral* of the troops. Before leaving his position at Ospitaletto General Broussier had a most brilliant affair which augurs well for the future success of the campaign. He was attacked at 2.30 p.m. by a force double his numbers. . . .

I cannot tell Your Majesty what I shall do to-morrow. My disposition will depend on the enemy's movements.

My intention is to pass the day in my present positions, to rest my troops, who are much fatigued by the long marches, which they have been making in the midst of continual rain. I shall bring up Barbou's Division: its head is at Pordenone to-night. I shall closely watch the enemy, and if I notice any hesitation or weakness in his advance, I shall attack him vigorously with my four Divisions. If, on the other hand, the enemy advances in force towards the Tagliamento, which is fordable everywhere, I shall make another march rearwards to the Livenza, and from there resume the offensive with all my troops.

On the 15th the Austrians attacked the French rearguard. Eugène expected his rearmost divisions to join him on the 16th, and, for the reasons given in his letter of the 17th (see below) to Napoleon, decided that he must accept battle at Sacile.

The Austrians had 45,000 men, and Eugène 5 Divisions

(Broussier, Seras, Grenier, Barbou, Sevoroli), or about 36,000 men. Lamarque's Division and Grouchy's Dragoons would have given him 10,000 more troops. But these Divisions, being delayed by swollen torrents, did not arrive, and Eugène was beaten. He lost 3,000 men. The Austrians lost about the same in the fight, but the retreat of the French was made under the most deplorable conditions, so that their total losses were very great.

It was an error to give battle in open country for such insufficient reasons as those advanced by Eugène. It was a still greater error to fight this battle before the concentration of his troops had taken place.

Eugène to Napoleon.

ON THE BANKS OF THE PIAVE,
17th April, 1809.

In conformity with what I have already reported to Your Majesty, it became each day more necessary to offer battle to the enemy.

1st.—Because Prince John began to press us closely.

2ndly.—Because I could not bear the idea of giving up two provinces of Your Majesty's Kingdom without a fight.

3rdly.—Because General Chasteler's march through the Tyrol (he arrived at Brixen on the 13th April) rendered an engagement more and more necessary.

Accordingly I fought a battle yesterday, and I am sorry to have to report to Your Majesty that I lost it.

The fight began at 9 a.m., etc.

Eugène to Napoleon.

VICENZA,
23rd April, 1809.

If Your Majesty disapproves of my having given battle, you will at any rate take into consideration my reasons for fighting: 1st, I had already made three retrograde marches, and brought together five divisions of Infantry which, but for the floods, would have arrived upon the battle-field during the day; 2ndly, the men were complaining at being obliged to fall back before they had even seen the colour of their adversary; 3rdly, lastly, Chasteler's arrival in the Tyrol.

If I already had had the honour of winning victories I would have let the troops talk, and would have made two more marches to the rear to reach the Piave, which undoubtedly would have been a more favourable battle-field. But I was afraid, above everything, that Your Majesty might disapprove of my retreating and giving up several provinces in which you had won renown; and I could not bear the idea that any day Your Majesty would be able to say to me: "You ought to have fought."

These reasons entirely decided me. But, if I had known on the evening before

the battle what I only learned next day, namely, that your Majesty had ordered the Grand Army to retire to the Lech, I would then have followed your example, and the results would have been very different.

The following report on the battle of Sacile was sent by Eugène on April 25 to General Clarke, the Minister of War :

The concentration should have been completed by the morning of the 16th. I knew that my orders had reached the troops, and that they had marched in accordance with them ; but the terrible weather which was experienced for several days, and the flooded water-courses, delayed the march of several Infantry Divisions and the Cavalry. On the 15th the enemy attacked my advance guard in force, and on the 16th I was obliged to stand and give battle. Every one fought with the greatest determination, but victory was entirely on the side of the Austrians.

(E) NAPOLEON'S CRITICISM.

No. 15,116. *Napoleon to Eugène.*

RATISBONNE,
25th April, 1809.

I received your two letters (dated 14th and 17th) together. It was a pity to have fought without your Cavalry. If you weakened your Field Army in order to hold Verona, you did wrong. *Before giving battle you ought to have concentrated all your troops ; if you had won it, you would have had nothing to fear from the enemy's force in Tyrol.* The line of the Adige ought now to be strongly held.

Duroc to Eugène.

LANDSHUT,
26th April, 1809.

The Emperor says : "A lost battle is nothing, we can remedy that ; but he cannot prescribe that remedy because he does not know where you are, nor what troops you have with you. It would have been better to have sent an officer here who had had a good look round, and would be able to give a full report to His Majesty. An ordinary despatch-rider can tell us nothing."

No. 15,128. *Napoleon to Eugène.*

LANDSHUT,
26th April, 1809.

You are fixing your attention on the Tyrol, where there is absolutely nothing to cause you alarm. Setting aside the fact that one of my corps is marching on Salzburg, what do you imagine 12,000 men can do, so long as a handful of your troops are posted at Montebaldo, to contain the enemy ? All that is foolishness. The battle must indeed have been a most terrible one since it caused you to abandon the line of the Piave. It was most stupid of you to allow Venice to be invested without some very strong reasons, apart from your ridiculous terror about the Tyrol. If you are afraid of an invasion from the

Tyrol, occupy the positions which I held during my Italian campaigns. Every drummer in your army knows them ! I occupied Montebaldo, Corona, Rivoli, and the Adige ; the enemy was then in possession of Insbruck, Bavaria, and the Tyrol, and I beat him, mainly through preventing the junction of his troops in the Tyrol with those in Frioul. I see that you are not very well up in the history of those campaigns, since you say that if the enemy comes by the Tyrol, the plain of Verona must be given up to him. He cannot possibly debouch from the Tyrol if you occupy the heights about Rivoli, and he cannot force the Rivoli position if you occupy La Corona and Montebaldo. If you are master of Bassano, the enemy will never dare to pass beyond Trente because you would intercept his communications by the Brenta defiles.

No. 15,131. *Napoleon to Eugène.*

LANDSHUT,
27th April, 1809.

I sincerely hope that you have not evacuated the line of the Piave, nor given up the fine country between that river and the Adige to be pillaged.

30th April.

I trust that you have not lost your head to such an extent as to have evacuated the line of the Piave. The enemy's Italian Army will soon be upon my right flank : I want to know its strength. If I only knew what had happened to my Italian Army, I could operate with greater boldness.

No. 15,144.

BURGHAUSEN,
30th April, 1809.

My son, I have received your letter of the 22nd by the post.

I am sorry to see that you have given up the line of the Piave. You consider it strange that the enemy has not appeared there yet : I should have been astonished had he done so, and not rested content at capturing in one day the whole country from the Isonzo to the Piave. If instead of destroying the bridge over the Piave you had constructed a bridge-head, and made some show of an intention to defend it, the enemy would never have dared to pass that river ; Venice would never have been invested, and the country between the Piave and the Adige would not have been pillaged. If, however, contrary to all expectation, the enemy had tried to cross the Piave, and you were not in a fit state to oppose him, you still had twenty-four hours before you. I am sorry to see that you have no notion of what war is or how to carry it on. The Austrians are so little accustomed to make war in this fashion that they were surprised at finding that you had not held on to the line of the Livenza, which formed a good rallying point for you. They also never conceived that you would abandon the Piave. *In war, we always see our own misfortunes, but fail to notice our enemy's difficulties.* You must show some confidence. Until the enemy had made an attempt to force the bridge over the Piave, you ought to have held on to the bridge-head ; you were always in a position to destroy the bridge even if the enemy had crossed above or below it.

I am aware that people in Italy pretend to despise Massena ; if I had sent him there, what has happened would never have taken place, etc., etc. . . .

If you know anything of history, you would know that the "quolibets" are of no use at all, and that the greatest battles in history have been lost simply through the general having listened to the advice of the troops.

There are many valuable lessons to be learnt from a study of the campaign outlined above. In the first place it teaches us that a commander must never stand to fight a *decisive* battle when he has no chance of being victorious. It is an error to fight without all one's means at hand: time must be gained for concentration: to this end impose on the enemy by partial and timely counter-attacks, take up a position to make him expect a fight, make him lose time in preparations, then retire before allowing one's troops to become involved; but take every precaution to ensure an easy retreat. By such tactics the necessary time will be gained for concentrating one's troops on some prepared position, which is designed to compensate for the inferiority in our numbers. Defend this line with determination, but prepare a second, in case the first line is forced.

This system of defence, step by step, is the only method of war possible for a General of ordinary ability in a *secondary* theatre of war, where he has been placed with resources which are recognised to be inferior to those of the enemy. By operating as described he will prevent the enemy from advancing too rapidly, and will keep his attention occupied while the fate of the campaign is being settled on the decisive theatre.

If the enemy retires, attack him vigorously so as to make him face about and delay. Such was the second act of this campaign.

The Austrians were forced to fall back by Napoleon's successes in the main theatre, and began their retreat on May 1. Eugène followed, crossed the Brenta behind them, and arrived on May 7 on the Piave. Here the Austrians wished to halt; but the French forced the Piave, and defeated the Austrians in battle at Conegliano.

We now proceed to the consideration of the strategical situation as depicted in the "General Idea" (p. 140).

GENERAL MAP



valley. Many roads radiate from the city, so that

as depicted in the General Idea (p. 145).

The Strategical Situation.

(See General Map, No. 5.)

1. One of the enemy's Armies (believed to be his main force) is acting offensively from Bhopal in the direction of Aurangabad. Another of his Armies holds the line of the Godavery and the country northwards to Raipore.

2. Our objective is to contain the latter Army and to gain time for our main Army about Aurangabad to defeat the enemy's forces in the primary theatre. To this end the General Officer Commanding containing force must not only prevent the enemy from occupying the district south of the Godavery with its capital Hyderabad (the second most important town of the Buffer State), but must also prevent any large detachment being made towards the primary theatre.

3. The forces at our disposal are 4 Divisions of Regular Infantry, 1 Cavalry Division of 4 Brigades and 4 Batteries Royal Horse Artillery, and 20,000 levies (mounted and on foot).

The enemy's Army on the Godavery is believed to be much superior in numbers and is estimated at 120,000 Infantry and 10,000 mounted troops.

4. (a) The country southwards from the Godavery to Hyderabad is, speaking generally, composed of rugged hills covered with jungle alternating with open cultivated plains in which are numerous villages and large tanks.

(b) An important edge of hills runs south-eastwards from near where the Manjera river joins the Godavery via Duggy and Sircilla to Warangal (east of Sunnigarum). From Sunnigarum, both westwards and eastwards, there is a belt of very rocky country indeed, but passable by numerous roads and country tracks between the hills.

(c) Hyderabad is situated in this zone in the Moosy river valley. Many roads radiate from the city, so that

a force at Hyderabad can be moved quickly to any part of the Godavery river: and, moreover, can be moved more quickly from the secondary to the primary theatre than can a force about Nirmal and Yellagudpa on the Godavery, as this would have to march by cross-roads.

(*a*) There are four main lines of advance from the Godavery upon Hyderabad available for the enemy:—

- (1) Up the Manjera valley. This river is a formidable obstacle parallel to the march of an Army operating from the North.
- (2) Viâ Dichpali and Bhiknur (a metalled road).
- (3) Viâ Polas and Kutkoor.
- (4) Viâ Sunnigarum.

Routes (2) and (3) can easily be blocked by an inferior force at the passes through the important belt of hills referred to in paragraph (*b*) above, viz. about Duggy and Sircilla. Route (4) passes the ridge at Sunnigarum, but the defile is there less of an obstacle.

5. Courses open to the enemy and to Officer Commanding Southern containing force.

The enemy may (*a*) act on the defensive, or (*b*) move a part of his force to the primary theatre, retaining another part on the Godavery, (*c*) march in force on Hyderabad.

The consideration of case (*a*) by itself may be omitted because a plan to meet (*b*) includes it.

(*b*) A hostile force from Nirmal and Yellagudpa, wishing to reach the primary theatre, would probably march viâ Bhainsa and Bokur, Oolah and Nandgaon. Such a movement might best be delayed by mounted troops from Kondelwaddy and Nandair on the south, while a southern Infantry column moved from Hyderabad towards Kheir and the Purna river.

Note.—Kunnairgaon (18 miles north of Hingoli), on the Paingunga river, is held by a double bridge-head—(see Third Study: Aurangabad).

(c) In the event of his marching in force on Hyderabad, a distance varying from 25 to 40 miles would separate the several columns, if the enemy used the four routes mentioned in paragraph 4 (d). It is to be presumed, therefore, that in this case his real advance is likely to be made only on the front comprised by two of these roads until the Beerkoor-Duggy-Sircilla ridges have been occupied by his troops.

The Southern Commander cannot oppose this movement on the Godavery because the enemy already holds that river line. The next obstacle to the enemy's advance is the belt of hills Beerkoor-Duggy-Sircilla-Warangal. The country comprised between this belt and Hyderabad should be organised to enable the containing force to carry on a war of positions, and to take the offensive should the enemy commit an error in his advance.

These measures would include :—

- (1) Double bridge-heads near Basvada and Medak over Manjera river for offensive purposes, 500,000 rations in each.
- (2) Positions round Sircilla and Warangal strengthened for occupation by levies, as a pivot of manœuvre, 100,000 rations in each.
- (3) Position prepared near Bhiknur to block the road from Balkonda and to cover lateral communication between Medak and Sircilla. Roads to Medak improved.
- (4) Improvement of road generally.

Disposition of Containing Force.

(1) *Cavalry*.—The bulk of the Cavalry to be located on the enemy's right front, with patrols on enemy's right flank, in order to gain early warning of any movement towards the primary theatre. A detachment to watch the approaches towards Sircilla.

Say three Brigades on a front from about Sungum, near the mouth of the Manjera, to Sakunderpoor, on Dichpali road, 25 miles. One Brigade on the front Korutla-Polas,

15 miles. Sakunderpoor to Korutla, 30 miles. Mounted levies from Polas eastwards to mouth of the Maner river, 50 miles.

(2) *Infantry*.—Two divisions with 10,000 levies on the front Basvada-Duggy-Sircilla, 60 miles. Two divisions in Reserve at Hyderabad, 80 miles from Duggy.

Then, A.—If the enemy advances on the front Manjera River-Duggy :

- (1) Garrison of Sircilla and 1 Cavalry Brigade covers the front Sircilla-Sunnigarum, 20 miles.
- (2) One Infantry Division with 3 Brigades of Cavalry delay enemy on the line Basvada-Duggy, 25 miles.
- (3) Remaining 3 Infantry Divisions and levies concentrate on Medak with the object of using the line of the Manjera as a "parallel obstacle." Duggy-Medak, 30 miles.

B.—It is unlikely that the enemy will advance by both the Duggy and Sircilla roads, because for 40 miles a mass of jungle would then separate the two columns; but if he does so the Sircilla garrison will delay his column on the east, while 2 Infantry Divisions and 3 Cavalry Brigades fall on the head of the western column debouching from Duggy. Medak-Bhiknur (on Dichpali road) will in this case be the main position and pivot of manœuvre.

C.—If the enemy advances on front Sircilla-Sunnigarum 1 Infantry Division with levies, the Sircilla garrison and 1 Cavalry Brigade delay him on the line Sircilla-Sunnigarum long enough for the remaining Cavalry and 3 Infantry Divisions to concentrate towards Bhiknur and Medak. In this latter case, a new base would be organised towards the west at, say, Tandoor, with line of communications viâ Pampad and across the loop of the Manjera river to Medak, whilst the Hyderabad garrison would be provisioned for a siege.

Commencement of the Operations.

1. The North holds the line of the Godavery river, from the junction of that river with the Manjera on the west to

its junction with the Maner river on the east. The enemy's main strength seems to be about Nirmal and Yellagudpa. Hostile Cavalry detachments are scouting in the district south of the Godavery.

Supplies have been collected in large quantities near the two places named, and also near Mudhol (some 30 miles west of Nirmal) and Kohal (20 miles north-east of Yellagudpa).

2. Southern Army Headquarters are at Aurangabad. The Commander-in-Chief does not expect the enemy to take the offensive on the Godavery, but the General Officer Commanding containing force is ordered to be ready to prevent the enemy overrunning the country between Hyderabad and the Godavery river, and meantime to engage the enemy's attention on that river with the object of preventing him from detaching troops to strengthen the Northern Army in the primary theatre.

3. The dispositions of the Southern Troops of the containing force in the secondary theatre on the evening of the 16th January were as under:—

(a) 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions with 10,000 levies on line Basvada—Duggy—Kutkoor.

(b) 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions in reserve at Hyderabad.

(c) Warangal, Medak, and Hyderabad are fortified and garrisoned by levies.

(d) Southern 2nd Cavalry Division (of 4 Brigades). Divisional headquarters and 3rd Brigade at Dichpali, 8 miles south-east of Indoor, on the Nirmal-Hyderabad main road: 1st Brigade headquarters at Indoor, 2nd Brigade headquarters at Sakunderpoor, 4th Brigade at Korutla. Brigades have detachments pushed forward to get touch with the enemy's mounted troops.

(e) Mounted levies are in touch with the enemy on the Godavery eastwards of Polas, and are in independent scattered groups throughout the country; only a corps of scouts being in any way organised under the orders of the General Officer Commanding Cavalry Division.

4. The rôle of the Cavalry Division is to observe the enemy on the Godavery west from where the Hyderabad-Polas road crosses the Godavery river. In the event of the enemy moving southwards or detaching towards the primary theatre, the General Officer Commanding Cavalry Division, is directed to operate so as to delay the movement and to give time for the Southern Infantry to co-operate.

FIRST AND SECOND DAY.

Wednesday, 17th January, and Thursday, 18th January.

Strategical Reconnaissance by the Cavalry Division.

In accordance with the situation on Tuesday evening, January 16, the following orders had been issued:—

No. 1.—Operation Orders.—2nd Cavalry Division.

HEADQUARTERS, DICHPALI :

Tuesday, 16th January, 1906 (20 hours).

1. (a) The enemy's main strength appears to be about Nirmal and Yellagudpa. Supply depôts have been formed at these places, and at Mudhol and Kohal. Detachments of his Cavalry are reported south of Godavery river.
- (b) The headquarters of our 4th Cavalry Brigade are at Korutla, with detachments in touch with enemy's mounted troops near Polas and Mullapooram.
2. The task of the Division is to observe the enemy on and west of the Polas-Dermappoor road and to clear up the situation about Mudhol; and in the event of the enemy moving either towards Hyderabad or westward up the left bank of the Godavery, to delay such movement with the object of gaining time for our Southern Infantry Divisions to co-operate.
3. (a) The G. O. C. 1st Cavalry Brigade will reconnoitre the crossings over the Godavery between Sungum and Nalaishwar (on road from Mudhol to Koodaunpoor) with the object of discovering what parties of the enemy have come south of the river. Reconnaissances are also to be sent towards Mudhol to ascertain the situation there, and to report whether there are any preparations for a movement up the Godavery or the Manjera rivers.

In view of the possibility of the Division having to operate on the west of the Manjera, a suitable crossing-place near Kundgaon will be reconnoitred and prepared.

- (b) The G. O. C. 2nd Cavalry Brigade will occupy Balkonda with the object of impeding the movement of hostile detachments on the south of the Godavery. Reconnaissances will be sent towards the crossings over the Godavery between Nikkalpoor (inclusive) on the west, to Chintulchanda Ferry inclusive on the east, and also beyond the river to clear up the situation about Nirmal.
- Communication will be opened with the 4th Cavalry Brigade at Korutla.
- (c) The 3rd Cavalry Brigade will remain in a position of readiness near Dichpali. The G. O. C. will send forward at daylight connecting posts to Indoor, and to a suitable point beyond, to connect with the 1st Brigade, and also to Sakunderpoor to connect with the 2nd Brigade.
4. Divisional Headquarters will be at Dichpali.

Where opposing Cavalries are in close contact as in the present instance, it is highly probable that the reconnoitring parties endeavouring to cross a river may find their advance opposed. Although the rôle of a reconnoitring party is to obtain information and not to fight, yet a combat may be a necessary prelude to fulfilling the main purpose ; thus a strong feigned attack may be commenced, and under cover of this a portion of the party may, by a wide, rapid, and well-concealed movement, gain a crossing elsewhere; or even during the combat itself, by engaging the attention of the enemy, may cause him to leave unguarded some entry not far off, through which scouts can gain access to the further bank. In all cases, however, any tendency to detach too freely must be carefully checked, as it leads too often to unnecessary dissemination on insufficient information.

The reconnaissances ordered were carried on during Wednesday, 17th, and Thursday, 18th, with the result that about noon on the latter day the General Officer Commanding was enabled to locate the enemy as follows :

Detachments of the enemy's Cavalry in occupation of the following places south of the Godavery :

Sungum and Kundakoorty (near the junction of the Manjera River).

Banouli-Kandaunpoor-Balkonda (on the Nirmal Road) in force.

Mullapooram-Polas, 500 to 600 men, with 4 guns.

Columns of all arms are reported to be advancing from Banouli, Balkonda, and Mullapooram.

Later in the day more information was obtained, and the situation at night was as follows :

Enemy.

Cavalry at Novvapett and Palda (58 miles north-west of Indoor).

A strong column of all arms at Balkonda.

Some Cavalry and guns moved west from Polas to Korutla, joining there a mounted force which had come from the north.

Velloolla, west of Korutla, occupied.

Southern Force.

1st Cavalry Brigade at Indoor, with one squadron near Kundgaon.

2nd Cavalry Brigade at Sakunderpoor.

3rd Cavalry Brigade and Divisional Headquarters at Dichpali.

4th Cavalry Brigade near Pasaneepett, 10 miles south of Korutla, and 30 miles east of Sakunderpoor.

The General Officer Commanding the Southern Force directs the Infantry at Basvada to move off on the 19th towards Yelaspoor (south of Duggy and on the Nirmal Road).

THIRD DAY.

Friday, 19th January.

Strategical Reconnaissance culminates in Tactical Collision.


On the morning of the 19th the following orders were sent by the General Officer Commanding to the Commanders of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Brigades :

RECONNAISSANCE of

GROUND FOR COUNTERSTROKE

Scale 2 Inches to 1 mile.

SKETCH 18.



London: Hugh Rees, Ltd.

(TELEGRAM.)

No. 2.—To G. O. C. 1st Brigade, Indore.

DICHPALI :

Friday, 19th January, 1906 (4 hours).

1. Enemy appears to have one Cavalry Division on line Awrmoor-Ramanapett. My intention is to contain it with bulk of 2nd Brigade about the Sakunderpoor defile, and to support you in overthrowing enemy's mounted troops with which you are now engaged.

2. 3rd Brigade with one regiment from 2nd Brigade will be in position of readiness near village of Muddenpully by 7 hours.

3. Withdraw in direction of Dichpali.

4. I am leaving for Indoor. Send reports along main road to meet me.

(TELEGRAM.)

No. 3.—To G. O. C. 2nd Brigade, Sakunderpoor.

DICHPALI :

Friday, 19th January, 1906 (4 hours).

1. My intention is to concentrate as strongly as possible with object of overthrowing hostile mounted troops now on line Nuvvapett-Palda, while you with your Brigade (less one regiment) contain enemy reported on line Awrmoor-Ramanapett.

2. Detail one regiment to march so as to reach Muddenpully by 6½ hours.

3. Your line of retreat will be on Yedulvoy (on Nirmal-Hyderabad road).

4. I am leaving now for Indoor.

(BY STAFF OFFICER.)

No. 4.—To G. O. C. 3rd Brigade, Dichpali.

1. Situation } as per Nos. 1 and 2 in copies of telegrams sent herewith.
2. Intention }

3. March at 5 hours to Muddenpully. Send your 2nd Line Transport to Yedulvoy at daylight.

4. Report to Indoor.

In conformity with these orders, the General Officer Commanding 2nd Brigade, after a rapid reconnaissance of the ground north of Sakunderpoor, decided to take up a position south of Juckumpully (see Sketch 18), holding the mouth of the defile with two squadrons only. These, if driven back by superior strength, would retire in the direction of Sakunderpoor, drawing the enemy on behind them. The remainder of the Brigade (1½ regiments and 6 guns) were kept concealed in a position towards the west, whence, when

advisable, a counterstroke against the right flank of the pursuing enemy could be made.

Meantime, the 3rd Brigade and a regiment from the 2nd Brigade had concentrated near Muddenpully at 7 hours. The 1st Cavalry Brigade fell back from Indoor on to Dermawaram, to the flank of this position. The resulting General Situation is shown on Sketch 19. The hostile mounted force following the 1st Brigade was overthrown and driven back in disorder, whilst the advance from Balkonda sustained a severe check by the action of the 2nd Brigade.

One of the consequences was that freedom of patrolling was at once gained. The enemy's main advance was now discovered to be via Balkonda-Dichpali road, and also in great strength along the Bimgul-Godkole road, which bifurcates from the former at Balkonda.

The pursuit of the north-west hostile force was therefore not pressed, and the Division fell back towards the Duggy defile.

In the evening the situation was as follows :


Enemy at—

- (a) Jullalpoor—6 miles north of Indoor—(Cavalry).
- (b) Dichpali—(Cavalry). Head of Infantry at Sakunderpoor.
- (c) Sunnagoal—(about 16 miles north of Sircilla) and Mullailla—(Cavalry), Korem—13 miles north-east of Sircilla—(Cavalry). Enemy's main advance is now ascertained to be from Balkonda and by Bimgul, moving southwards.

Southern Forces—

Cavalry Division.—1st Brigade at Gowrsummodrum ; Indoor occupied by contact squadron. 2nd and 3rd Brigades and Divisional Headquarters at Yedulvoy.

4th Brigade, after being engaged with hostile division all day, retires on Sircilla entrenchments at nightfall ; reports Infantry columns of enemy moved towards Bimgul (*i.e.* south-west from Velloolla).



The Commander of the Southern Army is now concentrating his main forces towards and on the Balconda-Hyderabad roads.

Infantry.—1st Division, with 5,000 levies, at Gandaree Upalvai, Yelaspoor.

2nd Division, with 5,000 levies, at Racherla, Kutkoor.

3rd and 4th Divisions at Medchel (38 miles south of Bhiknur on main road to Hyderabad, and 55 miles south of Yelaspoor.

The patrol sent to report on and watch the Manjera river (Operation Orders No. 1 of 16th instant) is still out—a most important point of detail. The patrol sent to Chintulchanda ferry has been reporting on the enemy's advance to Bimgul, and keeping touch both with enemy and with our 4th Brigade patrols ; its supporting squadron halts to-night near Kondoer, on Bimgul road.

FOURTH DAY.

Saturday, 20th January.

Action of Cavalry in broken Country retarding Hostile Advance in order to gain time for its own Army to concentrate.

The following orders were issued :

No. 5.—Operation Orders.—1st Cavalry Division.

HEADQUARTERS, YEDULVOY :

Saturday, 20th January, 1906 (4 hours).

1. (a) No change reported in enemy's position.
(b) Our 1st Infantry Division, with 5,000 levies, will reach the line Lingumpully-Pudmajeewaddy by 15 hours to-day.
(c) The 4th Cavalry Brigade should reach Reddypett about the same hour.
2. The Division will delay the enemy's advance from the direction of Dichpali by holding the line Gowrsummodrum-Yedulvoy-Gowrarum at daylight. If forced to fall back, the line Duggy-Sirnappully will next be held.

3. Brigadiers will dispose their brigades to hold positions as follows :
 - (a) 1st Brigade between Yedulvoy and Gowrsummodrum.
 - (b) 3rd Brigade near Yedulvoy.
 - (c) 2nd Brigade will detail two squadrons to march at 5 hours to Kondoor to support its reconnoitring detachment in that vicinity ; if forced to retire they will go southwards on Reddypett. The remainder of the Brigade will hold the line Goondawarum-Gowrarum.
4. Reports to Ramchunder after 7 hours.

Two general lines of resistance are named in Divisional Orders, and each Brigade had its own line of retreat to the second line ; otherwise Brigadiers had a free hand to delay the enemy in the Duggy defiles as best they could. Brigadiers formulated their own plans. The following was, for example, suitable action for 3rd Brigade, holding the centre of the line and covering the main road :

To capture the Duggy plateau by frontal attack would be an extremely difficult task for enemy's Cavalry alone ; if they turned the flank they would be open to a combined attack of two of our brigades, who would then have every advantage. We may take it as possible to hold the plateau against them till the arrival of their Infantry and guns, which with hard marching may be expected about the middle of the afternoon ; if their attack is not immediately and vigorously carried out we may calculate on holding the Duggy plateau till to-morrow morning.

Counterstrokes.—Enemy's march may first be retarded at nullah and swampy ground from Yedulvoy tank eastwards, held by dismounted fire of one regiment with cross-fire from rocky hillocks, supported by Artillery and dismounted fire from ridge north of Ramchunder. A counterstroke might be prepared here, as ground favours mounted action. One regiment might charge enemy as they struggled over nullah or gained open ground near Goondawarum.

Next.—On the northern edge of Duggy plateau, ground is suitable for charge just as enemy struggled on to plateau edge ; troops would be invisible to one another till moment of attack, which would have to be well timed by signal. *Lastly*, if enemy turns west flank and gains open ground

there, attack, pivoting on guns near Duggy Fort. If necessary, ground on top of Duggy plateau is suitable for charge to cover retirement.

In preparing or selecting any position for defence, it must be remembered that all the more important topographical objects, such as river-courses, marshes, forests, mountains, etc., are in the first instance obstacles to movements, and, hampering the attack, favour for that reason the defence. This does not at all preclude the fact that the defence, by an *improper* use of obstacles, may deprive itself of these advantages. As a rule, it is an improper use when the defender tries to make use of an extensive obstacle as a position with the bulk of his Army for decisive battle. He will then almost always find that he can only be successful if he maintains the whole line, whilst the victory will fall to the assailant as soon as the latter penetrates at one point. The correct use of such an obstacle is to stand in rear of it, to block, perhaps, one or some of the crossings, but to leave others open or to make only a pretence of defending them; whilst the centre of gravity of the action lies in the counterstroke upon the first large body of the enemy which forces the passage and appears before our front.

Excepting to the west of Duggy no mounted action was possible in the very broken country passed over. Numerous opportunities of ambushing the enemy's advance, however, presented themselves, which would have had a moral effect on the enemy similar to that of mounted counterstrokes. The fighting during the day was limited to fire action, and dependent on the initiative of the Regimental and Squadron Leaders. The enemy's "Independent Cavalry" and his "Advance-Guard Cavalry" were in these defiles pending the arrival of his infantry in force.

The question of intercommunication between brigades was a difficult one on account of the thick jungle. All three brigades communicated back to a central station at Duggy.

The situation at 18 hours, Saturday, 20th January, was :

1. (a) Enemy's Cavalry unable to get further south than Yedulvoy.
- (b) Southern Cavalry, after engaging enemy all day, are relieved by Infantry outposts on line Ootaloor-Duggy-Raganadpully, and Brigades halt for night as under:
 - 1st near Jeevada.
 - 3rd } Oopulvoy.
 - 2nd (less $2\frac{1}{2}$ squadrons) }
 - $2\frac{1}{2}$ squadrons of 2nd Brigade, Kondapoor and Toompully in Gadkole defile.
 - 4th Cavalry Brigade, Reddeypett.
2. Enemy's outposts on line Beechpully-Kondoor. Gadkole occupied by their Infantry.
3. Our 1st Infantry Division, with levies, on Mulloorpett position.
 - Our 2nd Infantry Division, marching to Bhiknur.
 - Our 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions, marching to Masaibpett (22 miles south of Bhiknur on main Hyderabad road).
4. On the east.—Hostile Cavalry near Yelgandal, engaged with Sircilla garrison and levies.

FIFTH DAY.

Sunday, 21st January.

Tactical Action of Cavalry Division in retarding Hostile Column much superior in number of rifles and guns but weak in Cavalry, arising from the advance down the Bimgul Road.

With a view to dealing with this problem the four Cavalry brigades were temporarily organised as follows :—

The 1st and 3rd Brigades continued to deal with the main situation, whilst the 2nd and 4th Brigades were formed into a Division for the special task of attacking a hostile column advancing from Gadkole on the Bimgul Road.

The following information and instructions were given late at night on the 20th to the General Officer Commanding appointed to command the Division.

1. Further information shows that a hostile division was at Gadkole yesterday evening (Saturday). It comprises :

2 Brigades Infantry, *i.e.* 4 regiments = 12 battalions.

2 "Groupes" of Field Artillery = 6 batteries.

1 Squadron of Cavalry.

2. About two squadrons of 2nd Brigade are in touch with enemy's advance, and the remainder of that Brigade, with the 4th Brigade, will be at 6 hours in a position of readiness near Ramaredypett, covering the right flank of the Mulloorpett position.

3. Hinder the advance of the enemy as much as possible.

At 9 hours, 21st January, this General Officer Commanding received information that the enemy is advancing from Gadkole, and that at 10 hours his vanguard would probably arrive 3 miles south of the line Kondapoor-Toompully, moving south-west towards the right of the Mulloorpett position (see Sketch 20).

The country through which the enemy must pass in his advance on Ramaredypett is thickly wooded and the various ridges rocky, with the exception of that part marked as cultivation in Sketch 19. Nevertheless, it is possible for mounted troops and Infantry to move through any part of it in open order. Guns, however, would be confined to the tracks.

The field of fire is much restricted, and the enemy's guns could not be employed until capture of the ridge two miles north-east of Ramaredypett (marked Y Y in Sketch). The kopji (marked X in Sketch) forms a salient in this important ridge. This prominent feature commands an uninterrupted view of whole area of the operations. From this point there are only two lines of advance open to the enemy, east or west of it. Either route necessitates the capture of kopji ridge by the enemy.

Immediately on receipt of information of the enemy's advance from Gadkole, the whole of the Division was moved forward to a position of readiness behind Kopji X. At the same time were detached—


- (a) One regiment to act on the enemy's left flank and harass his advance in every way, in which operation the rocky spur north and north-east of Reddypett will assist.
- (b) Two squadrons, *i.e.* the remainder of the regiment already in touch with enemy's vanguard, to act similarly on enemy's right flank.

From the commanding position X, already noted, could be seen at once how far other troops might be advantageously employed, and their immediate proximity in rear would obviate any difficulty in the rapid communication of orders. With the object of influencing the enemy to decide on the route to the east of the ridge one section R.H.A. was posted on the flat hill D, and the remainder of the R.H.A. (10 guns) was kept concealed in the eastern spurs of the ridge Y Y Y. Should this device be successful there will be an excellent opportunity of making a counterstroke against the enemy's advance guard in their deployment over the open ground before referred to.

In dealing with a hostile mixed force weak in Cavalry, detachments can safely be made, and thus the enemy's Infantry is caused to deploy first in one direction and then in another, until they finally become physically and morally exhausted. Then, and probably not till then, the opportunity will arise for Cavalry to charge home and complete their discomfiture.

At noon, Sunday, 21st January, the enemy was in force on Duggy ridge, driving in Infantry outposts; the enemy's column from Gadkole, three miles north-east of Ramaredypett, was engaged with the Eastern Cavalry Division.

1st Division Southern Infantry began withdrawing from Mulloorpett position on to Yelaspoor ridge, leaving outposts on Mulloorpett ridge.



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In the course of the day the Eastern Cavalry Division had succeeded in driving back the hostile Infantry column into the jungle south of Toompully. The normal organisation of the Division was resumed, and the 2nd Brigade returned to the main body.

The Commander of the Southern Force now decides on a retirement by night towards Bhiknur, so the following orders are issued by the General Officer Commanding 2nd Cavalry Division :

No. 6.—Operation Orders.—2nd Cavalry Division.

HEADQUARTERS, OOPULVOY :

Sunday, 21st January (16 hours).

1. (a) The enemy's advanced troops are on the line Ootaloor-Duggy-Sirnappully, with outposts on the watercourse from Bomappully eastwards via Kulvaral to Raganadpully.
- (b) Our 1st Infantry Division and levies are holding the Yelaspoor position, with a rearguard on the Mulloorpett ridge in touch with the enemy, but will withdraw from Yelaspoor towards Bhiknur at midnight.
2. The Cavalry will take over the position now occupied by our Infantry at 18 hours, and will hold them with the object of covering the withdrawal of the Infantry.
3. (a) The 3rd Brigade will relieve the Infantry rearguard on the Mulloorpett ridge at 18 hours.
- (b) The remainder of the Division will bivouac as follows: each Brigade will provide for the security of its bivouac:

1st Brigade,	Yelaspoor.
2nd ,,	Yellaredypett.
4th ,,	Rungumpett.
- (c) The Yelaspoor hill will be entrenched and held by 2nd Brigade.
4. Headquarters will be at Yellaredypett, where reports are to be sent until daylight.

Von Cæmmerer writes as follows on withdrawing before a superior enemy before battle :

Schlichting clearly points out that we would do well to adopt a "limited eccentric" mode of procedure when it becomes necessary to retire. If we are obliged to withdraw before a superior enemy before battle, it is not a question of immediately moving towards the nearest friendly force, or even to retire straight upon its front, *but to place oneself abreast of it with a proper interval.* The enemy is thereby not only prevented from seriously endangering the too closely concentrated and united portions by enveloping them, but such action may eventually perhaps lead to our advancing against the flank of the pursuing enemy. If a

battle has been fought, after which we are obliged to retire—*i.e.* if we are beaten—then the problem of establishing an adequate strategic front is as a rule difficult to solve. Its establishment behind a natural obstacle presented by the ground seems then the sole safeguard of the Army.

Another highly important idea which Schlichting has introduced into the theory of war is that in a *defensive* battle the place of the reserves must not only not be behind the centre, and not even close behind or beside the flank, but rather that *a considerable interval must be left between reserves and flank* if the object is to be attained. How differently could Bazaine have shaped his battle on August 18th, 1870, if he had had ready at his disposal a strong Army reserve so far towards the right rear that they could have rolled up the exhausted Guards before all the forces of the Saxons became available !

Where large bodies of troops are concerned, this interval of the main reserve must be increased to half or a whole day's march.

Only one thing is to-day no longer advisable—namely, to plan an offensive movement in a defensive battle by a simple counter-attack of the whole front, strengthened by the reserves, as Benedek had intended in those days. Where we ourselves have chosen gentle, open slopes with the object of obtaining the fullest effect from our own firearms and of rendering the enemy's advance impossible, there will hardly be suitable ground for counter-attack. *A deliberate division of labour among the various units of the Army or portions of the Army*, that is the actual principle which Schlichting has established for the tactical defence ; and the maintenance of an adequate front for operations in the defensive is therefore just as important as in the offensive.

SIXTH DAY.

Monday, 22nd January.

Cavalry holding a Defensive Position to cover Retirement of its own Infantry.

The enemy is advancing in force in four columns on the front Gowrsommodrum-Gadkole, his advanced troops being on the line Ootaloor-Duggy-Sirnapully.

The 2nd Cavalry Division is holding Mulloorpett (3rd Brigade), and the Yelaspoor position. The 1st Infantry Division is retiring from Yelaspoor in the direction of Bhiknur. [The 2nd Infantry Division is one march east of the Bhiknur position. The 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions are one march south of Bhiknur.

Some 5,000 levies are on the Sircilla front, the remainder are moving on Bhiknur.

It is our object to induce the enemy to attack our prepared position near Bhiknur, and there so decisively to defeat him by means of a vigorous and well-timed counterstroke that he may be forced to relinquish his advance on Hyderabad.

Factors affecting the situation.—(a) South of Duggy the country opens out into a wide undulating valley, dotted with large tanks, and with wet cultivation (paddy-fields) following the lines of the valleys as far south as Yelaspoor.

(b) The Yelaspoor ridge stands out as a prominent feature, and, with some detached hills to the west, forms a commanding position, with an uninterrupted view over the area of operations—with the exception of the north-west where a ridge runs roughly north-east-south-west, at a distance of some 3,000 yards.

(c) South of Yelaspoor, until about six miles north of the Bhiknur position, the country is as noted in para. (a). From this latter point commences a stretch of dry country covered with scrub jungle, with occasional rocky prominences.

(d) The moral of the enemy's Cavalry and of the Infantry column advancing from Gadkole must have been considerably affected by their severe handling near Indoor and Ramaredypett respectively.

The probable objective of the enemy is, after concentrating his forces in the vicinity of Upalwai, to continue his southerly advance upon Hyderabad. Our retirement from successive positions may well lead him to suppose that we do not intend to make any very serious opposition to his advance, and so may induce him to commit himself to an attack on our prepared position.

The Cavalry Division, in covering the retirement, will therefore delay the enemy's advance as much as possible, and take care that no hostile flanking movement takes place undetected. They will retire in the direction of Bhiknur with the object of drawing the enemy on to our prepared position.

The 1st Infantry Division will retire viâ Chittlāl to Yellapoor, where they will be temporarily in reserve.

The 2nd Infantry Division will take up a position extending from Bhiknur (inclusive) to about Ped Mullareddipully.

The 3rd Infantry Division will take up a position from Bhiknur (exclusive) to about Argoonda.

The 4th Infantry Division will be in reserve in the vicinity of Chota Duntapully.

The native levies will be utilised in the difficult ground to the west and north-west of our left flank.

The Cavalry Division, after the completion of their duties noted above, will concentrate in the vicinity of Tongundla, prepared to move to a position of readiness on either flank as required—leaving detachments in observation on both flanks.

SEVENTH DAY.

Tuesday, 23rd January.

Rôle of the Cavalry before, during, and after the General Engagement.

The Situation on Tuesday, 23rd January—daylight, is as follows :

1.—Enemy.

The enemy's reconnoitring detachments have been checked on the line Rajumpet, Lingiapully, Fort, Beebeepett, Bopapoor.

The remainder of their Cavalry Divisions (about 4,000 sabres strong all told) are in bivouac near Mootiumpett in readiness to press the reconnaissance further southwards.

The heads of the Infantry Columns are on the line Sundapoor, Kamareidi, Arrapully—moving southwards.

Southern Troops.

1st Infantry Division—Untumpully, with outposts on line Rajampett—Fort.

2nd Infantry Division—Loreepully, holding line of outposts east of Fort to Bopapoor hill.

3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions—Kondapoor, Vellapoor.
Cavalry Division—Chittial.

Corps Cavalry Brigade—Bopapoor (made up of four
Divisional Cavalry regiments, less one squadron per
Division).

Note.—Position prepared and entrenched from Naroneepully on east along northern edge of Bicanoor village to detached hill half mile south of Thippapoor. The plateau south-west of Venkadripully is entrenched in the direction of Kondapoor to resist an attack from the north or north-west.

On the ninth day, Thursday, the 25th January, the situation is as follows, the interval having been spent in manœuvring operations:

2. *Southern Troops*.:—Corps Cavalry Brigade on right of Bicanoor position in position of readiness.

1st Infantry Division holding Bicanoor entrenchment.

2nd Infantry Division has been withdrawn westward, and is in readiness near Ped Duntapully and holding plateau north-west of that village.

3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions in readiness near Kondapoor.

Cavalry Division (four Brigades) north-west of Kondapoor.

Enemy.:—(a) The Northern Commander-in-Chief deployed part of his Army on the line Buswanapully—Gootimookla to hold the Southern Army in front, while another part, consisting of two Divisions, marched via Beebeepett to turn right flank of Southern Army and to connect with a force expected from the north-east.

(b) Remains of Northern Cavalry, which is now reduced to about twenty-five squadrons, accompany the turning column.

Early news of the turning movement by Beebeepett was received by the Southern Commander-in-Chief, thanks to the energy and good dispositions of the General Officer Commanding "Corps Cavalry Brigade."

The 1st Division was thus able to retain sufficient troops in hand to extend the right flank southwards to the Damarcherroo hill.

Hard fighting took place on the front Venkadripully-Thippapoor, and the 2nd Division had to reinforce the 1st Division on the west of Bicanoor and also to hold the trenches on the south-west of Venkadripully.

The Southern Commander-in-Chief then decided that the time had come to make "the supreme effort," and he launched the 3rd and 4th Divisions against Arrapully-Tallamudla, while the Cavalry Division (four Brigades) co-operated on their north flank in the direction of Buswanapully and Rajumpett.

This counterstroke took the enemy by surprise, and his right wing and Reserves were shattered. They begin to retreat northwards.

The Southern Cavalry harassed the retreating columns, and cut off their retreat on Duggy.

The left of the Northern Army was obliged to draw off, and hold the hills about Bopapoor.

The remains of the Northern Army collected on this line, and were only saved from complete destruction by the approach of reinforcing columns from the north-east.

* * * * *

The South was soon victorious in the Primary Theatre. The enemy's troops in the Hyderabad District then retreated north-east on Polas, closely followed by the Southern forces, which were enabled to press the pursuit closely, thanks to the Sircilla entrenched Supply Depôt which then fulfils its rôle, *i.e.* it becomes useful for "offensive purposes." (See Napoleon's note on Palmanova on page 184.)

"Moral"—the Basis of Success in War.

In discussing all these problems we must not forget that we are dealing with men of flesh and blood and nerves. Great moral difficulties confront a Commander whom circumstances compel to retire before giving battle.

To withdraw from one position to another before one's troops become involved, is easy enough at manœuvres and at the war game, but Eugène's letter to Napoleon, dated

Vicenza, 23rd April, 1809 (see page 199) shows what happens when dealing with men of high courage in the presence of a real enemy and when feelings run high. It was really the complaints of the troops which forced Eugène to give battle at Sacile and which brought about his defeat. Again, although Kuropatkin loudly protested before he left St. Petersburg that he would not give battle until he was ready, but that he would withdraw and concentrate detachments first, yet the results show that circumstances were too strong for him; detachments gave battle and were defeated before concentration was effected.

Grumbings and criticisms of a similar kind are common to all Armies under similar circumstances, not by any means excluding the British Army.

The following "General Orders" show what difficulties Sir John Moore suffered in this respect the moment his Army commenced its retreat towards Corunna. (The orders are copied from "A Narrative of the Campaign of the British Army in Spain, commanded by His Excellency Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore, K.C.B.," published in 1809.)

GENERAL ORDERS.

HEADQUARTERS, BENAVENTE,
27th December, 1808.

The Commander of the Forces has observed with concern the extreme bad conduct of the troops at a moment when they are about to come into contact with the enemy, and when the greatest regularity and the best conduct are the most requisite. He is the more concerned at this as, until lately, the behaviour of that part of the Army, at least, which was under his own immediate command, was exemplary, and did them much honour.

The misbehaviour of the troops in the column which marched by Valderas to this place, exceeds what he could have believed of British soldiers. It is disgraceful to the officers, as it strongly marks their negligence and inattention.

The Commander of the Forces refers to the General Orders of the 15th of October, and of the 11th of November. He desires that they may be again read at the head of every company of the Army; he can add nothing but his determination to execute them to the fullest extent. He can feel no mercy towards officers who neglect in times like these essential duties, nor towards soldiers who injure the country they are sent to "protect." The Spanish forces have been overpowered; and, until such time as they are re-assembled, and ready again to come forward, the situation of the Army must be arduous, and such as to call for the exertion of qualities the most rare and valuable in a military body. These are not

bravery alone, but patience and constancy under fatigue and hardship, obedience to command, sobriety, firmness, and resolution, in every different situation in which they may be placed. It is by the display of such qualities alone that the Army can expect to deserve the name of soldiers; that they can be able to withstand the forces opposed to them or to fulfil the expectations of their country.

It is impossible for the General to explain to his Army the motive for the movement he directs. The Commander of the Forces can, however, assure the Army that he has made none since he left Salamanca which he did not foresee, and was not prepared for; and as far as he is a judge, they have answered the purposes for which they were intended.

When it is proper to fight a battle he will do it; and he will choose the time and place he thinks most fit: in the meantime he begs the officers and soldiers of the Army to attend diligently to discharge their parts, and to leave to him and to the General Officers the decision of measures which belong to them alone.

The Army may rest assured that there is nothing he has more at heart than their honour, and that of their country.

The latter part of the above order alluded to a number of officers having been indiscreetly free in their criticisms of the military operations. This licence is characteristic of Englishmen; but in the present situation of the Army it had a most mischievous tendency. Moreover, as Sir John Moore kept all his intelligence extremely secret, it was quite impossible for the officers to judge of the propriety of the movements.

GENERAL ORDERS.

HEADQUARTERS, ASTORGA,
30th December, 1808.

The present is a moment when the Army is necessarily called upon to make great efforts, and to submit to privations, the bearing cheerfully with which is a quality not less estimable than valour.

The good-will of the inhabitants will be particularly useful to the Army, and can only be obtained by good conduct on the part of the troops.

The Commander of the Forces cannot impress too strongly on the whole Army the necessity of this; and he trusts that the Generals and Commanding Officers will adopt such measures, both on the march and in the cantonments, as will ensure it.

It is very probable that the Army will shortly have to meet the enemy; and the Commander of the Forces has no doubt that they will eagerly imitate the worthy example which has been set them by the Cavalry, on several recent occasions, and particularly in the affair of yesterday, in which Brigadier-General Stuart, with an inferior force, charged and overthrew one of the biggest corps of Cavalry in the French Army.

The Generals will immediately inspect the baggage of the brigades and divisions. They are held responsible that it does not exceed the proportion fixed by the General Orders.

GENERAL ORDERS.

HEADQUARTERS, LUGO,

6th January, 1809.

Generals and Commanding Officers of Corps must be as sensible as is the Commander of the Forces, of the complete disorganisation of the Army.

The advance guard of the French is already close to us, and it is to be presumed that the main body is not far distant; an action may, therefore, be hourly expected. If the Generals and Commanding Officers of regiments, feeling for the honour of their country and of the British arms, wish to give the Army a fair chance of success, they will exert themselves to restore order and discipline in the regiments, brigades, and divisions which they command.

The Commander of the Forces is tired of giving orders, which are never attended to: he therefore appeals to the honour and feeling of the Army he commands; and if those are not sufficient to induce them to do their duty, he must despair of succeeding by any other means. He was forced to order one soldier to be shot at Villafranca, and he will order all others to be executed who are guilty of similar enormities: but he considers that there would be no occasion to proceed to such extremities if the officers did their duty; as it is chiefly from their negligence, and from the want of proper regulations in the regiments, that crimes and irregularities are committed in quarters and upon the march.

GENERAL ORDERS.

NEAR LUGO,

7th January, 1809.

The Army must see that the moment is now come when, after the hardships and fatiguing marches they have undergone, they will have the opportunity of bringing the enemy to action. The Commander of the Forces has the most perfect confidence in their valour, and that it is only necessary to bring them to close contact with the enemy in order to defeat him; and a defeat, if it be complete, as he trusts it will be, will, in a great measure, end their labours.

The General has no other caution to give them, than not to throw away their fire at the enemy's skirmishers, merely because they fire at them; but to reserve it till they can give it with effect.

GENERAL ORDERS.

HEADQUARTERS, LUGO,

9th January, 1809.

It evident that the enemy will not fight this Army, notwithstanding the superiority of his number; but will endeavour to harass and tease it upon its march.

The Commander of the Forces requests that it may be carefully explained to the soldiers that their safety depends solely upon their keeping with their divisions, and marching with their regiments; that those who stop in villages, or straggle on the march, will inevitably be cut off by the French Cavalry, who have hitherto shown little mercy even to the feeble and infirm who have fallen into their hands.

The Army has still eleven leagues to march, the soldiers must make exertion to accomplish them; the rearguard cannot stop, and those who fall behind must take their fate.

So much fatigue had been endured in the march from Lugo that Sir John Moore halted on the 10th to give the soldiers repose. He there published a fresh order, being unwearied in his exertions to diminish the irregularities, though he could not entirely restore discipline.

GENERAL ORDERS.

HEADQUARTERS, BETANZOS,
10th January, 1809.

A great deal of irregularity has arisen from the practice of some Commanding Officers allowing soldiers, who pretend to be bad marchers, to precede their Corps. Men of this description, whom Commanding Officers may think expedient to send forward, must be placed under an officer, who is held responsible for their conduct.

(MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL OFFICERS.)

To prevent the renewal of the same scene which the march of last night presented, the Commander of the Forces directs that, previously to the march to-morrow morning, the General Officers will see their Divisions and Brigades properly formed; that they wheel them by sections; and that during the march, they pay constant attention to the preservation of that order.

It behoves us all to realise the fact that grumbling and criticisms *will* take place, and their mischievous tendency during operations in the field. Each one must, in his own particular sphere, discourage all "grousing" and ignorant criticism of what is being done. The General who is directing operations can alone decide when it is proper to fight: it is impossible that subordinates can have the necessary information to judge the propriety of movements ordered from headquarters.

"Grousing" is very infectious, and, if allowed to go unchecked, the *moral* of the force will be greatly affected for the worse. Now the bed-rock on which every *strategical* and *tactical* problem depends is the *moral* of the troops. The success of Japan has recently brought this fact very prominently to the front. The German instructor could not alone have produced the great results recently achieved by the Japanese Army had the latter not been composed of patriots, each individual ready to die rather than to do a discreditable act.

The question for us all, is how can we train our squadrons and regiments so that we may be sure that they can cope with the difficulties of all kinds which will undoubtedly confront them in war? Careful tactical training is not enough. We must be sure that the *foundation* is sound—*i.e.* the recruits on joining must have already a knowledge of *national* duty.

The educational system of the country should imbue the youth of Great Britain with a true feeling of patriotism. For the last fifty years the tendency of education has been to inculcate the idea that war is a crime instead of being a natural incident in the life of nations. It is a natural law that any animal which becomes unable to defend itself becomes a prey for the more plucky and powerful: the history of the world shows that the same law holds good for nations. Egypt, Greece, Italy, India, China, etc., are all examples of this.

These are facts, and the future efficiency of our Army greatly depends on their being recognised. France had to learn her lesson in 1870. Few people in England seem to realise fully what unsuccessful war must mean for us. No strategical and technical skill on the part of officers will make up for deficiencies in the human factor of our Armies. Moreover, training, discipline and methodical work are more potent than patriotism, when the latter is combined (as must inevitably be the case if organisation is lacking) with ignorance and lack of experience.

CHAPTER VII.

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE.

THE general idea is intended to bring into prominence the strategical employment of Cavalry covering the concentration of the Main Army to one flank. As Napoleon's employment of his Cavalry during the Ulm Campaign, 1805, is a classic historical example of this employment, the work of the Ride is prefaced by notes on that campaign.

General Idea. (*Vide* Sketch 21 and General Map No. 6.)

1. (a) Srinagar is the capital and base of an Eastern Empire.

Its western frontier runs from a point about 12 miles west of Chitral to another point some 40 miles north-west of the Malakand Pass; thence it turns eastwards near Abbottabad and thence south to Golra; from the latter point as far as the river Jhelum the existing N.-W. Railway line shows the frontier; thence a line eastwards to Pathankot.

(b) An *Independent State* is in alliance with the *Eastern Empire* and is bounded as follows:

The northern and eastern boundaries are contiguous with the Eastern Empire from north-west of the Malakand Pass to as far as Sihala; thence it passes along the Sohan river to Chaoutra, where it turns west, passing south of Khushalgarh, Kohat, and on to Kurram; thence it runs eastwards to the Khaibar, and thence north till it joins the Northern Frontier.

A *Neutral State* is bounded on the north-east by a line passing through Pathankot, west to Sihala, thence west-by-south by the Independent State to a point some 50 miles south-east of Kurram, whence it trends south and west to Chaman (the latter place is off the map).


Western State is bounded on the east by the Eastern Boundaries of the Eastern, Independent, and Neutral States of which the primary base is Kabul. The latter is connected by railway with Europe, its ultimate base.

2. (a) Hostilities have broken out between the Eastern Empire and Independent State on the one hand, and the Western Empire on the other.

(b) In order to gain time for reinforcements to arrive from Europe the Western Forces at once invade the Independent State, via the Khaibar and Kurram, with

MAP.

SKETCH 21



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about 75,000 men, and occupy the country as far east as a line Torbela-Attock, pushing reconnaissances towards Pindi, Abbottabad, and Derband.

(c) The troops of the Independent State (about 20,000) withdraw north of the Malakand Pass, until the Northern Army is ready to take the field.

Note.—In this Staff Ride the Attock defences, and other railways than those shown on Sketch 20, are non-existent.

Special Idea.—No. 1. (See General Map 6.)

1 The mountainous nature of the country and the absence of railways cause the strategical concentration of the *Eastern Forces* to proceed slowly. The general plan of the Committee of Defence is—

- | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|--|
| (a) To mobilise at once at Rawalpindi | { | 4 Infantry Divisions (British), each with their Divisional Troops. |
| | | 1 Infantry Brigade (British). |
| | | 1 Cavalry Division (the 1st) of 4 Brigades. |
| | | 1 Brigade Howitzers, and the usual Corps Troops. |
| „ „ Abbottabad | { | 1 Infantry Division (British). |
| | | 1 Cavalry Brigade. |
| | | 2 Native Infantry Brigades. |
| „ „ Derband | { | 1 Infantry Division (British), weak. |
| | | 1 Cavalry Regiment. |

Reserves, numbering 50,000, will begin to assemble at Rawalpindi as soon as possible after the first mobilisation is completed.

(b) To concentrate this Army as soon as possible on the line Haripur-Torbela-Khabal. This concentration is expected to be completed by the 20th March.

(c) To cross the Indus and march on Hoti Mardan, join hands with the corps of 20,000 of the Independent State [see paragraph 2 (c) of General Idea], and then, based on the line of the Malakand, to operate against the enemy's forces holding Nowshera, Attock, and vicinity.

2. As regards the Western Forces, reconnaissance and report of spies indicate that they—

(a) Hold the line of the right bank of the Haro river, from the point where it joins the Indus to a position north of Burhan Station (20 miles east), and have occupied Hazro and the villages lying to the north-east as far as the Indus. The Kabul river has been bridged between the Indus and Jehangira.

(b) A bridge of boats has been thrown across the Indus between Topi and Dal, 28 miles east of Attock. A force of Cavalry (estimated at 2,000), based on Dal-Mohat, is scouting towards Abbottabad and Haripur.

(c) Nowshera and Hoti Mardan are held by the enemy.

(d) The Khushalgarh-Golra road is reported to be clear of Western troops.

Note.—In the Staff Ride it is mainly the operations of the 1st Cavalry Division of the Eastern Army that will be considered.

Notes on the Ulm Campaign as a Basis for the Attack Cavalry Staff Ride.

The following *précis* is taken chiefly from General Bonnal's "De Rosbach à Ulm":


The Campaign of Ulm, 1805. (See General Maps 7 and 8, page 266.)

On the 24th August, 1805.—Napoleon concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with the Elector of Bavaria.

On the 23rd August.—Napoleon wrote from his camp at Boulogne to Talleyrand, Minister of Foreign Affairs as follows:

"The more I think over the European situation, the more I see the necessity for decisive action. I can really expect nothing in the way of explanation from Austria. She will reply with fine phrases and gain time in order that I can do nothing this winter, and in April I shall find 100,000 Russians in Poland subsidised by England, 15,000 or 20,000 English in Malta, and 15,000 Russians in Corfu. I shall then be in a critical position. So my mind is made up. I shall strike my camps and replace my war battalions with the 3rd battalions, which will always give me a fairly efficient Army at Boulogne, and on the 1st Vendémiaire (23rd September) I shall have 200,000 men in Germany and 23,000 men in the kingdom of Naples. I shall march on Vienna and we will not lay down our arms until I am in possession of Naples and Venice, and have so increased the Elector of Bavaria's kingdom that there will be nothing further to fear from Austria—Austria will certainly be pacified in this manner during the winter."

At this date (23rd August) Napoleon knew that Austria had withdrawn troops from Hungary and Bohemia, and was moving large forces towards the Bavarian frontier; and he presumed that during the coming autumn and winter he would have to deal only with the Austrian Armies. His intention to march at once upon Vienna is thus easily explained. The Bavarian alliance was sure, and the neutrality



of Prussia had been gained, while the presence of Massena with 50,000 men in Italy relieved him of any anxiety in that direction—Napoleon had, therefore, nothing to fear by carrying the war into Austria.

On the same day (23rd August) Napoleon sent several letters to Marshal Berthier containing orders to be issued regarding the forthcoming movement of the Grand Army towards the Rhine.

24th August.—Napoleon issued orders to complete the organisation and strength of the divisions of Reserve Cavalry, and to despatch them to the Rhine.

“The concentration of the Austrians in the Tyrol makes me think it will be useful at this time to ‘border le Rhin.’”

The six divisions of the Reserve Cavalry were then directed to form a screen on the left bank of the Rhine from Belfort to Mayence.

The 1st Division of heavy Cavalry (D’Hautpoul), two brigades, went into billets about Landau.

The 2nd Division of heavy Cavalry (Nansouty), three brigades, marched upon Schlestadt and Neu-Breisach.

The four divisions of Dragoons (each of two brigades) marched by two roads on Strasburg; the first two brigades left on the 26th, the other two on the 27th August.

25th August.—Murat and Bertrand were sent off on reconnaissances, viz. :

(I.) Murat, the Generalissimo himself of the Cavalry, was ordered to start by post on 26th August, and be back at Strasburg on 11th September. In 16 days he had to carry out the following programme :

1st. Go straight to Mayence, but not to stop there; pass through Frankfort, reconnoitre Offenbach, and go on to Würzburg, where he was to stay 36 hours.

“He will look at the communications from this place to Mayence and the Danube, and find out about the exits towards Ulm, Ingolstadt, and Ratisbon.”

This order was given after full deliberation.

Napoleon had ordered the 1st Corps to assemble at Göt-

tingen (Hanover), whilst the 2nd Corps marched on Mayence (order of 23rd August). Thus Würzburg might be chosen as the point of junction for the two corps. "In this case is it possible to move in several columns (at least in two) upon Ulm, Ingolstadt, or Ratisbon?" The fact that these three towns are mentioned shows that Napoleon was thinking of uniting the bulk of his forces near one of them before beginning the actual operations against the Austrians, who had halted in observation on the right bank of the Inn.

2nd. From Würzburg to go to Bamberg, and from there to the Bohemian frontier, near Egra.

"He will look at the communications between Bamberg, Bohemia, and the Danube, find out about the Bohemian mountains, have a description compiled of the route from Bamberg to Prague and especially of the Egra gorges—it is of the utmost importance that he should procure a copy of 'Marshal Belle-Isle's Campaign.'"^{*}

For Napoleon, Bamberg would be the point of junction of the troops which he would have to concentrate against any Austrian diversion debouching from Egra upon the left flank of the Grand Army as it marched upon Ingolstadt or Ratisbon. And so, in his eyes, the account of the famous retreat from Prague would supply some valuable hints to the commander of the containing force eventually located at Bamberg.

3rd. Follow the river Regnitz, go along the left bank of the Danube, cross that river at Passau and move up the Inn as far as Kufstein, then pass through Munich, visit Ulm, Stockach, see the battle-field of Möeskirch, and have a look at the exits from the Black Forest.

(II.) General Bertrand (an engineer) was ordered to go direct to Munich and to deliver an autograph letter from Napoleon to the Elector of Bavaria, to examine Passau fortress, carry out a thorough reconnaissance of the Inn as far

^{*} The reference is to Marshal Belle-Isle's retirement from Prague through the Egra gorges to Alsace, pursued by the Austrian Army under Prince Lobkowitz, in December 1742.

as Kufstein, of the Salza as far as Salzburg, and to report on the road from Wasserburg (on the Inn) to Munich. Detailed information regarding the exits of the passes from the Tyrol into Bavaria was wanted, and the Lech had to be reconnoitred from Fussen downwards, also Donauwörth and Ingolstadt.

General Bertrand had finally to reconnoitre the Regnitz as far as the Main, and from Bamberg he was ordered to go to Ulm: then to Stuttgart and Rastadt. "In the course of this journey, he will be careful to indicate very clearly the road from Ulm to Donauwörth by the left bank of the Danube, from there to Ingolstadt and thence to Ratisbon. From Ratisbon to Passau he will fill in details of the road according to information gathered. When at Passau he will reconnoitre the road which goes from Passau into Bohemia. Is it possible to march to Prague by this route?"

Napoleon's train of thought is clearly visible. He wishes to lead his Army from the Middle Rhine into the district north of Ratisbon, thence to march on Vienna along the edge of the Bohemian mountains with the Danube covering his right flank. Only it is most essential that, during the execution of this march, no Austrian corps should be able to come either from Prague to Passau, or from Prague to Bamberg.

Referring to the instructions issued to these three officers, Von Wartenburg, in "Napoleon as a General" (vol. i., page 203), writes as follows:—

"In these orders the Emperor's whole plan of campaign is revealed, and we should pay the greatest attention to them; for Napoleon, standing as he did at the head of the State, invested with absolute power and no longer fettered by any personal considerations, has now free-play for his genius and could put his ideas fully into practice.

"To begin with, we note that he resolved to bring matters to an issue in Germany; we have already, when treating of the campaign of 1800, pointed to the fact that the decisive point lay there. He now placed the bulk of his Army, 200,000 men, there, opposing only 50,000 men to the Austrian

Army in Italy. Thus we have a more markedly admirable illustration than at any other time of his *principle of appearing at the decisive point with overwhelming forces, neglecting all considerations of secondary importance*. And, just as in 1800 against Kray's left wing, these overwhelming forces were now set in motion against the right wing of the Austrian Army in Germany, as indeed the reconnaissance of the roads by Savary (*vide* page 239) led us to expect. This wing was the right one to attack, for it was the one first met with from the north-west and indeed from the north, whence two corps, those of Bernadotte and Marshal Marmont, were marching. Therefore, by attacking and turning this wing with superior strength, the Emperor would cut the Austrians entirely off from their communications with Vienna, and would consequently annihilate them.

"Here we must point out the difference which is shown between Napoleon's strategy and that in vogue nowadays. Napoleon, as appeared from his first plan in 1800, and as now may be more particularly noted here, effected the strategical concentration of his Army in the first place on the enemy's flank, so that with a simple forward movement for battle he gained the latter's communications; hence the first encounter could not fail to prove an Ulm or a Jena. Nowadays this can no longer be done. Inasmuch as we must endeavour now to employ *all* the railway lines for our concentration, and inasmuch as the enemy also has to make use of all his railway lines leading towards the frontier, there will be in the main a frontal concentration on the part of both combatants, and it will no longer be possible to gain such an enormous advantage with respect to *space* in the first massing of forces, as Napoleon gained here by his strategical marches on the enemy's flank; it will only be possible to gain an advantage in point of time.

"In Napoleon's day there was plenty of time during the march of the Armies to the field (for then they had to march) to become acquainted with the enemy's formation and to direct one's own concentration to his flank, assuming of course

a correct strategical perception of the situation. The modern rapidity of mobilisation and of strategical deployment by means of railways has made the latter a task which must be arranged in all its details during peace; it is therefore impossible to alter it according to the position of the enemy's flank. Only after the Armies have been massed and operations have begun, can a superiority of strategical calculation be displayed as to placing oneself on the flank or the rear of the enemy; hence the manœuvres with which Napoleon was in the habit of opening his campaigns will only be possible after the first few encounters. We can no longer begin immediately with a Jena, but we can still, after a Wörth or a Spicheren, choose our lines of operation in such a manner that we may force the enemy to a Gravelotte."

The main principles of the plan of operations had already taken shape in the mind of Napoleon by the 25th August—perhaps even on the 23rd when he took steps to concentrate the 1st and 2nd Corps at Würzburg. That plan consisted in turning the important and numerous watercourses (constituting so many defensive lines) which flow from the Tyrol into the Danube, from Ulm to Passau, by operating along the *left* bank of that river. The proof of this statement is confirmed by the following phrase at the end of the instructions given to General Bertrand:

"What advantageous circumstances or obstacles confront an Army marching along the left bank of the Danube with the object of turning the river Inn, and which might move by Freistadt (20 miles north-north-east of Linz, the latter being on the Danube about 45 miles below Passau) with the intention of advancing into Moravia?"

The letter which General Bertrand delivered to the Elector of Bavaria (dated 25th August) shows that Napoleon had formed the opinion that Austria would not attack until the following spring; it also contains the following information:

"My intention is to entrust my advance guard to Prince Murat, who will probably precede me by several days' march." Thus the Grand Army is to be preceded by a

"strategical advance guard" to ensure to Napoleon strategical freedom of action.

28th August.—Murat and Bertrand had been sent off on their reconnaissances on the 26th. Three days later Napoleon's ideas have further developed. He now sends one of his aides-de-camp (General Savary) to explore and report on three parallel roads running from the Rhine to the Upper Danube, which seem suitable for the corps of the Grand Army to use.

These roads are—

- (1) Mannheim to Dillingen.
- (2) Gernersheim to Gundelfingen :
 - (a) by Bruchsal, Aalen, Heidenheim.
 - (b) by Weissenstein and Heidenheim.
- (3) Pforzheim to Ulm by Stuttgart.

The reconnaissances ordered by Napoleon on the 25th and 28th August show the working of his mind.

The main idea appears first of all to march on Vienna with 200,000 men before the Russians can make their strength felt. But the Austrians are concentrating on the right bank of the Inn. Their position will be turned by marching down the left bank of the Danube.

What difficulties beset this march from Ulm to Passau? Prince Murat and General Bertrand will answer this question.

Before beginning the operations properly speaking, the means for carrying on the struggle must be collected.

If the Austrians remain in observation on the Bavarian frontier, as their interests seem to demand, the Grand Army ought to be concentrated within measurable distance of the Inn.

The concentration of the Grand Army can be carried out under favourable conditions in Bavaria, the country of an ally. The zone of assembly should touch the Danube because that river will serve as an obstacle towards the enemy and will conceal the operation. But it must be possible to reach this zone by good roads, sufficient in number and at suitable

distances one from the other, with ample lateral communications. Between Carlsruhe and Mannheim, immediately north of the Black Forest, Napoleon noticed that there were the beginnings of three, if not four, itineraries, leading towards the front Ulm-Dillingen (about 35 miles).

Hence General Savary was sent at once to reconnoitre these roads, and report on the size of the water-courses and valleys which they cross, etc.

On this date (28th August) Napoleon seems to have decided to avoid sending any troops through the Black Forest. It is a wooded mountainous district with few and indifferent roads, so that the columns would experience much difficulty in marching, in obtaining supplies, and in billeting.

29th August.—The 7th Corps (Augereau) is detailed as Strategic Reserve and only the four corps in the camps on the English Channel are set in movement towards the Rhine. Napoleon remained himself at Boulogne until the 5th September, busy with the organisation of his forces.

6th September.—An order was sent to Marshal Bernadotte to have his Army Corps (the 1st) at Würzburg by the 23rd and 24th September. On the 26th August an order to Marmont directed him to have his Corps (the 2nd) at Mayence by the 17th September, at the latest. The start given to these Corps over those marching to the Rhine between Mannheim and Strasburg, shows clearly that by the end of August Napoleon had an idea of concentrating the 1st (Bernadotte's) and 2nd (Marmont's) Corps at Würzburg, at the time the 3rd (Davout's), 4th (Soul't's), 5th (Lannes'), and 6th (Ney's) Corps would be beginning to cross the Rhine.

Würzburg to Mannheim is	.	.	.	3 marches.
"	"	Egra (Bohemian frontier).	6	"
"	"	Ratisbon	.	6
"	"	Donauwörth	.	5

By the time the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Corps were upon the Rhine between Strasburg and Mannheim, the 1st and 2nd Corps (and eventually the Bavarian Corps) would be

at Würzburg and in a position to cover the deployment of the main body of the Grand Army upon the Neckar by containing any Austrian forces which might try to debouch from Bohemia.

On the other hand, if the Austrian forces concentrated only in the Tyrol and behind the Inn, the 1st and 2nd Corps (with the Bavarian Corps) would form a manœuvring mass ready to outflank the Austrian right wing.

12th September.—Napoleon wrote to Fouché:—"Forbid the gazettes published about the Rhine to speak of the Army, but bid them to write as if it does not exist."

13th September.—The aerial telegraph was working between Strasburg and Paris. Murat, who had been ordered to be at Strasburg by the 11th September, after the completion of his reconnaissance, reports by telegraph on the 13th that the Austrians crossed the Inn on the 10th September and were marching on Munich. Without losing a moment, Napoleon at once sent an order to General Marmont to go on ahead of his Corps to Mayence to take command of the place and put it in a state of defence, as well as of Kastel, its *tête-du-pont*.

"General Marmont must send spies, officers even, to Nuremberg and into Franconia to discover and watch the movements of the Austrians.

"Under certain circumstances, there is no doubt but that you should manœuvre to combine with Marshal Bernadotte's movement upon Würzburg in order to support him." Prince Murat received orders to send agents to Donaueschingen, to the several exits of the Black Forest, to Kempton and Stockach.

15th September.—General Marmont is ordered to march to Würzburg, where Bernadotte's Corps and the Bavarian troops were to assemble. Napoleon was at St. Cloud from 7th to 22nd September: the 23rd and 24th were spent in Paris: and he reached Strasburg on the 25th September.

17th September.—An order from Napoleon fixes the points where the Cavalry Divisions and Corps of the Grand Army

are to cross the Rhine, and fixes their itineraries up to the points of assembly which have been selected near the Danube, left bank. The main body of the Army was to cross the Rhine along a line from Mannheim to Kehl, seventy miles in extent, on the 26th September, the independent Divisions of Cavalry having preceded it on the 25th by the same roads. The latter would arrive before the entrances of the Black Forest and penetrate some way into them. Thus they would not only cover their own Army during the passage of the Rhine, but also create amongst the enemy a mistaken impression as to the real direction of the Emperor's advance. For, as we see, the mass of the Army was not to cross the Black Forest frontally, but to turn to the left so as to avoid its passes, and to stand by the 9th October on the line Weissenburg-Nordlingen-Aalen-Ulm.

"This employment of the Cavalry," writes Count von Wartenburg, in his work on "Napoleon as a General," "may be considered masterly. It is indeed a characteristic, uniformly noticeable in the strategy of all the greatest generals, that they know how to utilise their Cavalry to the best advantage. For it is this arm, designed for a wide field and rapidity of movement, which requires superior officers of exceptionally large grasp and quick resolution, who, keeping only the great aims of a war in view, are able to set aside objects of secondary importance and to put up with heavy losses also, for Cavalry employed over a large area must often get into situations from which it cannot withdraw without suffering them." Napoleon himself said: "The use of Cavalry demands boldness and ability; above all it should not be handled with any miserly desire to keep it intact." And again in this very campaign: "I do not wish the horses to be spared if they can catch men. Take no heed of the complaints of the Cavalry, for if such great objects may be obtained as the destruction of a whole hostile Army, the State can afford to lose a few hundred horses from exhaustion."

The effect of the order of the 17th September is summed

up as follows by the Emperor : " Thus on the 9th (or 10th) October Ney's and Lannes' (6th and 5th) Corps should be at Ulm : Soult (4th) at Aalen : Davout (3rd) at Nordlingen ; Bernadotte (1st) and Marmont (2nd) at Weissenburg : the Reserve Cavalry (a division of Cuirassiers and two of Dragoons), the park, and the Guard Grenadiers at Gmund." By this order Napoleon assigns points of assembly for his Army Corps 125 miles distant from their starting points upon the Rhine ; and for the 1st and 2nd Corps 100 miles from Würzburg.

It should be noted that the Austrian Army which crossed the Inn near Wasserburg on the 10th September could have had its outposts fifteen days later on the Danube from Möeskirch to Donauwörth, and its main body at Memmingen.

But on the 17th September Napoleon does not credit the enemy with such decisive action. Being in the dark as to the nature of the Austrian movements, then in course of execution, Napoleon does not yet modify the plan which he has formed, but reserves the power to do so later, if circumstances require it. Similarly von Verdy writes (page 11, " With the Royal Headquarters, 1870-71 ") : " In making a plan of operation it is always well to begin first of all by getting a clear idea of what our own intentions are, and only then to ask oneself what the opponent may do to foil them. If the opposite course were taken, and one were first to consider what the opponent could do, and then deduce one's own plan, the latter would be dependent on the opponent's will. This would be to allow him to lay down the course of procedure and to deprive oneself of the most important factor in the conduct of war, viz. *the initiative*. And so, in order to keep our attention fixed upon the objective of our operations we must constantly fight against drawing imaginary conclusions which partial news of the enemy may cause our minds to formulate. A good general follows the plan which he has decided upon until the enemy opposes some obstacle in his path ; then

he operates with the object of destroying the hostile masses which have placed themselves in his way."

In the present case there was nothing to prevent the junction of the French Corps into four groups, namely, the right (5th and 6th Corps) at Ulm, the centre (4th and 3rd Corps) between Aalen and Nordlingen, the left (1st and 2nd Corps) at Weissenburg, and, lastly, the Guard and Reserve Cavalry at Gmund.

As the crow flies, the distance from Ulm to Aalen is about 31 miles; 19 miles from Aalen to Nordlingen; and 31 miles from Nordlingen to Weissenburg. So that the Army would be formed into three groups on a front of about 80 miles.

The instructions contained in the order of 17th September do not take into account the enemy's possible movements, *i.e.* where and when he is likely to be met. They seem to be the result of a decision arrived at before the Austrians had entered Munich.

There appears to be no doubt that on the 17th September Napoleon paid but little attention to the invasion of Bavaria and occupation of Munich by the Austrians, because on the 18th September he wrote to Massena:

"I calculate that I shall cross the Rhine on the 27th September, *and I shall not stop until I am on the Inn and beyond it.*"

In Napoleon's mind, the manœuvre to turn the line of the Inn must follow at once, without any delay, after the grouping of the forces as laid down in the order of the 17th September, and he expected the decisive battle to be beyond the Inn, perhaps on the Morawa.

20th September.—Napoleon issues an order from Saint Cloud modifying the disposition contained in that of the 17th September. He now takes into consideration the probable positions of the Austrians behind the Danube on the front Donauwörth-Ulm, and withdraws the Right of the Grand Army northwards from Ulm. Thus the strategical Front of the Army is now almost parallel with the Danube, and is reduced to some 52 instead of over 80 miles in length.

21st September.—Napoleon still thought that the advance guard (the Reserve Cavalry under Murat and 5th Corps under Lannes) could pass by the Kniebis road through the Black Forest, and he orders Murat to send his Dragoon Divisions by the three roads (Frieberg, Offenburg, Kniebis) through the Black Forest, and to push his reconnaissances as far forward as possible.

This evening (or on the morning of the 22nd) Napoleon, who was still at Saint Cloud, learns that the Austrians had appeared in considerable strength at the various exits from the Black Forest, as well as on the side of the Lake of Constance. At the same time he hears that the Austrian advance guard is on the Iller, and the main body of the Army between Munich and Augsburg. Under the circumstances, Murat and Lannes cannot march by Kniebis, but must be drawn to the north of the Black Forest.

Napoleon was still in hope that he could leave the Austrians to sleep in false security on the Upper Rhine, whilst he operated to cut them off from the Inn before the arrival of the Russians.

He therefore drew up the following table with his own hand:

Saint Cloud, 22nd September.

	28th September.	6th October.	9th October.	16th October.
Bernadotte—1st Corps	Würzburg.	Anspach.	Nuremberg.	Ratisbon.
Marmont 2nd "	Mannheim.	Mergentheim	Anspach.	Dietfurt.
Davout 3rd "	Selz.	Crailsheim.	Weissenburg.	Ingolstadt.
Ney 6th "	Strasburg.	Gmund.	Nordlingen.	Neuburg.
Lannes 5th "	Landau.	Aalen.	Donauwörth.	
Soult 4th "				

On the 16th October the three Corps on the left would be ready to contain the Russians if they appeared: and the three Corps on the right to reduce the defences on the Lech, no matter whether the enemy decided to hold the left or the right bank. For it will be seen that the 5th and 6th Corps from Neuburg and Ingolstadt are in a position to take in

flank the defences on the right bank : while the 4th Corps from Donauwörth could debouch upon the enemy's flank in the event of his holding the left bank.

But two faults seem patent in the order of the 22nd September :

1st. An enveloping movement is planned about a month beforehand against an enemy who is believed to be on the Iller, but who is perfectly free to move as he chooses, and that for several days.

2nd. Suppose the Austrians remained stationary until they found their position turned, and then decided to reach the Inn before the French, the campaign would then be shifted further eastwards, towards the district whence the Russians were expected to arrive.

The orders of the 22nd September aimed at a second Marengo. But, even with his boldness, Napoleon could not attempt so rash a manœuvre before knowing the actual strength of the Austrians in Bavaria, their position, and how far away the Russians would be when the first collisions took place. So he abandoned the plan of operations embodied in the orders in question.

26th September.—Napoleon decided not to attempt to force the Kniebis defile. The 5th Corps (Lannes) was halted between Rastadt and Baden, and Lannes was ordered to reconnoitre up to Wildbad with his Cavalry. The reconnaissances are to start before daylight : "You will send two regiments two leagues (5 miles), one regiment two more leagues (10 miles), a squadron another league (12½ miles), and a well mounted 'piquet' another league (total, 15 miles)."

Note how Napoleon considered that the special circumstances of the situation required three regiments to scout 15 miles. Owing to a long defile through the mountains, it was necessary to arrange for detachments of increasing size towards the rear, to secure the safe retirement of the parties in front.

But why scout to Wildbad ?

The 5th Corps (Lannes) had to march northwards from

Rastadt along the narrow valley of the Rhine before it reached a road by which it could arrive at its position between the 4th (Sault) and 6th (Ney) Corps in the general march disposition of the Grand Army. During the flank march it was necessary to protect it from any surprise which a hostile detachment might attempt by descending through the Black Forest by Simmersfeld or Wildbad.

27th September.—Marshal Davout (3rd Corps) was ordered to send a staff officer to Marshal Marmont (2nd Corps), and to communicate with him by Cavalry connecting posts every evening, partly in order to exchange information, and partly in order to be in a position either to support him or to be supported by him.

Writing to Marshal Bernadotte to-day, Napoleon thus outlines the situation:

"The Austrians have sent no detachments over (*i.e.* on to the left bank of) the Danube, and the Russians have not yet arrived. I am thus in a position to deal with any eventually.

"From Würzburg you will march to the Danube, in accordance with the orders which the Minister of War is sending you. Keep General Marmont on your right and the Bavarians on your left.

"I shall join up my whole Army with Marmont, and if I have the good luck for the Austrian Army to remain sleeping three or four days longer on the Iller and in the Black Forest, I shall have turned it, and I hope only some fragments will escape. Austria will be done for before the 12th October."

The plan thus unfolded to Marshal Bernadotte was arrived at gradually, and was not, as some historians make out, at once decided upon when the camps at Boulogne were struck. There is something very human in the workings of Napoleon's mind, as indicated by the several modifications of his orders.

At the same time that Napoleon sent instructions to his marshals to ensure a certain combination in their marches,

he left Prince Murat with three divisions of mounted, and one division of dismounted, Dragoons facing the exits from the Black Forest defiles, to occupy the attention of the Austrians and to lull them to sleep.

Marshal Ney was ordered to occupy alarm quarters at Stuttgart on the 30th September in order that his whole Army Corps (6th) might be concentrated if necessary "in less than two hours. I wish him to take up a good position at Stuttgart, because I don't want any serious fighting in that direction."

Ney's 6th Corps was thus to form the pivot on which the rest of the Grand Army wheeled from facing east to south, preparatory to its advance in three groups in echelon from the left (two Corps in each group) towards Heidenheim, Nordlingen, and Eichstadt.

30th September.—The following extracts from a letter, dated the 30th September, written by Napoleon to Marshal Augereau, commanding the reserve at Langres, explain the situation at this date as well as his intentions:—

"My dear and good brother the Emperor of Austria came to Memmingen. His Army is opposite the exits from the Black Forest: counting the troops which are towards Lake Constance, it numbers 100,000 men; but reports which reached me yesterday state that the Emperor returned to Vienna after holding a grand council yesterday. May God grant that his Army may remain in the same positions for another eight or ten days, or, what would be still better, may advance towards the Rhine.

"Marshals Lannes (5th) and Ney (6th), the Dragoon Divisions, and my Guard, have reached Stuttgart. I am leaving myself to-night to take command of this part of the Army, in order to combine with Marshal Soult and to turn Ulm. The Austrians are done for if they allow me to gain a few marches on them. I hope to be able to turn them and to place myself with my whole Army between the Lech and the Isar; but I fancy the departure of the Emperor already indicates an awakening, and that the Austrians will be in a

hurry to withdraw from Bavaria. The head of the Russians is gradually drawing nearer."

Napoleon does not yet imagine that the Austrians are going to shut themselves up in Ulm. He believes that they are behind the Iller, their centre at Memmingen protected towards the Upper Rhine by strong detachments holding the Black Forest defiles, and others posted in the direction of the Lake of Constance.

2nd October.—When Napoleon speaks of "turning Ulm," he means to do so well below the junction of the Iller with the Danube, because on the 2nd October (two days later) he writes as follows from Ettlingen to Bernadotte :

"I am following the road Stuttgart, Schorndorf, Gmünd, Aalen, in order, if the enemy crosses the Danube and waits for us at Heidenheim, personally to direct the movements of the right, *i.e.* 5th and 6th Corps, Reserve Cavalry, Guard, and Soult's 4th Corps. My latest information is that the enemy is still on the Iller, and has fortified Memmingen."

Napoleon's information of the enemy's movements was very good. He writes this same night to his brother Joseph : "The enemy is marching and countermarching, and seems much perplexed"; and he calculates that with the right of his Army, numbering 80,000, he will be in greatly superior strength on the battle-field to the enemy, whose total numbers are 100,000, but who are so much scattered that not more than 50,000 could be united on one battle-field to oppose him.

Napoleon informed Murat to-day that the Dragoon Divisions (mounted and foot) which had been employed from 25th September until 1st October in scouting the passes of Oberkirch, Kniebis, and the *Val d'Enfer* were on the march by Rastadt to join him at Stuttgart. Murat is requested to come at once to the Imperial Headquarters at Münchingen (10 miles north-north-west of Stuttgart), and in the meantime Napoleon prepares him for what he wants him to do with the Cavalry : "You must flank the whole of my march, which is a delicate operation, because it is an oblique

march towards the Danube. If the enemy tries to take the offensive, you must give me warning in good time, in order that I may have the initiative, and not be obliged to do what suits the enemy."

Napoleon still does not believe that the Austrians are concentrated at Ulm, but believes that they are behind the Iller, and that when the advance of the Grand Army is reported, they will cross to the left bank of the Danube, either by Ulm, or Donauwörth, or Ingolstadt, and will attack the French columns of march in flank.

During this "delicate flank march" Napoleon is determined that his *will* shall not be subordinated to that of his enemy. At all costs he means to preserve his liberty of action. Note the means he employs to secure this end :

Three Divisions of Dragoons under Murat are detached towards the enemy (*i.e.* upon Napoleon's right) with orders as given above. But they are not to be without support. Napoleon orders as follows :

"The Dragoons will leave Stuttgart on the 3rd October. The 6th (Ney's) Corps will follow them on the 4th instant at 24 hours' distance, and will operate under the orders of Murat, who will command the whole flank guard, numbering 30,000 to 35,000 men.

"I shall be myself with Marshal Lannes' 5th Corps, which marches by Gmund."

Murat's flank guard marched by Göppingen and Weissenstein upon Heidenheim.

On the 5th October the 6th Corps, supporting Murat's Dragoons, was at Göppingen, while the 5th Corps reached Gmund, and Saint-Hilaire's Division (from the 4th Corps), coming from Heilbronn, halted at Gaildorf.

"You see, then, that if the enemy were to debouch from Ulm with the object of attacking me in flank, the two Corps (6th and 5th), with which he would be met, could be easily reinforced by part of Soult's (4th) Corps, which I have disposed suitably for that purpose."

3rd October.—In a letter, dated Ludwigsberg, 3rd October,

Napoleon explained to Davout the three movements open to the Austrians, and how to frustrate each in turn. The latter were still in possession of the Danube, and were free to debouch on to the left bank, either by Ulm, by Donauwörth, by Ingolstadt, or by all three crossings simultaneously, in order to assail the Grand Army in flank.

Napoleon also wrote to-day to Marshal Soult: "My intention, when we meet the enemy, is to surround him on every side." And in a letter to his brother Joseph he states: "No blood has been spilt anywhere yet."

Thus, before the smallest engagement had taken place, Napoleon contemplates investing and capturing the enemy's Army. This is the first time in which such an idea appears in Napoleon's correspondence.

4th October.—On the 4th October Napoleon knew that the enemy was still behind the Danube, and had made no offensive movement.

He was more than ever confirmed in his decision to cross the Danube below the point where the Lech joins. This movement, however, required a covering force in the direction of the enemy who was known to be established on the Iller.

Ney's 6th Corps, with Bourcier's Division of Dragoons, was directed to remain on the left bank of the Danube: "Bourcier's Division at Geislingen," in order to explore "all the crossings from Ulm, and to cover the whole movement"; the 6th Corps at Heidenheim, with detachments of light Cavalry at Giengen, watching the crossings from Gundelfingen.

The remaining Cavalry Divisions marched by Neresheim on Nordlingen under Murat's orders.

At the same time Napoleon busied himself in providing means for the 4th (Soult's), 5th (Lannes'), 3rd (Davout's), 2nd (Marmont's), and 1st (Bernadotte's) Corps to cross the Danube.

5th October.—Napoleon wrote from Gmünd to Murat telling him that Marshal Soult reported 5,000 to 6,000 of the enemy at Nordlingen. The 4th Corps would deal with these, and

Murat, with the Dragoon Divisions, instead of moving by Nordlingen as already ordered, was now to march on the 6th from Heidenheim direct on Donauwörth.

6th October.—Napoleon wrote to Soult from Aalen: "My intention is to throw bridges of boats across the Danube below the point of junction with the Lech, in order to turn that position; but if I can surprise the bridge at Donauwörth this plan will not prevent me from making use of it at once."

Soult's 4th Corps had the good fortune to find the bridge of Munster, a few miles above Donauwörth, undefended, and occupied it.

On the evening of the 6th October, the Grand Army was disposed approximately as shown in the Sketch 22.

Comparing the actual positions of the Grand Army on the 6th October with those which the several Corps ought to have reached on the 9th October, in accordance with Napoleon's order of 20th September, it will be seen that the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Corps have gained three days, and the 5th and 6th Corps five days. The acceleration of the march was due to urgent orders from Napoleon, who was afraid that the Austrians might extricate themselves from their dangerous position by withdrawing towards the Inn before he could place his troops upon the Lech.

Napoleon now decided to pass his troops simultaneously over the Danube at three points of crossing below the mouth of the Lech, and also at Donauwörth, namely:

At Ingolstadt . . . 1st Corps and Bavarians.

At Neuburg . . . 2nd „

At Bertholzheim . . 3rd „

At Donauwörth . . Murat's Cavalry, 4th and 5th Corps.

Thus, supposing that the 1st Corps and the Bavarians were required to act as a containing force against the Russians, who were reported to be marching towards the lower Inn, Napoleon would have:

1st. As a covering force to watch the sector Ulm-Geislingen - Heidenheim - Gundelfingen, Ney's 6th Corps

Bourcier's Division of Dragoons, and a Division of Dis-mounted Dragoons.

2nd. As covering force towards the east, either at Ingolstadt, Freising, or Munich, Bernadotte's 1st Corps and the Bavarians.

3rd. To make a frontal attack from east to west against the line of the Lech, which was supposed to be held by the Austrians, Davout's 3rd and Marmont's 2nd Corps.

4th. To take this line in reverse on the left bank, and from north to south, Soult's 4th and Lannes' 5th Corps, with Murat's Cavalry, and perhaps the Guard.

It will be noted that Napoleon had not yet judged it necessary to hold in force the exits from Ulm on the left bank of the Danube. He wrote to Murat on 5th October :

"General Bourcier can hardly be turned out by Cavalry, so he must only retire when he sees Infantry in force. The enemy will not be able to occupy a position about Ulm. So order him to place posts on all the exits from Ulm at a distance of 7 or 8 miles.

7th October.—Events now began to move quickly.

Early this day, the 4th Corps (Soult) carried the bridge at Donauwörth, which was weakly held, and crossed the Danube there. Murat's Cavalry, followed by Lannes' 5th Corps, crossed at Munster.

On reaching Donauwörth, Napoleon learned that General Kienmayer was in command of the enemy's Division which had fought there, and had then retired towards Munich. He at once concludes that the bulk of the Austrian Army must be on the march to escape from its perilous position.

8th October.—Soult (4th Corps) is ordered to march on Augsburg, keeping two Divisions on the right bank and one on the left: Murat's Cavalry and Oudinot's Division of Lannes' Corps (5th) to Burgau, on the main road from Ulm to Augsburg. Napoleon calculated that the mass of the Austrian Army must pass by Augsburg on its retreat towards Munich and the River Inn. The main body of Lannes' 5th Corps was ordered to halt at Wertingen, and to com-

municate with the 6th Corps (Ney) by the bridge of Dillingen.

At 1 p.m. Napoleon sent an aide-de-camp (General Dumas) to Neuburg to hurry on the crossing of his left wing, as he expected the Austrians to attack. He calculated that the whole Austrian Army could be before Augsburg on the 10th.

9th October.—Supposing that the Austrian Army, after concentrating on the south of Ulm, had advanced on Augsburg with the object of cutting its way through the French forces, Napoleon would have had at his disposal on the 9th October four Army Corps disposed as follows:

(1) At Gunzburg astride the Danube, Ney's 6th Corps, forming the most westerly group of the Grand Army.

(2) At Wertingen, the Imperial Guard and Suchet's Division (detached from Soult's 4th Corps).

(3) At Zumarshausen, Lannes' 5th Corps.

In advance (*i.e.* west) of the line Zumarshausen-Wertingen, towards Burgau, Murat's Cavalry.

(4) The line of the Lech, from Rain to Augsburg organised as a defensive barrier and occupied as follows:

At Rain, an Infantry regiment with Artillery and Cavalry.

At Augsburg, three Divisions of Soult's 4th Corps.

(5) In reserve in rear of the left wing, at Aicha, Davout's 3rd Corps.

Napoleon's plan was for the advance guard to fall back from Wertingen to Donauwörth, whilst the 5th, 4th, and 3rd Corps, together with Murat's Cavalry, manœuvred towards his right with the object of driving the enemy into the *cul-de-sac* formed by the Danube and Lech near Donauwörth.

The Austrian General, however, had no plan of such a decided nature. To go back a few days, and consider the movements of the Austrians, on *the 5th October* General Mack, the Austrian Commander-in-Chief, heard of the French at Geislingen (Ney and Murat). He concluded that this was

the left of the Grand Army moving to attack his right, and that the French main body was marching through the Black Forest direct upon the Iller. He therefore deployed his Army on the right bank of that river south of Ulm facing west.

6th October.—Discovering his mistake, Mack concentrates his Army between Ulm and Gunzenburg, and faces north.

7th October.—The passage of a French Corps at Donauwörth is reported. Mack decides to march thither, and to drive back the enemy; and with this object Auffenberg's Division is sent off as advance guard towards Wertingen. Later in the day, however, he changes his mind, and decides to retire by Augsburg on Munich and Wasserburg (on the Inn).

8th October.—Preparations for this retreat are begun.

9th October.—On the head of his columns reaching Burgau, he hears that Auffenberg's Division has been cut up. Thereupon Mack's next plan is to cross the Danube at Gunzburg and to escape to Bohemia. But on the evening of the 9th, Ney captures Gunzburg bridge and repulses the new advance guard which had been sent out by the Austrians. Mack is still determined to march towards Bohemia, so he orders a retreat on Ulm, meaning to march by Nordlingen and Nuremberg.

10th October.—The Austrian Army falls back to Ulm and prepares to march next day on Heidenheim.

Turning again to consideration of Napoleon's operations:

10th October.—Vague rumours are current that the Russians are approaching the Inn. Napoleon's orders of the 9th already foresee a possibility of having to meet an attack from the east, and on the 10th October two advance guards or "covering groups" are formed: one *offensive*, towards the west, consisting of the 5th (Lannes') and 6th (Ney's) Corps and four Divisions of Cavalry, all under Murat: the other, *defensive*, towards the east, namely, Bernadotte's (1st) and Davout's (3rd) Corps and the Bavarians, all under Bernadotte.

The remainder of the Grand Army, under the orders of the

Emperor, was disposed as follows, ready to act towards the east or west as the situation required: Soult's 4th Corps at Landsberg, Marmont's 2nd Corps and the Guard at Augsburg.

Sketch 23 shows approximately the relative position of the several corps and the intervening distances.

A distance of two marches (25 to 30 miles) separates the three Reserve Corps on the Lech from the covering groups. This must be considered as about the minimum distance for an Army of five or six Corps, which expects to be attacked from opposite directions. For, suppose the Austrian Army on the Iller, numbering 80,000, had marched on Burgau on the 12th October, it would have been able to drive back the 5th and 6th Corps some 10 or 12 miles. On hearing of the advance in the afternoon, Napoleon would have had time to select a battle-field between Burgau and Augsburg, and to move out the 2nd Corps and the Guard during the night 12th-13th to it; and also at the same time to direct the 4th Corps in such a way as to strike the enemy's right flank whilst he was engaged next day with the 2nd, 5th, 6th, and Guard.

Similarly, if the Russians were to debouch from the Isar, twenty-four hours at least would be required to organise a battle between the Isar and Lech in which the 1st, 2nd, 3rd Corps, Guard, and Bavarians, and perhaps the 4th Corps could take part.

The distance of two marches chosen by Napoleon on the 10th October, as a *suitable zone for strategical manœuvre*, is the same as what he advised Massena to form before the opening of the 1800 Campaign. He recommended him to concentrate all his troops near Genoa and to watch the exits from the Apennines by detachments posted at *two marches* from the entrenched camp.

An area of two marches, or say 25 to 30 miles, must be considered the minimum possible for a zone of manœuvre for an Army of five or six Corps, so as to allow of the bulk of the forces being concentrated in one day against one of the adver-

saries and beating him, without the other adversary being able to take part in the battle.

Thus, suppose 80,000 Austrians attacked Burgau on the 12th October and that the same day 60,000 Russians arrived in front of Dachau. On both fronts the two covering groups must engage the enemy and dispute the ground yard by yard in order to gain time. Let us imagine that Murat, facing the Austrians, on the 12th October lost 12 or 13 miles of ground, and that Bernadotte, facing the Russians, fell back the same distance.


Napoleon then decides to act first of all against the Austrians. On the 13th he gives battle, about 12 or 13 miles west of Augsburg, with four of his Army Corps.

On the same day the Russians press Bernadotte back almost to Augsburg. Next day, the 14th, the Austrian Army (presumably beaten the evening before) is in retreat towards Ulm, followed (say) by the 2nd Corps. Napoleon is now able to come with the 4th, 5th and 6th Corps to the assistance of the 3rd and 1st Corps, which are engaged with the Russians near Augsburg. A new battle is fought with greatly superior forces and results in a second victory.

On the other hand, if the zone of manœuvre were any smaller, the Russians would have been able to reach the battle-field on the west of Augsburg on the evening of the 13th October and to take the bulk of the French Army in reverse.

11th October.—Murat proceeds to drive back the enemy on to the left bank of the Iller. At the same time Dupont's Division of Ney's 6th Corps with a Division of dismounted Dragoons (the only troops of the Grand Army remaining on the left bank of the Danube) is sent against Ulm with orders to capture it. Dupont is met by 25,000 Austrians and loses severely, but succeeds in withdrawing without being followed.

Napoleon is convinced to-day that the Russians are about to debouch on to the left bank of the Inn. He estimated their strength (with Kienmayer's Austrian Corps) at 60,000, but Bernadotte is ordered to clear up the situation more



Position of the

GRAND ARMY.

on 11TH October

Miles 20 15 10 5 0 20 40 60 Miles

Scale 1" to 20 miles.

London : Hugh Rees, Ltd.

fully before Napoleon takes action. Against these numbers Napoleon prepares to operate with 90,000—namely, Bernadotte's 1st Corps and the Bavarians, Davout's 3rd and Marmont's 2nd (or Soult's 4th), while Murat contains the Austrians on the Iller with Ney's 6th, Lannes' 5th, and the 4th (or 2nd) Corps.

12th October.—Napoleon's appreciation of the situation completely changed to-day. Reliable news had come in which indicated that the Russians were certainly advancing towards the Inn, but their columns were so distant and widely scattered that he concluded eight or ten days must elapse before their presence would be felt. Napoleon therefore at once turned all his attention towards the Iller, with that quick decision and energy which is a special trait in his character.

Marshal Bernadotte, with the 1st, 3rd, and Bavarian Corps, is to continue his "covering rôle on the Inn"; but his force is only to act as a group of *observation*, and is not to move until further orders.

At 9 a.m. Napoleon wrote from Augsburg to Murat: "Marshal Soult is marching on Memmingen, where he can only arrive very late to-morrow night (13th). It is my intention, should the enemy continue in his present positions, and be willing to accept battle, to fight, not to-morrow but the day after, so that Marshal Soult and his 30,000 men may take part in it: he will march against the enemy's right flank and attack when he has turned it, a manœuvre which will assure us a certain and decisive result." Thus carefully did the Emperor always prepare for battle, so as to have beforehand every advantage on his side.

Napoleon believed that the Austrian Army was still in position on the left bank of the Iller, between Ulm and Dietenheim, and he expected it to march towards its right during the 13th, in order to reach Memmingen and escape to the Tyrol. Napoleon accordingly made his arrangements so that his enemy would be strongly opposed at Kellmünz by a detachment of Soult's Corps: while at the same time the 2nd

Corps (Marmont) would continue its march from Krümbach on Kellmünz (14 miles): two more Divisions of the 4th Corps (Soult) were also to support him in this direction. The enemy would thus be held in front by four Divisions while at the same time the bulk of Ney's 6th, Lannes' 5th, and the Guard Corps would attack his columns in flank between Illertissen and Illereicheim.

According to General Bonnal, this plan had the grave defect that "time and space" had not been sufficiently considered, and he shows that by the evening of the 13th or morning of the 14th, the 4th and 2nd Corps could barely have accomplished the long and difficult tasks which Napoleon had set them.

At 10.30 p.m. the Emperor left Augsburg and drove through the night and pouring rain (which had been continuous since the 8th) 30 miles to the vicinity of Weissenhorn. At the moment of entering his carriage he received a despatch from Murat that the "enemy are still at Ulm with 40,000 men." Reflecting over the situation on the left bank of the Danube, Napoleon came to the conclusion that the exits from Ulm were not sufficiently guarded on that side. He had raised no objection when Murat ordered the bulk of the 6th Corps (Ney) to the right bank, because on the 10th, 11th, and 12th instant he had only Lannes' 5th and Ney's 6th Corps with three Divisions of Cavalry at his disposal to confront the whole of the Austrian Army then on the Iller. Nevertheless he is now of opinion that a mistake has been committed in thus denuding the left bank of the Danube of troops, and hastens to repair it.

The Emperor now adds a postscript to his letter to Soult directing him: "If the enemy is not at Memmingen to move down the Iller like lightning until level with us. I see it will be you who will gain everything. Not one of the enemy should escape us."

According to the Emperor the position is as follows:—

"The whole of Ney's 6th Corps has been moved back to the left bank of the Danube and is closing in upon Ulm;

Lannes' 5th Corps supported by Marmont's 2nd is in a position to block the bridge-head of Ulm on the right bank, and Soult's 4th Corps, moving down the left bank of the Iller, will pick up all the detachments which the enemy has left in position on the river.

13th October.—On reaching Pfaffenhofen on the Roth, Napoleon discovered that Murat had not grasped the importance of his advice about making a bridge across the Danube between Albeck and Falheim. Ney was accordingly ordered to seize the bridge of Elchingen next morning (14th) and to cross the whole of his Corps to the left bank.

At the same time Lannes' 5th Corps and the Reserve Cavalry are ordered to advance against the bridge-head of Ulm on the right bank and the 2nd Corps (Marmont), after crossing the Iller near its position then, near Kellmünz, to descend the left bank until opposite Wiblingen.

On the 13th, Mack commenced his projected advance to Heidenheim; he marched part of his troops in that direction, part towards Gundelfingen, while sending Jellacich back into the Vorarlberg. The vanguard of the former column reached Heidenheim, but the other column met with a French detachment near the bridge of Elchingen, which it repulsed, occupying this village; the French, however, destroyed the bridge and the Austrians could not advance any further. Mack now fell into the most egregious errors; he even went so far as to assume that Napoleon was endeavouring to force a return to France, as a rebellion had broken out in Paris and the English had landed in France! In consequence of this opinion, he kept half of his Army, which was still at Ulm, in that town, and did not send it after the other half, which had advanced towards Heidenheim and Elchingen.

14th October.—Ney advanced towards Elchingen, and Dupont towards Albeck; the former defeated the Austrians who tried to defend Elchingen, took the town by assault and drove the enemy back towards Ulm. Lannes' (5th) approached

Ulm and took up a position on the heights of Pfuhl, whilst Marmont (2nd) reached the Iller at Kirchberg. At 9 p.m. on the 14th, Napoleon issued the following orders from Falheim for the next day :

“ Lannes (5th) to cross the Danube an hour before daylight by the bridges of Elchingen-Thalvingen, and to relieve Ney's troops (6th) at Elchingen and Albeck.

“ The 6th Corps (Ney) as soon as relieved by the 5th Corps (Lannes) to march about 8 a.m. and attack the Michelsberg defences (on the north of Ulm).

“ Klein's Dragoon and Nansouty's Cuirassier Divisions with the Imperial Guard to follow Marshal Lannes' movement.

“ Beaumont's Dragoon Division to be attached to the 2nd Corps (Marmont). The latter to assemble beside its advance guard opposite the Abbey of Wiblingen (on the right bank of the Iller) and to march from there across country in mass with the object of occupying the heights of Pfuhl . . . and in this position to hold the enemy in Ulm and, if it becomes necessary, to defend the two bridges (of Thalvingen and Elchingen) over the Danube.” Note the order *to march in mass across country* a distance of $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles: this meant a saving of three hours, and ensured a rapid deployment in case of meeting the enemy.

15th October.—Ney occupied the Michelsberg, but could make no impression on the fortifications of Ulm.

Soult reached Biberach.

16th October.—After one hour's bombardment the Emperor opened negotiations with Mack regarding a surrender, and in the afternoon of the 17th these were concluded. “ My plan,” he wrote to Talleyrand this evening, with an evident feeling of satisfaction, “ was carried out exactly as I had conceived it. I deceived the enemy completely, and of this Army of 100,000 men more than half are prisoners, killed, wounded, or stragglers.”

General Notes.

1. Mack's Army should have acted as a strong covering force, or strategical advance guard, for the Russian Army

advancing from Galicia against the French Army from the Rhine. Under no circumstances should it have allowed itself to be cut off from the Inn, but should have retired, fighting step by step if need be, *to gain time*.

Under these conditions, according to Napoleon, its best position was behind the Danube, between Ulm and Donauwörth, but *reconnaissances should have been pushed out, not only into the Black Forest, but also on to the Neckar and beyond it*. The Austrian Army had essentially a *manœuvring rôle* to play: if it had been handled in that way, great service might have been rendered to the Allies, and Napoleon might have been confronted with superior forces in the decisive battle.

It will be noted that it was chiefly owing to the skilful use made of the French Cavalry that Mack was not only kept in ignorance of Napoleon's real objective, but was led to believe that the Cavalry, which appeared from the direction of the Black Forest, was part of the advanced troops of the Grand Army.

There was no "Cavalry screen" put out after the manner suggested by certain theoretical text-books with clouds of patrols in front, all arranged with mathematical accuracy. On the contrary, Napoleon's Cavalry was kept much concentrated, and *a large mass of it was boldly pushed forward into close contact with the enemy*. It was thus an actual menace to the enemy. Moreover, contact was kept up by means of active reconnoitring bodies, not by a cordon of posts of observation.

In view of the opinions expressed by certain military authorities who profess to believe that the days of Cavalry acting mounted are over, and that it is only likely to be of use provided it acts dismounted, it seems interesting to consider what would have resulted had General Mack also concentrated his Cavalry and employed it boldly in opposing the French horsemen.

The logical conclusion would appear to be that, no matter what firearm the Cavalry carried, a gigantic Cavalry combat

would in the first place have resulted ; that success in this action must have fallen to that side which was the superior at the decisive point, in *numbers*, in *training*, and in *moral*: and that the victor in this Cavalry fight would probably then so have dispelled the "fog of war" for his own friends, and increased its density for the enemy that the latter's after-manceuvres must surely have failed, being, so to speak, planned and executed in the dark.

2. Napoleon's strategy has been called "one-sided"; people have said: "He was really in his element only where the course of events allowed an unrestricted offensive, that is, strictly speaking, only at the head of superior numbers." But in this campaign the total strength of the Austrians and Russians together was in no way inferior to Napoleon's forces, yet the latter appeared at the decisive point with an overwhelming superiority of numbers.

Mobility was the key-note of French efficiency. This mobility was derived from an almost entire absence of supply arrangements. Owing, however, to the area swept over by the troops in their rapid marches being large, increased resources became available. But the want of organised supply brought in its train a host of evils, even in an Army having in its ranks a far higher range of intelligence and patriotism than were then obtainable in any other country in Europe. Every one at all connected with the army ought to try to realise what moral grit is required to ensure success in war, and what tremendous "driving power" had to be applied in one form or another by Napoleon to his subordinates. The complaints of Napoleon's marshals seem to show that he touched about the high-water mark of the attainable in the work he succeeded in getting out of his men during the Ulm campaign. To give an idea of the sufferings endured by the soldiers of the Grand Army in October, 1805, the following extract is quoted from Colonel Maude's "Evolution of Modern Strategy" (page 69):

"This state of destitution in which most of the corps now found themselves does not appear to have astonished the

Emperor, for in answer to Marmont's complaints Berthier writes on the 11th October :

"In all the letters which M. le Général Marmont writes to me, he speaks of provisions. I must repeat to him that in the War of Invasion now being prosecuted by the Emperor there are no magazines ; it is the duty of the Generals Commanding the Corps to provide themselves with the means of subsistence in the country they traverse. General Marmont has received the orders to provide himself with four days' bread and biscuit in advance ; he cannot, therefore, count on anything but the resources he procures for himself, as all the other Corps of the Grand Army likewise do, and no one knows better than General Marmont the manner in which the Emperor makes war."

This letter deserves study, as it reveals in the clearest manner the "driving force" Napoleon knew how to apply. As M. Colin points out, "It would be indeed a difficult task to reconcile a satisfactory system of supply with the extreme mobility absolutely essential to the methods of the Grand Army"; but be this as it may, the fact remains that the extreme privations undergone by the troops brought in their train marauding, pillaging, and the break-up of discipline.

Davout writes on the 11th October to Berthier :

"I have the honour to represent to Your Excellency that it has become absolutely necessary to take prompt measures to put a stop to the marauding and pillaging, which have reached the limits of excess. The inhabitants of the districts see with the keenest anguish that, at the moment when their Prince and Army are making common cause with us, they are receiving worse treatment than when allied with Austria against us. I have the honour to solicit Your Excellency to procure for me the authority of His Majesty to shoot a few of these scoundrels ; terrible examples are necessary to stop this evil, which is constantly growing."

To this he received no reply, and the fact, taken in conjunction with Berthier's letter to Marmont, reveals only too

clearly the Machiavelian insight of the Emperor. Hunger was the "driving force"—what matter if the inhabitants suffered, and the weakly men amongst the troops died? The survivors had to hunt for their dinners like wolves in a pack ; thus, and thus only, could "mobility," the secret of his "strategy," be imparted to the mass.

Fezensac sums up the whole story of these sufferings and disorders in the following passage, which conveys a picture of facts governing Napoleon's strategy absolutely indispensable for the student's guidance :


"This short campaign proved for me an epitome of all which were to come after it. The extremity of fatigue, the want of food, the terrible weather, the disorders of the marauders, nothing was wanting, and in one month I tasted a sample of what was to be my destiny during the whole of my career. The brigades, even the regiments, were sometimes dispersed. The order to reunite arrived late, because it had to filter through so many offices. Hence the troops were marching day and night, and I saw for the first time men sleeping as they marched. I could not have believed it possible. Thus we reached our destinations without having eaten anything and finding nothing to eat. It was all very well for Berthier to write: 'In the War of Invasion, as the Emperor makes it, there are no magazines; it is for the generals to provide themselves from the country as they traverse it'; but the generals had neither time nor means to procure regularly what was required for the needs of such a numerous Army. It was an authorisation of pillage, and the districts we passed through suffered cruelly. We were often hungry, and the terrible weather intensified our sufferings. A steady, cold rain, or, rather, half-melted snow, fell incessantly, and we stumbled along in the cold mud, which was churned up by our passage almost up to our knees. The wind made it impossible to light fires. On the 16th October the weather was so infamous that not a soul remained at his post. One found neither sentries nor piquets; even the Artillery remained unguarded. Every one sought shelter as

best he could, and never again, except in Russia, did I see the Army suffer so much, or in such disorder. All these causes developed insubordination and marauders. When in such weather the troops entered a village, it was hard to get them out again; hence the number of stragglers roaming about the country became considerable. The inhabitants were exposed to ill-treatment of all descriptions; and the wounded officers, left behind, who tried to assert their authority, were openly defied and threatened by the marauders. All these details are unknown to those who read the history of our campaigns—one sees only a valiant Army whose soldiers vie with their officers for glory—and the price of suffering paid for the most brilliant successes is forgotten." M. Colin concludes: "Such was the condition of the Grand Army in October, 1805, and thus we must picture it, in following day by day its forced marches and its victories."

3. *Napoleon and von Moltke's Staff System.* "The German system of issuing orders, according to von Moltke's standard, *starts from the assumption that the subordinate understands his business thoroughly*; the orders assist him by giving him all the news which can be given, and the orders are careful not to prescribe anything that he himself is able to arrange. When studying Napoleonic operation orders we have to admire over and over again the all-embracing and active mind of the Emperor, who thought of everything and provided for everything; but after a short time we also arrive at the conclusion *that leaders could never be trained in such a school*. The helplessness and awkwardness of his Marshals, when confronted by real problems in leadership, are most assuredly not an accidental misfortune; they are the consequence of that inconsiderate, and even tyrannical, treatment preferred by the Emperor when dealing with his Marshals—a consequence of that constant interference by far too categorical orders, and of that cruelty with which he punished every disregard of his commands. In that way one does not bring up reliable assistants for difficult

work and great emergencies ; and just because he had no such assistants, the Emperor had all those misfortunes in the gigantic struggles which led to his overthrow. Any one who is studying Napoleon's operation orders may easily be misled if he does not clearly see this fact."—(*Von Cæmmerer*, p. 172.)





CHAPTER VIII.

ATTOCK STAFF RIDE—*continued.*

THIS Staff Ride commenced on 18th of March, 1906, on which date thirty-two officers joined the Director and his four assistants at Hasan Abdal and took part in it. The Directing Staff had arrived two days previously after riding over the ground to be traversed during the exercise, and fixing upon the more important situations for consideration.

PRELIMINARY WORK.

Appreciate the situation given in these General and Special Ideas from the point of view of the Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Army.

APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION.

1. Our forces are disposed as follows :—

	Our own forces.	
4 Infantry Divisions	} Fighting men } } approximately } } 52,000. }	} Mobilising } at } Rawalpindi.
1 Infy. Bde. (British)		
1 Cavy. Divn. (4 Bdes.)		
1 Bde. Howitzers, and Corps Troops		

NOTE.—The orders and appreciations which appear in this account of the Staff Ride are examples selected from the work done by the officers who took part in it.

1 Infantry Division	} Fighting men approximately	{ Mobilising at
1 Cavy. Brigade		
2 N. I. Brigades		
	20,000.	Abbottabad.
1 Infy. Division (weak)	} 8,000.	{ Mobilising at
1 Cavalry Regiment		
		Derbend.
Independent State Troops	} 20,000.	{ North of
		Malakand.

Total forces available within the next few days, about 100,000.

Reserve shortly to commence mobilising at Rawalpindi—50,000. There is nothing in the general or special ideas to indicate how soon these latter will be available.

2. The enemy has established himself in the Independent State, and occupies Nowshera and Mardan. He holds the Indus from Attock to Dal with an advanced line guarding Attock from the junction of the Haro and Indus rivers, along the Haro to Burhan Station, and north to the Indus through Hazro.

Cavalry (estimated at about one Brigade) are scouting from Dal towards Abbottabad and Haripur, with a bridge of boats over the Indus in their rear. Supposing that he has temporarily abandoned the Kurram line, in order to economise troops, the enemy has still 55 miles of line of communication from the Khaibar to Attock to guard, and cannot entirely disregard the Independent State troops (north of Malakand). It seems reasonable to assume that 60,000 troops is the maximum which he has on and beyond the Indus. The advantage of numbers is on our side by nearly 2 to 1; but the enemy has the advantage of having taken the initiative before our troops are fully mobilised.

3. There is nothing to indicate how far a violation of neutral territory would complicate matters. In the late war in Manchuria the violation of neutral territory was only such as might occur on the borders of any weak power out of

Europe. In the event of a war between France and Germany, violation of Belgian territory by the latter would possibly take place, but would be likely to cause other powers to interfere. Russia, in an advance against India, would probably not hesitate to violate Persian territory in order to gain the granaries of Khorassan and Seistan. It is presumed, however, that neutral territory in the case under discussion will not at present be violated, because the western power would gain no particular advantage by using such an eccentric line as that afforded by the Tochi or Gumal routes.

4. The Independent State forms a salient bounded by a zone of mountainous country, the most intricate part of which bars the way to the Eastern capital, Srinagar. In this salient the Western Army is exposed to attack from north or east. The line of communications from the Khaibar to Attock is flanked on the south by the range of hills running west from Attock, and on the north by the Kabul river. Outside a rough quadrilateral, Khaibar, Attock, Campbellpur, Hazro, Torbela, Malakand, the country is mostly unsuited to large operations: that on the left bank of the Indus, up to the Haripur-Hasan Abdal road, though locally reported to be passable for all arms, is rough and hilly. Military operations outside this area can only be undertaken by small forces, and so must be indecisive in character.

Roads.—With the exception of the first-class roads shown on the strategical sketch map, they are mostly “katcha” and in bad condition. There are good roads along the Indus and Kabul valleys, and besides the main road there appear to be two good roads leading from the Grand Trunk road to Haripur, and one from Haripur to Torbela.

Rivers.—The Haro is reported to be fordable in many places, and is turned from Haripur. The Indus is unfordable between Attock and Khushalgarh, where it runs in a deep gorge through mountainous country with very difficult approaches; but is reported to be fordable in many places between Attock and Torbela. The Kabul river is reported to be unfordable between Nisatha and Attock.

[*Note*.—The report as to the possibility of fording the Indus between Attock and Torbela, and part of the information as to the enemy's dispositions afterwards proved to be false. Misleading information as to trans-frontier topography, and regarding an enemy's movements must, however, be expected at all times.]

5. The main objective must always be the destruction of the enemy's forces. The latter are holding a line from the junction of the Haro and the Indus to Dal, roughly 40 miles. By crossing the Indus N.W. of Haripur this line can be turned, and an advance from W. and N. against Nowshera will force the enemy to form front parallel to his line of communication. Time is the great factor ; for it is necessary to defeat the Western Forces before reinforcements arrive from Europe.

The following are secondary objects as compared with the above, but are steps leading up to it :

- (a) A point of safe concentration east of the Indus.
- (b) The crossing of the Indus, preparatory to joining hands with the troops of the Independent State, and attacking the enemy.

6. It may be safely assumed that the enemy has concentrated his forces somewhere in the vicinity of Nowshera. If he had continued to use his two original lines of advance, his forces, initially inferior, would be divided and separated by some 35 miles of bad country.

He has the advantage of having been the first to concentrate his forces, and of having gained the initiative. He has the following courses open to him :

- (a) To advance east of the Indus against our forces concentrating there.
- (b) To await our advance, and retire slowly before it.
- (c) To hold the river line strongly, and await his reinforcement.

(a) Would mean an advance into a country of which the physical difficulty increases as he proceeds, against numerical superiority, and further away from his reinforcements ; during

the whole of which time his lines of communication are threatened from the north.

(b) Would mean the abandonment of territory easily gained, of his present advantage, and of a strong defensive line ; though a retreat would carry him nearer his reinforcements and add to our difficulties.

(c) Considering his present position, this course appears the most natural one for him to adopt. It is anticipated that he will contain the force north of the Malakand, hold the Indus strongly, and push out east to try to delay and interrupt our concentration. His power of manœuvre behind the Indus is greatly increased by the bridges at Attock and at Dal. His present position seems to indicate that he expects a direct advance on Attock. His great object is to delay ; ours to bring matters to a speedy issue.

7. The general plan of the Committee of Defence entails a change of base, which is made possible by the formation of our frontier. If this plan is successful, it means that the Western Forces may be entirely cut off from their line of communication, or forced back into the difficult country south of the Khaibar-Attock line, and while part of our forces pursue them, the remainder would be available for striking at reinforcements issuing from the Khaibar. The proposed plan uncovers our capital, in the event of large reinforcements arriving ; but considering the natural obstacles guarding Srinagar, a force based on Malakand would be well placed strategically. But the enemy holds part of the line on which it is intended our Army should deploy, and as yet our forces are very scattered and not completely mobilised.

Abbottabad to Haripur is 21 miles, Rawalpindi to Haripur is 38 miles, therefore troops first mobilised could not be expected to arrive at Haripur from Rawalpindi in less than three marches. Derband to Torbela is 14 miles, but the Derband force has to march through what is practically a defile, and it would not be safe for it to advance until Torbela is in our possession. There is the alternative of

bringing it round by Abbottabad, but that road means seven long marches, and it would be better to keep as many troops as possible off the Haripur-Torbela road. It is undesirable that the general plan of the Committee of Defence should be altered, as that would mean that instead of carrying our own plan through with vigour, we allow the enemy to impose his will on us. Still, safe concentration is absolutely essential, and we must not expose our forces to attack in detail. Again, any concentration about Haripur with a view to crossing the Indus from that direction is confronted by the difficulty of communications. Local reports cannot be relied upon, and the advance must not be undertaken without very careful reconnaissance. Further, the enemy's Cavalry Brigade (which may prove to be a larger force than reported) must first be defeated and forced back over the river ; until this takes place we will not have liberty of action. Our strategic advance guard moving from Rawalpindi will have two rôles :

(1) To mislead the enemy as to our intentions, for it is only by successfully carrying this out that we can hope to hold him to the Indus until we have outmanœuvred him.

(2) To cover the flank march which the remainder of the Rawalpindi troops must make to reach their point of concentration.

But the Cavalry Division must be released as soon as possible to operate against the Western Cavalry. It is only by defeating them that our movements can be concealed.

To sum up, it is concluded that the general plan will best be carried out :

(1) by concentrating the Rawalpindi and Abbottabad troops in the direction of Haripur, covered by a strategic advance guard ;

(2) by defeating the enemy's Cavalry east of the Indus ;

(3) by crossing the Indus at suitable places between Torbela and Dal, during which operation the enemy should be taken in flank by the troops from Derband, who should cross the river north of Khabal.

Once across the Indus it must be our object to cut the western line of communication and to hem the enemy in against the Indus, acting in conjunction with the troops of the Independent State.

Special Idea.—No. 2.

1. In order to cover the concentration of his Army on the line Haripur-Torbela, the Eastern Commander-in-Chief sends forward an advance guard from Rawalpindi, consisting of the First Cavalry Division, supported by two Infantry Divisions, with their Protective Cavalry, with orders to engage the enemy on the Haro river, and to make him expect an advance from Rawalpindi direct against Attock.

The troops from Abbottabad are ordered to occupy Bharu and Haripur, and to push forward detachments south and west of these places to prevent the enemy using the footpaths through the hills from the direction of Ghazi.

2. One Cavalry Brigade (the 1st) is ready to march from Rawalpindi on Friday, 16th March. The remainder of the First Cavalry Division will be ready by daylight on Sunday, 18th March.

3. The following instructions are given at a personal interview by the General Officer Commanding First Cavalry Division to the Brigadier, First Cavalry Brigade, at Divisional Headquarters, Rawalpindi, at noon on Friday, 16th March :

“(1) Reliable information has just been received that the enemy occupied Attock and Torbela last night. This morning his patrols entered Hazro village and Campbellpur cantonment.

“(2) The Cavalry Brigade which is mobilising at Abbottabad has been instructed to clear up the situation in the neighbourhood of Torbela.

“(3) You will move without delay towards Attock, with the object of ascertaining what forces of the enemy have crossed to the left bank of the Indus, and what his intentions are.

“(4) The remainder of the Division will march on Sunday at dawn towards Hasan Abdal.”

In accordance with this Special Idea No. 2, certain officers were asked to write orders for the march of the Cavalry Brigade. The following is an example :

No. 10.—Operation Orders by Brigadier-General X, Commanding 1st Cavalry Brigade.

RAWALPINDI,

16th March (12 hours).

1. (a) Reliable information has just been received that the enemy occupied Attock and Torbela last night (15th). This

morning his patrols entered Hazro village and Campbellpur cantonment.

(b) Our 5th Cavalry Brigade from Abbottabad is moving towards Torbela.

(c) Our 1st Cavalry Division (less 1st Brigade) marches to Hasan Abdal at dawn on Sunday (18th).

2. The General Officer Commanding intends to march towards Attock to gain touch with the enemy and ascertain his movements.

3. The 1st Hussars (less 2nd L. T.) will march towards Hasan Abdal at 12.45. The Officer Commanding will attend at Headquarters at once for special instructions.

4. The remainder of the Brigade (with all 2nd L. T.) will march in the following order to Kala-ki-Serai at 13 hours. Starting-point, West Ridge Church. *Advance Guard*: Officer Commanding Major D, 2nd Cavalry, 1 squadron 2nd Cavalry. *Main Body*: 1 squadron 2nd Cavalry, "A" R.H.A., 2 squadrons 2nd Cavalry, 3rd Lancers, 2 squadrons I. S. Troops (less 1 troop), Field Hospitals, 2nd L. T., escort to baggage, 1 troop I. S. T.

5. The General Officer Commanding will be at the head of the Main Body on the Grand Trunk road.

A., Major.

Special verbal instructions to Officer Commanding 1st Hussars. (Information detailed as in orders.)

"Push on with your regiment to Hasan Abdal, which you should be able to reach to-night. I want the Haro river reconnoitred from where it crosses the Hasan Abdal-Haripur road to its junction with the Indus. Send a small patrol from Hasan Abdal to Haripur to gain touch with the Cavalry from Abbottabad. Send a contact squadron towards Campbellpur, and a contact squadron towards Hazro. You must get me information as to what forces of the enemy are east of the Indus, and in what direction they are moving.

"I will camp at Kala-ki-Serai to-night, and will move along the Grand Trunk road towards Attock to-morrow at dawn."

A second task involved the consideration of the action of the 1st Cavalry Brigade after its arrival at Hasan Abdal, and pending the arrival of the Infantry Divisions in support (see General Map No. 6, and Sketch 24):

The 1st Brigade reached Hasan Abdal at 12 hours on 17th, and was checked till dark on the line of the river Haro. Patrols report that the country south of the small range of hills about four miles south of Burham is free of the enemy.

Required:

- (a) The disposition of the Brigade for the night of 17th-18th.
- (b) What action would you take on the morning of the 18th to ascertain the strength of the enemy in front of you, and to maintain your position pending the arrival of the 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions from Pindi, due at Hasan Abdal on evening of 18th?

No. 1.—Operation Orders by Brigadier-General X, Commanding 1st Brigade.

HASAN ABDAL,
17th March, 1906 (17 hours).

1. The Brigade will halt for the night near Hasan Abdal, and will bivouac south of the Ziarat hill on right bank of stream flowing past Kamala Bania.

2. The 1st Hussars, who have rejoined the Brigade, will bivouac south of road which passes east of Ziarat hill (shown by the railway on the Map), and the remainder of the Brigade north of Grand Trunk road passing west of same hill.

3. The Brigade will be covered by outposts towards north-west, holding the defiles east and west of Ziarat hill.

4. Signalling communication will be established between the bivouacs and with the outposts.

5. In case of attack the Brigade will hold these defiles, 1st Hussars on right, 2nd Cavalry on left.

The Reserves, 3rd Lancers, and Battery R.H.A. in rear of left.

A., Major.

Issued at 17 hours to Officer Commanding Units and Outposts.

**No. 2.—Operation Orders by Brigadier-General X,
Commanding 1st Brigade.**

HASAN ABDAL,
17th March (18 hours).

1. The enemy is holding the line of the river Haro, and has checked our advance. Patrols report that the country south of the small range of hills south of Burham is clear of the enemy.

Our 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions are expected to arrive at Hasan Abdal to-morrow evening, Sunday, 18th instant.

2. The General Officer Commanding intends to attack to-morrow the enemy holding the line of the Haro, with a view to preventing his advance beyond that line.

3. The Officer Commanding 2nd Cavalry will detail for reconnaissance one contact squadron and one officer's patrol. Officers Commanding these bodies should report to Headquarters at once for orders.

4. The Brigade (with the fighting portion of 1st Line Transport only) will march at 5.30 to a position of readiness at the point where the nullah running south from Kacha crosses the Grand Trunk road.

Order of March—*Advance Guard*: 2nd Cavalry (less 1 squadron). *Main Body*: 3rd Lancers, R.H.A. Battery, 1st Hussars.

Starting-point, Hasan Abdal Dāk Bungalow.

5. The advance guard will push on towards Burhan, and will feel for the enemy along the Haro between Kolian and the Grand Trunk road bridge over the Haro.

6. All transport (less fighting portion of the 1st L. T.) will park north of the Grand Trunk road by the K. of Kamala Bania.

7. The General Officer Commanding will be first at head of main body, and afterwards at Kacha.

A., Major.

Issued at 18 hours to Officers Commanding Regiments and Battery, and S. and T. Officer.

**Confidential Orders to Officer Commanding Units
issued verbally.**

"If I am driven back by the enemy advancing over the Haro, I mean to fall back to a position about Hasan Abdal,

and hold it at all costs. The Officer Commanding R.H.A. will select a position covering the defile north of Ziarat hill. The 1st Lancers will hold this defile and watch the ground to north. The 1st Hussars will hold the defile through which the Grand Trunk road runs, and watch the ground to south. The 2nd Cavalry will be in reserve on the Grand Trunk road in rear of the defile held by the 1st Hussars."

Reconnaissances: (1) One officer's patrol to south of hills, south of Burhan (reported clear of enemy), directed on Lawrencepur.

(2) Contact squadron directed on Jab, crossing the Haro by Kolian.

Both to start with native guides at 12 midnight.

Preliminary Conference.

The first conference took place in camp at Hasan Abdal on the evening of the day of assembly, 18th March. The general and special "ideas" were reviewed by the Director, and the preliminary tasks entered into and criticised.

With reference to special idea No. 2, it was pointed out that the principles which the Brigadier should bear in mind in dealing with this reconnoitring problem are—(a) first of all make a few soundings with patrols: then, as the situation develops, send out more; (b) keep in hand, covered by patrols the mass ready to strike when the situation is favourable. Even nowadays these principles are often forgotten, and squadrons are scattered, as in the so-called "screen" formation. The special strategical objective of the Brigade would be to seize the position at Hasan Abdal, and to hold it as a pivot for the flanking movement of the main Army in rear, moving from Rawalpindi to Haripur. Compare Ney's position at Stuttgart, "to be in so good a position as to prevent any serious fighting taking place": Ney's corps being then the pivot on which the rest of the Grand Army wheeled. (See Notes on Ulm Campaign, September 27.)

With regard to the march of the Division from Rawalpindi, in India opportunities are rare of seeing the working in the

field of large bodies of Cavalry, such as divisions. It is therefore very necessary for officers to try clearly to grasp the idea of what the movement of large masses of Cavalry means, especially when confined to roads—*e.g.* the space occupied by 1st and 2nd Line Transport, the time required to get all the troops and transport on the move, etc. Without a clear realisation of such matters beforehand, the staff work will certainly be bad, and men and horses will be worn out long before contact with the enemy is gained.

Time Table of Operations—16th to 18th March.

—	Friday, 16th.	Saturday, 17th.	Sunday, 18th.
<i>Eastern.</i>			
1st Cavalry Division	1st Brigade marches to Kala-ki-Sarai. Remainder at Pindi . . .	1st Brigade gains touch with the enemy on the Haro. Remainder at Pindi . . .	1st Brigade checks enemy till Infantry arrives. Remainder march to Hasan Abdal, arriving 16 hours.
1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions, supporting Cavalry Division.	At Pindi . . .	Reach Kala-ki-Sarai and Balot . . .	Reach Hasan Abdal and occupy ridge of hills to south and south-west of it.
Main Body Eastern Troops.	Do. . . .	At Pindi . . .	March half way to Haripur.
5th (Abbottabad) Cavalry Brigade.	At Abbottabad .	At Abbottabad .	Reach Haripur.
Abbottabad Infantry Division.	Do. . . .	Do. . . .	March half way to Haripur.
Derband Force.	At Derband .	At Derband .	At Derband.
<i>Western.</i>			
Troops on Nowshera-Attock line.	Mounted troops reach line Hazro - Lawrencepur .	Mounted troops occupy Roa - Lawrencepur position, outposts on Haro river .	Infantry arrive and take over Roa - Lawrencepur position. Mounted troops attempt to advance: checked as above.
Cavalry Detachment.	Reach Sawabi .	Reach Pihoor (opposite Dal on general map) and construct bridge .	Reach Torbela. Scouts to Haripur, etc.

Narrative up to the 18th instant.

So soon as the enemy were reported to be crossing at Attock, the General Officer Commanding Eastern Army sent forward one Cavalry Brigade (the 1st) to clear up the situation, the remainder of the Cavalry Division being

unready to move. The 1st Brigade marched from Rawalpindi on Friday, 16th instant, and was checked on Saturday, 17th instant, by enemy's mounted troops holding the line of the Haro, west and north of Hasan Abdal. On Sunday, 18th instant, the enemy attempted to advance, but was checked by the 1st Cavalry Brigade until about midday, when the 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions from Rawalpindi arrived to support. In the afternoon the enemy was driven back beyond the line of the Haro.

Situation at 20 hours—Sunday, 18th instant.

Our 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions are holding the Ziarat-Loiset hills (*i.e.* hills south, south-east, and south-west of Hasan Abdal). The enemy occupy the Kibla-i-Nandi-Lawrencepur ridge: outposts in touch on the Haro. The remainder of the 1st Cavalry Division reached Hasan Abdal at 16 hours to-day, Sunday.

FIRST DAY'S WORK.

Tactical Reconnaissance by the Cavalry Division.

1. Special ideas Nos. 1 and 2 above show that the primary duty of the General Officer Commanding the Advance Guard from Pindi is to assist the concentration of the main Pindi forces on the line Haripur-Torbela by engaging the enemy on the Haro river, and by making him expect an advance from Rawalpindi direct against Attock. Accordingly the General Officer Commanding the now combined force of two Infantry and one Cavalry Division decides to attack.

The following is a summary of the orders given to the General Officer Commanding 2nd Cavalry Brigade at a personal interview at Headquarters of the 1st Cavalry Division at Hasan Abdal on Sunday, 18th March, 18 hours:

1. (a) The Kibla-i-Nandi-Lawrencepur ridge is occupied by the enemy's Infantry, who seem to have come up this afternoon.
- (b) The right bank of the Haro is watched by his mounted troops. But how far up and down stream his outposts extend is not yet clear.

The point where the Grand Trunk road crosses the Haro and the ford about one mile west of it are held in force. The enemy's mounted troops which engaged us to-day fell back in this direction. Our patrols were fired on from Niku this afternoon.

2. To-morrow our Cavalry Division is to reconnoitre the enemy's position, and to ascertain where his left flank rests. If possible it will push a detachment to Hazro and northwards to the Indus, with a view to finding out what troops the enemy has in that quarter, and if it is possible to cross the river in that neighbourhood.

3. To facilitate the movement of the Cavalry Division it is necessary to have a foothold on the right bank of the Haro by daylight to-morrow.

The nullahs on the west of Kolian seem to offer facilities for a surprise. Here are three guides to lead some dismounted men.

Have the remainder of your brigade in bend of the nullah south of Kolian ready to ford the Haro at daybreak.

4. All guns of the Division will be ready to cover your crossing from high ground south of Kolian.

The Divisional Cavalry are to demonstrate on west of Burhan, and are to reconnoitre the enemy's right.

The 2nd Brigade (Y's) was assumed to have been bivouacked during the night 18th-19th west of Hasan Abdal and north of the Grand Trunk road, with outposts observing the line from Burhan along the left bank of the Haro river to Kalu, the line of resistance being held by supporting Infantry. On receipt of the above instructions officers were first sent out to report on suitable approaches by moonlight towards Kolian, and the Brigadier then issued the following orders :

No. 3.—Operation Orders by Brigadier-General Y, Commanding 2nd Brigade.

CAMP, HASAN ABDAL,
18th March, 1906 (22 hours).

1. The Brigade will move off at midnight, 18th-19th March, to effect a crossing over the Haro river. Order of March—*Advance Guard*: 1 squadron 4th Dragoons. *Main Body*: (less 1 squadron) 4th Dragoons, B Battery R.H.A., 5th Lancers, 6th Lancers. Head of the column to pass the 237th milestone on the Grand Trunk road at midnight.

2. Units to be on the line Kacha-Bai by 5 hours on 19th.

3. B Battery R.H.A. and 1 troop 4th Dragoons will take up a covering position on left bank of Haro ready to cover the advance at daylight.

The 5th Lancers and 6th Lancers will push across the river at the Bai-Kolian ford and establish themselves on the far bank.

4. The General Officer Commanding will be with the Battery at first.

B., *Major*,
Brigade Major, 2nd Brigade.

2. Colonel Z was placed in command of the Cavalry Division for this first day's operations. Assuming that the 2nd Brigade had been successful in their task as described in paragraph 1 above, the following instructions were issued to Colonel Z:

"The enemy's outpost line on the night 18th-19th ran through Kacha and up the right bank of the river Haro—your outposts being in touch with the enemy. During the night the 2nd Cavalry Brigade gained a footing on the right bank of the river Haro in the vicinity of Kolian. The 1st Cavalry Division is bivouacked close to Hasan Abdal, and your Infantry hold the Hasan Abdal-Ziarat Hill and the small range of hills 4 miles south of Burhan. As General Officer Commanding 1st Cavalry Division, you are instructed (a) to locate the enemy's left flank, (b) to estimate how his position is held, (c) to push reconnaissances towards Hazro with the object of ascertaining the strength of the enemy in that quarter, and whether it is possible to cross the river Indus north of that town. Our 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions are advancing at dawn to attack that part of the enemy's position lying in the hills north of the river Haro and west of the line Kolian to Gurgushtian (4 miles south of the Indus)."

Required (a) your orders, (b) your instructions to the reconnoitring parties.

In accordance with these instructions, Colonel Z issued the following orders:

**No. 1.—Operation Orders by Colonel Z,
Commanding 1st Cavalry Division.**

HASAN ABDAL,
19th March, 1906 (6 hours).

1. The enemy's outpost line on night 18th-19th ran through Kacha, and up right bank of river Haro.

During night 2nd Cavalry Brigade gained a footing on right bank of river Haro in vicinity of Kolian. Our Infantry hold Ziarat hill. 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions attack at dawn (to-morrow) enemy's position in hills north of Haro and west of line Kolian to Gurgushtian.

2. I intend to make a reconnaissance with a view of ascertaining : (a) enemy's left, (b) with what strength enemy is holding line Roa-Lawrencepur, (c) what strength is at Hazro, and (d) if it is possible to cross Indus north of Hazro.

3. The 1st Brigade will move at once to reinforce 2nd Brigade at Kolian.

The 1st and 2nd Brigades will demonstrate against enemy with a view of ascertaining his strength and the left of his position, and will push patrols towards Hazro.

3rd and 4th Brigades and Divisional Artillery will move to a position of readiness near Bai to support demonstration.

4. Signalling communication between all Brigades and Divisional Headquarters to be kept up.

5. Second Line Transport will remain parked.

6. Reports to Bai.

Dictated to officers from each Brigade at 6 hours, 19th March.

Instructions issued for Reconnoitring Parties.

(1) The reconnaissance in force will disclose enemy's left and strength ; it remains only to provide for reconnaissance to Hazro, and passages over Indus north of it.

(2) Should Jab fall into our hands to-day, an officer's patrol, followed up by contact squadron, could get required information.

(3) If enemy hold crest at Jab in strength, scouts on foot with local guides must be sent at night through the outpost lines to ascertain if Hazro is held, and to bring back local guides if there are passages over the Indus.

Z, Colonel.

3. All officers met the Director at 12 hours at a point in the hills south of Jab, whence the ground could be viewed



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and the situation clearly explained. The Director pointed out that it would have been impossible for the General Officer Commanding Division to have gained any really valuable information merely by sitting still and sending out scouts and patrols. An advance in force was essential. In carrying out this advance, note the sequence of events :

First gain a foothold during the night on the far side of the river, with, say, one regiment, or even one squadron. At daybreak push rapidly forward in support with the remainder of the Brigade. Then, making full use of mobility, and working in co-operation, make from one point of vantage to another.

Narrative—19th instant, Monday.

At daybreak this morning the 2nd Brigade obtained a footing on the right bank of the Haro river near Kolian. The remainder of the Division followed, and by nightfall had gained the line of the watershed between the Indus and Haro rivers west of Roa, the enemy holding still the broken ground north-westwards and westwards towards Hazro. Patrols reported that the country between the hills and the left bank of the Indus was clear of the enemy east of Gurgushtian.

Situation at 20 hours, 19th instant.

- (a) 1st Cavalry Division bivouacked in the hollow north of Jab. Outposts in touch with the enemy to the west and north-west.
- (b) 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions near Burhan, holding the line of the Haro river as far westwards as the point where the Grand Trunk road crosses it.
- (c) 5th (the Abbottabad) Cavalry Brigade in touch with the enemy's Cavalry Detachment, which latter holds the eastern exit from the Torbela defile. Our Abbottabad Infantry have reached Haripur.
- (d) The Derband Division has crossed the Indus to Amb.

SECOND DAY'S WORK.

Action of a Cavalry Brigade clearing the Passage of a Defile by Force.

I. It was assumed that the General Officer Commanding the enemy received reliable information of the flanking

movement of the main Eastern Army from Pindi to Haripur on Sunday night, 18th-19th instant. He accordingly determined at once to commence to concentrate towards Sawabi with a view to engaging the Eastern Army before the latter could fully deploy from the Indus defile near Topi. On Monday, 19th instant, orders were issued to his advanced force which was holding the Roa-Lawrencepur position to withdraw towards Attock, covered by the mounted troops. And it was probably owing to these orders that our Cavalry Division succeeded in pushing so far forward on Monday, and reaching through such difficult country the crest of the hills near Kibla-i-Nandi. On Tuesday the Cavalry Division was occupied in following up this withdrawal towards Attock, but its action was not considered in detail by the Staff Ride. The whole party moved, instead, to consider the forcing of the Torbela defile by the Abbottabad Cavalry Brigade.

Now the object of our flank march from Pindi, via Harpur, is to deploy in open ground south of Topi before the enemy can concentrate superior force north of the Kabul-Indus rivers to oppose this deployment; then to move west, and in conjunction with the forces of the Independent State, at present waiting inactive in the Swat Valley north of the Malakand Pass, to attack the enemy or to fall upon his communications between the Kaibar Pass and Attock. Time is therefore of the greatest importance.

With reference to this situation round Torbela on the Monday night, 19th-20th, we have :

- (a) The Abbottabad Cavalry Brigade bivouacked at Padhana in touch with the enemy. Columns of Infantry reaching Haripur from both Pindi and Abbottabad; long marches the previous day, men and animals tired.
- (b) The force from Derband (1 weak Infantry Division and 1 Cavalry regiment) at Amb ready to march the next morning to Khabal, 15 miles along a single

road unfit for field guns or wheeled transport, high precipitous hills on one side, and the river on the other. A very difficult position to force about one mile north of Khabal (*vide* Sketch 25).

- (c) The enemy (estimated at about 2,000 mounted troops) holding Khabal and the Torbela defile. From the nature of the general situation it is unlikely that the enemy will make a very stubborn resistance. But it is important that our Abbottabad and Derband forces should attack simultaneously and work in co-operation.

Colonel Z was placed in command of the Abbottabad Cavalry Brigade with the following instructions:

Situation as explained above. As General Officer Commanding 5th Brigade (bivouacked about Padhana), you receive instructions at 20 hours on 19th instant to force the defile between Kandal and Torbela early on the morning of the 20th, with a view to assisting the advance of the Derband Division down the right bank of the Indus. (a) Write Brigade Orders for the 20th instant, (b) be prepared to state, at a conference to be held at 11 hours near Thapla, how you propose to carry out your instructions.

Colonel Z, accordingly, issued the following orders:

**No. 2.—Operation Orders by Colonel Z,
Commanding 5th Cavalry Brigade.**

PADHANA,

19th March, 1906 (21 hours).

1. The Torbela defile is held by a portion of a hostile Cavalry Brigade, which is opposing the advance of the Derband Division.

2. I intend to force the defile between Kandal and Torbela.

3. 1st Regiment will march at 2.30 hours and seize the hill on right bank of Dore river just north-east of Kandal at 6 hours.

2nd Regiment will march at 2.45 hours and seize the hills at Dari.

The remainder of Brigade (less 1 Squadron I.S. Troops) will march at 3 hours—order of march :—1 Squadron I.S. Troops, Batt. R.H.A., 3rd Regiment—starting-point, lamp at fourth milestone Haripur-Torbela road, and take up a position near Kandal to cover attack at 6 hours.

4. The whole of the transport will be ready to march at 6.30 hours : escort, 1 squadron I.S. Troops.

5. Reports to Kandal.

Z, Colonel.

Dictated to Commanding Officers confidentially at 21 hours, 19th instant.

NOTE.—Reference C. T. 112 (1). I have assumed that as I was in bivouac at Padhana at 20 hours on 19th March, I had personally reconnoitred the mouth of the defile, and had sent patrols out, so I have excluded any orders for special patrols in my operation orders for 20th instant.

(*Note by Director.*—"Night signalling arrangements: Will there be a station at Kandal?"—D. H.)

Cavalry Detachment defending the Passage of a Defile.

2. The action of the enemy defending the defile was also considered.

Colonel Y was assumed to be in command of the enemy's detachment, holding the Torbela defile with 1 regiment of Cavalry (organisation 6 squadrons per regiment) and 2 guns, whilst 1 regiment and 4 guns held the positions north of Khabal on the right bank of the Indus. His detachment was assumed to be bivouacked at Kot, with outposts in touch with the eastern advanced Cavalry. The following orders were issued (see Sketch 25):

No. 3.—Operation Orders by Colonel Y, Commanding Detachment of Western Cavalry.

KOT, 19th March, 1906 (20 hours).

1. (a) Information just received from Divisional Headquarters is to the effect that an important concentration of

Eastern troops is in progress at Haripur, while another Eastern Force attacked our troops holding the Haro river this morning. A third Eastern Force (estimated at 1 Infantry Division with some Cavalry) has commenced to move down the right bank of the Indus from Amb to-day.

(b) The remainder of this Brigade has been sent north to oppose the hostile force from Amb, and my orders are to oppose any advance that may take place from the direction of Haripur.

2. The following troops will move out, and be in position as follows by 5 hours to-morrow, the 20th instant :

1st squadron and 2 guns H. A. to Bharu and high ground north of Bharu; 2 troops 2nd squadron to high ground S.-W. of bank of Dore at eastern end of defile near Dari; the remainder of 2nd squadron will be pushed out to E. and S.-E. to get touch with enemy.

The remaining 4 squadrons will move at daybreak under cover to north end of high ground north of Bharu in readiness. The contact patrol towards Derband will remain out.

3. First position of Officer Commanding Detachment will be with the guns.

In the event of having to retire, Colonel Y proposed to fall back to a second position on "One-Tree Hill" as follows :

"(a) The guns will move on to the main Haripur-Torbela road, moving into the bed of the Siran north of their present position, and then keeping along the stream north-westwards cross it about a mile S.-E. of Tandula. (b) The withdrawal of the guns will be covered by a dismounted squadron at 'One-Tree Hill' sent back from the main body and by the $\frac{1}{2}$ squadron on the S.-W. of the Dore and Siran. (c) The dismounted squadrons at Bharu will join the main body mounted. (d) The future arrangements will be: (1) guns to keep to road, and come into action as ordered later; (2) one squadron to go by Derband road, communicating

with the $\frac{1}{2}$ troop now reconnoitring on this road: this squadron's object is to prevent possibility of a rapid advance by Eastern Cavalry up Derband road threatening any retirement on Torbela; (3) $\frac{1}{2}$ squadron to keep on main road, cover guns and secure road; (4) the remaining $3\frac{1}{2}$ squadrons will at present remain in readiness north of 'One-Tree Hill': Officer Commanding with the main body."

Possible Course of Events subsequently.

(1) The enemy's guns come into action from Bharu. His Infantry from high ground S.-W. of Dore river, his Cavalry acting on his right flank.

(2) Our $4\frac{1}{2}$ squadrons near "One-Tree Hill" now retire, carrying on dismounted fight. Our guns and $\frac{1}{2}$ squadron move along road: the remaining squadron has already been detached to watch Derband road.

(3) The retirement continues to 3rd position (sketched and reported on by Major C), subsequently to open ground near Mohrat. Here the guns, which have trotted on from flank of 3rd position, take up a new position, and the mounted squadrons take position in readiness behind.

March of a Cavalry Brigade through a Mountain Defile.

3. A third problem was considered during this Tuesday morning, viz. *the passage of a Cavalry Brigade with all its transport through a defile such as might be encountered on the North-West frontier or in Afghanistan.* It was assumed that the neighbouring hill tribes were warlike and unfriendly, but not openly hostile. The brigade was assumed to have camped during the night 19th-20th at Padhana, and to be marching the following morning to Torbela.

Order to Captain P, Commanding Patrol.

1. You will patrol defile running from Bharu to Torbela. Information required on following points: (a) on what bank of river does best road run; (b) width of

road : (c) features which you consider should be piqueted to ensure safe passage of column.

2. Report to be sent to Thapla as soon as possible.

Report on Torbela Defile.

- (a) (1) Road on left bank : Good hill cart-road 8 to 10 ft. wide, no very steep gradient, in good repair. Passable Infantry in fours, Cavalry in $\frac{1}{2}$ sections, carts and guns one way.
- (2) Road on right bank : Old road crossing Siran river at Thapla, goes viâ Khoond and Mohrat, and re-crosses river at Gojera Tali, near Torbela end of defile. Road in very bad repair, and very rough and stony. Passable all arms and pack transport, but not carts. Both fords passable all arms. Country on right bank rough, but passable all arms, except in some places where too steep and rough for wheeled Artillery : this should keep on road. Width of road, 8 ft. to 12 ft., but boundaries very much broken and obliterated.
- (b) On left bank : About 10 piquets needed at various points on spurs above road. Piquets should be about 250 ft. to 350 ft. above road.
- On right bank : This is the place whence danger is most to be feared, and a strong flank-guard of at least one regiment with Artillery should cross at Thapla to right bank, and move parallel to the column which is on the left bank. This force could greatly assist the piquets on the left bank by firing across the river at the enemy on hills above cart-road. The flank-guard can re-cross by ford at Gojera Tali. The A. G. Commander should have about a squadron in hand at the Torbela end to cover re-crossing of flank guard.

P, *Captain.*

Special Instructions given to Major D, Commanding the Advance Guard, at an interview on evening of 19th March.

Your regiment is to march at 6 hours to-morrow without impedimenta, and to piquet such portions of the Torbela defile as you consider essential to procure the safe passage by the Brigade. The main body will leave bivouac at 7 hours, and its head should arrive at Thapla, at entrance to defile, by 8.20 hours. The length of the baggage column is approximately $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles, and will probably take $2\frac{1}{2}$ hours to clear the defile.

You must arrange for the safe custody of the led horses of your piquets, and see that they do not block up the road.

One squadron, 1st Hussars, is being sent on with you to piquet the entrance to defile.

On the above the following orders were issued :

Advance-Guard Orders by Major D, Commanding.

PADHANA, 19th March, 1906 (22 hours).

1. The inhabitants of the hills bordering the Bharu-Torbela defile are reported to be unfriendly. Our 1st Cavalry Brigade is to march through the defile towards Peshawar by the right bank of the Siran river.

2. The Advance Guard will march through the defile by the left bank of the Siran river, and safeguard the passage of the 1st Brigade transport on same road.

3. Distribution :—*Vanguard*: Officer Commanding, Capt. X, A Squadron 2nd Cavalry. *Main Guard*: 2nd Cavalry (less $1\frac{1}{2}$ Squadrons), 1st Line Transport. *Rear Party*: Officer Commanding, Capt. Z. $\frac{1}{2}$ D Squadron, 2nd Cavalry.

N.B.—This Rear Party is necessary because main body marches by a different route.

4. The Vanguard will march off at 6 a.m., and trot to the mouth of the defile, and halt there.

5. The Main Guard will follow at a walk, and close up to 750 yards at the defile.

6. The Rear Party will not be thrown out till the defile is entered ; it will follow main guard at 150 yards.

7. Any important points commanding the defile W. of Thapla village will be piqueted by the vanguard: piquets

to fall in as a rearguard as baggage passes on. Arrangements will be made for preventing the led horses from blocking the road. The depletion of men from the vanguard by piquet requirements will be filled up by Officer Commanding Main Guard. The Officer Commanding Rear Party will arrange to protect the led horses of piquets after Advance Guard has passed on.

8. The Officer Commanding 1st Hussars, from the main body of the Brigade, is responsible for the piqueting of both sides of the defile as far as Thapla village and the right bank beyond.

9. Signalling communication will be arranged as far as possible between all units and from piquets, also with main body.

10. I shall be with the main portion of the vanguard till further notice.

D, *Major.*

[*Notes by Director.*—Good work right through showing knowledge and thought. According to data, the danger is from “snipers” or small parties seeking loot, not from serious attack. Against these, small piquets (6 to 10 rifles) on commanding points are generally sufficient, as they threaten the retreat of individuals. A support here and there of about a troop should be ample to reinforce piquets, if necessary. About 7 piquets were judged to be necessary after seeing the ground.

Reference paragraphs 7 and 8 of previous order.—Order 7 states “any commanding points W. of Thapla” will be piqueted by vanguard. Order 8 states left bank only. This is somewhat confusing. It would be better to detail a vanguard to piquet both sides of the defile, former being fed as necessary from the main guard. One officer should be responsible. In this case, the vanguard would not march by the road along left bank of Siran as seems intended.

Orders 4 and 5.—The main guard should not close up to 750 yards of vanguard, but should feed it as necessary. This

closing up would bring it without reason within decisive rifle range of ground the enemy's snipers might hold.]

4. All officers met the Director on "One-Tree Hill" at 11 hours.

Here Colonel Z's plan for forcing the Torbela defile was discussed, and also the dispositions made by Colonel Y for its defence. The Director pointed out :

(a) That any attempt to hold the mouth of the defile by occupying an advanced position in any strength on the hill north of Bharu would probably be ineffective ; for any such position could be turned by a wide movement by mounted troops over the open valley to the north. Such a movement would directly threaten the line of retreat of the advanced troops of the defence, and must cause an early evacuation of the advanced position.

Inversely, should the hill be held, serious attack by Colonel Z's troops on it would be likely to entail unnecessary delay and loss, and to commit a large proportion of the Brigade to premature and unnecessary action. The object must be to gain access to the main position on "One-Tree Hill" with as little delay and loss as possible.

The best tactics for the attack would appear to be a turning movement towards the north by a portion of the Brigade accompanied by guns. Then, should the enemy delay in evacuating the advanced position, this turning force should endeavour to cut them off and eventually to deliver a decisive stroke against them while retreating, with the object of throwing them into disorder, and next by an active pursuit to allow them no time to rally or reform. Such a movement would have to be covered by fire action by the remaining troops of the attack.

The impracticability of retiring the guns of the defence from the advanced position on Bharu hill by any other route than up the defile itself was pointed out. Should the attacking troops gain a footing in the hills on the left bank of the Siran river commanding the main approach to the defile, it would be very hazardous to attempt to withdraw guns even

in this way. Whilst, if forced to retire northwards on the left flank of the main defensive position, guns must either follow the Derband road, thus losing touch with their main body, or else run the risk of getting into difficulties in the hilly country west of this road to Derband. In any case to attempt to leave the defile would entail considerable delay, be exposed to view and fire of the attack, and must be considered impracticable under the circumstances.

(b) The retirement of the defending troops from the advanced position on Bharu hill having been assumed, the Director next considered the attack on the main position on "One-Tree Hill." The hills on the left bank of the Siran river were weakly held by only a half-squadron. The ground favoured a concentric turning attack by superior numbers, which must eventually cause the retirement of this half-squadron. Once dislodged, these would be obliged to retire at least one mile, and probably more, before finding and being able to occupy another suitable position on the left bank. The attacking troops on this left bank would then be able to deploy a dismounted firing line at decisive rifle range on the Thapla spur, whence, supported by guns under cover in rear in the stream bed, they would also be able to direct oblique and enfilade fire against the defenders holding "One-Tree Hill" on the right bank. To command the approaches to the defile, and the entrance of the defile itself, the defenders must hold the forward crest of the hills, the lower slopes of the hills being here precipitous. The attackers' fire position being within decisive rifle range, it seemed that the defenders must either remain close under cover of "sangars," etc., or must retire altogether from the forward crest. In either case, after some moral effect from a searching fire had been gained, and under cover of it the remainder of the Brigade might well have mounted and galloped through the defile, following the river bed : the defending troops would then be in a precarious position. Such a movement appeared the more practicable owing to the precipitous slopes on the right bank, which would cause the greater part of the river bed to be dead

ground. The principles of such an attack were the proper use of dismounted fire by a portion of the force to cover a dash at the greatest pace possible by another portion in order to turn the enemy's position. A prolonged frontal attack employing fire tactics alone was out of the question in this case, and contrary to the Cavalry spirit.

The proposal to retire the guns by the main Haripur-Torbela road along the left bank of the Siran river appeared wrong. The road was cut out of steep and often precipitous hillsides, and guns once on it would be deprived of all freedom of manœuvre. They would therefore have to retire straight to Torbela, and would be practically lost to the defenders in their retirement. It appeared preferable in every way to withdraw them by the old road to Torbela, *i.e.* via the right bank of the river. Although rough, this road was in no way impassable ; the hills over which it ran and bordering it were comparatively low, and sufficiently practicable to allow of guns taking up positions off the road, and even at some distance on either side of it. The guns would thus be able to co-operate effectually, and to cover the general retirement. The lesson here brought out was the necessity for combination and co-operation of Cavalry and Artillery at all times, and for reconnaissance of ground.

5. A second conference was held at about 13 hours at Torbela, on a hill above the village where Colonel Y's plan for the defence of the Torbela defile, and especially the defence and attack of the last position covering egress from the defile itself into the Indus valley, was discussed ; the possibilities of co-operation between detachments, both of the Western and Eastern Army, operating on the right bank, but separated by the river, were also gone into.

The facilities for defence offered by a succession of steep and difficult spurs descending from a mountain range to such an obstacle as a broad and unfordable river were obvious, so long as operations were confined to one bank only ; but, on the other hand, the attackers could gain great advantage by advancing along both banks and employing Artillery and


To illustrate
PASSAGE OF

TORBELA DEFILE

from Topi

Scale - $\frac{3}{4}$ of an Inch = 1 Mile.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Miles.



long-range rifle fire from one bank to sweep the watershed lines of the spurs on the other bank. (Compare a land force advancing along a coast road between a mountain range and the sea in face of opposition on land, whilst warships are co-operating by gun fire from the sea, *e.g.* the battle of Nanshan.)

Referring to the actual ground, it was shown that the possession of the egress of the Torbela defile was essential to the Eastern force, in order to assist the advance of the Derband Division down the right bank of the Indus, opposed as it was in the very difficult ground above Khabal. The position blocking the egress from the Torbela defile was therefore held to be the decisive point with regard to the operations in the Indus valley at this place.

The best plan of securing this position to the Eastern force was then considered. The greater practicability of the ground on the right (northern) bank of the Siran river obviously indicated this as the flank on which to manœuvre, whilst facilities for signalling ensured the co-operation by Artillery of the Derband force in support of such a movement. Once the attack had gained the low open ground lying between the Indus and the hills on its left bank north of Torbela village, it seemed that the position of the defenders covering egress from the Torbela defile would become untenable ; by bringing Artillery into action on this low open ground at medium Artillery range, the successive positions occupied by the Western troops on the right bank of the Indus, above Khabal, could in turn be enfiladed.

To sum up, the best method of forcing an advance through such a defile as that presented by the Indus valley near Torbela appeared to be fire co-operation between two forces, one on either bank, directed to enfilade from one bank positions held by the enemy on the other, and so to cover and support the advance of men on foot to the attack of otherwise very difficult positions. Each such force became a detachment in so far as reinforcement in men from the other was impossible, and each such force must therefore

be capable of holding its own on its own bank against counter-attack.

Narrative, 20th instant, Tuesday.

Assisted by the movement of the Derband Force towards Torbela the 5th Cavalry Brigade succeeded in forcing the Torbela defile by about 15 hours to-day. The enemy's cavalry detachment withdrew towards its bridge at Dal, rear-guard holding a position near Tirpali.

Situation at 19 hours, 20th instant.

(a) The 5th (Abbottabad) Cavalry Brigade bivouacked in open ground south of Torbela in touch with enemy holding northern exit of the Dal-Tirpali defile. The Derband Division has reached Khabal. Head of the main Army from Haripur is commencing to reach Torbela.

(b) 1st Cavalry Division, after being engaged with the enemy during the day, bivouacked near Yasin with a view to crossing the Indus the next morning. Outposts in touch with the enemy's Infantry in the direction of Hamid. Our 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions on line Hazro-Lawrencepur.

(c) The enemy's mounted troops concentrating at Attock with a view to acting on the north bank of the Kabul river.

THIRD DAY'S WORK.

**Crossing of the Cavalry Division and of 5th Cavalry
Brigade over Indus : covering deployment on
right bank.**

1. The enemy, driven out of the Torbela defile yesterday, was able to occupy a strong position near Tirpali with almost impassable cliffs on the east side, protecting his right, and with the Indus river on his left. The Abbottabad Brigade was thus checked in its pursuit, and bivouacked near Torbela. Similarly on the right bank the Derband Division was unable to advance beyond Khabal.

At daybreak this morning, Wednesday, an observation post, situated in the heights above Srikote, reported to General Officer Commanding Eastern Army that the enemy was crossing by their pontoon bridge at Dal to the right bank of the Indus, and that only a small party now held the Tirpali-Dal defile.

Orders were issued at once to the General Officer Commanding 5th Cavalry Brigade to push on and to endeavour to seize the pontoon bridge at Dal before it

could be removed or destroyed, and in conjunction with the Cavalry regiment of the Derband Division to establish a footing on the right bank near Pihoor, at the mouth of the Indus defile. (See Sketch 26.)

From the observation post it would presumably also be apparent that the enemy's detachment is unsupported. Threatened from three different directions, viz. by the Abbottabad Cavalry Brigade, by the force from Derband, and by the Cavalry Division crossing near Minara, it is unlikely that this small body of hostile Cavalry will make any prolonged attempt to hold the crossing. The longer they stay the better the chance of the 1st Cavalry Division being able to cut them off. One regiment of the 5th Brigade is therefore ordered to rush the Dal-Tarpali defile, being supported by the remainder of the Brigade in rear and by long-range fire from the force on the right bank of the Indus. It was assumed that the regiment was successful, and succeeded in occupying some low hills on the left bank south of and covering the bridge, and that the latter was only partially destroyed (see Sketch 26). So soon as he reaches a position whence he can see the situation the Brigadier issues the following orders :

**No. 5.—Operation Orders by Colonel T, Commanding
5th Brigade.**

DAL,
21st March, 1906.

(1) The enemy's Cavalry (strength about 2,000) has retired to the right bank of Indus, partially destroying pontoon bridge at Dal-Pihoor.

A detachment covering its retreat on the right bank has been cut off and captured.

The 13th Cavalry is holding the ridges on left bank $\frac{1}{2}$ mile on each side of the bridge.

(2) The 5th Brigade will prevent the further destruction of the bridge, and will establish a footing on the right bank.

(3) X Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, will at once come into action near upper ferry, first, to clear enemy off positions

in vicinity of bridge, and, secondly, to support advance of covering party across river.

(4) 14th Cavalry will extend the line to the south-west crowning heights on left bank: they will make every effort to cross river and seize Pihoor.

(5) 15th Cavalry will be in support near Dal and will make immediate preparations to cross river near that place.

E, *Captain.*

Brigade-Major, 5th Cavalry Brigade.

Issued personally to Officers Commanding units at 9 hours.

N.B.—Attack would be pushed home and supported opposite Dal: that by the 14th Cavalry is a strong feint.

2. Simultaneously with the crossing of the 5th Cavalry Brigade at Dal-Pihoor the 1st Cavalry Division was ordered to cross the Indus about 12 miles lower down. (See Sketch 27.)

General X was placed in command of the Division with the following instructions:

“You are General Officer Commanding the 1st Cavalry Division bivouacked about Yasin, with instructions to cross the Indus with the Division on the 21st, above the line joining Azgar (south bank) and Gar (north bank) and below Ghazi. Spies state at 20 hours on 20th March that the enemy's mounted patrols reached the north bank of the river on the afternoon of the 20th and they report that about one regiment of Cavalry reached Kunda at 17 hours on the 20th.”

No. 6.—Operation Orders by Brigadier-General X, Commanding 1st Cavalry Division.

BIVOUAC YASIN,
20th March, 1906.


(1) (a) The enemy retired to-day in the direction of Attock. Spies report that hostile patrols reached the north bank of the Indus this afternoon, and that one regiment of hostile Cavalry arrived at Khunda at 17 hours to-day.

(b) Our 5th Cavalry Brigade is near Torbela in touch with the enemy holding the northern exit of the defile Dal-Tirpali.

SKETCH OF FERRY AND PONTOON BRIDGE NEAR DAL.

Scale, roughly - 1 inch = 1 Mile.

Heights impassable to Cavalry



London: Hugh Rees, Ltd.

Our 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions are on the line Hazro-Lawrencepur.

(2) The 1st Cavalry Division will cross the Indus to-morrow morning.

The 3rd Brigade will act as a covering force, and effect a crossing near Mirpur, which point it should reach by 5 hours.

The 2nd Brigade will effect a crossing simultaneously at Qasipur.

The 1st and 4th Brigades will follow the 3rd and 2nd respectively.

(3) The Imperial Service squadrons of the 3rd and 2nd Brigades under Major X will act as a flank and rearguard, and will send out detachments in the direction of Hamid-Mal at 5 hours.

(4) A feint at crossing will be made by the Imperial Service squadrons of the 1st and 4th Brigades under Major Y at a point south of Dharæ at daybreak.

(5) The outposts furnished by the 4th Brigade will rejoin their Brigade on relief by the flank guard.

(6) Each Brigade will leave all pioneers and 10 men per regiment on the left bank of the river to make rafts and assist the transport to cross at Mirpur.

(7) The transport (2nd line) will march at 6 hours in order of brigades and park south of Mirpur.

*A, Major,
A.A.G., Cavalry Division.*

Dictated to Brigade Majors at 20 hours.

Notes by Director on River-crossings.

The majority of the officers reporting on the river in connection with these problems were inclined to make too much of the difficulties of crossing. Every Cavalry regiment ought to be able, by means of some extemporised raft for kit and arms and by swimming horses, to cross a patrol or two over a river such as the Indus is at this season. The local villagers and cattle cross and re-cross. It is not too much to say that

horses could swim the river, at present state of flood, anywhere between Torbela and the Attock gorge. Compare the crossing of the Danube in flood by Skobeloff's Cavalry in Russo-Turkish war of 1877. Orders in a case like this should be very clear and precise, so as to ensure the crossing being made or attempted.

3. Colonel Z was assumed to be in command of the covering Brigade, and issued the following orders (in reality independently of the Divisional Orders above):

**No. 7.—Operation Orders by Colonel Z, Commanding
3rd Cavalry Brigade.**

TUNGA,

21st March, 1906.

(1) Hostile mounted patrols have been seen on right bank of Indus, but spies state enemy's force does not exceed one Cavalry regiment (6 squadrons), whose headquarters are at Khunda.

(2) I intend to cross Brigade over Indus as soon as possible and cover the crossing of the remainder of the 1st Cavalry Division.

(3) 7th Regiment will forthwith cross dismounted on rafts, and entrench on the further bank. The O. C. will detail a suitable detachment to remain with the horses.

8th Regiment will next cross in rafts, swimming their horses, and then, mounted, cover the crossing, pushing patrols to Khunda and Zeyda and hills in vicinity.

9th Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery, and Imperial Service Squadrons will then cross, followed by the horses and detachment of 7th Regiment.

The crossing on our side will be covered by one squadron 9th Regiment, dismounted, with a section Royal Horse Artillery on island 200 yards below crossing, to which point they will be passed over on rafts, and by 3 squadrons 9th Regiment and remainder of battery at wood 600 yards below crossing place.

- (4) All horses will be watered before crossing.
- (5) Reports to the crossing known locally as Tunga.

Z, Colonel.

Dictated to Officers from each unit at 6 hours.

On completion of the crossing the 3rd Brigade was disposed as follows, though it was afterwards agreed that probably one regiment in advance would have been quite sufficient under the circumstances :

Dispositions of 3rd Cavalry Brigade to cover crossing of River Indus by the 1st Cavalry Division.

The 7th Cavalry will take up the line Hund-Zeyda with patrols pushed on beyond Khunda.

The 8th Lancers will carry the line on from Zeyda (exclusive) to Marghaz-Yara Khel, with patrols towards Sawabi-Raja and up to the right bank of the Indus to try and get touch with the 5th Cavalry Brigade, which is coming towards us. The 9th Hussars and battery will be at Dudher in support.

Regiments to entrench their positions and arrange their own supports. Signalling communication to be established to Dudher, where all reports should be sent to the General Officer Commanding.

*C, Major,
Brigade Major.*

The Division halted for the night, 21st-22nd, near Minara.

**No. 8.—Operation Orders by Colonel Y, Commanding
1st Cavalry Division.**

MINARA,
21st March, 1906.

1. The 1st Cavalry Division has secured the passage of the river at Minara, and our patrols are in touch with the enemy at Hund-Khunda-Shahmansur-Panjpir. Advanced troops of the Derband Division have reached Topi.

2. The Division will halt for the night near Minara: the 1st Brigade will bivouac between Minara village and the river, the 2nd Brigade west of the 1st Brigade, and the 3rd Brigade on the "bela" in the river west of the 2nd Brigade: the 5th (Abbottabad) Cavalry Brigade will join the Division this evening and will bivouac east of the 1st Brigade. Our 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions are at Yasin to-night.

It is the intention of the General Officer Commanding to continue the operations against the enemy at daybreak.

3. The 4th Brigade are providing the outposts under orders issued direct.

4. In case of alarm each brigade will cover its own front on the high ground north of the Divisional Camp.

5. Officers Commanding Brigades will replenish ammunition and fill up supplies on arrival of convoy from Yasin.

6. Headquarters to-night will be in the 2nd Brigade camp.

S, Major,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

Dictated to Brigade Majors at 17 hours.

Narrative—Wednesday, 21st instant.


The 5th (Abbottabad) Cavalry Brigade succeeded this morning in forcing a passage across the Indus between Dal and Pihoor, whilst the 1st Cavalry Division simultaneously crossed, unopposed in any force, some 15 miles lower down the river to a point near Minara, each force thus assisting the passage of the other. The Derband Division continued its march down the right bank of the Indus and occupied Topi. The main Pindi Force commenced crossing to right bank by pontoon bridges established at Khabal and Dal. The enemy's Northern Cavalry detachment withdrew from Pihoor in the direction of Maneri.

Situation at 5 hours on Thursday, 22nd instant.

The 1st Cavalry Division, which was joined by the 5th (Abbottabad) Brigade on the evening of the 21st, bivouacked at Minara last evening. A pontoon brigade was constructed during the night to Minara, and one Infantry Brigade of the 2nd

SKETCH 27.

The best Conical



Infantry Division crossed the Indus and now occupies a position covering the bridge-head. The remainder of the 2nd Infantry Division is engaged in crossing over the bridge. The Derband Infantry Division holds the line Topi-Bataguri to cover the deployment of the main body of the Army from Haripur. The Cavalry Division has sent out a contact squadron to the high ground east of Lahor, which reports country as far west as Tordher clear of the enemy. Enemy's outposts hold the line of hills Shahmansur-Panjpir-Raja. A patrol reports that a large force of mounted troops (estimated at about two Divisions of Cavalry) are concentrated about Maneri.

FOURTH DAY'S WORK.

The Cavalry Fight.

1. The situation to-day being as it is, a fight between the two masses of Cavalry is almost unavoidable. On both sides the respective Commanders-in-Chief are desperately in need of information. Individual scouts will not be sufficient, and reconnaissance in force becomes essential. Detachments risk defeat in detail: on both sides, therefore, the Cavalry concentrate to fight.

General X was placed in command of the division this day. (See Sketch 28.)

Appreciation of situation at 5 hours on 22nd instant by General Officer Commanding 1st Cavalry Division.

(1) The 1st Cavalry Division bivouacked, at Minara, was joined there on evening of 21st March by 5th (Abbottabad) Brigade, and now numbers about 7,000 sabres, with 30 guns. During the night one Infantry Brigade crossed the Indus at Minara by pontoon bridge, and is covering the bridge-head, while remainder of 2nd Infantry Division is still crossing.

The Derband Infantry Division holds the line Topi-Bataguri covering deployment of main Army from Haripur.

(2) The enemy's Cavalry detachments retired yesterday from Pihoor towards Maneri, a large force of enemy's Cavalry (about 2 divisions or, approximately, 6,900 sabres and 24 guns) is reported to be concentrated about Maneri.

Towards Attock the country is clear of enemy as far west as Tordher.

The enemy's outposts hold the line of hills Shahmansur-Panjpir-Raja.

(3) My object is to find out, defeat, destroy, or drive back the enemy's Cavalry so as to clear the way for and screen the advance of our main Army, and to ascertain the movements and strength of enemy's forces.

(4) The enemy's communications and line of retreat run almost due west to Mardan, to which place there are two roads from Maneri. His left flank rests on the hills. Round his right flank from Khunda to Garhi Ismailzai the country is open, and for the most part suitable for Cavalry action.

(5) The position of the 1st Cavalry Division bivouac is favourable for turning the enemy's right flank unobserved by reaching the cover of the high ground by Khunda and Lahor before daybreak, from which a further advance under cover may be made to south of high ground at point 1208, from whence the enemy's communications are directly threatened.

(6) Contact squadrons should be sent towards Tordher and Yar Husain and a covering force (1 regiment Cavalry, 4 squadrons I. S. Cavalry) posted about line Jalsae-Salla to protect left flank and rear of division from direction of Attock, until further advance of our Infantry renders this unnecessary.

X, Brigadier-General.

[*Notes by Director.*—(1) A good appreciation. (2) I do not agree with marching before daylight in this case. (3) As regards protection from direction of Attock, I would rely on an entrenched post on Anbar or Lahor hill, with an active system of patrols and good communication. By this means every available man is brought to the decisive point to fight the decisive action. Should in the course of the day the enemy come on from Jehangira, detach to Lahor hill. But before doing so you may have beaten the enemy's *main* Cavalry force, which is of vast importance.]

**No. 9.—Operation Orders by Brigadier-General X,
Commanding 1st Cavalry Division**

MINARA,

21st March, 1906 (20 hours).

(1) The enemy's Cavalry detachment has withdrawn towards Maneri. Our Derband Division occupies Topi and our main body is now crossing the Indus at Dal and Khabal. Our 2nd Infantry Division is ready to cross to-night to this place by the pontoon bridge which had been constructed.

(2) The Cavalry Division and the 5th Cavalry Brigade are to be ready to march to-morrow at 5 hours. All 2nd Line Transport to remain here.

S, Major,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Cavalry Division.

Dictated to Brigade Majors at 20 hours.

**No. 10.—Operation Orders by Brigadier-General X,
Commanding 1st Cavalry Division.**

MINARA,

22nd March, 1906 (5 hours).

(1) The enemy's outposts hold the line Shahmansur-Panjpir-Raja and a patrol reports a concentration of about two Divisions of Cavalry at Maneri.

Our contact squadron (4th Brigade) reports the country as far west as Tordher clear of the enemy. One brigade of our 2nd Infantry Division now covers Minara bridge-head, and the Derband Division holds the line Topi-Bataguri.

(2) It is my intention to seize at daybreak the high ground about Lahor and Khunda unobserved. Thence to push on towards the ridge marked 1208—1142 and to attack the hostile Cavalry.

(3) The General Officer Commanding, 4th Brigade, will send a second contact squadron towards point 1,142 and Yar Husain. He will also detail one regiment, assisted by the

Imperial Service squadrons of the 2nd and 3rd Brigade, (the whole under Colonel X) to take up a position on the line Jalsae-Salla, so as to cover our left flank and rear until the further advance of our Infantry.

(4) The 1st Brigade will cover the advance to Khunda.

Order of march : — 1st Brigade, 2nd Brigade (less 2 squadrons I.S. Troops), 3rd Brigade (less 2 squadrons I.S. Troops), 4th Brigade (less 2 squadrons and 1 regiment), 5th Brigade.

(5) The General Officer Commanding will march at the head of the 1st Brigade.

(6) The troops now on outpost duty to withdraw at day-break and rejoin the division at Khunda on being relieved by Divisional Cavalry.

S, Major,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Cavalry Division.

Diciated to Brigade Majors at 5.15 hours.

Copy sent to General Officer Commanding Infantry Brigade holding bridge-head and also to Officers Commanding Outposts by orderly.

2. A conference was held near Shahmansur at 14 hours to consider the Cavalry action, after all officers had ridden over the ground where it was considered the fight would probably take place.

The advance of the Eastern Cavalry was followed out in detail. It was pointed out that the first objective, or pivot of manœuvre, to be secured was the Anbar hill. This once secured would allow of the division being collected in a formation of readiness pending further reconnaissance. To carry out the latter, the General Officer Commanding Division would himself go on ahead of the division with a small advance guard, no unnecessary patrols, etc., would be detached, it being essential to concentrate every man for the decisive stroke. All impedimenta would remain under cover of Khunda hill, which would be entrenched and held by about a squadron. The formation to be adopted in the further advance, when contact with the enemy became imminent, should be adapted to the ground, concealment and readiness

to act with the least possible delay to front or flanks being the essential conditions to be attained.

From the northern foot of Anbar hill the ground rises at a gentle slope to a well-defined ridge (marked on map 1208). Seen from a distance this slope appeared uniform, and only by traversing the ground itself was it to be realised that the minor features afforded excellent cover for large bodies of mounted troops. These minor features took the form of spurs and small valleys descending from the main ridge to south, south-east, and east, the undulations being everywhere gentle, and the *nalas* broad and open.

A well-defined spur descended from the main ridge (1208) directly towards Khunda hill, and the Director pointed out how this could be made use of. The formation suggested was that shown in Sketch No. 5. The advantages of such a formation were pointed out as well as several similar formations on the same principle.

Continuing the advance, the importance of securing successive "pivots of manœuvre" was insisted on, and the use to be made of them. The final pivot would probably be on the main ridge itself as here, or near here—further concealment becoming almost impossible to either force—the decisive action must take place. The occupation of this pivot of manœuvre was discussed; one or two squadrons would probably be dismounted and be hastily entrenched, one of these squadrons acting also as escort to the Royal Horse Artillery.

The "manœuvre" phase of the Cavalry fight had now been entered on. The importance of guarding against a premature opening of fire by the Royal Horse Artillery was pointed out, the objective to be striven for in this respect being—


- (a) To draw the enemy into such a premature opening of fire; then to manœuvre so as to cause his Cavalry to mask it.
- (b) To employ "surprise" fire tactics at the psychological moment. To do so, the Royal Horse Artillery Commander must remain to the last with the General Officer Commanding Division, and yet be in

constant communication with his batteries. At the crucial moment, just prior to the delivery of the Cavalry stroke, these should co-operate by moving out at a rapid pace to such a position as to take the enemy's Cavalry by oblique or enfilade fire when the latter advanced to meet the attack. Only a very fleeting opportunity would be offered them; but if properly made use of, the element of surprise plus the favourable position to a flank would exert a very considerable influence on the result of the Cavalry fight. This is true co-operation between Cavalry and guns. Only by *rapid* action on the part of the Royal Horse Artillery could the Cavalry be launched to the attack before the enemy could manœuvre to avoid being taken at a disadvantage.

The rôle of the Royal Horse Artillery in the event of (a) victory and (b) defeat was also discussed. The guns must remain in action until the result of the fight was declared, and then either join in the pursuit or, by remaining in action, cover the retirement of their own Cavalry and so form a pivot behind which the latter could be rallied. On such an occasion the auxiliary arm might even be called on to sacrifice itself.

Narrative.—*Thursday, 22nd instant.*

The 1st Cavalry Division engaged the main portion of the enemy's Cavalry to-day at about 15 hours on the high ground about 5 miles north of Lahor, and was successful. The pursuit was checked by a hostile force of all arms on the line Baragae-Khorighati. Reconnaissances pushed west and north-west after the action got touch with large masses of Infantry moving from Yar Husain and Turlandae, estimated at about two Army Corps. At nightfall the 1st Cavalry Division fell back and was relieved by the Protective Cavalry of the main Pindi force. The Cavalry Division bivouacked east of Panjpir hill.



Situation at 20 hours—Thursday, 22nd instant.

Eastern Army: (1) South of Indus (see Sketch 29) :

(a) Facing Attock—1 Brigade of 1st Infantry Division + Divisional Cavalry of 1st and 2nd Divisions.

(b) Holding Yasin-Minara bridge (both banks)—1 Brigade of 1st Infantry Division.

(c) At Hasan Abdal—5,000 reserve troops from Pindi and a supply depôt.

(2) Bivouacked on line—spur north of Raja-Panjpir hills—Shahmansur :

1 Brigade 1st Infantry Division (remainder 1st Division in (a) and (b) above).
2nd Infantry Division (less Cavalry).

The Derband Division.

The Abbottabad Division.

1 Native Infantry Brigade from Abbottabad.

The Corps Howitzer Brigade from Pindi.

1st Cavalry Division—east of Panjpir.

The 5th (Abbottabad) Cavalry Brigade—at Khunda.

(3) Holding Dal-Pihoor bridge—1 Native Infantry Brigade from Abbottabad.

(4) Still in Indus defile—3rd Pindi Division (over Indus on right bank),
4th Pindi Division (on left bank).

(5) Bivouacked about 10 miles north of Mardan—1 Division + 1 Brigade of the Malakand Force.

All troops are accompanied by brigade or other supply columns : total, 7 days' supply with troops. Wireless communication has been established between Headquarters Eastern Army at Panjpir and Headquarters Malakand Force. Outposts thrown out in front of line mentioned in (2) above are holding roughly from Maneri hill to Anbar hill, in touch with the enemy.

Western Army: (1) South of Indus—the enemy has retired over Attock bridge leaving a weak rearguard, holding the hills east of Attock. (2) North of Kabul river—Advance guards of troops which advanced from west and north-west have occupied a position along the watershed line from point 2 miles west of 1208 across the Topi-Mardan roads to hill 2 miles north-east of Ahad Khan, with outposts in front.

Reports from Eastern patrols indicate that hostile columns are moving up from Mardan and Nowshera. A contact squadron at Tordher reports the country clear of enemy for 2 miles west of this place, and a portion of the enemy's Attock force still engaged in crossing Kabul river near Jehangira.

FIFTH DAY'S WORK.

Cavalry Division temporarily filling a Gap in Line of Battle.

1. Taking the situation as described above, certain officers were asked to appreciate the situation. With reference to these appreciations it was pointed out that—

(1) The two Armies being now in contact, strategy must give way to tactics, and the immediate objective must be directed towards *tactical* success. In this case tactical success would at first consist in fighting a delaying action on the defensive in order to allow of the arrival of the 3rd and 4th Divisions from Topi. These latter having once arrived the further objective would be the decisive defeat of the enemy by means of the concentration of superior force at the decisive point.

But until they do arrive there can be no question of decisive defeat of the enemy, unless he commits blunders.


(2) The enemy's communications cannot be "cut" at Mardan by frontal attack (as suggested in one of the appreciations), since the enemy's force lies practically at right angles to his line of communications, and such an advance would, if successful, only force him back *on* his communications.

(3) Once tactical contact has taken place between the opposing Armies, an advance against the line of communications of the enemy (which lie through Martan, *i.e.* straight to his rear) can only be undertaken by a force already disposed on the flank of the enemy, *e.g.* by the force from Malakand; in any other it would be necessary to execute a flank march within striking distance of the enemy—an unsound military operation.

(4) To attempt the flank march after tactical contact has occurred, *beyond* striking distance of the enemy involves making a detachment and sending it beyond supporting distance; this means disintegration of force or running the risk of defeat in detail.

(5) The possibility of outflanking an enemy and so striking at his communications must depend strategically on being in superior strength on the scene of operations. The possibility of making a tactical flank attack depends chiefly on being in superior strength on the battle-field and on the ground itself. But in this case the Eastern Force is assumed to be numerically inferior to the Western on the battle-field.

SKETCH 29



ROUGH SKETCH TO ILLUSTRATE
GENERAL SITUATION ON THURSDAY
NIGHT, 22ND AND 23RD MARCH

Western Army.....
Eastern Army.....

Scale

MILES 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4

2. The special scheme for consideration this day was as follows :

A general action is in progress, our troops (as given in the situation at 20 hours, 22nd instant) held approximately the line (see Sketches 29 and 30) :

Spur north of Raja—Panjpir hill—Shahmansur hill : with the 5th Abbottabad Cavalry Brigade towards Khunda and 1st Cavalry Division in a position of readiness east of Panjpir.

The enemy (estimated strength, 60,000 men) is taking from the north-west, and has occupied Maneri hill and threatens our right in hills to east.

Two of our Infantry Divisions, occupying a front from the Topi-Maneri road by the Panjpir and Shah-Mansur hills to the Topi-Khunda road, are ordered to make a flank movement to about Anbar hill, and to carry out a counter-stroke from there against the enemy's right flank. (The country to west of Anbar is reported clear of the enemy.)

The 1st Cavalry Division is ordered to occupy the gap thus formed from Topi-Maneri road to Topi-Khunda road, pending the arrival of the 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions from direction of Topi.

Colonel Z. was placed in command of the Division and issued the following orders :

**No. 10.—Operation Orders by Colonel Z,
Commanding 1st Cavalry Division.**

PANJPIR,

23rd March, 1906 (7 hours).

(1) Our 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions holding from Raja to Shahmansur are moving to Anbar to make a counter-stroke.

(2) The 1st Cavalry Division will occupy the gap thus formed from Topi-Maneri road to Topi-Khunda road, pending arrival of 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions.

(3) The line will be occupied as follows :

1st Brigade from Raja (inclusive) to neck at eastern end of Panjpir (inclusive).

2nd Brigade (less Royal Horse Artillery) from neck east of Panjpir (exclusive) to Badrae Nullah (inclusive).

3rd Brigade from Badrae Nullah (exclusive) to Khunda-Topi road.

4th Brigade (plus Royal Horse Artillery of 2nd Brigade) in reserve south of Panjpir.

The Corps Howitzer Brigade and Infantry Divisional

Artillery will retain their present positions at Panjpir and Shahmansur.

(4) Reports to headquarters, 2nd Brigade, near Kala.

Z, Colonel.

Verbally to Brigade Commanders at 7 hours, 23rd March.

3. A secondary scheme involved the problem of how best to employ the Divisional Cavalry with reference to the situation on the night of 22nd-23rd March. Officers were unanimous as to the necessity of brigading the four regiments available, and it was considered that the concentration could be effected before the morning of the 23rd. Once concentrated most officers were of opinion that the brigade should be pushed forward in order to seize a suitable tactical point at daybreak whence to support reconnaissances of the enemy's position, partly mounted and partly dismounted, since patrols alone in such a situation can discover little more than the general front of the position. The enemy's left was considered to be the best flank to work against. The following is an example of the work submitted :

Action of Divisional Cavalry.

(1) I understand that there are at my disposal four regiments of Cavalry, viz. those of the 3rd and 4th Divisions and of the Derband and Abbottabad Divisions.

(2) These, less two squadrons, would be formed into one Cavalry Brigade, with the task of Protective Cavalry.

The supporting points of the outpost line would, I assume, be held by Infantry, and the two squadrons I have detached would carry out the mounted requirements of the outposts. Our outpost line runs from Maneri hill to Lahor hill.

(4) The enemy's advance guard hold the line from point 2 miles west of 1208 to hill north-east of Ahad Khan. Their outposts are probably along line 1208-Bargae-Nagram.

(5) The hostile Infantry, estimated at about 60,000 men, are converging on the Maneri, with the evident intention of

getting possession of the hills there and north of it, and so turning our right.

(6) Our Infantry are over 50,000 strong now, and 35,000 more are coming up in support from Pihoor.

(7) It will be the business of the Protective Cavalry Brigade to seize and hold such tactical points as are suitable, and to deny them to the enemy until our reinforcements arrive.

(8) I assume that we have only to deal with the enemy's Advance Guard Cavalry to-night. Also that the Abbottabad Cavalry Brigade at Khunda will co-operate, and be responsible for the high ground about 1208, Lal Beg.

(9) I consider that my duty will be best performed by moving my brigade north of ridge north of Salim Khan, and pushing out detachment to seize and hold the spurs to the north of Jehangir Darra, Moghdarra, Nagram ; the last would probably have to be forced. I should then be on the left flank of the enemy's line of advance, and be able at any rate to delay him.

(10) This position would also facilitate the reconnaissance by patrols of the enemy's position next day.

4. A conference was held at 14 hours on a knoll near Kala. Brigadiers and regimental commanders explained and pointed out on the ground the dispositions proposed. The Director first discussed the actual occupation of the position.

The course of the fight was then followed out, and the probable direction of the main attack indicated, leading up to the necessity which would arise for a considerable counter-stroke, by means of which only could tactical success in defence be hoped for.

The situation was such that this counter-stroke could only be delivered by withdrawing local reserves from the first line, and even depleting the supports, as the Eastern force was fighting a delaying action and awaiting the arrival from Pihoor of the remainder of the Army (two divisions), destined to form the general reserve.

Such an occasion might necessitate Cavalry being employed to relieve other troops in some section of the first line of the defence, but not absolutely committed to the fight, and therefore available to form a nucleus for a counter-stroke. These troops would have to be collected in rear of the defensive position, as close as possible to the point (probably a flank) from which the counter-stroke could best be delivered, moved to a flank and deployed for attack. All this means delay. The Cavalry taking the place of troops so withdrawn would therefore be employed partly dismounted and actually occupying the trenches of this Infantry firing line and part in hand as a local reserve to deliver local counter-stroke.

Such a depletion of the defensive line would probably be carried out from one or more sections of the defensive position centrally situated—a direct frontal attack being always less likely to form the enemy's main attack. It would probably be covered, and the weakened sections of the defensive line strengthened, by the building up of a line of guns in rear. Such a concentration of artillery would have the additional advantage of deceiving the enemy by the volume of fire directed from it.

In the case under consideration it was assumed that one complete Infantry Division (in local reserve) and all available troops of a second Infantry Division (in first line) would be withdrawn from the centre section of the defensive line and move to the extreme left to deliver a counter-stroke against the enemy's right. The Artillery in this section would have consisted of the divisional Artillery (four Brigades Royal Field Artillery) and perhaps a Howitzer Brigade. Of this at least two Brigades must accompany the troops for the counter-stroke, whilst two Brigades had already been disposed of on the left flank. The Artillery in this section must therefore be reinforced by—(a) Royal Field Artillery from other sections (two Brigades would be required), the Howitzer Brigade (if not already detailed to this section), the Royal Horse Artillery of the Cavalry Division (four batteries) and the Royal Horse Artillery Battery of the detached 5th

Cavalry Brigade. Two Cavalry Brigades would probably be detailed to act dismounted, leaving their horses under cover ; the batteries of these brigades going into action with the other Field Artillery, the two remaining Cavalry Brigades (with their Royal Horse Artillery) being held in hand as local reserves in rear of the firing line, ready to deliver local counter-strokes should a favourable opportunity present itself.

The probable Artillery positions in the central section of the defensive line were discussed. No time had been available to go over the ground carefully and to select the actual gun positions, but the general distribution considered likely was as follows :

Howitzer Brigade—In rear of low range of hills east of Shahmansur forming the general defensive line ; observation post, etc., in the hills. Guns covered from view and fire except from hostile howitzers by slope of hills. Two Royal Field Artillery and one Royal Horse Artillery Brigade Divisions—A suitable position seemed to be offered by a flat plateau lying between the Shahmansur and Panjpir hills. The height of this plateau above the plain in front was not sufficient to affect materially the lateral zone, which would be swept by bursting shrapnel ; an excellent view was obtainable, and the ground was suitable for entrenching. The guns would probably be dug in on the system often adopted by the Japanese in Manchuria, viz. guns so dug in as to allow of direct laying over ground in front, with deeper pits for detachments on either side in which the *personnel* could take refuge if under concentrated shell fire. The guns would be shielded in addition. The nullah running behind the plateau afforded a means of moving the guns into fire positions, and for the supply of ammunition ; it would also render the observation of ranging shell by the enemy more difficult. Ample space was available for the 48 guns. Looked at from the enemy's position, it appeared that if skilfully concealed the accurate location of these batteries would be difficult. One Royal Horse Artillery battery (5th Brigade)

would be disposed of according to local requirements. Total, 72 guns to about 2 miles of front.

Amongst other points touched on were—

The necessity to avoid taking up fire positions too soon. Disposal of led horses. Employment of maxims. Necessity for local reserves. Staff officers to watch the combat. Inter-communication. Selection of trench line. Counter-stroke. Duties of staff before, during, and after action. Pursuit. Action if Cavalry and Horse Artillery are called upon to cover retirement.

Narrative.—*Friday, 23rd instant.*

The Eastern Army occupied a position from Shahmansur viâ Panjpir with right on the ridges north of Raja. The enemy attacked and manœuvred to turn both flanks. In order to extend the line towards Khunda the 3rd and 4th Divisions, Eastern Army, were moved from Panjpir and Shahmansur hills to Anbar hill, whilst the 1st Cavalry Division was moved up to fill the gap thus caused. At about 15 hours the enemy's attack on the Eastern right was pressed vigorously, and they succeeded in carrying Raja, and pressed back the Eastern troops towards Topi. At this moment the 1st Cavalry Division was launched in attack towards Maneri, and succeeded in checking pursuing Western troops, and enabled the 3rd and 4th Divisions to withdraw from Anbar hill on the Minara bridge-head.

Situation at 20 hours on Friday, 23rd instant.

The operations described above are now supposed not to have taken place, and an alternative situation will be considered, viz. the same as that shown at 20 hours, 22nd instant (see page 309) with the following modifications:

3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions from Pindi have come up and are bivouacked south of Khunda. The 1st Cavalry Division (4 Brigades) is bivouacked on the left bank of the Badrae river, south of Khunda. No modification in the dispositions of the enemy.

“Special Idea” for Saturday, 24th instant.

A general action commences on the morning of the 24th, when the enemy advances to attack. The Eastern Force holds the position running from the spur

north of Raja through Panjpir and Shahmansur hills, with extreme left on Anbar hill. At 10 a.m. a counter-stroke executed by the 3rd and 4th Divisions is in progress from the line Khunda-Lahor in the direction of hill 1208. The 1st Cavalry Division at this hour is concentrated in a position of readiness south of Anbar hill with instructions to cover the left flank, and at 10 to 15 hours its General Officer Commanding receives the following helio message from a contact squadron out towards Tordher:—"Strong hostile column of all arms estimated at a Division (16,500 rifles, 48 guns) and about 2 squadrons of Cossacks approaching from direction of Jehangira. Am in touch with his patrols: his leading Infantry now 1 mile south-west of Tordher." (From Capt. A B, Commanding Contact Squadron—Tordher, 9.45 hours, 24/3/06.)

SIXTH DAY'S WORK.

Cavalry Division hinders the advance of a column of Infantry and Artillery advancing from Jehangira.

The problem as given in the "Special Idea" above is similar to that discussed on the fifth day of the Medak Study (see page 216).

Certain officers were asked to appreciate the situation from the point of view of the General Officer Commanding 1st Cavalry Division. All were agreed as to the necessity of immediate action in order to prevent the junction of the enemy's reinforcing column with his own main Army on the battle-field, or his interference in the development of our counter-stroke now in progress. The following were amongst the suggested plans of action :

- (a) To advance at once concealed to Jalsae, whence, pivoting on the massed guns, to charge the column and strike home before enemy can recover from his first panic, and to roll up the column before it can deploy.
- (b) To place the division between the force advancing from Jehangira and the right of the enemy's position by seizing a position between Tordher and hill 1208 in the neighbourhood of Jalsae, and to hold it with dismounted fire.
- (c) (i) To send off the remainder of the regiment which supplied the contact squadron towards Tordher to

support it and drive back the Cossacks. (ii) To advance with the whole Division towards Jalsae under cover (*i.e.* north-west of the ridges, to a position of readiness south-west of Jalsae, whence to break out and attack the enemy as far out as possible, mounted if possible, sending the brigade to which the detached regiment belongs to Mankai with 6 guns. Then to hold the ridges pivoting on the Lahor-Jalsae position.

On this last appreciation, which was judged to be the best of those submitted, the following orders were issued :

No. 11.—Operation Orders issued personally and verbally to General Officers Commanding Brigades by General Officer Commanding 1st Cavalry Division, at 10.15 hours, Anbar, 24/3/06.

(1) A strong hostile column of all arms estimated at a Division, 48 guns and 2 squadrons Hussars, is approaching from the direction of Jehangira. His leading Infantry is now about half a mile south-west of Tordher.

Our 3rd and 4th Divisions are now making a counter-stroke from the line Anbar-Lahor in the direction of hill 1208.


(2) I intend to prevent this column from joining in the action at all costs.

(3) The Division (less 1st Brigade) will move to a position of readiness just south of Jalsae, moving in column of Brigade masses in the following order—2nd, 3rd, 4th.

(4) The General Officer Commanding 1st Brigade will support the contact squadron now in front with the remainder of its regiment to drive off the enemy's Cavalry. The remaining 2 regiments of his Brigade (less 2 squadrons I. S. T.) and battery Royal Horse Artillery will proceed to Mankai.

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SKETCH 30.



(5) The guns of 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Brigades will be massed under the C. R. A.

(6) The 1st Brigade will detail 4 officers to make a rapid reconnaissance of the ground towards Tordher.

(7) The General Officer Commanding 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Brigades, and the C. R. A. will come with me now to Jalsae.

(8) Park all transport (except fighting portion of the 1st line) with an escort, 2 squadrons I. S. Troops, 1st Brigade, under a field officer, 1st Brigade.

S, *Major.*

A.A.G.

A conference was held near Jalsae at mid-day. The Director pointed out that the lesson which to-day's problem was intended to bring out was the overwhelming advantage of the mounted arm over a numerically stronger dismounted force, when the latter is unprotected by its proper proportion of mounted troops. But this advantage will not, as a rule, be gained either by charging home at once or by taking up a position and waiting to be attacked. Here on the one side we have the Cavalry Division (4 Brigades), say, 7,500 men and 24 guns, and on the other 16,500 rifles and 48 guns, and the odds would be too great for either course. The tactics best employed are those used by the Boers outside Ladysmith on the Monday prior to the investment. Mystify, mislead, and worry the enemy first, occupy a succession of false fronts compelling each time the enemy to deploy, and always in a different direction, outflanking, encircling, and appearing even in the rear. Then when the Infantry begin to weary and to show signs of distress, look out for your opportunity and charge.

An historical example of Cavalry acting successfully in a somewhat similar situation may be found in the Austrian official account of the battle of Custoza, from which the following extract is taken :

"The numbers employed, therefore, were the same on the

both sides; but the situation was unfavourable to the Italians, who had deployed too many of their troops, and who, although their flank was threatened, had on that side only one battalion (550 strong). Still, General Cerale held Monte Cricole, the Austrians having been repulsed from it, and was taking steps to make good his position. But there now occurred an incident which displayed the energy and devotion of the Austrian Cavalry, and is well worth quoting in full:

"The sudden intervention of some Austrian Cavalry luckily modified the situation. Six troops of Sicilian Uhlans, under Colonel de Berres, had been sent from Corte as a support to the Reserve Artillery of the 5th Corps. That officer, closely watching the progress of the fight on Monte Cricole, sent Captain Bechtoldsheim, with three troops of the 6th squadron, to take in flank the enemy's column marching on Fenile. The Uhlans at once advanced to the Tione, but while they were looking for a ford between Palazzo Alzarea and Fenile, the enemy seized the latter point.

"Bechtoldsheim, however, did not stop. He crossed the river, moved forward to the high-road, wheeled to the left, and passing the troops under General Benko, ascended Monte Cricole to reconnoitre the enemy's position. He saw on the road below the Forli Brigade in order of march. He descended like a hurricane at the head of his Uhlans, rode through the Pisa Brigade, and fell on the flank of the Forli Brigade. The Italians were completely routed. The Generals and their staff turned back. The two guns which were at the head did the same, and threw the Infantry into confusion. The Uhlans pursued; again cut through the demoralised column, and captured the two guns which had been overturned in the rush. Generals Cerale and Dho were badly wounded and escaped with difficulty. The first was struck by a bullet, and the latter received three lance-wounds. The guns had to be abandoned for want of teams to take them off.

"The Forli Brigade was broken up. A perfect panic seized the troops. Of the five battalions, one alone offered resistance, and was not dragged along in the rout; the others dispersed. Some of the fugitives stopped at Oliosi, but the remainder fled as far as Monzambano and Valeggio. The battalion which had remained intact established itself in the ditches to the right and left of the road, and when the Uhlans returned from the pursuit, they were received with a murderous fire, which caused severe losses in a few moments. General Benko was saved, but the brave Sicilian Uhlans paid dearly for their heroic action. The three troops were reduced to 17 men. They had lost in killed, wounded, and missing, 2 officers, 84 men, and 79 horses.

"In the charge, Captain Bechtoldsheim had his horse killed under him; but he mounted another belonging to an Infantry Major who had been mortally wounded by a lance, and was thus able to return with the remnant of his brave troopers.

"This glorious feat of arms, its success, and the signal service it rendered to the Austrian Army, speak for themselves, and are beyond criticism."

"The Cavalry," writes Von der Goltz in his 'Nation in Arms,' "will again play its rôle in deciding the day as in former days, when Seydlitz led the attack at Kolin, Rossbach, and Zorndorf. This claim of the Cavalry is, for the most part, justified by the recollection of certain situations in the late wars. The lines of sharpshooters were often seen to dissolve under the fire, to become thinner and thinner, and, in their endeavour to surround the enemy, to extend, disperse, and become ragged. Their energies became exhausted in advancing through thick corn or underwood, in climbing hills, in a breathless charge, following immediately a long march and the evolutions of compact masses across country. The ammunition almost gave out. Many officers fell; the command nearly ceased. Then arose in the hearts of many, who saw all this, the fearful question: how if now the enemy's Cavalry appear on the flank, and career over the battle-field? It would without more ado sweep away the wreck of the Infantry! When, in the evening of the battle of Vionville, the dusk descended, and scarcely anything more could be discerned of the Infantry on the wide battle-field, and the great masses of the Artillery of the centre, more than 100 guns strong, stood defenceless, a similar thought arose in our breasts. It appeared impossible to check a resolute Cavalry charge, that might have hurled itself upon these batteries. This view of the case was one of the reasons for despatching all our available Cavalry against the enemy."

Again, as an example of the effect of a long-continued strain on weary Infantry, we read that after the battle of Gettysburg, 2nd to 4th July, 1863, 24,000 loaded rifles were picked up on the battle-field. Of these only 6,000 were properly loaded; 12,000 had two charges; 6,000 had three to ten charges. Some had five to six bullets to one charge of powder, and in one rifle there were as many as twenty-two!

Notes on Supply.

On the 21st inst. the following scheme was set :

" Assuming an advanced supply depôt at Hasan Abdal, and a cart road thence to the bridge of boats at Minara viâ Burhan, Hazro, and Jalalia, state the arrangements proposed in this section of the line of communications for the supply of the Cavalry Division bivouacked at Minara. Animal transport only is available."

1. Now the amount and nature of supplies obtainable locally depend on the area under cultivation, on the attitude of the inhabitants, and on the season of the year. Supply arrangements must be thought out early, and may require constant modification in accordance with changes necessarily introduced into the original plan of action, with each varying phase of the operations. Every Commanding Officer, however, acting independently must know exactly what he wants, and when and where he will want it. In the area of operations now being considered, in the spring green fodder can be obtained locally in almost unlimited quantity : a moderate stock of live meat is available and, in any case, meat on hoof can easily be driven up in rear of the troops. Fresh vegetables and fuel in limited quantities could also be collected locally. All other supplies would have to be brought up from the rear : grain, flour, etc., would be at their minimum in the local villages at this season.

2. The weights of daily rations, as estimated by the supply and Transport Department (Simla) in 1904,* are as follows :

British *personnel* : something under 2 lb. per diem, exclusive of meat on hoof or tinned meat and vegetables.

Native *personnel* : 2½ lb. per diem, exclusive of vegetables.

It is contemplated to issue preserved (cooked) rations to British troops, when on active service, in the proportion of

* These statistical details constantly vary. The important point is thoroughly to understand the main principles of their application.

one day in seven. This ration weighs $3\frac{1}{2}$ lb., including packing and everything.

3. Taking the strengths given on page 21, the daily requirements in foodstuffs for one Cavalry Brigade to be pushed up from the Advanced Dépôt is as follows :

One Brigade.

Actual numbers.	Round numbers.	At lb. per diem.	Nature.	Total lb.
712	720	2	British rations	1,440
2,248	2,630	$2\frac{1}{2}$	Native (including followers)	6,570
1,933	2,180	10	Riding horses and ponies * (grain)	21,800
1,106	1,260	$5\frac{1}{2}$	Mules (grain)	6,930
			Total	36,740
			or, say, 460 maunds.	

This is equivalent to 36 mule-cart loads, or, say, 200 cart loads for the division (4 brigades), allowing a reasonable spare margin.

4. A "staging system" is recognised as the most economical for the organisation of the lines of communication, provided *safety* permits of it. When used stages should be so arranged as to be about 10 miles in length, so that transport from each post can move out 5 miles to meet the convoy from the next post, and return the same day to its own post. When changing convoy, animals would be unhooked from loaded vehicles, and the latter handed over as they stand in exchange for the empty carts.

The F. S. Manual S. and T. Corps gives tables showing requirements in transport on a line of communications for any number of stages calculated on a required input of 1,000 maunds daily.

From Hasan Abdal to Manara over the pontoon bridge, the distance is about 25 miles. The most suitable

* A large proportion of these would only receive 8 lb. grain per diem.

places in which to locate transport are shown in the table below :

Post on L. of C.	Carts required per Brigade for a daily input of 460 maunds.	Carts required for one Division for a daily input of 2,000 maunds.
Minara	—	—
Hazro (10 miles)	46*	200
Burhan (10 miles)	46	200
Hasan Abdal (8 miles)	46	200
Total	138	600

The above is an example of a rough calculation of an estimate of supply such as any commander of Cavalry should be able to work out for himself. It would be sufficiently accurate for practical purposes ; all detail would, of course, be the duty of the Departmental Staff.

* The 2nd Line Transport (wheel) of the Cavalry Division would in this case be made use of for some days at Minara, to work back to Minara at night, thus reducing requirements by 46 carts per brigade, or, say, 200 for the division.

In the foregoing Studies and the Staff Ride, are to be found many orders given, many duties imposed. And in bringing this work to a conclusion, I would give counsel to my brother officers as to the dealing with the orders, and the duties which may come to their notice, not only when reading Military History, whether real or, as in this book, imaginary, but also when themselves actually in the Field. A mere understanding of an order, or of the nature of a duty, will not suffice. The recipient of the order, and he who has to carry out the duty, should alike endeavour to ascertain the connection of the task with the larger operation of which they are merely single incidents ; and, conversely, what is the larger operation into which they enter. The literal execution of a command received is, of course, a first and primary consideration ; but this may be found not to be possible ; and in this case it is

the officer, and he only, who, understanding the main purpose of and the reason for the command, will be in a position to adopt, *as a substitute*, some line of action which will contribute indirectly, though perhaps to a less degree, towards the desired main purpose ; but contribute *it will*.

Lastly, it must also be fully recognised that no matter how keen or how highly educated in his profession an officer may be, he will not be able to get the best service from his troops in war unless he has also a knowledge of the human heart and understands the art of dealing with *men*.

APPENDIX I.

NOTES ON WORK DONE BY OFFICERS DURING THE RIDES.

1. *Reconnaissance Reports.*—Some excellent work was produced, but the following points should be borne in mind :

- (a) On receipt of orders, first get a thorough grip of what is wanted. Don't start till quite sure that you have done this. And conversely, when giving orders don't let any one else get started.
- (b) Make up your mind how this object is to be arrived at.
- (c) Finally, give the result shortly, clearly, concisely: attaching details for reference as required. State an honest opinion, and don't shirk the responsibility of giving it.

What the officer ordering a report or reconnaissance wants to get at is the *pith of the matter*, and neither he nor his staff have the time to wade through pages of closely written matter when in the field. Accordingly—

Show everything possible on the sketch, remembering "clearness, not artistic effect, is required."

Confine the report to the most prominent points.

Spell strictly according to the map in use. Reports and sketches must be readable at once in the saddle, or by a flickering candle light, therefore avoid fine pencilling, write absolutely distinctly and accentuate important tactical features. Keep a stock of red and blue pencils. When pinning reports together leave the pin margin clear.

2. *Appreciations of situation* were, in general, too voluminous and often involved. An appreciation of a situation is a critical examination of a military situation culminating in a *plan* of action. The mental steps are exactly the same as in paragraph 1.

Consider the aspects of the problem from both your own and the

enemy's point of view, not forgetting that the enemy has legs and will not remain stationary whilst you develop your plans.

Come to a conclusion, and settle how *you* are to act.

Write it down in telegraphic language, succinctly, by successive steps.

Too much dependence still appears to be placed upon *memoria technica*, text-book data, and lists of headings. Such aids are valuable as a preliminary training course for young officers; but once an officer takes the field, he should depend upon his own grasp of the situation and his imagination to supply all that is required.

Similarly, far too much reliance is placed upon *note-books* instead of trusting to the memory: the more the latter is trusted the stronger it becomes.

3. *Orders*.—Don't interfere with the initiative or duties of smaller unit commanders under you. See "Cavalry Tactics," page 6: "Leaders must train their subordinates to work intelligently and in accordance with *brief* and very general instructions." Avoid too much detail: say *what* you want *done*, not how to do it [compare the difference between Napoleonic and German methods—p. 265.] Practise giving and receiving verbal orders quickly. Night-march orders should usually be given confidentially.

4. *Outposts*.—"And in case of attack such and such a position will be held" is constantly forgotten. Too many troops are usually put on outpost duties (see "Cavalry Tactics" Note at foot of page 63), e.g. in Attock Staff Ride on the night 18th-19th March, a whole regiment was detailed for outpost duty in the 2nd Brigade, and the commander of this regiment put three whole squadrons out. When enemy's outposts are near, a detachment (say, one section, half troop or troop) should be pushed out to *keep touch* during the night.

5. *Camping Grounds or Bivouacs*:

The 4th (Gott's) Brigade was given the task of selecting and reporting on a bivouac for the Cavalry Division for the night of 18th-19th March. With reference to the work done in connection with this problem the following notes were made:

- (a) Insufficient attention has been devoted to military considerations in presence of enemy by several officers. There was no reason why the bivouacs should not have been in this case out of view and out of possible Artillery range of the enemy, to the east of Hasan Abdal. Bivouacs may sometimes *have* to be within Artillery range, but should never be within *view* also of enemy. Compare, for instance, the

British camp at Peiwar Kotal, 1878, which was first pitched within range of Afghan guns. These opened fire during the afternoon instead of waiting till night, and camp was shifted in daylight. Imagine the confusion, if the enemy had bided his time and had opened Artillery fire at night. ‡

- (b) Water arrangements are sketchy, and insufficient information is given for writing Divisional and Brigade Orders. Each brigade must have its own supply of drinking and animal water to avoid confusion, etc. The approaches to and from animal watering places should be clearly shown. Animals to return by a separate route. How many animals can water at one time? Quantity of drinking water available? If wells are used, depth and quantity available in wells?
- (c) The spaces allotted to brigades are insufficient. 600 yds. × 450 yds. may be taken as a minimum for one brigade with its 1st and 2nd Line Transport, Ammunition Column, Supply Column, etc.


APPENDIX II.

NOTES ON THE ORGANISATION OF A SINGLE STAFF RIDE.

1. A good "general idea" is necessary really only as a framework into which certain problems, based on situations neither strategically nor tactically improbable, can be made to fit. In order to obtain as much instruction as possible in the short time available, a great many phases of the operations have to be unnaturally hastened. If necessary, imaginary lapses of time can be assumed (*cf.* pp. 166 and 223); but on the whole it is best to make the operations continuous, so long as unreasonable or absurd situations are not thereby involved.

2. After deciding roughly on the "general idea," all, or as many as possible, of the directing staff should thoroughly reconnoitre the selected ground, after which the terms of the general idea can be finally decided on and an "operation table" drawn out (*cf.* p. 278). In all five rides it was found convenient to make the operations culminate in a general engagement. And this general engagement is best made the basis of the operation table—*i.e.* having selected

a good site for the battle, bearing in mind the general idea, next work out the marches of both main Armies, or in any case that of the enemy, *backwards* to some situation suitable for the first special idea—*e.g.* if the main Armies are required to meet at a certain point A on the 10th instant, then on the 9th they will be at B B', approximately two marches apart, on the 8th at C C' or approximately four marches apart, etc. :



Secondary situations involving the action of the respective advanced mounted forces, of detachments, etc., can then be fitted into the space between the two main Armies as found convenient. The operation table should be for the use of the directing staff only, and should therefore be kept secret ; on it are founded the special ideas, situations, etc., on which in turn the tasks are based. And if every one knows beforehand what course the operations are about to follow, all interest is likely to vanish.

3. With the operation table, when completed, as a guide it can next be determined where the staff ride itself can daily most conveniently camp. Camping grounds should then be selected and the civil authorities given plenty of warning as to supplies, etc. Unless, as in the Medak Staff Ride, a railway is made use of, camping grounds should rarely be more than 15 to 20 miles apart ; occasionally it was found to be convenient to stay more than one day in one camp.

4. The general idea, the first special idea, and a map should be issued to all officers at least fifteen days before the assembly ; and on these data as many officers as possible should be given a preliminary task—*e.g.* an appreciation, to work out beforehand. This ensures that officers arrive at the assembly with some previous study, both of the general idea and of the country in which the imaginary operations are about to take place.

Maps should not be on a larger scale than 4 miles to the inch. The special value of a staff ride lies in the study of ground, a point that is apt to be forgotten when large scale maps are available. Officers, moreover, should get accustomed to work with no better maps than are likely to be provided on service.

5. Excluding the Director himself, four officers were found to be

a convenient number for the Directing Staff of a ride, attended by about thirty others; too many staff officers are apt to get in each other's way. The duties were roughly divided as follows:

- (a) The Director, with personal assistant,—prepares the situations, issues divisional orders when necessary, and deals with the work and criticisms as a whole. Excepting in the last staff ride, the Director usually retained imaginary command of the Division. In the Attock Staff Ride Brigadiers took command in turn.
- (b) Two officers—select the tasks for Brigades or individuals, criticise and note on the work done, and prepare for submission to the Director. *N.B.*—The tasks should, as far as possible, all be decided on beforehand; once started, there is little time to think out good ones.
- (c) One officer—issues and collects tasks, supervises camp arrangements, issues routine orders in connection with staff-ride transport, supplies, etc., and manages the Directing Staff Mess; he should have a smart native officer and four orderlies to assist him.

As the Directing Staff are chiefly busy whilst other officers are at rest, and *vice versâ*, it is best for them to mess apart.

6. In addition to the special tasks assigned them, Brigadiers should assist the Directing Staff by arranging, supervising, and commenting on all work executed by officers in their Brigades, before submitting it for the Director's criticism. In certain cases it was found convenient to issue a task to a Brigade as a whole and to ask the Brigadier to allot tasks to individuals. All officers should be available, irrespective of their supposed appointments, for duties of all sorts.

7. Tasks for individuals should be as varied as possible. It is only possible to keep up the interest by varying the work and by making perfectly sure that all officers understand exactly what is supposed to be taking place. Copies of divisional orders, situations, etc., should therefore be issued to every one, and those in doubt should be encouraged to ask questions. At least one good clerk with a cyclostyle should be at the disposal of the Directing Staff to ensure sufficient copies being available. Some arrangement for the rapid reproduction of sketches and maps, though never actually practised in the staff rides, would certainly have been most useful.

8. Officers should put into writing all orders, instructions, memoranda, etc., required from them in their supposed situations,

including orders or instructions assumed to have been given verbally. And all writing should be in an Army Message Book (No. 153) or its equivalent.

9. All conferences dealing with tactical situations should as far as possible be held on the spot, and the actual features of the ground be referred to whilst discussing them. Strategical and general subjects can be dealt with in the evening in camp. For the latter a blackboard is useful; a sheet of white calico with a few coloured chalks is better still.

10. Finally, a very clear understanding should be arrived at beforehand with the Pay Examiner as to the payment of bills and contingent expenses. More time has, for instance, been wasted and trouble caused in the settlement of the accounts of one staff ride than in the compilation of the whole of this report.—*Experto crede*.

APPENDIX III.

A FEW SPECIMENS OF TASKS SET.

1. Select and report on a bivouac for your Brigade and show measures taken for security.

2. Report on the river from westwards
with a view to forcing a passage.

Battery commander ditto from an Artillery point of view. Not to approach within half mile of far bank: work to be divided into sections by mutual arrangement.

3. Calculate length, in column of route, of your Brigade: (a) fighting ranks; (b) first and second Line Transport.

4. Reconnaissance showing dispositions recommended for the passage of the defile by the leading Brigade.

5. Report on dispositions recommended for the defence of the defile until the arrival of our Infantry, with the following troops placed at your disposal: *Regulars*: 1 squadron. *Nizam's Irregulars*: 1 Mountain Battery, 1 Regiment Cavalry, 3 Battalions Infantry; the Royal Engineer Officer to work with the above and recommend types of works, with due regard to time and material available.

6. You are appointed Brigade Intelligence Officer. What would your duties be, and how would you proceed to organise a system?

7. Calculate amount and class of supplies required for (a) a Division; (b) a Brigade. Give a rough-and-ready method of estimating the amount of supplies that could be collected between _____ and _____ in twenty-four hours and be ready for issue at _____.

8. Select a position near _____ and dispose your Brigade to cover the Division crossing the river _____.

9. The situation being so and so, you are in command of the Advance Guard. State your action.

10. Four officers to enlarge the map (scale 1 inch to 4 miles) to one of 2 inches to the mile, and correct it with a view to assisting the Cavalry Commander in disposing his troops for the Cavalry fight. One Officer to supervise and to compile into one the sketches and reports. Sketch to be completed as rapidly as possible and handed to the Director on the ground.

11. What are the duties of a Staff Officer during and after a successful engagement?

12. On what points should prisoners and inhabitants be questioned?

13. Appreciate the situation from the Divisional Commander's point of view.

14. In the event of the river rising to a height of 6 feet, what arrangements can you make with local material for the crossing of the Division over the _____ river. Time required.

15. In the event of the Division moving off before the supplies collected at _____ can be issued, what arrangements can you make to convey them to _____ utilising local transport?

16. Report on positions suitable for occupation by lines of communication troops (when they come up) to secure the road from attack from the north _____ on the section of the road from _____ to _____ assuming that _____ troops are placed at your disposal, and report on the measure you would adopt for the establishment of staging posts at _____ and _____.

17. Show on a sketch, scale 1 inch to 1 mile, the arrangements you suggest for maintaining signalling communication between _____ and _____ on the assumption that the latter will become posts on the line of communications.

18. Report on a route from _____ to _____ and thence towards _____ with a view to a flank movement against the enemy's right.

19. Make a reconnaissance of position extending from _____ to _____ suitable for occupation by the Cavalry Division against an enemy advancing from the north.


20. How many carts would you require to place 60 maunds per diem at and seven intermediate stages, each stage requiring the same amount, employing Army transport carts?

21. With reference to Southern Force Order No. 100 (p. 167), paragraph 3 (a), reconnoitre the ground and make your dispositions as if commanding a section of the enemy's force on this line. Strength at your disposal: 1 Cavalry Brigade, 1 Infantry Division.

22. With reference to Southern Force Order No. 100, paragraph 3 (b), reconnoitre the ground towards the north with a view to co-operating in the Infantry attack to-morrow, with special reference to (1) approach, (2) preparation, (3) assault.

23. A reconnaissance of a route for the Cavalry Division from towards and , selecting positions of readiness for the above-named force with a view to co-operating in the attack on the 19th and 20th.

24. The Brigade is advancing to the attack from , the enemy is advancing from . Estimate the minimum time required for a Brigade to deploy into line from column of masses, and point out on the ground (a) the amount of ground which would be covered in such a deployment, and (b) where the actual collision would probably take place. How would you employ your guns?



Scale of Miles
5 10

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